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Abstract 
 
7KLVWKHVLVFRQVLGHUV5DOSK:DOGR(PHUVRQ·VFRPSRVLWLRQDOprocess RI¶GRXEOHZULWLQJ·
as a distinctly theorised and intellectually coherent practice that generated discrete bodies 
of text: his private journals and notebooks; and the public essays, lectures, and poems. 
Throughout Emerson scholarship, critics tend to quote the two bodies without 
differentiation, often either neglecting the issue of their coexistence or asserting the 
priority of one form over the other. I contend instead that principles of self-reading, 
DFFUHWLYHUHLQVFULSWLRQDQGDSHUSHWXDWHGUHODWLRQWRKLVRZQWH[WFRQGLWLRQ(PHUVRQ·V
ideas of poetic agency and the role of literature in broader socio-cultural contexts, to the 
extent that they become the preeminent factor in shaping his philosophical and literary 
aspirations. 
Focusing on the period 1836-50, from the beginning of the coexistence of public 
and private corpuses to the point at which he finalises his theory of textual relation, I 
WUDFHWKHZD\LQZKLFK(PHUVRQ·VRQJRLQJWH[WXDOLQYHVWPHQWILUVWHFKRHV³and later 
disrupts³aspirations to realise a philosophy of the subject steeped in the romantic 
tradition. The first part of the thesis examines the two textual bodies insofar as they 
reflect upon each other and on theories of composition, finding that Emerson gradually 
loses faith in the function of his public works up to 1842. In the second section of the 
thesis, I illustrate the continual revision his relation to text undergoes in the major works 
of the 1840s, as his compositional theory adapts to first conceptualise and then fulfil 
certain ethical obligations of the scholar and poet. I end by examining the poetic 
apotheosis figured by Poems (1847) and Representative Men (1850), which has little in 
FRPPRQZLWKKLV\RXWKIXODVSLUDWLRQVEXWZKLFKH[SODLQVWKH¶VDJH·-like mantle he 
accepted in American life and letters from the 1850s until his death in 1882. As well as 
UHYLVLQJFRQFHSWLRQVRI(PHUVRQ·VOLWHUDU\DJHQF\DQGWKHVWUXFture of his canon, this 
WKHVLVRIIHUVDQRULJLQDOUHDGLQJRIWKHWKHRU\RIDQDXWKRU·VVRFLR-cultural role in the mid 
nineteenth-FHQWXU\WKURXJKWKHH[DPSOHRIRQHRIWKHHUD·VPDMRUILJXUHV
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INTRODUCTION 
 
,QILQLW\LQ$VNHVLV,QWHQWLRQ,PSHUDWLYHDQG(PHUVRQ·V(QFRXQWHUVZLWK)RUP 
 
 
 Why need I volumes, if one word suffice? 
(PHUVRQ¶7KH'D\·V5DWLRQ· 
 
A written word is the choicest of relics. 
Thoreau, Walden 
 
 
:KHQ(GJDU$OOHQ3RHGLVWLQJXLVKHGLQ·V¶3KLORVRSK\RI&RPSRVLWLRQ·EHWZHHQ
his own careful literary constructLRQVDQGWKH¶VSHFLHVRIILQHIUHQ]\·E\ZKLFKWKH¶VR-
called poetry of the so-FDOOHG7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVWV·ZDVVXSSRVHGWRKDYHEHHQSURGXFHG
he identified a polarity which conditions a certain attitude in and toward American 
literature even to the present.1 While romantic models of inspired authorship by divine 
efflux have generaOO\EHHQJLYHQXSWKHUHLVDSHUVLVWHQWQRWLRQWKDW7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVP·V
distinction depends on the conditions of spontaneity and organicity traditionally 
common in romantic theories of composition.2 This has much to do with the perceived 
qualities of the archetypal Transcendentalist text³the private journal³a form in which 
Ralph Waldo Emerson developed his ideas, sketched his lectures, poems, and essays, 
and generally used as a reflective medium of spontaneous expression and self-analysis 
throughout his career, famously advocating that his acolytes and friends do the same.3 
As Thomas Meaney noted in a recent review article of new editions of writings by 
(PHUVRQDQG7KRUHDXWKHMRXUQDOVRIVXFKZULWHUVZHUHILOOHGZLWK¶YDWLFXWWHUDQFHVDQG
                                                 
1 Edgar Allen Poe, ¶7KH3KLORVRSK\RI&RPSRVLWLRQ·(1846) in The Complete Tales and Poems of Edgar Allan 
Poe, with Selections from his Critical Writings (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1992), pp. 978-87 (p. 979, 986). 
2 $UHFHQWH[DPSOHRIWKLVLV'DYLG+HUG·VEnthusiast!, in which Transcendentalist spontaneity is argued to 
be the catalyst for a kind of American writing which bears a germ of the vigour of its composition, 
indicative of the kind of divine immediacy implied by the title. See Herd, Enthusiast!: Essays on Modern 
American Literature (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 1-25. 
3 6HHIRULQVWDQFHWKHILUVWOLQHRI+HQU\'DYLG7KRUHDX·VHTXDOO\FHOHEUDWHGSULYDWHMRXUQDO¶´:KDWDUH
\RXGRLQJQRZ"µKH>(PHUVRQ@DVNHG´'R\RXNHHSDMRXUQDO"µ6R,PDNHP\ILUVWHQWU\WR-GD\·
Thoreau The Journal: 1837-1861, ed. by Damian Searls (New York: New York Review Books, 2009), p. 3. 
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sudden gasps of PHDQLQJ>WKDWZRXOGEHFRPH«@WKHUHFRJQLVDEOH$PHULFDQGLIIHUHQFH
LQOLWHUDWXUHZKLFKQHYHUOLNHVWREHOLWHUDU\· 4 
 The spontaneity and organicity observed in this method also constitute the basis 
of the other forms used by Emerson and the Transcendentalists. Through our access to 
extensive cross-referenced editions of journals and collected works we now know the 
precise extent to which Emerson, significantly more than Thoreau, reused his journals 
in the composition of works for public consumption. As such, his canon is a kind of 
¶GRXEOHZULWLQJ·DWH[WXDOERG\ZKLFKZKHQWDNHQDVDZKROHFRQWDLQVPDQ\LQVWDQFHV
of partial or full repetition, of the reinscription and accretion of passages or lines in 
different places and different contexts. It appears thus to have a dual aspect: particular 
instances are either spontaneous or derived, primary or secondary. But idiosyncrasies in 
WKHSURFHVVDUHZLGHO\LJQRUHGE\FULWLFV0HDQH\·VVLPSOHH[SODQDWLRQLVV\PSWRPDWLF
¶By ladling out wholesale passages of their notebooks into their books and essays, they 
ensured this immediacy was not lost in their finished work·5 Essentially, the distinction 
between spontaneity and derivation is fixed and mechanical. The apparent organicity of 
sections of the published works is actually the product of a cunning contrivance, and 
3RH·VPRFNHU\RIWKHLUGLVLQJHQXRXVQHVVZDVMXVWLILHG 
 Yet while this explanation does not want for clarity, it simplifies a problem that 
RXJKWWREHVHHQDVIXQGDPHQWDOLQ(PHUVRQ·VFRPSRVLWLRQDOSUactice. After all, the 
extensive use of a private journal seems to imply a complex and multifaceted relation to 
text on the part of its author prior to or distinct from the impression their work has on 
DZLGHUDXGLHQFH$QG(PHUVRQ·VMRXUQDODVLVZHOO-knRZQLVLQQRVHQVHDPHUH¶ERRN
RIGD\V·LQWKHZD\DFRQYHQWLRQDOGLDU\PLJKWEHEXWDFRPSOH[V\VWHPRIYROXPHV
kept in different conditions, sometimes for different purposes, yet nevertheless held 
together by sophisticated indexing systems developed b\WKHDXWKRU0HDQH\·VFRPPHQW
                                                 
4 7KRPDV0HDQH\¶3RLVRQHG$UURZV·TLS, 5614 (2010), 3-4 (p. 4). 
5 Meaney, p. 4. 
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VLPSO\GLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQ¶ILQLVKHG·DQGXQILQLVKHGZRUNDQGLPSOLHVWKDW(PHUVRQ·V
sole audience was that for which the journal was mere rehearsal. Clearly, this is 
reductive. So what was the nature of that complex and multifaceted relation of Emerson 
with his own text, and what does it tell us about literary agency in a broader sense? 
 The purpose of this thesis is to elaborate the system which I perceive to underlie 
(PHUVRQ·VGRXEOHZULWLQJSUDFWLFHDQGH[SORUHKRZDQG why the philosophical 
exigencies attending the apparently rather simple phenomena of self-reading and the 
UHYLVLRQRUUHLQVFULSWLRQRIRQH·VRZQSDVWZULWLQJDUHDFWXDOO\RIFUXFLDOVLJQLILFDQFH
first for Emerson himself, but by extension for the writer as a social or ethical 
IXQFWLRQDU\,QGHHG(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWLVDWDOOWLPHVFRQGLWLRQHGE\KLVXQLTXH
compositional practice, its possibilities fuelling his intellectual aspirations, and its 
boundaries defining their limits. Initially, in the early works of the 1830s, this poetic 
system informs his philosophy of the subject, but later his entire theory of the societal 
and cultural obligations of the scholar and the poet, and his own ability to fulfil them, is 
transformed by the demands of a relation to his own writing which never permits either 
his settled investment in text, or his ability to leave his past inscriptions behind. 
 Significantly, (PHUVRQ·VWKHRU\RIFRPSRVLWLRQ is one of the few aspects of his 
work which lacks for attention. The mutual study of the Journals and Miscellaneous 
Notebooks and Collected Works is a habit of all Emerson scholars, and more often than not 
no distinction is drawn between that which appears only in the journal, and that which 
is adapted or altered in the published work. The simple but critical fact that his canon 
consists of doubled text seldom enters consideration anywhere in Emerson studies. The 
one scholarly monograph which takes the journals for its primary text, Lawrence 
5RVHQZDOG·VEmerson and the Art of the Diary (1988), offers compelling arguments in 
IDYRXURIQHXWUDOLVLQJKLHUDUFKLHVEHWZHHQ¶XQILQLVKHG·DQG¶ILQLVKHG·YHUVLRQV
(something scholars have long done in principle by quoting indifferently from the two 
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bodies of text), yet does not extend to a detailed analysis of the relational play between 
forms which, even if not hierarchised, nevertheless occupy different positions of 
proximity to the author and describe variant conditions of authorial property.6 
 Furthermore, the object of my inquiry is to address a principle which has wider 
consequences in reconsidering authorship in romantic and post-romantic contexts. 
6LPSO\E\UHUHDGLQJDQGUHLQVFULELQJ(PHUVRQLV¶UHYLVLQJ·³a term which does not 
QHFHVVLWDWHDOWHUDWLRQVEXWVLPSO\WKH¶VHHLQJDJDLQ·WKDWDFFRPSDQLHVDUHWXUQWRRQH·V
past work. Indeed, even revision understood conventionally will include decisions to 
accept those aspects of a text which correlate with newly refined ideas of its function 
and coherence. The problem is that revision is given to be opposed to the basic notion 
of romanticism. A prominent recent book on the subject by Hannah Sullivan reaffirms 
this view through extensive generalisations, while two wide-ranging studies of 
romanticism and revision of the last twenty years also decline to offer much that might 
destabilise or reinterpret the concept.7 0\SURSRVLWLRQKHUHLVWKDW(PHUVRQ·VGLVFRYHU\
                                                 
6 $OWKRXJK5RVHQZDOGUDLVHVWKHRQJRLQJUHODWLRQWRWH[WLQ(PHUVRQ·VFDQRQREVHUYLQJWKDW¶the 
(PHUVRQLDQOLWHUDU\V\VWHPDVDZKROH·FDQDQGVKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGLQWHUPVRIKLVSHUSHWXDOO\UHYLVLWHG
relation to his texts, his main reasoning for rejecting a hierarchised distinction is more spurious. He 
declines to accept any differentiation in privacy between the published works and journals on the basis 
that an unknown number of friends and family had, oQRFFDVLRQSDUWLDODFFHVVWRWKHMRXUQDOV· contents. 
True as this is, it hardly detracts from the fact that Emerson rewrote extensively from their contents in the 
FRPSRVLWLRQRIZRUNWKDWKHSXEOLVKHGHVWDEOLVKLQJDFOHDUGLVWLQFWLRQLQWKHUHODWLYH¶SXEOLFQHVV·RIWKH
two forms. )XUWKHUPRUHWKHERRNVLPSO\GHFODUHVLWVGLVLQWHUHVWLQWKHSDUWLFXODUVRI(PHUVRQ·VVHOI-
reading and reinscription VLQFHLWLV¶QRWOLNHO\WR\LHOGPXFKOLJKW·+LVMXVWLILFDWLRQLVWKDWWRGRVR
assumes Emerson to be ¶WKHUHYLVHURIDGUDIWIRUSXEOLFDWLRQ%XWWKHMRXUQDOVDUHQRGUDIWWKH\DUHDWH[W
A primary fact about Emerson the writer is that he created two texts, two large formal structures, for the 
same words·This is a fact which I value in common with Rosenwald, but I find his logic for declining to 
see how the two corpuses interact in specific instances bizarre and inexplicable. Rosenwald, Emerson and 
the Art of the Diary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 8-10, 62-8, and passim. 
7 +DQQDK6XOOLYDQ·VUHFHQWWork of Revision situates its central claim³that revision becomes a fundamental 
part of literary composition with the modernists³against the generalisation that precursors, especially 
romantic precursors, had little to do with it. She does, however, acknowledge that her own distinction is 
constructed, since ¶>P@DQ\RIWKHURPDQWLFVGLGPRUHUHZRUNLQJWKDQWKH\RUWKHLUSXEOLVKHUVOLNHGWR
pretend·,ZLVKKHUHWRDXJPHQWWKLVVXPPDU\E\H[SDQGLQJRQZK\DGHVLUHH[LVWHGWR¶SUHWHQG·WKDW
romantic composition should be otherwise. Sullivan, The Work of Revision (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2013), pp. 3, 9, and 25-32. In terms of romantic revision, bRWK=DFKDU\/HDGHU·VRevision 
and Romantic Authorship DQG-DFN6WLOOLQJHU·VColeridge and Textual Instability dedicate extensive attention to its 
problematic effect on establishing authoritative, scholarly editions of major works. Both consider some 
manner in which revision reflects aspects RIWKHDXWKRU·VEURDGHUSRHWLFSURMHFWfor instance, Leader 
notes that Wordsworth revises to affirm his conviction in consistent personal self-identity, whereas Byron 
revises for precisely the opposite reason, to prove to himself that life is as temporally inchoate as he 
suspects. SWLOOLQJHUUHDVRQDEO\GHPRQVWUDWHVWKDW¶UHYLVLRQ·H[LVWVLQHYHU\UHODWLRQVKLSHVWDEOLVKHGZLWKWKH
10 
 
was that revision could be conceptualised both to aid and to disrupt the realisation of 
certain romantic ideals. My eventual finding will be that the demands of textual 
investment, which involves risk and loss insofar as one must submit to the formal 
exigencies of written language, necessitate that those philosophical ideals be revised, but 
the process of realisation undergone by Emerson is complex and convoluted. 
 
5HYLVLRQDQG(PHUVRQ·V5HSXWDWLRQ 
Should doubts remain that this double writing practice is due further analysis, it is worth 
UHFDOOLQJWKHIDFWWKDWLWLQIOHFWV(PHUVRQ·VPRVWIDPRXV¶YDWLFXWWHUDQFH·LQDYHU\
significant way. Below LVWKHVRXUFHIRUWKH¶WUDQVSDUHQWH\H-EDOO·SDVVDJHLQNature, 
along with the published version. The italicisations are mine, and highlight the major 
changes: 
 
As I walked in the woods I felt what I 
often feel that nothing can befall me in 
life, no calamity, no disgrace, (leaving me 
my eyes) to which Nature will not offer a 
sweet consolation. Standing on the bare 
ground with my head bathed by the blithe 
air, & uplifted into the infinite space, I 
become happy in my Universal relations. The 
name of the nearest friend sounds then 
In the woods, we return to reason and 
faith. There I feel that nothing can befall 
me in life,³no disgrace, no calamity, 
(leaving me my eyes,) which nature cannot 
repair. Standing on the bare ground,³my 
head bathed in the blithe air, and uplifted 
into infinite space,³all mean egotism vanishes. 
I become a transparent eye-ball. I am nothing. I 
see all. The currents of the Universal Being 
                                                                                                                                          
text, including, of course, those quite distinct from the author, thus devaluing any idea of authoritative 
HGLWLRQV+HXVHVWKLVILQGLQJWRVXEVWDQWLDWHDUDWKHUFRQYROXWHGWKHRU\RI¶YHUVLRQV·RIJLYHQZRUNVLQ
which Coleridge is simply the case study, and as such relatively contingent. However, neither book argues 
that the process of revision itself is fundamental to how an author conceives of their poetic practice, as I 
see it to be the case with Emerson. See Leader, Revision and Romantic Authorship (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996); Stillinger, Coleridge and Textual Instability: The Multiple Versions of the Major Poems 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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foreign & accidental. I am the heir of 
uncontained beauty & power. And if then I 
walk with a companion, he should speak from his 
Reason to my Reason; that is both from God. To 
be brothers, to be acquaintances, master 
or servant, is then a trifle too insignificant 
for remembrance. (JMN V, 18-9. The 
entry is dated March 19th 1835) 
circulate through me; I am part or particle of God. 
The name of the nearest friend sounds 
then foreign and accidental. To be 
brothers, to be acquaintances,³master or 
servant, is then a trifle or a disturbance. I 
am the lover of uncontained and immortal 
beauty. (CW I, 10) 
 
 
Some of these alterations are more striking than others. There are many minor changes, 
which reflect the habitual alterations between textual contexts evident throughout his 
career. Of these, one might note first the typographical revisions, with hyphens being 
used extensively in addition to commas to facilitate a sharper division in clauses. The 
ILUVWOLQHTXRWHGLVJHQHUDOLVHGWKLVEHLQJRQHRI(PHUVRQ·VPRVWFRPPRQ
modifications when carrying over journal passages for publication. One might also 
remark the remRYDORIUHIHUHQFHWRD¶FRPSDQLRQ·LQWKLVHSLSKDQLFPRPHQWRQWKH
same terms, as a shift from the identifiably personal to the general and typical.8 Other 
lines are moved or slightly altered: WKH¶KHLU·RIEHDXW\EHFRPHVLWV¶ORYHU·ZKLOHWKH
¶WULIOH·RI the presence of a brother is differently described, and so on. But these are of 
relatively slight significance to the semantics of the passage, and the two versions 
essentially direct the reader in the same manner, with one major exception: there is no 
mention of the transparent eye-ball, or the sentences which surround it, in the journal. 
A change as distinctive as this begs some questions. Why does the simple, and 
VXSSRVHGO\PRUHLPPHGLDWH¶,EHFRPHKDSS\LQP\8QLYHUVDOUHODWLRQV·VWDQGRXWDVVR
                                                 
8 For an instructive analysis of the kinds of alterations which became habitual to Emerson in his 
recompositing process, including the generalisation of thoughts and ideas which previously featured 
SHUVRQDOSURQRXQVRUUHIHUHQFHWRIULHQGVDQGIDPLO\VHH*OHQ0-RKQVRQ¶(PHUVRQ·V&UDIWRI5HYLVLRQ
The Composition of Essays ·, Studies in the American Renaissance (1980), 51-72. 
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inadequate while the majority of that which surrounds it survives the cut? What function 
does the frankly bizarre eye-ball trope serve that its less intrusive precursor does not? 
And, by speculating on this instance toward more general ends, is there something to be 
VDLGRI(PHUVRQ·VUHDGLQJHGLWLQJDQGUHZULWLQJSURFHVVWKDWLVQRWSUDJPDWLFDOO\
related to a desire to make himself better understood by his readers, but rather has a 
bearing on the philosophical questions that he pursues? 
 One can examine the consequences of the inclusion of the eye-ball by attending 
to those few treatments of Nature ZKLFKSLFNXSRQ(PHUVRQ·VGHFLVLRQWRDOWHUWKH
journal version. While the first analyses of the issue, such as that of Jonathan Bishop in 
1964, consider the change WREHVLPSO\DPLVWDNHRURYHUVLJKWDQ¶LQQRFHQWO\·SURGXFHG
absurdity, later critics began to articulate positions in which the eye-ball served a specific 
purpose to condition or correct the impression of spontaneity into which it is 
embedded.9 In 1968, Walter Berthoff remarked on the striking rupture in the passage 
figured by the trope, much more so than the relatively benign journal alternative, 
making an argument for the philosophical (if not tropological) coherence of the eye-ball 
in which the very physicality of the terms used is critical. Berthoff writes that the 
XQFRPIRUWDEOHLPDJH¶SURGXFHV,KDYHDOZD\VWKRXJKWWKHIOXWWHURIDVLQJXODUO\LQWHQVH
SK\VLFDOVHQVDWLRQ·+HHODERUDWHVRQWKHOHYHORIIHHOLQJ¶´H\HµZRXOGKDYHGRQHMXVWDV
well, buW´H\H-EDOOµWRXFKHVWRWKHTXLFN·LQVXP(PHUVRQ·VLVDODQJXDJHZKLFK
¶FRQWLQXDOO\PRGXODWHVEHWZHHQSK\VLFDOLPDJHVDQGFRQFHSWXDODEVWUDFWLRQV·10 
 %HUWKRII·VFRPPHQWVHFKRDFRQFHUQZKLFKLVDOZD\VDWWKHKHDUWRI(PHUVRQ·V
work, particularly in his early career: the aspiration toward a working monism, a 
restitution of mind and world other than that of conventional philosophical idealism or 
skepticism, both positions being excessively intellectualised and inadequate to the 
                                                 
9 Jonathan Bishop, Emerson on the Soul (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 10-15. 
10 :DOWHU%HUWKRII¶,QWURGXFWLRQ·LQ(PHUVRQNature: A Facsimile of the First Edition (San Francisco: 
Chandler, 1968), pp. vii-lxxxi (pp. lxi-lxiii). 
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realisation of a stable coherence between the material world and the mental processes by 
which Emerson was convinced it was ordered. Of particular interest here, however, is 
WKDW%HUWKRII·VODVWSRLQWGLVFORVHVWKDWWKLVUHODWLRQLVSOD\HGRXWFRQVWDQWO\ZLWKLQWKH
performances of EmHUVRQ·VSURVHLQDZD\ZKLFKFDQRQO\EHFLUFXPVFULEHGE\
invoking terms of affection, a discourse of relationality which recognises the physical 
character of the text and the surfeit of signification beyond the semiotics of ordinary 
language. In the case of the eye-ball, this function becomes its exemplary characteristic. 
Not only is its apprehension oddly physical³both in terms of its bizarre content and its 
intrusive and sudden appearance on the page³LW·VDOVRORJLFDOO\IODZHG$V'DYLG9DQ
Leer wrote in 1986, the trope is a rhetorical figure from which ZH¶UHFRLO·EHFDXVH
¶>Z@RUVHWKDQXQUHDORUHPEDUUDVVLQJWKHLPDJHLVLQWHOOHFWXDOO\LQFRKHUHQW· It withdraws 
the power it presumes to offer LQPDNLQJPHRQO\¶SDUWRUSDUWLFOHRI*RG· Indeed, 
¶>W@KHYery notion of transparency is purgative: everything passes through and nothing is 
retained [«] A truly transparent eye-ball would have no opaque retina on which to 
IRFXVWKHLPDJHDQGDF\QLFPLJKWFODLPWKDWDOO(PHUVRQ·VOHQVFRXOGUHDOO\GRZRXOG
be to turn the world upside down·11 
 Based on the evidence available to us, therefore, it seems that the passage was 
altered by way of a cut, a considered and premeditated severance with the spontaneous 
coherence of the journal original. In its place, a metaphor with only limited precedent 
LQWKHZRUGV¶OHDYLQJPHP\H\HV·LVIRUFLEO\LQVHUWHGDQGWKHVHPDQWLFVRIWKDW
PHWDSKRUEHDURXWDQLPSOLHGGLVFRPIRUWLQWKHSURFHVV:KDW·VSDUWLFXODUO\LQWHUHVWLQJ
about this instance in context is that it seems to directly contravene what Emerson 
supposes the proper function of language to be later on in Nature, where a kind of 
transparency is ODXGHGLQZKLFKRQHPLJKW¶SLHUFHWKLVURWWHQGLFWLRQDQGIDVWHQZRUGV
DJDLQWRYLVLEOHWKLQJV·CW I, 20). Yet perhaps the precise opposite is the case: that the 
                                                 
11 David Van Leer, (PHUVRQ·V(SLVWHPology: The Argument of the Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), p. 22. 
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revivifying of language to transform the word itself into a visible³that is, non-
transparent³object is exactly what Emerson advocates there. In context, it constitutes a 
specific expression of doubt as to the practicality of philosophical formalising, actually 
rather deftly pointing out that maxims such as the cogito, with its pithy reduction of the 
mind-world problem to its essential limits, do little to facilitate the experience of a 
fundamental or authentic being.12 More generally, it tells us that words do not give way 
to ready comprehension in these articulations of high abstraction, and should be 
perceived to reflect some objective quality, just as a material object reflects light to 
reveal its own presence and form. In other words, the transparent eye-ball becomes, 
SDUDGR[LFDOO\WKHH[HPSODU\LQVWDQFHRIODQJXDJH·VQRQ-transparency. The insertion 
represents a problem experienced in an ongoing relation to text. At the very moment 
when language is nominally hoped to do most, to convey this sense of immanent 
immersion in the divine, Emerson steps in as editor and adapts the text toward the 
converse, introducing a trope which disrupts immediacy and renders the representation 
paradoxical. Against its content, it is a passage we cannot internalise or cause to vanish 
into understanding. It tests our credulity and receptivity; it sticks to the page in front of 
us in its unchanging, intransigent form. Understanding the broader significance of this 
intervention is the object of all that follows. 
 
The Investment in Form 
This intervention by language into the grammar of philosophical formalism, and in 
another distinct sense into material form, also goes some way toward explaining how 
WKHFRPSOLFDWHGUHODWLRQWRWH[WLQ(PHUVRQ·VZRUNVPLJKWshed light on disagreements 
in the history of his reception. From his contemporaries Francis Bowen and Andrews 
                                                 
12 $V9DQ/HHUZULWHV¶>L@QLWVYHU\VLOOLQHVVWKHH\H-ball avoids the subtle dangers of a concept like the 
Cartesian cogitoZKLFKLQLWVUHVWUDLQWVHHPVWRSURYHPRUHWKDQLWDFWXDOO\FDQ·7KDWLVZKHUHWKHcogito 
moves toward synthetic affirmation, the eye-ball maintains mutually exclusive positions in tellingly 
uncomfortable and convoluted terms. Van Leer, p. 52. 
15 
 
1RUWRQWKURXJKWR76(OLRW·VIDPRXVVWDWHPHQWRIWKDW¶WKHHVVD\VRI(PHUVRQ
are already an encumbrance· to Yvor Winters and Perry Miller, and finally to the New 
Americanist movement of the 1990s and 2000s, there has always been a vocal section of 
(PHUVRQ·VSRWHQWLDODXGLHQFHWKDWVWURQJO\REMHFWVWRWKHHVWHHPKLVZRUNKDVPDQDJHG
to attain and his continued canonical centrality in American literature and thought.13 
Consistently, criticism has asserted that Emerson surely could not³or otherwise should 
not³have meant much of what he wrote, and on many occasions the point at issue 
boils down to a specific formal decision made in the compositional process; a choice 
between possibilities in syntax, logic, or vocabulary; the use of an inapposite figure or 
trope, or a word selected less for transparency of meaning than for effecting the 
recognition of its etymology, or the construction of an unusual internal logic by way of 
repetition in poetic or conceptual terms, and so on. As Francis Bowen noted when he 
reviewed Nature for the Christian Examiner LQ(PHUVRQ·VSURVHH[KLELWVWKH¶VSLFH
of affectation· and Bowen, who knew very well who had written the anonymously 
SXEOLVKHGWH[WVDLGWKDW¶WKHDXWKRUNQRZVEHWWHUWKDQWRRIIHQGVRRSHQO\DJDLQVWJRRG
taste, and, in many passages of great force and beauty of expression, has shown that he 
can do better·14 From his earliest readers, therefore, the charge is levelled that Emerson 
seems to wilfully mislead his audience by way of techniques that are intrusive, obtuse, or 
otherwise discomfiting. 
 (PHUVRQ·VZRUNLVFXULRXVEHFDXVHLWOHDGVXVWRTXHU\WKHQDWXUHRIDXWKRULDO
agency at every stage: first, in its compositional process whereby the author returns to 
and interrogates, corrects, or simply passively reproduces what he finds there; secondly, 
LQWKHGHFLVLRQVWDNHQDWRQHRIWKRVHVWHSVDJDLQVWKLVSRWHQWLDOWR¶NQRZEHWWHU·ILQDOO\
by appearing to trust and depend on the willingness on the part of the reader to accept 
                                                 
13 T. S. (OLRW¶$PHULFDQ/LWHUDWXUH·The Athenaeum (April 25th, 1919), 236-7. 
14 Among the offending passages, Bowen quotes the transparent eye-EDOO6HH%RZHQ¶5HYLHZRINature·
The Christian Examiner and General Review, 21 (1837), 371-85 (pp. 371-2). 
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(or otherwise reject) what is in front of them. As such, against traditional perceptions of 
his work, it seems appropriate to declare that his writing should be of specific interest to 
scholars interested in literary form. My reasoning for this is that the invocation of form 
always has at its core a simple set of questions: why this word and not another? Why the 
selection of trope, of phrase, of tone, and so on? They are questions asked both of the 
author/s and, possibly independently, of the text itself, of how it functions according to 
the choices it embodies irrespective of how its author/s may have come to inscribe the 
particular linguistic units that we have before us.15 :KDW·VPRUHEHFDXVH(PHUVRQ·V
FDUHHUKDVWUDGLWLRQDOO\EHHQVHHQWRGHVFULEHDJHQHUDOWUDMHFWRU\IURP¶IUHHGRP·WR
¶IDWH·IURPWKHSURVSHFWVRIHQWKXVLDVWLFDJHQF\LQNature to the ironic and self-
FRQVFLRXVUHVLJQDWLRQRIWKHODWHHVVD\¶)DWH·WKLVTXHVWLRQRIDJHQF\Ds the essence of 
literary form ought to be considered especially significant.16 
A caveat is perhaps necessary here, since within areas of literary study which are 
FRPPRQO\LGHQWLILHGDV¶IRUPDOLVW·TXHVWLRQVRIDJHQF\KDYHWUDGLWLRQDOO\EHHQGHHPHG
irrelevant. New Criticism, predominantly by way of W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe 
%HDUGVOH\·V¶LQWHQWLRQDOIDOODF\·GHFOLQHGDOOUHFRXUVHWRGLVFXVVLRQVRIOLWHUDU\DJHQF\,Q
WKHLUIDPRXVIRUPXODWLRQ¶>L@IWKHSRHWVXFFHHGHGLQGRLQJ·ZKDWHYHULWZDVKHVHWRXWWR
do¶WKHQWKHSRHPLWVHOIVKRZV·LW,IRQWKHRWKHUKDQGRIWKLVDUJXPHQW¶WKHSRHWGLG
QRWVXFFHHGWKHQWKHSRHPLVQRWDGHTXDWHHYLGHQFH·DQGZHPXVWJR¶RXWVLGH·WKH
SRHPWRFRQWH[WXDORU¶H[WHUQDO·HYLGHQFHZKLFKLVSURSHUO\WKHDUHDRIOLWHUDU\
                                                 
15 Of course, formal analyses ordinarily cannot ascribe authorial autonomy to a single figure if there is any 
suggestion of intervention on the part of editors, or indeed of non-professional readers acting in the 
capacity of editors or emendors. Emerson, however, is somewhat unique insofar as, by virtue of financial 
independence and literary association, he held complete editorial control over his own work as published 
by James Munroe, later by first Phillips, Sampson, and Company and then Ticknor and Fields, right up 
until the onset of dementia in the 1870s. In combination with his journal and notebook writings³private 
WH[WVZKLFKZKLOHRFFDVLRQDOO\UHDGE\IULHQGVZLWK(PHUVRQ·VSHUPLVVLRQZHUHSULQFLSDOO\IRUKLVH\HV
alone³it is reasonable to consider that for almost the entirety of his writing the editorial judgement 
exercised, in a practical sense, was solely his own. 
16 $VKLVWLWOHVXJJHVWVWKLVLVWKHSULQFLSDOWKHVLVRI6WHSKHQ:KLFKHU·VLQIOXHQWLDOVWXG\6HH
Whicher, Freedom and Fate: An Inner Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson, (1953), 2nd edn (Philadelphia: University of 
3HQQV\OYDQLD3UHVV7KHHVVHQWLDOSDUDPHWHUVRI:KLFKHU·VDUJXPHQWDQGHVSHFLDOO\KLVPRGHORID
gradual sequence of shifts toward the acceptance of fatalism across EmersRQ·VPDMRUZRUNVUHPDLQ
entirely valid. 
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biography, given to be a wholly distinct category from literary criticism.17 The object of 
WKH1HZ&ULWLFVRIFRXUVHZDVWKHMXGJHPHQWRISRHWLFYDOXHDQGD¶VXFFHVV·EDVHGRQ
their own criteria of the autonomous artwork, but the rejection of intent as a condition 
tied to formalist conditions was carried over as a critical norm into the concerns of 
structuralism and post-structuralism, in which the author becomes a function, first of 
socio-political structures, and later of language.18 In the same critical moment, Marxist 
commentators have argued that the study of form itself, the iconic discipline of 
bourgeois aestheticism and disengagement, directs attention away from hegemonic 
ideological structures and thus precludes meaningful (i.e., politically motivated) agency 
and intervention, making it complicit with those hegemonies.19 
These rejections of formalist approaches in literary studies have been 
enormously influential, and it has only been in the last ten to fifteen years that 
scholarship has begun making tentative steps to rediscover value in studies of the 
material limits of the text. Yet a particular point of interest in this advocacy of a return 
to a formalist disciplinary attitude is its fundamental recognition that it is a practice 
which knows of and wRUNVZLWKLQSUDFWLFDOERXQGVLWLV¶DVNHVLVDQDWOHDVWWHPSRUDU\
DFFHSWDQFHRIGLVFLSOLQDU\HQFORVXUH·DQGFULWLFDOO\¶YROXQWDU\·DV-RQDWKDQ/RHVEHUJ
has written.20 To elect to study form is to pursue partial rather than totalising ends, and 
the critic that follows this path must remain cognisant of this fact. But equally, to 
                                                 
17 :.:LPVDWW-UDQG0RQURH&%HDUGVOH\¶7KH,QWHQWLRQDO)DOODF\·LQThe Verbal Icon: Studies in the 
Meaning of Poetry (Lexington KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1954), pp. 3-18 (p. 4). 
18 The history of this tendency has been well documented elsewhere and need not be elaborated here. 
Suffice it to say, however, that the principles they describe, of textual genesis being inseparable from the 
exigencies of the culture and society the author belonged to, or, more pressingly, the language in which he 
or she exists, were apparent in the nineteenth-century to Emerson and were explicitly interrogated 
throughout his career, as I will argue throughout. 
19 6HHIRULQVWDQFH7HUU\(DJOHWRQ¶,GHRORJ\DQG/LWHUDU\)RUP·, in Criticism and Ideology: A Study in 
Marxist Literary Theory (London: Verso, 1978), pp. 102-61. 
20 -RQDWKDQ/RHVEHUJ¶&XOWXUDO6WXGLHV9LFWRULDQ6WXGLHVDQG)RUPDOLVP·Victorian Literature and Culture, 
27 (1999), 539-48 (p. 541). In treatments of romantic literature amongst practitioners of New Formalism, 
this aspect is especially pronounced. Writing of :RUGVZRUWK·VPrelude, Susan Wolfson notes the 
¶DQWLWKHWLFDO·UHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKDWDXWKRU·VURPDQWLFXQLYHUVDODQGWKH¶SURIDQLW\·RIWKHQHFHVVLW\WKDW it 
EHSUHVVHGLQWR¶WKHPDWHULDOIRUPRIZULWLQJ·:ROIVRQ¶:KDW*RRGLV)RUPDOLVW&ULWLFLVP"2UForms and 
Storms DQGWKH&ULWLFDO5HJLVWHURI5RPDQWLF3RHWU\·, Studies in Romanticism, 37 (1998), 77-94 (p. 78). 
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commit to form as a writer entails issues of voluntary partialisation, of a kind of relation 
WRRQH·VRZQZRUNWKDWLVYHU\IDUIURPWKHLGHDOW\SHRIGLVHPERGLPHQWIRXQGLQWKH 
New Critical model of the completely successful, immanent, independent poem, and 
which countenances the lack of authorial autonomy argued for in various forms across 
the twentieth-century by structuralism, post-structuralism, New Historicism, and so on. 
As another advocate of a revived formalism, W. J. T. Mitchell, puts it, merely by existing 
(which means, in a discursive context, to speak; in a literary context, to write) we are ¶LQ
fact committed to form and to various formalisms without knowing it·21 Before it is 
possible to know what it means to make a commitment, we must already have made it; 
before the ramifications of an act of partialisation can be understood, our will to act 
considered, the act must be complete.22  
The consequences of this are best brought out in a relatively early essay by 
Stanley Cavell, who in 1969 wrote on the contested topic of artistic intention in a 
manner that, with hindsight, would inevitably lead him to Emerson, given the 
importance that Emerson accords the principle of voluntary partialisation throughout 
his career. Responding directly to Monroe Beardsley and Joseph Margolis, Cavell 
entirely rejects the intentional fallacy on the following grounds: 
 
The artist is responsible for everything that happens in his work³and not just 
in the sense that it is done, but in the sense that it is meant. It is a terrible 
responsibility; very few men have the gift and the patience and the singleness to 
                                                 
21 :-70LWFKHOO¶7KH&RPPLWPHQWWR)RUP2U6WLOO&UD]\DIWHU$OO7KHVH<HDUV·PMLA, 118 (2003), 
321-5 (p. 324). 
22 As Mitchell goes on to say, echoing the quote from Cavell which follows in the above, recognising our 
investment in form means recognising that we have been committed as though against our will: it is likely 
to seem ¶VRPHWKLQJRQHGLVFRYHUVDERXWRQHVHOI a situation or condition of engagement that I find myself 
LQ·DVLWXDWLRQKHOLNHQVWRKRZRQHPLJKWILQGRQHVHOI¶FRPPLWWHG·WRDQLQVWLWXWLRQIROORZLQJDGLDJQRVLV
of insanity. Mitchell, p. 323. 
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shoulder it. But it is all the more terrible, when it is shouldered, not to appreciate 
it, to refuse to understand something meant so well.23 
 
7KHVLJQLILFDQFHRI&DYHOO·VSRLQWDQGLWLVRQHKHZould develop over the following 
decades, is that in writing³indeed, in the creation of any bounded art form³the artist 
must accept silently (not that they are likely to have the right of reply in any case) all 
interpretation, however diverse, attendant on what they have created as ultimately what 
they meant. This is why intention is actually a redundant concept³it is probably more 
problematic than it is worth to seek to ascertain whether a particular reading was 
intended, but, nevertheless, it must be read as meant insofar as a reader has taken it, 
according to reasonable principles, to mean something. Rather than become 
concentrated, determinate, and XQLYHUVDOWKHDUWLVW·VWKRXJKWVDUHDWWKHPRPHQWRI
their manifestation in the partialised final form of the work, made diffuse, impersonal, 
DQLQGHWHUPLQDWHPDVVRISRVVLELOLWLHVZKLFKPD\YHU\ZHOOEHXQUHODWHGWRWKHDUWLVW·V
desire. And yet the artist is responsible for it, and remains responsible in perpetuity. 
 Returning to the primary subject, this is precisely what form meant to Emerson 
throughout his career, although his attitude towards its enclosing necessity changed 
significantly between the mid-1830s and 1850, the period with which this thesis is 
concerned. He opened his career as a published author with a renunciation of a kind of 
formalism that had become odious to him. The rejection of the ossified forms of 
tradition in the opening lines of Nature sets a tone which reaches its fullest expression in 
WKH'LYLQLW\6FKRRO¶$GGUHVV· Here, the type of historical Christianity Emerson attacks 
LVODEHOOHG¶DSSURSULDWHGDQGIRUPDO·; WKHSXOSLWLVOLDEOHWRKDYHEHHQ¶XVXUSHGE\D
IRUPDOLVW·ZKRWKHQ VSHDNVZLWKD¶KROORZGU\FUHDNLQJIRUPDOLW\· and so on (CW I, 82, 
85, 87). But, even as he makes these remarks, Emerson speaks in another register of 
                                                 
23 6WDQOH\&DYHOO¶$0DWWHURI0HDQLQJ,W·LQMust We Mean What We Say? 1HZ<RUN&KDUOHV6FULEQHU·V
Sons, 1969), pp. 213-37 (pp. 236-7). Emphasis in original. 
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IRUPDQGLWVXVHV¶OHWWKHEUHDWKRIQHZOLIHEHEUHDWKHGE\\RXWKURXJKWKHIRUPV
already existing [«] A whole popedom of forms one pulsation of virtue can uplift and 
YLYLI\·CW I, 927KHDPHOLRUDWLRQLPSOLHGKHUHLVIURPEDG¶IRUPDOLVP·WRDJRRG
UHYLYLI\LQJLQWHUURJDWLYH¶IRUPDOLVW·SUDFWLFHDQGQRWWKHDEURJDWLRQRIRQH·V
responsibility to a world conditioned by formal parameters altogether, as might initially 
seem to be the case. 24 
 Form, in its multiple meanings across philosophy and literary theory, was of 
crucial significance to the way Emerson thought. He was not³was never³merely an 
egotistic intuitionist, a deluded and enthusiastic pseudo-Kantian in the sense that some 
of his friends and associates may have been; even from the outset of his career, when 
his idealist tendencies were at their strongest, secular conditions of particularity and 
GLIIHUHQFHFRQVLVWHQWO\GLVVXDGHGKLPIURPIDLWKLQRQH·VFDSDFLW\WRVHHWKURXJKWKH
YLVLEOHZRUOGWRLWVVSLULWXDO¶IRUPDO·LQDSKLORVRSKLFDOVHQVHHVVHQFH25 The difficulty 
in assuming the posture of the man of infinite possibility in a world which, from the 
moment we exist in it, declines and delimits possibility constitutes the background to a 
remark in an 1841 address, ¶7KH0HWKRGRI1DWXUH·: ¶6RZHPXVWDGPLUHLQPDQWKH
form of the formless, the concentration of the vast, the house of reason, the cave of 
PHPRU\·CW I, 127). In this sentence, Emerson states what later in life he would 
reiterate as the essence of his philosophy, the infinitude of the private man, but also the 
contradiction which always faces it: form of the formless, infinitude bound up in the 
finite, private, and particular, and the idea tied to the materiality of time and of place, 
                                                 
24 Susan Wolfson makes a comparable methodological point in Formal Charges in an explicitly literary 
FRQWH[W6KHZULWHVWKDW¶´)RUPDOLVWµFULWLFLVP>«@ names a concern with how poetic form is articulated 
DQGYDOXHG·ZKLFKGLIIHUHQWLDWHVLWIURP¶´IRUPDOismµZKLFKLQFULWLFDODQGSROLWLFDOWUDGLWLRQW\SLFDOO\
names an ideologically toned disciplinary commitment that prioritises and privileges form in relation to 
RWKHUSRVVLEOHORFDWLRQVRIYDOXH·:ROIVRQFormal Charges: The Shaping of Poetry in British Romanticism 
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 235, n. 1. Emphasis in original. 
25 $FFXVDWLRQVRI(PHUVRQ·VGHOXVLRQDOLQWXLWLRQLVPKDYHbeen made many times, but the most forceful is 
SUREDEO\-RHO3RUWH·VWUHDWPHQWLQKLVEmerson and Thoreau: Transcendentalists in Conflict (Middletown CT: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1966), pp. 68-92. I will address the shortcomings of these assumptions insofar 
as they specifically impinge on my thesis in chapter one. 
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¶IRUP·LQWKHVHQVHRIFRQIRUPLQJDQGSHUIRUPLQJDFFRUGLQJWRGHWHUPLQDWLYH
principles.26 
 It is crucial to note, however, that this principle appeared to Emerson primarily, 
and most forcefully, through his ruminations on language. In January 1835, for instance, 
KHZULWHVWKDWZKLOH¶>W@KH&ROHVDQG%ULJJVHVFDQILQLVKWKHLUVHUPRQWKHPDQRIJHQLXV
cannot because they write words & pages which are finite things & can be numbered & 
HQGHGDWSOHDVXUH+HZULWHVDIWHU1DWXUHZKLFKLVHQGOHVV·JMN V, 14). And the same 
generally pessimistic tone inflects other musings on the subject over the following years. 
In 1838, next to the journal source of the proscrLSWLRQLQ¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·RIIHDURI
FRQWUDGLFWLRQLQRQH·VXWWHUDQFHVKHFRQWHPSODWHVWKHWHQGHQF\WR¶ZRUVKLSWKHGXOO
*RG7HUPLQXV	QRWWKH/RUGRI/RUGV·IURPDQRWKHUHQWU\ODWHUWKDW\HDU¶*ODGO\,
would solve if I could this problem of a Vocabulary which like some treacherous wide 
VKRDOZD\OD\VWKHWDOOEDUN>«@,QFRPPRQOLIHHYHU\PDQLVOHGE\WKHQRVHE\DYHUE·
(JMN VII, 25, 149). Writing means restraint; it also means giving of oneself into the ebb 
and flow of currents over which the author has no command. As such, writing is always, 
as it were, ruinous³¶>H@YHQWKHJUHDW	JLIWHGGRQRWHVFDSHEXWZLWKJUHDWWDOHQWV	
SDUWLDOLQVSLUDWLRQKDYHORFDOFUDPSVZLWKHUHGDUPV	PRUWLILFDWLRQ·$WRQFHKRZHYHU
exigencies are implicitly accepted. Not only is Emerson writing in spite of a distaste for 
its demands, but in his writing he recognises the principle of choice, a limited function, 
UDWKHUWKDQOLEHUW\¶$PDQLVDFKRLFH·¶$6FKRODULVDVHOHFWLQJSULQFLSOH·JMN V, 115; 
VII, 50). By 1843, (PHUVRQ·VDWWLWXGHVHHPVZKROO\DFFXVWRPHGWRWKLVIDFW¶$QGWKRX
shalt serve the god Terminus, the bounding Intellect, & love Boundary or Form: 
                                                 
26 These are, of course, archetypal romantic preoccupations³they might be rephrased along the lines of 
the relationship between individual freedom and societal obligation, or between the spontaneous 
originality of the genius and the shared, legalistic mediums through which that genius is refracted. But 
ZKLOHDWH[WOLNH7KRPDV0F)DUODQG·VOriginality and Imagination is and will remain a major statement of the 
¶RULJLQDOLW\SDUDGR[·WKDWOLHVDWWKH heart of the ethics of romanticism, an extended study of Emerson in 
WKLVOLJKWFDQSHUKDSVEHMXVWLILHGJLYHQWKDWE\0F)DUODQG·VRZQDGPLVVLRQ(PHUVRQLVSHFXOLDUO\
exemplary in this respect. See McFarland, Originality and Imagination (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1985), pp. 14-5, 30. 
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EHOLHYLQJWKDW)RUPLVDQRUDFOHZKLFKQHYHUOLHV·JMN VIII, 405). Tracing how 
Emerson came to such a consideration from his earlier positions is a principal aim of 
this thesis.  
What begins in aspirations of singularity, pure identity in mind and act, ends in a 
complex mediacy through a language which is considered in its doubleness. If Emerson 
well understood WKDWWKHGHPDQGVRIZULWLQJGLFWDWHWKDWKHDFFHSWVRPH¶WHUULEOH
UHVSRQVLELOLW\·WKHQWKLVGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWKHDFTXLHVFHVZLWKRXWUHVHUYDWLRQRU
without seeking alternatives. Throughout, I will illustrate how discipline in the 
acceptance of boundedness impacts not simply on (PHUVRQ·V thoughts on literature and 
on his own capacity to express (and realise) his personal sense of infinite possibility, but 
DOVRRQKLVWKRXJKWRQOLWHUDWXUH·VVRFLDOLW\DQGKLVRZQVRFLDOUROHDVKLVOLWHUDU\IDPH
grew. IndeeG(PHUVRQ·VIXQGDPHQWDOHWKLFVIRUJRRGRULOOFRPHIURPKLVOLWHUDU\
experience, and the obligation to the world at large derived from this is then explored 
and fulfilled through the demands of writing undertaken simultaneously in two distinct 
contexts, private and public. 
 
Literary Ethics: Mind, World, and Language 
7RJHWDEHWWHUVHQVHRIKRZWKHELQDULHVLQ(PHUVRQ·VOLWHUDU\HWKLFVDUHGHILQHGRQH
FDQWXUQWRWKHUHFHQWLQWHUHVWLQ(PHUVRQ·VUROHLQGLVFRXUVHVFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKH
ethical deployment of language acts, which emerged from the ground-breaking work of 
Stanley Cavell. Cavell, with his background in Austinian speech act theory and 
:LWWJHQVWHLQLDQSKLORVRSKLHVRIODQJXDJHZDVILUVWWRGUDZRXW(PHUVRQ·VUHFRJQLWLRQ
of the necessity of a kind of abandonment of subjective autonomy in the entry into 
language. +HLQLWLDOO\UDLVHGWKHSULQFLSOHLQDERRNWUHDWLQJRI7KRUHDX¶:ULWLQJ³
KHURLFZULWLQJWKHZULWLQJRIDQDWLRQ·VVFULSWXUH³must assume the conditions of 
language as such; re-experience, as it were, the fact that there is such a thing as language 
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at all and assume responsibility for it³ILQGDZD\WRDFNQRZOHGJHLW· 27 What is being 
acknowledged is its necessary priority, its existence irrespective of ourselves, and thus 
WKDWRXUHWKLFDOEHDULQJRXUVHQVHRISODFHGHSHQGVXSRQLW¶:RUGVFRPHWRXVIURP a 
distance; they were there before we were; we are born into them. Meaning them is 
DFFHSWLQJWKHIDFWRIWKHLUFRQGLWLRQ·28 When he came, a few years later, to apply these 
LGHDVWR(PHUVRQLQDGGLWLRQWR7KRUHDXKHDSSHDUVWRUHFRJQLVH(PHUVRQ·VVWDWHG
dLVWDVWHIRUSUHFLVHO\WKLVLPSHUDWLYHKHQFHWKHDWWLWXGHLVQRWQHFHVVDULO\¶KHURLF·2Q
the one hand:  
 
What still wants expression is a sense that my relation to the existence of the 
world, or to my existence in the world, is not given in words but in silence. (This 
would not be a matter of keeping your mouth shut but of understanding when, 
and how, not to yield to the temptation to say what you do not or cannot exactly 
mean.)29 
 
2URQWKHRWKHUWKDWIRU(PHUVRQDVZHOODVIRU7KRUHDXLQ&DYHOO·VRSLQion): 
 
the achievement of the human requires not [Heideggerian] inhabitation and 
settlement but abandonment, leaving. Then everything depends upon your 
realisation of abandonment, that you have felt enthusiastically what there is to 
abandon yourself to, that you can treat the others there are as those to whom 
the inhabitation of the world can now be left.30 
 
                                                 
27 Stanley Cavell, The Senses of Walden: An Expanded Edition (1972) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1981), p. 33. 
28 Cavell, Senses, p. 64. 
29 &DYHOO¶$Q(PHUVRQ0RRG·LQSenses, p. 145. 
30 &DYHOO¶7KLQNLQJRI(PHUVRQ·LQSenses, p. 138. 
24 
 
The space between the concepts raised here circumscribes a crucial set of conditions 
ZKLFKDUHVHOGRPIXOO\LQWHUURJDWHGE\WKRVHZULWLQJLQ&DYHOO·VZDke.31 The first excerpt 
describes not taking responsibility, exactly, but seeking to withhold the commitment 
that entails. It is a mode of writing or speaking that defers the point, but not necessarily 
by silence, as Cavell observes, which instead suggests a mode of writing around, or away 
from, the obligation of writing. In the second, meanwhile, the major notion of 
¶DEDQGRQPHQW·LVEURDFKHGEXW&DYHOOLVFDUHIXOWRGLVWLQJXLVKWKDWWKLVSULQFLSOH
GHPDQGVSURSHU¶UHDOLVDWLRQ·RU¶DFNQRZOHGJHPHQW·³it is to bequeath oneself entirely to 
a world which one no longer inhabits; it is, therefore, a sacrificial act and a submission 
WROHJDF\GHPDQGLQJPXFKRIWKHDXWKRUDVWKHHDUOLHUTXRWHGSDVVDJHIURP¶$0DWWHU
RI0HDQLQJLW·VXJJHVWV,WVKRXOGEHFOHDUWKDWWKese two conditions³the decision either 
to give oneself over to language, or to try to cheat this exigency³are mutually exclusive, 
that a writer who might advocate the former but practice the latter³as I will suggest 
Emerson does in almost all of his writing from the late-1830s onwards³will invariably 
produce a body of work that straddles a contradiction. It seems to me that much of the 
major criticism written after or in engagement with the concepts that Cavell raises either 
overlooks or, more regularly, over-theorises this fact, draining it of its inherent 
complications in search of synthetic resolution.  
 5LFKDUG3RLULHUIRULQVWDQFHDUJXHVWKDWWKHFHQWUDOWKHPHLQ(PHUVRQ·VZRUNLV
WKDW¶WKHDFWRIVHOI-erasure, of disowning the words by which just a few seconds ago you 
                                                 
31 One essay I will not be discussing in detail here is worthy of specific mention insofar as it prefigures 
VRPHRIWKHFUXFLDOSULQFLSOHV,·OOEHFRYHULQJ7KHHVVD\E\0XWOX.RQXN%ODVLQJDGURLWO\UHFRJQLVHVWKDW
lanJXDJHRFFXSLHVDPHGLDWLQJ¶PLGGOHWHUP·EHWZHHQWKHSRODUSULQFLSOHVRIPLQGDQGZRUOG0(DQG
1270(LQ(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWPDNLQJ¶ODZRIWKHPLQGLQFDUQDWHDVWKHODZRIQDWXUH·LWLVSRZHUEXW
LWLVDOVRIDWHDQG¶SXWVOLPLWVHYHQRQWKRXJKW>«@IRULWWKLQNVXV·%ODVLQJFRQVLGHUVWKDWWKHIUXLWLRQRI
WKLVSULQFLSOHRQO\FRPHVLQ(PHUVRQ·VSRHWU\DUHDVRQDEOHDVVXPSWLRQJLYHQSRHWU\·VYHU\SUHVHQFHDQG
FRQFHQWUDWLRQLWLVVKHZULWHVDIWHU(PHUVRQWKH¶´)DWDOisµRIIRUP·DSRLQW,ZLOOWDNHXSLn chapter five 
in my own discussion of the poetry. I disagree with the terms by which Blasing describes the years of 
SURVHDVPHUHO\¶SUHFXUVRU·WRWKHIRFXVRIWKHSRHWU\DOWKRXJKVKHLVDJDLQFRUUHFWWRSURSRVHWKDWWKH
latter functions quite differentl\IURPWKHIRUPHUDV,ZLOOGLVFXVVODWHU6HH%ODVLQJ¶(VVD\LQJWKH3RHW
(PHUVRQ·V3RHWLF7KHRU\DQG3UDFWLFH·Modern Language Studies, 15.2 (1985), 9-23. 
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PD\KDYHLGHQWLILHG\RXUVHOIEHFRPHVLQIDFWSDUDGR[LFDOO\DQLQGLFDWLRQRIVHOIKRRG·32 
This may be so, but it constitutes a false abandonment; instead, it withholds 
commitment on the terms of the former condition quoted from Cavell, and, in 
perpetuating subjective autonomy, declines the ethical obligation in language. That is 
QRWWRVD\WKDW3RLULHU·VREVHUYDWLRQVDUHQRWRIFUXFLDOVLJQLILFDQFH³the mode of a 
writing which asserts neutrality via non-committal is an Emersonian speciality, and will 
be a point of discussion throughout this thesis, particularly in chapters two and three. 
%XWKLVUHDGLQJRQO\RIIHUVVXEVWDQWLDOLQVLJKWLQWRRQHVLGHRI(PHUVRQ·VOLWHUDU\
concerns, a habit that recurs in later, similar treatments.  
In a 1998 essay, Sharon Cameron offers acute insight into the lack of an 
LGHQWLILDEOHVHOILQ(PHUVRQ·VVW\OHDQGSRVLWVWKDWZKDWLVXQFRPIRUWDEO\DSSDUHQWLQ
KLVZRUNLVWKHDEVHQFHRIDQ\WKLQJ¶SHUVRQDO·DWDOOLQVWHDG¶WKHUHLVFKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\
vacancy in tKHSODFHZKHUHZHPLJKWH[SHFWWRILQGDSHUVRQ·33 This, she argues, is what 
XQGHUSLQV(PHUVRQ·VGLVFRQWLQXRXVDQGDORJLFDOHVVD\LVWLFSURVH%XWRQFHDJDLQWKLVLV
a reading that emphasises the literary invocation of neutrality, evident when Cameron 
goes RQWRFULWLTXH(PHUVRQ·VYRLFHIRUODFNLQJWKHDXWKRULW\RIZKLFKKLVHVVD\VVSHDN
SUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHKLV¶VWDWHPHQWVDUHinsufficiently SHUVRQDO·QRQ-heroic, contrary to his 
VWDWHGDLPVEHFDXVH¶WKHKHURLFLPSOLHVDSHUVRQ·VFRQWDFWZLWKWKHUHDO>«@7Ke 
OHJLWLPDF\RI>KHURLF@GLVFRXUVH>«@GHSHQGVRQWKHYLVLELOLW\RIWKHSHUVRQVSHDNLQJ·
their making a stake for themselves by accepting personal definition.34 True as this is 
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHDVSHFWRI(PHUVRQ·VZRUNWKDWZLWKKROGVFRPPLWPHQWLWVKRXld also 
be observed that he well knew that confessing personhood was an act of renunciation³
¶>D@SHUVRQLVILQLWHSHUVRQDOLW\LVILQLWHQHVV·DVKHQRWHGLQ³and therefore 
                                                 
32 Richard Poirier, Poetry and Pragmatism (London: Faber and Faber, 1992), p. 11. Poirier is here 
VXPPDULVLQJWKHFRQWHQWRIKLVHVVD\¶:ULWLQJ2IIWKH6HOI·ZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHGWKHILQDOFKDSWHURIKLVThe 
Renewal of Literature: Emersonian Reflections (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 182-223. 
33 Sharon Cameron, ¶7KH:D\RI/LIHE\$EDQGRQPHQW(PHUVRQ·V,PSHUVRQDO·, Critical Inquiry, 25 (1998), 
1-31 (p. 17). 
34 &DPHURQ¶:D\RI/LIH·SS-6. Emphasis in original. 
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&DPHURQ·VVXSSRVLWLRQWKDWWKH¶PLVVLQJVHQVHRIDSHUVRQ·LV¶HWKLFDOO\LOOHJLtimate if not 
LQGHHGVLPSO\GHOXVLRQDO·VHHPVWRPHWREHDOZD\VLQFRUSRUDWHGDQGSUHILJXUHGLQKLV
work by the excessive presence of aspirations to neutrality discovered there (JMN V, 
282).35 
 Finally, the tendency persists among the most recent treatments of Emerson 
within a post-&DYHOOLDQFRQWH[W%UDQND$UVLý·VOn Leaving is a significant recent study 
which examines broadly the same Emersonian concepts at the heart of this thesis³for 
LQVWDQFHWKHGHVWDELOLVDWLRQRIWKHVXEMHFWSRVLWLRQERWKLQ(PHUVRQ·V rhetoric and his 
philosophy and the emphasis on mannerism in language and act. I will return at the 
DSSURSULDWHSRLQWVWR$UVLý·VGLVFXVVLRQVRIWKHVHSDUWLFXODUV%XWLQVSLWHRIWKH
philosophical sophistication which $UVLý·VDUJXPHQWFHUWDLQO\SRVVHVVHV, and my broad 
agreement both with the content and method of much of her book, I disagree with her 
on a more fundamental level. $UVLý·VPRGHOWDNHVWKHSULQFLSOH&DYHOOODEHOVWKH
¶DYHUVLYH·WKHQHFHVVLW\RI¶DEDQGRQPHQW·DQGSRUWUD\VLWDVWKHVLQJOHDQd totalising 
IXQFWLRQRI(PHUVRQ·VSKLORVRSKLFDODQGOLWHUDU\SURMHFW7KHSUREOHPLVWKDWWKLV
model, in spite of $UVLý·VSURSRVDOVWRWKHFRQWUDU\DOZD\VXOWLPDWHO\OHDGVXVEDFNWR
subjective liberation; these ideas are said to free Emerson (and, by extension, 
pedagogically demonstrate the processes involved in this liberation to the reader) from 
the strictures of personhood that he may be let to live in an authentic way, a way that is 
FRQVDQJXLQHZLWKWKHUHDGHU·VPXWXDOH[LVWHQFH/HDYLQJLQ$UVLý·VWhesis is also levity, 
and it permits the avoidance of the kinds of pressing concerns that have always seemed 
absent from Emerson³whether it be specific social concerns or more testing abstract 
qualities such as evil³SURPXOJDWLQJDWKHVLVLQZKLFK¶WKHUHLV QRFRPSOHWHQHVV·VLPSO\
                                                 
35 &DPHURQ¶:D\RI/LIH·S2QWKLVSRLQWDHVVD\E\5DFKHO&ROHLVZRUWK\RIUHPDUNLQVRIDUDV
it argues the counter to CamHURQ·VSRLQWPDNLQJWKHFDVHWKDWSHUVRQDOLW\LQ(PHUVRQ·VZRUNLVGHILQHG
E\OLPLWDWLRQDQGUHVWUDLQWLQDPDQQHUHSLWRPLVHGE\ODQJXDJH·VFDSDFLW\IRUWKHVDPH6HHKHUFRPPHQWV
RQKRZSHUVRQDOLW\LVLQYRNHGE\D¶VSHFLILFDOO\SK\VLFDOWH[WXDOSUHVHQFH·¶WKHWH[WXDOILJXUHRI0RQWDLJQH
DVVRPHWKLQJOLNHDPDWHULDOREMHFW·SHUPLWWLQJ(PHUVRQWRVHHWKH)UHQFKHVVD\LVWDVRQHZLWKZKRPKH
could have, as it were, a personal UHODWLRQVKLS6HH&ROH¶7KH5HDOLW\(IIHFW(PHUVRQ·V6SHDNHUVDQGWKH
Phenomenon RI3HUVRQDOLW\·The Yale Journal of Criticism, 18 (2005), 67-86 (p. 72). 
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DSHUSHWXDOSURFHVVRIIOX[LRQ$UVLýLVOHGWRSRVLWWKDWZHVKRXOGUHDG(PHUVRQLQWKH
most ordinary and quotidian sense, so that through her study we should learn about the 
H[WHQWWRZKLFK¶WKHTXHVWLRQRIOHDYLQJDQGWKHUHSHUcussions that the idea of universal 
IOXFWXDWLRQKDVIRURXUHYHU\GD\OLYHV·36 
 The problem in all of these versions of a unitary Emerson is a consistent failure 
to recognise the extent to which authorial responsibility³indeed, responsibility as 
such³is a notion taken seriously in his work, even if its models are extremely unstable. 
)XOOXQFRPSURPLVLQJLQYHVWPHQWLQRQH·VDFWLRQVLVDQDUFKHW\SDO7KRUHDXYLDQ
GHPDQGKLVFULWLFLVPRI$PHULFDQGHPRFUDF\LQ¶5HVLVWDQFHWR&LYLO*RYHUQPHQW·
(1847) being specifiFDOO\WKDWLQLW¶>W@KHFKDUDFWHURIWKHYRWHUVLVQRWVWDNHG>DVVXFK
WKH\DUHQRW«@YLWDOO\FRQFHUQHGWKDW>«@ULJKWVKRXOGSUHYDLO·37 Emerson is, of course, 
much more complicated than this, but he nevertheless states frequently enough simple 
sentimenWVVLPLODUWRWKRVHLQ·V¶7KH3RHW·WKDW¶>Z@ords are also actions, and 
actions are a kind of words·CW III, 6). Turning back to one of the critics just 
GLVFXVVHGWKHUHIRUH$UVLýUHFRJQLVHVLISHUKDSVXQFRQVFLRXVO\WKDWZULWLQJ
necessitates commitment if one wishes to be taken seriously and to participate in 
GLVFRXUVHDVVKHZULWHV¶>P@\investment, therefore, is in the epistemological, existential, 
HWKLFDODQGSROLWLFDOFRQVHTXHQFHVRI(PHUVRQ·VLGHDRIXQLYHUVDOGHSDUWLQJ·38 Yet her 
                                                 
36 %UDQND$UVLýOn Leaving: A Reading in Emerson (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 8, 
7KLVUHDVRQLQJPD\KHOSWRMXVWLI\$UVLý·VSUR[LPLW\WR(PHUVRQWKURXJKRut. Although it is 
philosophically astute, the book is characterised by a lack of direct engagement with scholarly contexts 
HLWKHUZLWKLQRUZLWKRXWWKHFRQILQHVRI(PHUVRQVWXGLHVDQG$UVLý·VODFNRIFULWLFDOGLVWDQFHFDQDWWLPHV
be the most powerful, iISUREOHPDWLFIDFWRURIKHUDUJXPHQW7KDWVDLG$UVLýLVQRWWKHRQO\UHFHQWFULWLF
of Emerson to propose that we read him as a kind of guru, perhaps a re-foundationalising response that 
restores sageness to the sage after the broader tendency of iconoclasm in New Historicist critiques of the 
1990s. John Lysaker begins Emerson and Self-Culture GHFODULQJKLVLQWHQWWR¶GHIHQGE\ZD\RI(PHUVRQD
living conception of self-FXOWXUH·DQGWRUHDGKLPQRWZLWKLQVFKRODUO\DVNHVLVEXW¶SHUVRQDOO\WRUHFHLYHLt 
DVLWEHDUVXSRQP\RZQOLIH·6HH/\VDNHUEmerson and Self-Culture (Bloomington IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1998), p. 1, 8. 
37 +HQU\'DYLG7KRUHDX¶5HVLVWDQFHWR&LYLO*RYHUQPHQW·LQAesthetic Papers, ed. by Elizabeth P. 
Peabody (Boston: Elizabeth P. Peabody, 1849), pp. 189-211 (p. 194). 
38 $UVLýS(PSKDVLVDGGHG7KLVLQYHVWPHQWLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGH[WHQGVWRZKDWLVH[SHFWHGRIWKH
UHDGHUDV$UVLýH[SODLQVWKDWKHUERRNLVVWUXFWXUHG¶DVDQLWLQHUDU\·LWVFKDSWHUV¶LQWHUFRQQHFWHGDQG
GHVLJQHGWRKDYHDFXPXODWLYHHIIHFW·LPSOLFLWO\FKDVWLVLQJWKHIOLSSDQWUHDGHUZKRPLJKWZLVKWRFRPH
along only for what immediately interests or concerns them. 
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argument consistently exonerates Emerson from having to undergo similar obligations. 
+LVHVVD\VVKHSURSRVHVDUH¶WKHZULWLQJRIWKLVVHOIOHVVXQGHFLGHGQHVV·WKHPXUPXULQJV
RID¶SXUHO\UHODWLRQDOJUDVVOLNHVHOIZKLFKEHQGVZLWKWKHZLQG·39 As Cavell had written 
LQSHUKDSVKLVPRVWFRQFHQWUDWHGSLHFHRQWKHHWKLFDOREOLJDWLRQRI(PHUVRQ·VZULWLQJ
WKHOHFWXUH¶%HLQJ2GG*HWWLQJ(YHQ·WKHGHPDQGRIODQJXDJHLVGHFLVLYHQHVV
LWVHOIWKHGHFLVLYHQHVVRIDFWLQJQRZLWLVWKHGHPRQVWUDWLRQRIRQH·V¶UHDGLQHVVWR
VXEMHFW\RXUGHVLUHWRZRUGV>«@WREHFRPHLQWHOOLJLEOHZLWKQRDVVXUDQFHWKDW\RXZLOO
EHWDNHQXS·40 To declare something undecided or, worse, generally undecidable, as 
&DYHOOILQGVVRPHLQVXEVWDQWLDOYHUVLRQVRIGHFRQVWUXFWLRQWRGRLV¶WKHWDNLQJRID
SRVWXUHDQGDSRRURQH·LWLVRIFRXUVHDGHFLVLRQPDGHDJDLQVWWKHPDNLQJRID
decision, an acquittal, a neutralisation³QRWOHDYLQJRQH·VXWWHUDQFHWRFKDQFHEXW
PDLQWDLQLQJVRYHUHLJQW\E\GHFOLQLQJWROLPLWRQH·VSRVVLELOLW\ 41 Declining to make a 
GHFLVLRQLV¶VHOIOHVV·RQO\LQVRIDUDVLWFRQVWLWXWHVWKHUHIXVDOWRSRVLWDOLPLWHGSHUVRQ,Q
a personal sense, however, it offers the subjective liberty of not having to commit oneself, 
of not EHLQJ¶FODSSHGLQWRMDLO· and assuming the infinite selfhood that Emerson 
IDPRXVO\SRVLWVLQ¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·CW II, 29). 
 ,IWKHUHLVDVKRUWFRPLQJLQ&DYHOO·VWUeatment of this theme in Emerson, 
KRZHYHULWLVWRGRZLWKWKHYHU\FODULW\ZLWKZKLFKKHIUDPHV(PHUVRQ·VGLFKRWRPRXV
attitudes, of the necessity of giving oneself over, and the disinclination to do so. His 
solution (which he finds XQGHUO\LQJ(PHUVRQ·VWhought) is prospective³¶>J@HQLXVLV
accordingly the name of the promise that the private and the social will be achieved 
together, hence of the perception that our lives now take place in the absence of 
HLWKHU·42 :KDW&DYHOO·VWUHDWPHQWGRHVQ·WDFFRXQWIRU, in its concentrated encapsulation 
                                                 
39 $UVLýS 
40 &DYHOO¶%HLQJ2GG*HWWLQJ(YHQ·LQIn Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 114. 
41 &DYHOO¶%HLQJ2GG·S 
42 &DYHOO¶%HLQJ2GG·S 
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RIWKHHVVHQWLDOSUREOHPLVWKHSURFHVVE\ZKLFK(PHUVRQ·VZULWLQJPRGXODWHVWKLV
situation over a period of time, how Emerson appears to recognise, and constantly seeks 
to recalibrate, the nature of his condition in language: how, most of all, it is reflected in 
WKHGLYLVLRQLQKLVZULWLQJLQWRLWV¶GRXEOHG·IRUP,QGHHGWKHFRPPRQSULQFLSOHLQDOORI
&DYHOO·VZRUNRQ(PHUVRQ³the tracing of the limits of our agency in the world and in 
language, which he examines through the lens of a coming to terms with skepticism, 
with our capacity to know of and intervene in the world without³is something that 
comes to Emerson not momentously but gradually, and it is a discovery made through 
the prism of language. First, language is the type of the world prior to our own self-
knowledge; its conventions are our terms of definition, and we must internalise prior to 
any attempt at expression.43 Secondly, it does not necessarily accept the impress of our 
will as purely as one might hope³rather, we are bound to accept its laws, and their 
disruption of any attempt, on our part, of unique self-definition or expression. But, 
finally, it is nevertheless the epitome of mediums, and acknowledging and practising 
limited but still legitimate modes of action within its parameters is what Emerson 
theorises and aspires to. 
 Against the trite assumptions on literary agency made by vocal advocates of 
New Americanism in the last twenty years, therefore, Emerson fails to assent to an idea 
RIOLWHUDWXUH·VXQambiguous social or cultural power, much less to put such an idea into 
practice. The work of Donald Pease and John Carlos Rowe, for instance, is so fixed and 
UHVWULFWHGLQLWVSUHVXPSWLRQRIWKHHIILFDF\RIDQDXWKRU·VVRFLR-political agency that it 
simply cannot accommodate the expansion needed when this condition comes into 
question. 44 So, rather than the exertion of personal freedoms, it is discipline and 
                                                 
43 For a more extensive exegesis of the inherited and legalistic elements of this principle as derived from 
&DYHOODQGLOOXVWUDWHGLQ(PHUVRQ·V¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·VHH'DYLG*UHHQKDP¶7KH6NHSWLFDO'HGXFWLRQ
5HDGLQJ.DQWDQG&DYHOOLQ(PHUVRQ·V´6HOI-5HOLDQFHµ·, ESQ, 53 (2007), 253-81. 
44 $V'RQDOG3HDVH·VGHILQLWLRQDODUJXPHQWGHFODUHGWKH1HZ$PHULFDQLVW¶insist[s] on literature as an 
agency within the political world and thereby violate[s] the fundamental presupposition of the liberal 
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¶ORQJDQLPLW\·WKDW(PHUVRQDGPLUHVLQZULWLQJDQGLWLVMXVWVXFKORQJDQLPLW\³or 
askesis, to give that word its full sense³that he will eventually come to seek to 
replicate.45 The problem for the reader of Emerson is that the limited acts of will he 
postulates, and proposes to enact, tend despite the theoretical high-mindedness which 
accompanies them to end in practice in contrivance and machination. There are multiple 
reasons why this is repeatedly the case across his career, but broadly speaking, the 
GHPDQGGHVFULEHGE\&DYHOODVD¶WHUULEOHUHVSRQVLELOLW\·DSSHDUVWREHH[SHULHQFHGLQ
exactly this way. As I will demonstrate throughout, Emerson is a radical theoretician of 
the possibilities of literary form, albeit one with some curious flaws that lead him to 
acquittals, aversion of responsibility, and a general distaste for the theories that 
otherwise tKUHDWHQWRHQFORVHKLPVRWKDWWKHVHQVHRID¶GRXEOHZULWLQJ·LVH[WHQGHGWR
                                                                                                                                          
imagination·DSRLQWGHYHORSHGLQDIROORZ-up article which posited that ¶>S@ULPDU\LGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWKWKH
sociopolitical strategies of social movements, rather than the academic discipline they practice, leads to a 
very different description of what it means to be coQVWLWXWHGDVD1HZ$PHULFDQLVW·,n other words, the 
validity of their scholarly interest is to be judged according to its efficacy as an agent of social activism. 
John Carlos Rowe followed this advice to the letter in his $W(PHUVRQ·V7RPEof 1997. Finding Emerson 
LQDSSOLFDEOHWRWKHHUD·VPDMRUHPDQFLSDWRU\VRFLDOPRYHPHQWV5RZHFRQFOXGHGWKDW(PHUVRQ·V
¶aesthetic ideology·IXQFWLRQHGWRQHXWUDOLVHOLWHUDWXUHDVDVSDFHRIVRFLR-political agency, so that 
¶(PHUVRQLDQ7ranscendentalism had an important ideological function to serve in nineteenth-century 
America: the legitimation of those practices of intellectual abstraction required to rationalise the 
contradictions of the new industrial economy·7KHDVVXPSWLRQVPDGHE\WKLVVFKRRORIFULWLFLVPKDYH
more to do with anti-canonical controversy than the specific foibles of their major targets, and as such it 
is not surprising that they fail to acknowledge their perpetuation of the very notions they claim to be 
repudiating. What could be more conventionally Emersonian, after all, than calculated iconoclasm in the 
name of re-establishing a potency lost in the elite discourse of academe? As Elizabeth Maddock Dillon 
KDVZULWWHQWKHLPSOLFLWREMHFWRI1HZ$PHULFDQLVPLVDOZD\V¶WRUHFODLPDIRUPRIDJHQF\WKDWDFDGHPLF
interpellation had destroyeG>«@DQDXWRQRPRXVOLEHUDOVXEMHFWLVUHFRQVWLWXWHGWKURXJKHVFDSLQJWKH
DFDGHP\·7KH\GLIIHUIURP(PHUVRQKRZHYHULQVRIDUDVWKH\IDLOWRFRQIURQWRUTXHVWLRQZKHWKHUWKH
¶LPSRWHQFH·WKH\H[SHULHQFHDQGORRNWRRYHUFRPHPD\EHPRUHIXQGDPHQWDO³and, as Dillon adds, more 
textual³than they are willing to countenance, for to do so requires a disciplinary commitment they reject 
by claiming to operate wholly outside of conventional academic prerogatives. 'RQDOG3HDVH¶1HZ
Americanists: Revisionist InterventLRQVLQWRWKH&DQRQ·, boundary 2, 17 (1990), 1-37 (p. 16); Pease, 
¶1DWLonal Identities, Postmodern ArteIDFWVDQG3RVWQDWLRQDO1DUUDWLYHV·, boundary 2, 19 (1992), 1-13 (p. 8); 
John Carlos Rowe, $W(PHUVRQ·V7RPE7KH3ROLWLFVRI&ODVVLF$PHULFDQ/LWHUDWXUH (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997), p. 5; (OL]DEHWK0DGGRFN'LOORQ¶)HDURI)RUPDOLVP.DQW7ZDLQDQG&XOWXUDO
6WXGLHVLQ$PHULFDQ/LWHUDWXUH·, Diacritics, 27.4 (1998), 46-69 (pp. 50-3). 
45 Emerson finds cause to discuss a slightly unorthodox use of the term longanimity in reflecting on 
$QGUHZV1RUWRQ·VIDPRXVDWWDFNLQWKHZDNHRIWKH'LYLQLW\6FKRRO¶$GGUHVV·XQH[SHFWHGO\KLV
FRPPHQWVVHHPWRHYLQFHSUDLVHIRU1RUWRQ·VGHWHUPLQDWLRQDQGVW\OHZLWKRXWLURQ\ILQGLQJLQVWHDGLQKLV
¶WHQDFLW\RISXUSRVH>«@ZKDW%DFRQFDOOVORQJDQLPLW\·/DWHUWKDWVDPHPRQWKKHUHIOHFWVRQDOHWWHU
SHQQHGWR0DUJDUHW)XOOHUUHFRUGLQJWKHOLQHV¶VHHLQJKRZHQWLUHO\WKHYDOXHRIIDFWVLVLQWKHFODVVLILFDWLRQ
of the eye that sees them I desire to study, I desire longanimityWRXVH%DFRQ·VZRUG·JMN VII, 63, 92). In 
(PHUVRQ·VKDQGVWKHWHUPFRPHVWRVWDQGIRUDVLQJXODULW\WKDWLVWKHSURGXFWRIGLVFLSOLQHDFXOWXUHG
forbearance required to countenance the demands that writing places upon his concept of liberty, which 
FRUURERUDWHVWKHIXOOHUVHQVHRI¶DVNHVLV·LQFODVVLFDO*UHHNDVWUDLQLQJIRUDWUDGHRUSURIHVVLRQ 
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incorporate the ways in which he first confronts and then evades the responsibility of 
writing through writing, a writing that comes to have very different meanings for the 
author who depends upon it, and the reader to whom it is nominally addressed. 
 Before I give an overview of the chapters to follow, it is perhaps necessary to 
qualify what may appear to be a contradiction in my treatment of Emerson in the 
context of the above. A perpetual interrogation of informing conditions, and an 
H[SHULPHQWDOSOD\DJDLQVWWKHLUFRQVWULFWLRQVGRHVQRWTXLWHVXLW(PHUVRQ·V\RXWKIXO
objective³the assertion and affirmation of his divine and self-reliant individuality. The 
overtones of bourgeois subjectivity are never far away in such considerations, as a great 
many readers and critics of Emerson have written and said. But I find it somewhat 
unreasonable to hold Emerson fully to account on this; as an author in the post-Kantian 
tradition, he was neither the first nor the last to give in to the dream of a coherent 
philosophy of the subject. However, what is significant is that it is in the question of 
IRUPWKDW(PHUVRQ·VDVSLUDWLRQVDQGDQ[LHWLHVDUHSOD\HGRXWLWLVKHUHWKDWKHVHHVKLV
theories founder, and here that he seeks to subsequently reinvent them. As such, the 
FRQFHVVLRQVWR(PHUVRQ·VPRUHH[XEHUDQWDQGWRDPRGHUQUHDGHUHPEDUUDVVLQJLGHDV
in my earlier chapters are necessary if one is to successfully trace the trajectory of his 
ideas throughout the 1840s. 
 
Synopsis 
3DUWRQHRIWKHWKHVLVWUDFHVWKHILUVWVWDJHRI(PHUVRQ·VSRHWLFSURJUDPPHZKLFK
develops from ideas current in his philosophical and theological milieu and aspires to 
affirm the character of some essential, intuited self-consciousness through writing, a 
project which founders on the necessary conditions of literary form already discussed. 
,QWKHILUVWFKDSWHU,GHYHORSWKHJURXQGVRIP\WKHVLVRQ(PHUVRQ·VLQWHUHVWLQIRUPDV
a principle of secular commitment in more detail. Focusing on his first mature published 
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ZRUN·VNature, I examine the philosophical basis of his theory of consciousness, 
emphasising the necessity of the secular world of difference and concrete particulars, the 
1270(RI(PHUVRQ·VSKLORVRSKLFDl scheme, in his ability to register, by a deductive 
process, the hypothesised structure of the ME as an intuited and universal 
consciousness. In this process, the discovery of the intuition which Emerson 
consistently posits actually follows the acknowledgement of how the necessary primacy 
RIWKHIRUPHGZRUOGGHWHUPLQHVWKHQDWXUHRIZKDWKHWHUPVWKH¶IRUPOHVV·(PHUVRQDV
has finally been demonstrated in the last twenty-five years, is closer in method to Kant 
than to Jacobi, Fichte, or other post-Kantian idealists, and I will follow in the steps of 
critics such as David Van Leer, Patrick Keane, and David Greenham in maintaining the 
relevance of the post-Kantian tradition, mediated through Coleridge and others, to an 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI(PHUVRQ·VLQWHOOHFWXDO philosophy. However, I will also examine his 
thought in parallel with some less extensively documented sources, including Victor 
Cousin and the occasional Transcendentalist Orestes Brownson, with a view to 
HPSKDVLVLQJWKHQXDQFHVWKDWGLVWLQJXLVK(PHUVRQ·s relative complexity and difference 
IURPKLVFRQWHPSRUDULHV$V,ZLOOGHPRQVWUDWH(PHUVRQ·VWKHRU\RIPLQGGLIIHUVIURP
that of other romantics in the priority it assigns to legalistic, external structures, and 
hence a readiness to conform to worldly usage is, in fact, the essential Emersonian 
predicate. 
Chapter two elaborates the justification for the privileging of text as site of the 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQQHFHVVDU\WRIRUHQVLFDOO\WUDFHWKHRSHUDWLRQVRI5HDVRQ(PHUVRQ·V
prereflective, impersonal power working through the worldly actions of the person. I 
DQDO\VH(PHUVRQ·VFRQYLFWLRQWKDWDSURFHVVRIZULWLQJDQGVHOI-reading constituted the 
most effective way of discerning the functions of an innate, intuited, original being, and 
suggest that this principle derived from contemporary discussions in Unitarian 
theological journals of Biblical inspiration. Specifically, Emerson appears to have drawn 
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on the intellectualised interrogation of the epistemology of inspiration to assert a means 
by which the traces of an intuitive Reason could be the subject of hermeneutical inquiry, 
particularly insofar as the psychology of suspended subjective sovereignty theorised in 
these discussions mirrors the kind of inaccessible intuition of which Emerson was 
certain, but lacked the substantiating evidence for. In the second part of the chapter, I 
LQYHVWLJDWH(PHUVRQ·VFRQWLQXHGDWWHPSWVWRWKHRULVHDQGWKHQUHDOLVHWKLVKHUPHQHXWLF
within his compositional practice, particularly with respect to the addresses of the late-
1830s and early-1840s, and the volume Essays, published in 1841. While Emerson 
nominally advocates something like a recursive affirmation of perpetual personal 
identity by revisiting his journal writings in an attempt to trace there the essence of a 
more original, depersonalised utterance, in actual fact the modus of an intellectualised 
inspiration generates a tension between this former impersonal abandonment and the 
latter expectation of a retained personal agency. The consequence of this tension is that 
a disjuncture in the authorial persona is registered strongly for the first time, and 
Emerson appears to recognise a flaw at the heart of his project. Although his attitude to 
this exigency remains mainly ambivalent so far as the published works go (partly, 
perhaps, because the journal sources for the works published over this time date from 
across the 1830s and hence reflect a long period of development in his thought), in the 
last years of the decade a different set of conditions increasingly preoccupy him, 
according to which his original conception of double writing is adapted that it might 
negotiate between the poles of this disjuncture. 
 Chapter three examines the poetics of reiteration which emerges from this in 
detail, as it appears both in Essays and the journals of the months immediately preceding 
WKDWYROXPH·VSXEOLFDWLRQ5HLWHUDWLRQZKLFKLQDOLQJXLVWLFVHQVHFDQDQGGRHVLQWKLV
instance) equate to the more or less exact repetition of word, phrase, sentence, or other 
textual unit, comes to fascinate Emerson because repetition is apparently an instance of 
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universalisation within the remit of the particular. Indeed, for this very reason, repetition 
is, philosophically speaking, impossible. In linguistic terms, repetition can, at least, be 
figured, but doing so typically affects the semantic clarity and transparency of the 
repeated utterance, hence its use as a rhetorical or poetical device. For Emerson, the 
poetics of repetition goes further toward an ideal total opacity of language, in which its 
LPSHUVRQDOFKDUDFWHUEHFRPHVUDGLFDOO\YLVLEOH7KHREMHFWLYHLVWRVWDELOLVHRQH·VUHODWLRQ
WRODQJXDJHDQGGHFOLQHWKH¶FRPPLWPHQW·DQG¶GHILQLWLRQ·ZKLFKLVDFRUROODU\RIZULWLQJ
RQH·VVHOILQWRIRUP$VVXFK(PHUVRQK\SRWKHVLVHVWKDWUHSHWLtion is a means of 
preserving subjective neutrality, which is to say infinite possibility, by excluding any 
SRVVLELOLW\RID¶SHUVRQDO·LQYHVWPHQWLQODQJXDJH7KLVSURFHVVRIFRXUVHLVQRWZLWKRXW
problems, and the insubstantiality and provisionality of the programme is noted as I 
trace how Emerson abandons interest in it almost simultaneously with registering it. 
By 1842, his thought on literary form and the nature of a personal relation to it 
had turned radically, partly because of the provisionality of repetition, but more 
distinctly because of the effect on Emerson of the sudden death of his son Waldo in 
-DQXDU\WKDW\HDU:DOGR·VGHDWKOHGQRWRQO\WRDQRXWSRXULQJRIJULHILQWKHMRXUQDOVRI
the period, but also a renewed focus on the parameters of the personal, and especially 
on the status of persons other than oneself. For the first time, Emerson pays close 
attention to the role that the text plays in intersubjective relations, while the thesis of 
recursive affirmation of the personal through the text is finally abandoned in favour of 
an acknowledgement that writing is always, in one sense or another, for future persons. 
As such, the concern in the journals for 1841-44 turns increasingly to legacy, and this 
becomes the primary subject of consideration in the volume Essays: Second Series (1844).  
The second part of the thesis traces this effect in the journals and works of the 
1840s and early-1850s. In chapter four, I identify a theory of literary legacy based on an 
economy of the gift as it appears in Essays: Second Series. Taking the opposite pole to his 
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previous positions, Emerson appears to accept that the author must immolate 
themselves in textual production; that they give of themselves in committing themselves 
to form, and that this gift restores infinite possibility to the future by depriving the 
authorial subject of the same. In the later sections of this chapter the formal processes 
necessary in effecting this mode of the gift are examined in detail, the consequence 
being that Emerson turns out to be nothing like as generous as the theory suggests. 
Instead, by virtue of recourse to a self-conscious (but nonetheless disguised) plagiarism, 
(PHUVRQDEVROYHVKLPVHOIRIWKHGXW\WR¶LQYHVW·DQG¶LPSDUW·IRUWKHIXWXUHZKLFKKH
GLVFXVVHVLQ¶([SHULHQFH·DQGVXEVHTXHQWO\GHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWWKHSUREOHPRIDXWKRULDO
relation to text³of possessing the text, or being possessed by it³remains unresolved 
by the mid-1840s. 
 &KDSWHUILYHFRQVLGHUVWKLVLUUHVROXWLRQLQWKHFRQWH[WRI(PHUVRQ·VQH[W
published work, the 1847 collection Poems, contending that with this volume he finally 
attains a kind of apotheosis in terms of his poetic project, albeit one which has little to 
do with his aspirations of a decade earlier. Instead, by way of a more theorised and 
commiWWHGYHUVLRQRIWKHSRHWLFSUDFWLFHVVHHQLQ·V¶0DQQHUV·KHVHHNVWRUHILJXUH
the relation of the poet to his work, his legacy, and those who will in time come to read 
it, changing epistemic expectations on the part of the author and of his audience. As I 
demonstrate, the corollary of this is that any knowledge we bring to the poems, any 
expectation accrued in the study of literary skill and tradition, may potentially be 
challenged by the alternative poetic epistemology Emerson offers, and as such, the 
received idea that his verse is an aberration not representative of his broader oeuvre is 
reconsidered. As I argue here, there are reasons why the poetry may seem egregiously 
bad, pompous, and sententious. In the afterword that follows, the trajectory followed 
IURPWRLQZKLFK(PHUVRQ·VGHVLUHWRILQGDFTXLWWDORIWKHLPSRVVLEOH
investment in literature which he poses for himself, and which necessitates vacillation, 
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contrivance, and various methods of deceit, is concluded as I elaborate on how he 
formulates his position into theoretical coherence, something eventually published in 
WKHOHFWXUH¶6KDNVSHDUHRUWKHSRHW·LQ·VRepresentative Men. 
  
37 
 
Part One:  
¶Knowing aIWHUDKLJKQHJDWLYHZD\·7KH)ormality 
of Emersonian Consciousness: 1836-1841 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
¶6RPHKRZKHSXEOLVKHVLWZLWKVROHPQMR\·7KH(QGVRI,GHDOLVPDQGWKH
Beginning of Writing in Nature 
 
  
I know nothing of the source of my being but I will not soil my nest. I know 
much of it after a high negative way, but nothing after the understanding. God 
himself contradicts through me. (JMN V, 71) 
 
For most of the critical history concerned with Emerson, there has been little question 
as to where primacy lay in the relationship between the self and its representations. 
$OZD\VWKHVRYHUHLJQW\RIWKH¶LPSHULDOVHOI·ZDVSDUDPRXQW(PHUVRQLVDQLQWXLWLRQLVW
in the most straightforward and philosophically bankrupt sense, claiming immanent 
GLYLQHLQVLJKWIURPWKHIDFXOW\RI¶5HDVRQ· a pseudo-Kantianism derived from 
Coleridge.1 While these claims are based in fact and remain relevant to our reception of 
his work, criticism has, since the early 1980s, shifted its focus to the consideration of a 
¶GHWUDQVFHQGHQWDOLVHG·(PHUVRQAlongside the socio-political concerns which dominate 
Americanist analyses of the nineteenth-century from the last twenty years, there have 
also been a number of philosophically minded studies which have collectively thrown 
doubt on the sovereignty of the Emersonian self.2 $V(PHUVRQ·Vmost astute modern 
reader, Stanley Cavell, made plain in 1984, the reconstructed reader of a philosophical 
Emerson reacts with ¶DQQR\DQFHDWKDYLQJWRVWDQGWKHUHSHDWHGFRQIRUPLQJ
description of Emerson as a philosopher of intuition·,QVWHDG&DYHOOUHJards him a 
                                                 
1 There are myriad readings of Emerson which draw on this fundamental assumption. In the middle to 
later years of the twentieth-century, Yvor Winters, Quentin Anderson, and Joel Porte built careers around 
a critique of the American tradition that had an Emersonian elemental egotism at its heart. Philosophical 
defences of Emerson were few in the middle years of the twentieth-century, with René WelleN·V
FRPPHQWVRQWKHLQDFFXUDFLHVLQ(PHUVRQ·VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI.DQWDQG*HUPDQ,GHDOLVPLQConfrontations 
dominating the often more sophisticated earlier analyses by Frank Thompson and Henry David Gray. See 
Wellek, Confrontations (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 153-212; Thompson, 
¶(PHUVRQ·V,QGHEWHGQHVVWR&ROHULGJH·Studies in Philology, 23 (1926), 55-76; Gray, A Statement of New 
England Transcendentalism as Expressed in the Philosophy of its Chief Exponent (Stanford CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1917). 
2 )RUGLVFXVVLRQVRIWKHWHQGHQF\WRZDUGGHWUDQVFHQGHQWDOLVLQJ(PHUVRQVHH/DZUHQFH%XHOO¶7KH
(PHUVRQ,QGXVWU\LQWKHV·ESQ, 30 (1984), 117-36 (p. 120). See also Alan M. Levine and Daniel S. 
Malachuk, eds., A Political Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson (Lexington KY: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2011), particularly pp. 1-39 and 265-304. 
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¶WHDFKHURIWXLWLRQ· an exponent of a pedagogy which tutors us to reflexively tutor 
ourselves, and it is within the parameters of this dynamic that the challenge to absolute 
sovereignty and self-possession lies.3 For what Cavell and others have hypothesised is a 
model of the self in Emerson which undergoes stages of self-relation rather than 
continuous, immanent self-identity.  
In this chapter, I will revisit this model with a view to establishing how, at the 
beginning of his mature career with the publication of Nature in 1836, Emerson 
recognises the primacy of something manifestly distinct from the self³something 
PDWHULDOVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVLGHQWLILDEO\¶IRUPDO·LQVRIDUDVRQHFRXOGVHOI-define by 
FRPSOLFLWO\¶FRQIRUPLQJ·WRLW³in the affirmation of his romantically-derived 
subjectivity. In enlarging on his philosophical inheritance, (PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWILQGV
language to be the privileged locus of this affirmation. The reasons for this will become 
clearer as I go on, but fundamentally, his concern is with the formalities of a language 
which pre-exists (and is quite distinct from) consciousness. Submitting to such a 
language in pursuit of self-expression involves an elective affinity, a wilful act of 
conformity, as certain critics have recognised.4 I wish to augment these commentaries by 
arguing that the nature of this relationship with language is rooted in (PHUVRQ·V
idiosyncratic compositional practice. His ongoing investment in the texts of his past as 
the substance of the texts of his present and his future prescribes the terms of his 
philosophical labour, and this labour in language will in time be the dominant factor of 
his turn away from idealism. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 &DYHOO¶%HLQJ2GG·S 
4 As discussed in the introduction, this is typified by Cavell, and has been further elaborated in 
*UHHQKDP·V¶Skeptical Deduction·SS-81. 
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Self-Relation: The Identity of ME 
I want initially to focus on a few conditions relevant to Nature which make this text one 
of considerable significance not only in setting the terms of his early work, but also as 
constituting a new mark by which to identify the nature of his relation to his own texts. 
NatureRIFRXUVHZDVWKHILUVWRI(PHUVRQ·VPature publications, printed under an 
arrangement with the Boston publisher James Munroe according to which Emerson 
retained full editorial control and ownership of the plates that would continue into the 
1850s.5 By 1836, his study contained nearly two hundred unpublished manuscripts and 
sermons, as well as his extensive journals and poetry notebooks, the contents of which 
were not published in his lifetime.6 As such, the decision to publish³by an author who 
ZRXOGZULWHRI¶KDW>LQJ@WKLVFKLOGLVKKDVWHWRSUint & publish· and who would rue the 
QHFHVVLW\RI¶FRQILQLQJ·DQG¶GHILQLQJ·LQSXEOLFZULWLQJLQ·VEssays³constitutes a 
central point in his thinking (JMN VII, 358; CW II, 202).7 There is a sense, in other 
words, that Emerson was biding his time; WKDWKLVWKHRUHWLFDOILUVWVDOYRRU¶HQWHULQJ
wedge· as he described it to Carlyle, functioned to focus his energies on his 
methodology and the concision of his statement, a statement that depended on 
something inherent in the very fact of its being published.8 The model I will be 
exploring here, therefore, depends upon seeing Nature not as the invocation of intuitive 
self-knowledge, even as it does at times declare this as its central doctrine, but instead as 
                                                 
5 $VPDWWHULQJRI(PHUVRQ·VFDOORZYHUVHK\PQVDQGVHUPRQVUHDFKHGSULQWLQWKHODWH-1820s and early-
V,QJHQHUDOWKHVHSLHFHVDUHLQGXELWDEO\PLQRU6HHKLVSRHP¶)DPH·LQ>$QGUHZV1RUWRn],The 
Offering (Cambridge MA: Hilliard and Brown, 1829), pp. 52-¶7KH5LJKW+DQGRI)HOORZVKLS·LQ-DPHV
Kendall, A Sermon Delivered at the Ordination of Hersey Bradford Goodwin (Concord: Congregational Church 
and Society, 1830), pp. 29-DQG¶:H/RYHWKH9HQHUDEOH+RXVH·LQ+HQU\:DUH-UA Sermon Delivered 
at the Ordination of Rev. Chandler Robbins (Boston: James W. Burditt, 1833), p. 32. The only exception was 
WKH¶Historical Discourse, delivered EHIRUHWKH&LWL]HQVRI&RQFRUG·ZKLFKZDVSXblished in a small 
run in pamphlet form by C. F. Bemis of Concord. 
6 6HH5REHUW(6SLOOHU·VLQWURGXFWLRQWRWKH+DUYDUG%HONQDSHGLWLRQRINature, Addresses, and Lectures, 
(CW I, xiv-xv). 
7 Barry Wood noted this same principle in 1976, but admits that for KLPWKHQDWXUHRIWKLV¶FHQWUDOLW\LV
QRWH[DFWO\FOHDU·7KLVFKDSWHULVLQWHQGHGWRFODULI\RQHFULWLFDOUROHRINature in the context of the major 
ZRUNVRIWKHIROORZLQJIRXUWHHQ\HDUV6HH:RRG¶&ROHULGJH·V'LDOHFWLFDO0HWKRGDQGWKH6WUDWHJ\RI
EmerVRQ·VNature·PMLA, 91 (1976), 385-97 (p. 386). 
8 The Correspondence of Emerson and Carlyle, ed. by Joseph Slater (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1964), p. 149. 
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a working method, a product in language which permits the exigencies of the medium to 
LQIOHFWWKHWH[W·VREMHFWUDWKHUWKDQDVSLULQJWRDQH[SUHVVLRQDVSXUHDVWKH
consciousness that it nominally posits as its principal concern. In other words, Nature 
does and says two very distinct things at once, and this bifurcation, which distinguishes 
(PHUVRQ·VURPDQWLFREOLJDWLRQ to his potentially infinite self from the formalisms of 
society, language, and the material world, characterises all of his writing in the first stage 
of his literary career, from 1836 to 1842. 
 To begin in the simplest terms, Nature LVDSDUDGR[LFDOWLWOHJLYHQWKDW(PHUVRQ·V
VKRUWWH[WSURSHUO\IRFXVHVRQWKHVRYHUHLJQW\RIWKHLQGLYLGXDODQGKLV¶NLQJGRP[«] 
over QDWXUH·CW I, 45. Emphasis added).9 7KHGHFLVLRQWRWLWOHWKHERRN·VIirst chapter 
¶1DWXUH·UHVWDWHVWKHDSSDUHQWSDUDGR[\HWLQWKHSDUDJUDSKZKLFKFRQFOXGHVWKH
introduction, a striking omission³which to my knowledge has neither been 
acknowledged nor remDUNHGXSRQE\(PHUVRQ·VFULWLFV³opens up a possibility which 
qualifiHVWKHWLWXODUSULRULW\JLYHQWR¶QDWXUH·RYHUPDQ,TXRWHWKHSDVVDJHLQIXOO 
 
Philosophically considered, the universe is composed of Nature and the Soul. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, all that is separate from us, all which Philosophy 
distinguishes as the NOT ME, that is, both nature and art, all other men and my 
own body, must be ranked under this name, NATURE. In enumerating the 
values of nature and casting up their sum, I shall use the word in both senses;³
in its common and in its philosophical import. In inquiries so general as our 
present one, the inaccuracy is not material; no confusion of thought will occur. 
Nature, in the common sense, refers to essences unchanged by man; space, the 
air, the river, the leaf. Art is applied to the mixture of his will with the same 
                                                 
9 Patrick Keane also makes this observation, albeit in relative isolation, in his Emerson, Romanticism, and 
Intuitive Reason: The Transatlantic Light of All Our Day (Columbia MO: University of Missouri Press, 2003), p. 
43. 
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things, as in a house, a canal, a statue, a picture. But his operations taken 
together are so insignificant, a little chipping, baking, patching, and washing, that 
in an impression so grand as that of the world on the human mind, they do not 
vary the result. (CW I, 8) 
 
The second half of the extract emphasises the already granted primacy of nature, a 
primacy that enacts an extreme generalisation (as Emerson alludes in the phrase 
¶LQTXLULHVVRJHQHUDO·ZKLFKZLOOEHdeveloped throughout the piece. It is in the first half 
WKDWWKHJURXQGVIRUWKLVDUHVXJJHVWHG7KH¶1270(·LVH[SOLFLWO\GHILQHGDVQDWXUH
PDWWHUPDQ·VSURGXFWLRQVWKHERGLO\DQGVRRQ0HDQZKLOHWKHUHDUHWHUPVKHUHZKLFK
GHVLJQDWHZKDWLV¶QRWQDWXUH· so to speak, but Emerson seems to be hedging somewhat 
EHKLQGWKHDPELJXLW\RIWKHVHUHFHLYHGFRQFHSWV¶7KH6RXO· for instance³something 
not defined here as personal or impersonal. This is problematic³¶0(·PXVWQHFHVVDULO\
be personal³EXW(PHUVRQDOVRGHILQHVWKH¶QRWQDWXUH·DV¶XV· markedly illogical given 
WKDW¶DOORWKHUPHQ·DUH1270(7KHFUXFLDOSRLQWKHUHLVWKDWWKHUHLVno mention of a 
ME in Nature, despite the fact that the choice of term demands the ME as a logical 
predicate against which the negative is defined, otherwise the formula would consist of a 
thesis of NATURE and the antithesis NOT NATURE.10 The question, therefore, is 
why Emerson opts to posit a logical deduction which begins with the antithesis, both in 
fact in the terms of the above quoted passage, and more generally in granting nature the 
primacy implied by the title. 
 There are, of course, precedents for the terms ME and NOT ME, as there are 
for Reason and intuition, in the inheritance of German Idealism at the heart of 
                                                 
10 7KDW(PHUVRQGRHVLQDVHQVHRIIHUWKLVDOWHUQDWLYHDVDIWHUWKRXJKWZLWKWKHFDSLWDOLVHG¶1$785(·
that follows, indicates that the effective primacy lays with NATURE, even as the proper (yet necessarily 
implied, not asserted) primacy remains with the absent ME. The difference between the postulated logic 
of NATURE and NOT NATURE, and the unstated ME with its NOT ME, forms the interrogative 
structure of this chapter. 
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romanticism, although the path of influence in the case of Emerson has been 
contested.11 What is commonly shared by critics, however, is the failure to acknowledge 
the absence of the word ME from the text, and instead the two terms constitute a 
structuring polarity in which Stephen :KLFKHU·VVXPPDULVDWLRQ³WKDW¶LWLVSODLQWKDW
(PHUVRQ·VLQTXLU\LQWRWKHPHDQLQJDQGSXUSRVHRIQDWXUHLVDWERWWRPDQDWWHPSWWR
DVVLPLODWHQDWXUHLQWRKLPVHOIWRUHGXFHWKH1270(WRWKH0(·³has generally held 
firm.12 Under these conditions the stability and givenness of the ME is presumed, and 
this is where intuition and Reason come into play. Although both terms are Kantian 
derivations, they are unorthodox, reflecting instead misprisions in transmission and a 
GHVLUHDPRQJVW1HZ(QJODQG·VLQWHOOHFWXDOradicals to elaborate a sentimental or 
religiously-derived notion of innate self-knowledge which preceded the arrival of post-
Kantian terminology.13 $QDYHUVLRQWR-RKQ/RFNH·VVHQVXDOLVWHSLVWHPRORJ\ZDV
increasingly evident amongst the more liberal members of both Unitarian and 
7ULQLWDULDQZLQJVRIWKHFKXUFKWKURXJKWKHVDQGVGXULQJ(PHUVRQ·VVWXGHQW
years at Harvard and early ministry. Certain established critiques³such as those of the 
Scottish philosophers Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart, who proposed that there 
                                                 
11 5HQp:HOOHN·VIRXQGDWLRQDOH[DPLQDWLRQVWDWHVWKDW¶>Q@RGRXEWWKHWHUPVMe and Not-Me frequently 
used by Emerson [«] are ultimately Fichtean in origin, but they come to Emerson through Cousin or 
&DUO\OH·VHVVD\RQ1RYDOLV·:HOOHNp. 197. Another early commentator, Henry Pochmann, dismissed the 
WHUPVDV¶FRPPRQSODFHV>ZKLFK@ need not be referred to any particular source·6HH3RFKPDQQGerman 
Culture in America: Philosophical and Literary Influences 1600-1900 (Madison WI: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1957), p. 187. I contend that, while the source might not be specifically identifiable, these terms are 
nevertheless rather more significant than Pochmann suggests, and as such more recent contesting 
hypotheses on the route by which Emerson adopted these and other terms will be examined throughout 
this chapter as I analyse the part Nature plays in mediating and refiguring the idealist inheritance from 
Europe. 
12 Whicher, p. 52. 
13 Alternative, and much more extensive, treatments than I will offer of the development of an intuitive, 
essential consciousness in Transcendentalist thought which would come to be labelled Reason can be 
found in Barbara Packer, ¶7KH7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVWV·LQThe Cambridge History of American Literature: Vol. 2: 
1820-1865, ed. by Sacvan Bercovitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995), pp. 329-604, and 
SDUWLFXODUO\¶7KH$VVDXOWRQ/RFNH·SS350-61.  See also Lawrence Buell, Literary Transcendentalism: Style and 
Vision in the American Renaissance (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1973), and more recently Philip F. 
Gura, American Transcendentalism: A History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007). Versions which place 
additional emphasis on particular influences include Keane, who finds Coleridge, Wordsworth, and 
Milton to be the critical sources. See Keane, pp. 37-79. More recently, David Greenham has demonstrated 
WKDW(PHUVRQXVHGWKHWHUP¶UHDVRQ·WRFRQFHSWXDOLVHVRPHWKLQJDNLQWRGLYLQHLQWXLWLRQLQWKHVDQG
likely picked it up from his aunt, Mary Moody Emerson. See Greenham, (PHUVRQ·V7UDQVDWODQWLF5RPDQWLFLVP 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 35-6. 
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existed, at the very least, a universal sensus communis upon which human cognition was 
founded without reference to experience³were mainstream enough to have been 
included in the Harvard curriculum.14 But increasingly radical voices were also emerging. 
 Sampson Reed, a Swedenborgian who graduated from Harvard three years 
before Emerson, wrote in 1826 that: 
 
There prevails a most erroneous sentiment, that the mind is originally vacant, 
and requires only to be filled up [«] the mind is originally a most delicate germ, 
whose husk is the body; planted in this world, that the light and heat of heaven 
may fall upon it with a gentle radiance, and call forth its energies. The process of 
learning is not by synthesis, or analysis. It is the most perfect illustration of both. 
As subjects are presented to the operation of the mind, they are decomposed 
and reorganized in a manner peculiar to itself, and not easily explained.15 
 
As different from the relatively conservative principles of Reid and Stewart as this is, it 
nonetheless echoed the widely-held conviction that the element missing from the 
Lockean epistemology was a hypothesised more original, essential, and absolute basis of 
consciousness. Consequently, any further criticism of the old way of thinking was 
eagerly received, and examples continued to appear. In 1829, Alexander Everett³the 
EURWKHURI(PHUVRQ·V+DUYDUGWXWRU(GZDUG³published a piece in the North American 
Review on 9LFWRU&RXVLQ·VFULWLTXHRIWKH)UHQFK6HQVXDOLVWeWLHQQH%RQQRWGH
Condillac. Here, Cousin renounced the insidious influence that was by now perhaps 
XQIDLUO\EHLQJKHOGWREHWKHVROHUHVSRQVLELOLW\RIWKH(QJOLVKSKLORVRSKHU¶´Contempt of 
                                                 
14 Merrell Davis has speculated on this point that ¶LWPD\EHWKDW+DUYDUGZDVDOUHDG\UHTXLULQJLWV
VWXGHQWVWRFULWLFLVH/RFNHRQVXFK´FRQWURYHUWHGTXHVWLRQVµDVWKHSXUHO\HPSLULFDORULJLQRINQRZOHGJH
DQGWHDFKLQJ6WHZDUW·VV\VWHPIRUWKDWSXUSRVH·6HH'DYLV¶(PHUVRQ·V ´5HDVRQµDQGWKH6FRWWLVK
3KLORVRSKHUV·, The New England Quarterly, 17 (1944), 209-28 (p. 214). 
15 Sampson Reed, Observations on the Growth of the Mind (1826), in Transcendentalism: A Reader, ed. by Joel 
Myerson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 26-61 (p. 35). Emerson would write ostentatiously 
RIWKLVVKRUWERRNWKDWLWZDV¶WKHEHVWWKLQJVLQFH3ODWRRI3ODWR·VNLQG·L I, 176). 
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Locke is the beginning of wisdomµ·.16 Finally, and probably most famously, the liberal 
Congregationalist James Marsh composed an introductory essay to the 1829 American 
HGLWLRQRI&ROHULGJH·VAids to Reflection in which the neglect of a primary moral faculty 
LQGHSHQGHQWRIH[SHULHQFHPDUNHGRXWDV5HDVRQKDGLQHYLWDEO\OHGWRWKH¶KDELWRf 
using, since the time of Locke, the terms understanding and reason indiscriminately, and 
thus confounding a distinction clearly marked in the philosophy and in the language of 
the older writers·17 
 So the traditional history goes. Locke was damned by an entire generation of 
divinity students, and consequently Emerson inherits a theory the polar opposite to 
Lockeanism, a notional metaphysical psychology in which Reason is an innate faculty at 
the heart of consciousness, intuited directly as though it were an infallible moral 
FRPSDVV7KLVDV&DYHOODQGRWKHUVKDYHQRWHGLV(PHUVRQ·V¶PRVWH[SOLFLWUHYHUVDORI
.DQW·LQVRIDUDVWKH¶LQWXLWLRQV·GHVFULEHGLQWKHILUVWCritique as transcendent, and for 
that reason, essentially illusory, are instead considered to be genuine and potentially 
accessible.18 In spite of the philosophical errors this leads to, there are nevertheless also 
grounds upon which Emerson can be justifiably defended. Initially, it must be asserted 
that this Kantian misprision is absolutely thHFDVHERWKLQ(PHUVRQ·VRZQWKRXJKWLQ
the mid-1830s, at any rate), and in contemporary thought more broadly. A frequently 
                                                 
16 Quoted, with emphasis, in $OH[DQGHU+LOO(YHUHWW¶7KH+LVWRU\RI,QWHOOHFWXDO3KLORVRSK\·, The North 
American Review, 29.64 (1829), 67-123 (p. 83). 
17 -DPHV0DUVK¶3UHOLPLQDU\(VVD\· (1829) in Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Aids to Reflection (1825) and 
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit (1840) (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2005), pp. xxiii-lxxvi (p. lviii).  See also 
Aids to Reflection, p. 142, where Coleridge discusses the confounding of the terms to the detriment of 
philosophy, but using Bacon as his example.  Indeed, it should be noted that the contemporary hostility 
WRZDUGV/RFNHDPRQJVRPDQ\RI1HZ(QJODQG·V\RXQJLQWHOlectuals significantly alters the context of 
&ROHULGJH·VWH[W/RFNHLVQHYHUGLVFXVVHGLQWKLVFDSDFLW\LQAids to Reflection SURSHUEXWRQO\LQ0DUVK·V
introduction to the American edition. 
18 6WDQOH\&DYHOO¶7KLQNLQJRI(PHUVRQ·S0RUHUHFHQWO\ David Van Leer has lamented this 
¶WHQGHQF\WRUHLI\5HDVRQDVDQDEVROXWHHJR·DVWKHPRVWVHULRXVRI(PHUVRQ·VSKLORVRSKLFDOHUURUVDQGLW
has been the focus of the most savage criticisms, such as that of Joel Porte in Emerson and Thoreau pp. 68-
92; Van Leer, p. 5. An alternative 2009 reading by Erin Flynn demonstrates how Emerson resembles 
Novalis and Hölderlin in his aesthetic interrogation of this romantic metaphysical psychology, and 
challenges suppositions of assured egotism by suggesting that, like these German romantics, but unlike 
Fichte, Emerson was absolutely cognisant of the necessary division between the faculties of intuition and 
reflection, so that the consciousness as object of reflection cannot be identical with what is experienced 
subjectLYHO\6HH)O\QQ¶,QWHOOHFWXDO,QWXLWLRQLQ(PHUVRQDQGWKH(DUO\*HUPDQ5RPDQWLFV·Philosophical 
Forum, 40 (2009), 367-89. 
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cited passage from a letter to his brother Edward of 1834 finds him in dogmatically 
idealist mood: 
 
Philosophy affirms that the outward world is only phenomenal [«] wherein the 
Understanding works incessantly as if it were real but the eternal Reason when 
now & then he is allowed to speak declares it is an accident a smoke nowise 
related to his permanent attributes. Now that I have used the words, let me ask 
you do you draw the distinction of Milton Coleridge & the Germans between 
Reason & Understanding. I think it a philosophy itself. & like all truth very 
practical [«] Reason is the highest faculty of the soul³what we mean often by 
the soul itself; it never reasons, never proves, it simply perceives; it is vision. The 
Understanding toils all the time, compares, contrives, adds, argues, near sighted 
but strong-sighted, dwelling in the present the expedient the customary. Beasts 
have some understanding but no Reason. Reason is potentially perfect in every 
man³Understanding in very different degrees of strength. The thoughts of 
\RXWK	¶ILUVWWKRXJKWV·, are the revelations of Reason. (L I, 412-3. Emphasis in 
original) 
 
The principle dominates the Transcendentalist mind for years. J. A. Saxton stated in a 
Dial DUWLFOHRIWKDW5HDVRQLVWREHGHVLJQDWHG¶WKHIDFXOW\RILQWXLWLYHSHUFHSWLRQ· 
WKDW¶WKHLGHDVRIWKHVSLULWXDOWKHLQILQLWHRI*RGLPPRUWDOLW\DEVROXWHWUXWKDUHLQWKH
PLQG·DOUHDG\DQGEHFDXVHRIWKLV¶PDQSRVVHVVHVWKLVLQWXLWLYHSRZHURIGLVFHUQLQJ
truth·19 Almost two decades later, Theodore Parker affirmed this to have been the 
central doctrine of Transcendentalism, albeit here with a telling nod that the misprision 
of Kant was to some extent considered and intentional: 
                                                 
19 [J. A. Saxton] ¶3URSKHF\³Transcendentalism³3URJUHVV·, The Dial
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I found most help in the works of Immanuel Kant [«] if he did not always 
furnish conclusions I could rest in, he yet gave me the true method, and put me 
on the right road. I found certain great primal Intuitions of Human Nature, 
which depend upon no logical process of demonstration, but are rather facts of 
consciousness given by the instinctive action of human nature itself.20 
 
7KHUHWURVSHFWLYHQRGWRZDUG¶PHWKRG·UDWKHUWKDQGRFWULQHLQWKLVPHPRLULV
significant, since this is precisely what we find in Emerson at the outset of his career. By 
1836, the idealistic exuberance of the letter of 1834 has ebbed. The opening pages of 
Nature do not bear out the principles espoused elsewhere in the text without problems, 
HVSHFLDOO\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHGRFWULQHRILQWXLWLYH5HDVRQ,I(PHUVRQ·V0(FRQVWLWXWHV
the Reasoning, intuiting self, the self which exists absolutely prior to all experience and 
reflection, then his failure to assert it is curious, both within the terms of his own logic 
and with respect to the philosophy of the subject in the idealist tradition. 
 To develop this point, it is worthwhile considering this notional intuited 
subjectivity within the framework of one of its probable key sources, the model 
delimited by Coleridge in the twelfth chapter of his Biographia Literaria. Coleridge wrote 
RIWKH¶5HDVRQ·DVDGLVWLQFWSRZHURILQWXLWLRQWKURXJKRXWKis career, labelling it 
VRPHWKLQJZKLFK¶PD\EHVDIHO\GHILQHGWKHRUJDQRIWKH6XSHU-sensuous· and it is his 
FDSLWDOLVDWLRQRIWKHZRUGWKDWSUHILJXUHV(PHUVRQ·VXVDJH21 In Biographia Literaria, 
Coleridge offered his most rigorous philosophical defence of intuitive consciousness as 
the basis of the highest moral knowledge. Setting out the terms of the analysis of this 
¶VSRQWDQHRXVFRQVFLRXVQHVV· &ROHULGJHLQYRNHV.DQW·VGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQRIWKH
                                                 
20 Theodore Parker, 7KHRGRUH3DUNHU·s Experience as a Minister, with Some Account of his Early Life and Education 
for the Ministry (Boston: Rufus Leighton Jr., 1859)S6HHDOVR3DUNHU·VA Discourse of Matters Pertaining to 
Religion (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1842), pp. 14-20. 
21 Coleridge, The Friend: A Series of Essays in Three Volumes (London: Rest Fenner, 1818), II, p. 267. 
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¶WUDQVFHQGHQW·GHILQHGKHUHDVWKDWZKLFK¶WUDQVJUHVV>HV@WKH bounds and purposes of 
RXULQWHOOHFWXDOIDFXOWLHV·DQG¶WUDQVFHQGHQWDO·SKLORVRSK\ZKLFKDEVWUDFWO\DQGIRUPDOO\
interrogates the structure of the former epistemological principles without collapsing 
LQWR¶PHUHUHIOHFWLRQ·RU¶IOLJKWVRIODZOHVVVSHFXODtion· However, he also explicitly 
DFNQRZOHGJHVKLVGHSDUWXUHIURP.DQWLQDFULWLFDOUHVSHFWWKDWZKLOH.DQW¶FRQVLVWHQWO\
DQGULJKWO\GHQLHVWKHSRVVLELOLW\RILQWHOOHFWXDOLQWXLWLRQV·LQDFRQYHQWLRQDOVHQVH
&ROHULGJHGHFODUHVWKDWKH¶VHH>V@QRDGHTXate reason for the exclusive sense of the term, 
>DQGDVVXFKKDV«] reverted to its wider signification authorised by our elder 
theologians and metaphysicians, according to whom the term comprehends all truths 
known to us without a medium·22 Like many of KDQW·VLQKHULWRUVLQ*HUPDQ\
WKHUHIRUH&ROHULGJHXVHGWKHHOGHUSKLORVRSKHU·VLGHDVWRVXSSOHPHQWDVHQWLPHQWDORU
religious conviction in an innate, prereflective and pre-experiential basis of 
consciousness. But Coleridge also abides by a fundamental Kantian prerogative, the 
principle that a priori laws of cognition cannot be intuited independent of experience. As 
KHKDVLW¶>N@QRZOHGJHZLWKRXWDFRUUHVSRQGHQWUHDOLW\LVQRNQRZOHGJHLIZHNQRZ
there must be somewhat known by us·23 The consequence of this is that the teleology 
RIFRJQLWLRQLVQRWWUDFHDEOH,Q&ROHULGJH·VZRUGV¶>G@XULQJWKHDFWRINQRZOHGJHLWVHOI
the objective and subjective are so instantly united, that we cannot determine to which 
of the two the priority belongs. There is no first and no second; both are 
                                                 
22 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (1817) in The Major Works, ed. by H. J. Jackson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), pp. 155-482 (p. 293, 3,WLVZHOONQRZQWKDW(PHUVRQ·VILUVW-hand knowledge 
of Kant was slight³indeed, his personal copy of the first Critique, an 1838 London translation, bears little 
evidence of close reading. But his personal copy of Biographia Literaria contains, amongst numerous other 
PDUNLQJVDSHQFLOQRWHLQVLGHWKHEDFNFRYHUUHIHUHQFLQJWKHGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQRIWKH¶WUDQVFHQGHQW·DQG
¶WUDQVFHQGHQWDO·LQFKDSWHUWZHOYHVXJJHVWLQJWKDWKHZDVDWWKHYHU\OHDVWDZDUHRIWKLVJURXQGLQJEDVLV
of KantiaQWUDQVFHQGHQWDOLGHDOLVPDQGSUREDEO\DOVRRI&ROHULGJH·VVHOI-defined difference from it on the 
point of intuition, prior to 1836. Both of these volumes are held by the Houghton Library, Harvard 
University. For Kant, see *AC85.Em345.Zy838k. For Coleridge, see *AC85.Em345.Zy834c2. 
23 Coleridge, BiographiaS.DQW·VYHU\PXFKPRUHIDPRXVIRUPXODWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWLVKLVPD[LP
¶7KRXJKWVZLWKRXWFRQWHQWDUHHPSW\LQWXLWLRQVZLWKRXWFRQFHSWVDUHEOLQG·Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 
1787), ed. and trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
pp. 193-4 [A51/B75]. 
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coinstantaneous and one·24 In Nature, Emerson acknowledges this same condition³the 
EDVLVRIFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶GRHVQRWUHVLGHLQQDWXUHEXWLQPDQRULQDKDUPRQ\RIERWK· 
RUPRUHH[DFWO\LQ¶WKHEOHQGLQJRIH[SHULHQFHZLWKWKHSUHVHQWDFWLRQRIWKHPLQG·
(CW I, 10, 20-1). But at once, instantaneity necessitates retrospective analysis³man 
¶DFWV>KLVFRQGLWLRQ@DVOLIHEHIRUHKHDSSUHKHQGVLWDVWUXWK·³a problem to which 
Nature is addressed from its very first line (CW I, 7). 
 In negotiating a philosophically coherent way around this problem, Coleridge, 
borrowing rather heavily from Schelling, proceeds in methodical terms. There can be no 
LPPDQHQWNQRZOHGJHRIWKHSURFHVVE\ZKLFKFRQVFLRXVWKRXJKWDULVHVIRU¶>Z@KLOH,
am attempting to explain this intimate coalition, I must suppose it dissolved· 6R¶,PXVW
necessarily set out from the one, to which I therefore give hypothetical antecedence, in 
order to arrive at the other·25 *LYHQWZR¶HOHPHQWV·³¶VXEMHFWDQGREMHFW·IRUZKLFKwe 
might substitute ME and NOT ME³Coleridge acknowledges that two methods are 
¶HTXDOO\SRVVLEOH· Either the NOT ME or object is given precedence, and the subject or 
0(LVGHULYHGIURPLWDFRQGLWLRQ&ROHULGJHFRQVLGHUVV\PSWRPDWLF¶RIQDWXUDO
philosophy·, or the subject or ME is given precedence, this being the sine qua non RI¶WKH
transcendental or intelligential philosopher·26 
 This is where the curiosity lies with Emerson. It would indubitably be difficult to 
posit that he is an adherent of the kind of natural philosophy to which Coleridge is 
alluding³WKDWSKLORVRSK\RIVHQVHHSLWRPLVHGE\/RFNHZKLFKSXUVXHVDQLGHDO¶LQWKH
SHUIHFWVSLULWXDOLVDWLRQRIDOOWKHODZVRIQDWXUHLQWRODZVRILQWXLWLRQDQGLQWHOOHFW·³but 
it is nevertheless the case that nature occupies the primary place in Nature; that its 
                                                 
24 Coleridge, Biographia, p. 291. 
25 Coleridge, Biographia, p. 291. 
26 Coleridge, Biographia, pp. 291-3. As indicated above, the method Coleridge expounds here is essentially 
LGHQWLFDOZLWKWKDWSURSRVHGLQWKHHDUO\VHFWLRQVRI6FKHOOLQJ·VSystem of Transcendental Idealism. 
(ODERUDWLRQVRQ&ROHULGJH·VUHFHSWLRQDQGWUDQVPLVVLRQDUHEHVLGHWKHSRLQWKHUHVLQFHLWLVSUREDEOHWKDW
Emerson picked up the major principles, from which he diverts, predominantly from his reading of 
Coleridge. See F. W. J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), trans. by Peter Heath 
(Charlottesville VA: University Press of Virginia, 1978), pp. 5-33. 
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structure and logical method³from the foregrounding of nature itself, to its use as 
¶FRPPRGLW\· to the realisation of higher consciousness through various stages toward 
¶6SLULW·³roughly describes the naturalist trajectory.27 Because the implied ME remains 
the logical predicate of his philosophical consideration, however, such speculations are 
necessarily IDOVHEXWWKHVLPXOWDQHRXVPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIDVSHFWVRIERWKRI&ROHULGJH·V
hypothetical antecedents offers an insight into a doubt underlying the entire text of 
Nature. Although Coleridge countenances two equally valid philosophic methods, so far 
as he is concerned there can be no question as to which is correct, and he takes pains to 
make his conviction H[SOLFLWDVKHZULWHV¶,IWKHQ,NQRZP\VHOIRQO\WKURXJKP\VHOILW
is contradictory to require any other predicate of self, but that of self-consciousness·28 
7KLVFRQGLWLRQTXDOLILHVWKHSULPDF\RIWKH0(EXWLQ&ROHULGJH·VWUHDWPHQWDVZHOODV
in those of certain post-Kantians on whom he is drawing, this primacy is extended to 
incorporate notions of agency and of liberty which cannot be sustained under condition 
of a primary, and thus determining, natural world. If nature has primacy in the method 
of (PHUVRQ·VNature, therefore, this Coleridgean hypothesis cannot be applicable, but 
WKHTXDOLILFDWLRQIRUWKLVUHTXLUHVDIXUWKHUEULHIGLYHUVLRQWKURXJK&ROHULGJH·VVRXUFHV 
 Coleridge offers his evidence of absolute freedom in his exegesis of the principal 
FRQYLFWLRQRIWKHWUDQVFHQGHQWDOSKLORVRSKHUDFRQYLFWLRQ¶ZKLFKQRWRQO\FODLPVEXW
necessitates the admission of its immediate certainty· the conviction in the affirmation 
¶,$0· ZKLFKLVH[SODLQHGDV¶JURXQGOHVVLQGHHGEXWWKHQLQWKHYHU\ idea it precludes 
all ground [«] It is groundless; but only because it is itself the ground of all other 
certainty·29 The self-asserting, self-SRVLWLQJ¶,$0·LVWKXVVLPXOWDQHRXVO\ERWKWKH
evidence of an absolute ground of consciousness and the very being itself of this 
consciousness in the act of affirmation, while its absolute freedom is presumed in its 
                                                 
27 Coleridge, Biographia, p. 292. 
28 Coleridge, Biographia, p. 299. 
29 Coleridge, Biographia, p. 294. 
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groundless and unprecedented act of self-assertion. Coleridge is drawing here on Johann 
Gottlieb )LFKWHWKHRULJLQDWRUDQGSRSXODULVHURIWKHWHUPV¶,FK·DQG¶1LFKW-,FK·DQG
post-Kantian idealist whose adaptation of Kant has traditionally been deemed of the 
highest significance in the development of American Transcendentalism, because the 
line of influence is manifestly traceable.30 Frederick Henry Hedge, who would go on to 
EHWKHSLYRWDOPHPEHURIWKH¶7UDQVFHQGHQWDO&OXE· was unique amongst New 
Englanders for his exceptional familiarity with and grasp of German philosophy, and he 
published in 1833 an article in the Christian Examiner which discussed the Fichtean 
inheritance in Coleridge in some detail. To quote therefore from the paraphrase of 
Fichte which Emerson himself read: 
 
[The I] was first unconditionally affirmed to exist, and if allowed unconditional 
existence must of course exclude its opposite, [it] is now allowed to exist only so 
far as its opposite does not exist, and the opposite exists only so far as this does 
not exist, i.e., they coexist by mutual limitation; they define and determine each 
other. The I proposes itself as divisible or limitable, and determined by the not-I, 
and it proposes the not-I as divisible and determined by the I.31 
 
This, in other words, is the affirmation discussed by Coleridge in the Biographia: the I, 
which by an act of absolute freedom posits or objectifies itself, also proposes what is 
¶QRW-,·DVWKHQHJDWLYHOLPLWQHFHVVDU\IRUWKLVVHOI-objectification. In keeping with 
Coleridge, but not exactly with Kant, Fichte termed this process by which the self 
GHWHUPLQHGLWVHOIDQGFRQILUPHGLWVXQLWDU\LGHQWLW\¶LQWXLWLRQ·¶,QWHOOHFWXDOLQWXLWLRQ is 
                                                 
30 Wellek makes this case in Confrontations, pp. 187-212. See also Pochmann, and Stanley Vogel, German 
Literary Influences on the American Transcendentalists (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1955), for 
extended treatments of how German idealism inflected American intellectual culture in the middle years 
of the nineteenth-century. 
31 >)UHGHULFN+HQU\+HGJH@¶&ROHULGJH·V/LWHUDU\&KDUDFWHU·The Christian Examiner and General Review, 14 
(1833), 108-29 (pp. 123-4). 
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the immediate consciousness that I act, and of what I do when I act. It is because of this 
that it is possible for me to know something because I do it·32 
 So long as this Coleridgean/Fichtean model remains central, it sustains 
hypotheses of a purely subjectivist basis of consciousness, and, in the most recent 
philosophically-minded interrogation of this influence on American Transcendentalism, 
Leon Chai reiterates that the New England inheritors of what should be seen as a 
rigorously metaphysical hypothesis obfuscated its subtleties to affirm their sentimental 
SUHMXGLFHV,Q&KDL·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶>E@\EHJLQQLQJZLWKWKHVXEMHFWLYHQDWXUHRIWKH´,µ
DQGSURGXFLQJWKH´QRW-,µWKHZRUOGIURPLW)LFKWHLQHIIHFWWUDQVIRUPVWhe subjective 
LQWRREMHFWLYH´,µDQG´QRW-,µFRQVLVWRIRQHDQGWKHVDPHHOHPHQWRUVXEVWDQFH· And 
the consequence of this raises the absolute ego to a position of singular significance³it 
VHHPVDVWKRXJKWKH¶,·SUHFHGHVDQGDVLWZHUHcreates the world in its act of absolute 
freedom. So, Chai argues, does the TUDQVFHQGHQWDOLVWHSLSKDQ\RI¶FRQVFLRXVQHVV
H[SHULHQF>LQJ@LWVHOIDVGLYLQH·ILQGLWVSKLORVRSKLFDOMXVWLILFDWLRQ33 
 In the Emersonian context, however, this argument exceeds the evidence 
availablH&KDLFRQWLQXHVWRILQG(PHUVRQFULWLFDOO\LQFDSDEOHRIUHFRJQLVLQJ)LFKWH·V
SKLORVRSKLFDOIRUPDOLW\VLQFHKHSRVLWVWKDWIRU(PHUVRQRQH·V¶H[SHULHQFHRIWKH
external world is one and the same with the being of that world, and in the end he is 
¶LPSHOOHG·E\KLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI)LFKWHWR¶WKHLPPDQHQWNQRZOHGJHWKDWFRPHV
through pure consciousness·34 Yet while Emerson does at times invoke a system which 
looks UHPDUNDEO\OLNHWKLVLPDJLQLQJDZRUOGZKLFK¶EHFRPHVDWODVWRQO\DUHDOLVHG
will,³the double of man· UHDGLQJVDVVHUWLQJ(PHUVRQ·VFODLPWRLPPDQHQWNQRZOHGJH
negate or collapse the nuances of Nature to focus only on the ramifications of its 
                                                 
32 Quoted in Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 298. 
33 Leon Chai, The Romantic Foundations of the American Renaissance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 
pp. 282-6. See also Greenham, who discusses the concept of unitary self-identity in Fichte and Hedge (but 
QRW&KDL·VWUHDWPHQWRILWDQGLQDFNQRZOHGJLQJLWVGLVVROXWLRQLQWRSULYDWLYHSHUVRQDOLVPIollows 
similar lines to those I will be examining in this chapter. Greenham, Transatlantic Romanticism, pp. 72-8. 
34 Chai, pp. 332-3, 337. 
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notorious and calculated excesses (CW ,+HQFH&KDL·VUHDGLQJLVH[FHVVLYHO\
credulous of the letter of the transparent eye-ball, according to which a practical 
immanence of self and divine wisdom is conceivable, rather than its self-dissolving logic. 
The evidence to counter a purely Fichtean derivation is more widespread and 
FRPSHOOLQJ)LUVW)LFKWH·VLQIOXHQFHZDVVHHQDVSUREOHPDWLFDWWKHWLPH,WPD\EHWUXH
that his philosophical formality was misunderstood, but even so, this only made his 
thought the less likely to be accepted: HeGJHKLPVHOIGHFODUHGWKHV\VWHP¶DOWRJHWKHUWRR
subjective· while Orestes Brownson criticised Fichte throughout his long career, 
GLVPLVVLQJKLVV\VWHPDV¶SXUH(JRtLVP·DQGDQDWWHPSWWR¶SXWWKHVRXOLQWKHSODFHRI
God·35 
 And while Emerson surely longed to realise an experience of consciousness 
which coupled the reflective mode of the Understanding with an a priori, prereflective 
Reason, it was not to be the case. The problem here is with the singularity of the 
Fichtean subject, in which the self-positiQJ¶,·LVLGHQWLFDOZLWKWKHUHIOHFWLQJDQDO\WLFDO
¶,·36 ,Q(PHUVRQ·VFDOORZDQGUDWKHUXQVRSKLVWLFDWHGSKUDVLQJRIWKLVFRQFHSWKHZULWHV
WRKLVEURWKHU(GZDUGRIKRZ¶>W@KHWKRXJKWVRI\RXWK	´ILUVWWKRXJKWVµDUHWKH
revelation of Reason· HYHQLI¶Understanding[,] that wrinkled calculator· intervenes as 
PHGLDWRUDQGSRLQWVXVEDFNWRZDUGWKHZRUOG¶<HWE\	E\· (PHUVRQFRQWLQXHV¶DIWHU
having denied our Master we come back to see at the end of years or of life that he was 
the Truth. And it is obVHUYHGWKDW´RXUILUVWWKRXJKWV	WKLUGWKRXJKWVXVXDOO\
                                                 
35 +HGJH¶&ROHULGJH·S2UHVWHV%URZQVRQ¶0DUHWRQ5HDVRQDQG5HYHODWLRQ·%URZQVRQ·V4XDUWHUO\
Review, 2.5 (1857), 58-S¶3RUWHU·V+XPDQ,QWHOOHFW3DUW·LQWorks of Orestes A. Brownson 
(Detroit: H. F. Brownson, 1898), II, pp. 383-402 (p. 385). There are reasons to consider Brownson rather 
more significant in discussions of epistemology in Transcendentalist New England than is usually seen to 
be the case, a point I will elaborate upon shortly. 
36 7KLVSULQFLSOHLVWKHIXQGDPHQWDOEDVLVRI)LFKWH·VSKLORVRSKLFDOVXEMHFW¶7KH,LVZKDWLWLWVHOISRVLWV
and it is nothing but this; and what posits itself and reverts into itself becomes an I and nothing else. 
{Thus it is [only] insofar as I act upon myself and posit myself, [only] insofar as my activity reverts back 
XSRQPHWKDWWKH,DULVHVDQGWKDW,WKLQNDERXWP\,´,DP,µDQG´,SRVLWP\VHOIDV,µWKHVHWZR
SURSRVLWLRQVPHDQH[DFWO\WKHVDPHWKLQJ·Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy: 
(Wissenschaftslehre) nova methodo (1796/99), ed. and trans. by Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1992), p. 112. All brackets in original. 
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FRLQFLGHµ·L I, 412-3). Those lines were written in 1834, and such anecdotal evidence 
RIWKHDSSDUHQWVLQJXODULW\RIFRQVFLRXVQHVVZRXOGQRWVXVWDLQ(PHUVRQ·VSKLORVRSKLF
faith by itself. In 1837, for instance, he recorded the following passage in his journal: 
 
Who shall define to me an individual? I behold with awe & delight many 
illustrations of the One Universal Mind. I see my being imbedded in it. As a 
plant of the earth so I grow in God. I am only a form of Him. He is the soul of 
Me. I can even with a mountainous aspiring say, I am God, by transferring my Me 
out of the flimsy & unclean precincts of my body, my fortunes, my private will, 
& meekly retiring upon the holy austerities of the Just & the Loving [«] Yet 
why not always so? How came the individual thus armed & impassioned to 
parricide thus murderously inclined ever to traverse & kill the divine life? Ah 
wicked Manichee! Into that dim problem I cannot enter. A believer in Unity, a 
seer of Unity, I yet behold two. Whilst I feel myself in sympathy with Nature & 
rejoice with greatly beating heart in the course of Justice & Benevolence 
overpowering me, I yet find little access to this Me of Me. (JMN V, 336-7) 
 
The grammar of that last line is criWLFDOIRULWILJXUHVWKHHQWLUHVFRSHRI(PHUVRQ·V
doubt. English, like German, has distinct subject and object personal pronouns. Fichte 
DQGE\H[WHQVLRQ&ROHULGJHXVHWKHVXEMHFWSURQRXQ¶,··,FK· entirely appropriate 
given the logical priority the\DFFRUGWKHVXEMHFW(PHUVRQRQWKHRWKHUKDQGXVHV¶,·LQ
UHIHUHQFHWRWKHUHIOHFWLQJDQDO\WLFDODFWVRIWKHVHOIEXW¶0H·IRUWKHK\SRWKHVLVHG
prereflective consciousness supposed to precede it, an expression of reflexive relations in 
contravention of the grammatical order of the Coleridgean/Fichtean model, which 
echoes the impossibility of restoring immanence in all stages of personal consciousness. 
Emerson is by no means unique in this sense³&DUO\OHUDWKHUFKDRWLFDOO\XVHG¶,·DQG
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¶0H·LQGLVFULPLQDWHO\ZKLOHSHUKDSVPRUHVLJQLILFDQWO\9LFWRU&RXVLQXVHG¶0RL·DQG
¶1RQ-PRL·³but his vocabulary does seem to be considered, while the grammatical 
disjuncture involved represents a critical early example of the intrusion of linguistic 
prerogatives into his philosophical model of the mind, a concern which will intensify 
from the groundwork laid in this text throughout his later work.37 
In another hypothesis of the polarities of consciousness from 1838, the implied 
WHPSRUDOGLVWDQFHRI¶ILUVWDQGWKLUGthoughts· UHWXUQHGWR¶DWWKHHQGRI\HDUVRURIOLIH· 
restates and develops this disjuncture. Reflecting on archaeology, Emerson reduces its 
SUDFWLFHWR¶WKHGHVLUHWRGRDZD\WKLVZLOGVDYDJHSUHSRVWHURXVThen, & introduce in its 
place the Now: it is to banish the Not Me, & supply the Me; it is to abolish difference & 
restore Unity· But, in a critical additional line, the abolition of difference toward unity 
FRPHVE\ZD\RISDUDGR[LFDOPHWKRG¶%HO]RQLGLJV	VFUDWFKHV	FOLPEV	JURSHV
until he can VHHWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHPRQVWURXVZRUN	KLPVHOI·JMN VII, 111). 
,QRWKHUZRUGVWR¶VXSSO\WKH0(·WKLVYRFDEXODU\LVLPSRUWDQWDVDK\SRWKHWLFDO
                                                 
37 &DUO\OH·VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGWKHLGHQWLW\RIHVVHQWLDOFRQVFLRXVQHVVZDVDOZD\VOHVVIRFXVHGDQGPDUNHGO\
OHVVHDUQHVWWKDQ(PHUVRQ·VDQGKLVPRVWLPSRUWDQWWUHDWPHQWVRIWKHWHUPVRIGLVWLQFWLRQ³in his 1829 
essay on Novalis, and in Sartor Resartus³lack definition. Compared to what I have noted above on 
(PHUVRQ·VQXDQFHLQWHUPLQRORJ\&DUO\OH·V7HXIHOVGU|FNKDVNVTXHVWLRQVVXFKDV¶´:KRDP,ZKDWLV
WKLV0("µ·ZKLFKFROODSVHWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQSURQRXQVDQGUHVWRUHDXQLWDU\QRWion of subjectivity, even if 
this narrator fails to identify exactly what it is. See Carlyle, Sartor Resartus (1833-4) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 42. See also Carlyle, ¶1RYDOLV·, The Foreign Review and Continental Miscellany, 4.7 
(1829), 97-141 (pp. 115-IRUDVLPLODUHTXDWLRQRIWKH¶,·DQG¶0H·LQOLJKWRID)LFKWHDQDQDO\VLV7KH
impact of Cousin, whose &RXUVGH3KLORVRSKLH,QWURGXFWLRQDO·KLVWRLUHGHODSKLORVRSKLH Emerson read in 1831, is 
DUJXDEO\PRUHVLJQLILFDQW(PHUVRQ·VSHUVRQal copy bears significant pencil marking in lecture six, in 
ZKLFK&RXVLQXVHVWKHWHUPV¶PRL·DQG¶QRQ-PRL·GLVFXVVHV.DQWLQVRPHGHWDLOGHFODUHVraison to be 
impersonal, and makes a number of other statements relevant to the concern with subjectivity in Nature. 
Indeed, Cousin was a heavily discussed figure in New England in the 1830s-40s, with Orestes Brownson 
one of his chief advocates, and I will have cause to refer back to both Cousin and, more pressingly, 
%URZQVRQ·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIKLPLQSDUHQWKHWLFUHPDUNVKHUH)RU(PHUVRQ·VSHQFLOPDUNLQJVVHH
Cousin, &RXUVGH3KLORVRSKLH,QWURGXFWLRQDO·KLVWRLUHGHODSKLORVRSKLH (Paris: Pichon et Didier, 1828), 
*AC85.Em345.Zy828c, Houghton Library, Harvard University. The notion that Cousin and his 
WUDQVODWRUVVSHFLILFDOO\LQ%URZQVRQ·VRSLQLRQWKH7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVWDQGIRXQGHURI%URRN)DUP
*HRUJH5LSOH\ZHUHSULPDULO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHVSHFLILFWHUPV¶0H·DQG¶1RW0H·FDQEe partly 
VXEVWDQWLDWHGE\DODWHHVVD\E\%URZQVRQLQZKLFKKHUHIHUVWRWKHLQWURGXFWLRQ¶LQWRWKHODQJXDJH>RI@
such barbarisms as the me and the not-me·%URZQVRQ¶9LFWRU&RXVLQDQGKLV3KLORVRSK\·LQWorks, 
II, 307-S%URZQVRQ·VFODLm is both inaccurate and unfair, since Ripley only published his 
translation of Cousin in 1838, by which time Brownson himself, along with many others, was already 
XVLQJWKHVDPH¶EDUEDULF·WHUPV)RUDJHQHUDORYHUYLHZRI&RXVLQ·VLQIOXHQFHLQ1HZ(QJODQG, see 
*HRUJHV--R\DX[¶9LFWRU&RXVLQDQG $PHULFDQ7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVP· French Review, 29 (1955), 117-30. 
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unitary entity, one must work, and by working Emerson means working by way of 
difference, that antithesis precedes resolution in an intellectual synthesis. 
 
The Science of Self-Regard 
In Nature, however, the same principle of temporal disjuncture and resolution via 
historical recovery is coloured with hints of existential anguish. The opening paragraph 
RIWKHFKDSWHUHQWLWOHG¶1DWXUH· ZKLFKIROORZVRQGLUHFWO\IURPWKH¶SKLORVRSKLFDO
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ·GLVFXVVHGDERYHHPSKDVLVHVWKHJXOILQVHOI-knowledge by way of what at 
first seems to be a conventional series of ruminations on the stars. Apropos of nothing 
in the preceding passages, Emerson turns his attention to solitude, something not 
REWDLQHG¶ZKLOVW,UHDGDQGZULWHWKRXJKQRERG\LVZLWKPH· a condition which both 
alerts our attention that an unusual, metaphysically-inflected notion of solitude is about 
to be advanced while also preparing the reader for the expectation that the relation to 
text will have an important part to play in its dynamic. From here, a more essential 
solitude is advanced, a solitude which is based upon a crisis related to the failure of 
immanent self-knowledge: 
 
But if a man would be alone, let him look at the stars [«] The rays that come 
from those heavenly worlds, will separate between him and vulgar things [«] 
The stars awaken a certain reverence, because though always present, they are 
always inaccessible; but all natural objects make a kindred impression, when the 
mind is open to their influence. (CW I, 8-9) 
 
This is a considered trope, not simply an inherited romantic commonplace. Emerson 
was intensely interested in contemporary science, as Laura Dassow Walls has illustrated, 
and knew that a star was simply another, distant, sun, as was conceived by Giordano 
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Bruno in the sixteenth-century.38 And if the sun was commonly figured as the type of an 
intuitive moral power, the Platonic ¶OLJKWRIDOORXUGD\·GHSLFWHGE\:RUGVZRUWKLQKLV
¶,QWLPDWLRQVRI,PPRUWDOLW\· then Emerson is evidently working to a modified set of 
conditions by setting it at such distance. His scientific awareness guided his decision: 
Isaac Newton was just one among a number of eighteenth-century physicists to propose 
a precise measure for the finite speed of light, and by the early nineteenth-century the 
principle of accurately computing the distance to a star using these calculations and 
stellar parallax was coming to be well understood, with Friedrich Bessel the first to 
assert a definite distance in 1838. To look at the stars, therefore, is to look upon not 
only something immensely distant and categorically inaccessible, but to look upon its 
light and know that it is historical effect and not representative of the present acts of the 
star.39 ,WLVDV&ROHULGJHDOVRQRWHGRIWKHLQVWDQWDQHLW\RILQWXLWLRQORQJ¶GLVVROYHG·E\
the time reflection is turned upon it. 
 7KHUHIOHFWLQJ¶,·LQ(PHUVRQ·VZULWLQJLVWKXVLQDVWDWHRISHUSHWXDO¶VROLWXGH·
dissociated from the speculated full powers of a complete ME, always belated in its 
UHODWLRQWRVRPHLQFRQFHLYDEO\GLVWDQWDQGKLVWRULFDOLQWHOOHFWXDOLQWXLWLRQ:KDW·VPRUH
the solar/stellar trope is repeated in Nature (indeed, variations on it are repeated 
IUHTXHQWO\WKURXJKRXW(PHUVRQ·VHDUO\FDUHHUEXWLQDPDQQHUWKDWIXUWKHUdefines 
(PHUVRQ·VGHSDUWXUHIURPERWK&ROHULGJHDQG)LFKWH/DWHLQWKHWH[W(PHUVRQSLFNV
up upon the somewhat perplexing OLQHWKDW¶DOOQDWXUDOREMHFWVPDNHDNLQGUHG
LPSUHVVLRQ·WRWKHVWDUVLQDQLQYRFDWLRQRIWKHVRODUDQDORJXHZLWK¶6SLULW· 
                                                 
38 The journals are peppered with allusions to astronomy that support this hypothesis. As early as 1832, 
(PHUVRQZRXOGZULWHWKDW¶$VWURQRP\KDWKH[FHOOHQWXVHV>«@'R\RXEHOLHYHWKDWWKHUHLVERXQGOHVV
VSDFH"-XVWGZHOORQWKDWJLJDQWLFWKRXJKW>«@$OOLVORVWLQWKHERVRPRILWVJUHDWQLJKW>«@LWLUUHVLVWLEO\
PRGLILHVDOOWKHRORJ\·JMN IV, 25-6). Although Walls recognises the significance of astronomical 
metaphor in Transcendental philosophies of mind, it should be noted that she makes no specific 
reference to this passage of Nature. See Walls, (PHUVRQ·V/LIHLQ6FLHQFH7KH&XOWXUHRI7UXWK (Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 132, 223. 
39 In 1838, Emerson recorded in his journal a comment which proves beyond doubt that he was well 
DZDUHRIWKHVHFRQFHUQV¶$VWKH\VD\WKHOLJKWRIVRPHVWDUVWKDWSDUWHGIURPWKHRUEDWWKHGHOXJHRI
1RDKKDVRQO\QRZUHDFKHGXV·JMN VII, 78). 
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And all the uses of nature admit of being summed in one, which yields the 
activity of man an infinite scope. Through all its kingdoms, to the suburbs and 
outskirts of things, it is faithful to the cause whence it had its origin. It always 
speaks of Spirit. It suggests the absolute. It is a perpetual effect. It is a great 
shadow pointing always to the sun behind us. (CW I, 37) 
 
EmersRQ·VSRLQWLVWKDWWKHQDWXUDOZRUOGWKDWZHSHUFHLYHUHVWRUHVWRXVDVHQVHRIRXU
relation to intuition because it is, in a sense, created in our perception, generalised into 
VLQJXODULW\LQRXU¶LQILQLWHVFRSH· but there is a subtext in his placing the ¶OLJKWRIDOORXU
GD\·DWRXUEDFNVWKDWdepends on his rooting in Platonism. Like Plato, Emerson shares 
the conviction that sense, and specifically the sense of sight, is the means by which the 
soul can recover its association with the divine while enclosed in mortal being. The 
shadow we see, and are encouraged to study, is cast by our own necessary form. Only in 
this way are we able to perceive its extent as well as its limits. 
 In other words, therefore, Emerson realises that the fundamental obstacle to 
immanent self-knowledge is concerned with perspective. In this respect, Emerson is 
more reminiscent (if somewhat imprecisely) of Kant than of his idealist successors, a 
point which has been made extensively and compellingly by David Van Leer.40 By 
asserting the primacy of nature, of the NOT ME, Emerson essentially endorses the 
.DQWLDQ¶REMHFWLYLW\WKHVLV·³LQ9DQ/HHU·VZRUGVWKDW¶WKHQRWLRQRIH[SHULHQFH
SUHVXSSRVHVWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIREMHFWVGLVWLQFWIURPH[SHULHQFHRIWKHP·WKHQHFHVVLW\
ultimately, thDWWKH¶WKLQJ-LWVHOI·LVa priori to at least the same extent as the hypothesised 
                                                 
40 9DQ/HHU·s book remains the most sophisticated and insightful of philosophically-minded scholarly 
monographs on Emerson, in spite of the fact that the parallel he draws between Emerson and Kant is not 
corroborated by influence studies. Indeed, as Van Leer notes, the fact that such parallels can be so 
HIIHFWLYHUDWKHUJLYHVWKHOLHWRDQ\VLQJOHFODLPIRUWKHEDFNGURSWR(PHUVRQ·VHFOHFWLFLQWHOOHFWXDO
development. Van Leer, pp. 7-8. 
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¶VHOI-in-LWVHOI·WKDW(PHUVRQWHUPVWKH0(41 What is more, self-knowledge depends not 
upon consciousness being a Ptolemaic locus of the universe, receiving or emitting on all 
sides as a transparent eye-ball would presumably do, but on being located, on 
acknowledging that one has a particular perspective with respect to the objects around 
us, and then on making deductions based on this acknowledgment, as is the case with 
those astronomers who deduce stellar distance on the basis of parallax.  
If, however, the faculty of sight is one of the key tropes of Nature, then its 
UHODWLRQWRWKHWKLQJORRNHGDWLVRIHTXDOVLJQLILFDQFH,QGHHGWKHZRUG¶UHODWLRQ·RULWV
derivations appears thirty-ILYHWLPHVLQWKLVVKRUWERRNDQGDV9DQ/HHUQRWHVLW¶PD\
EHVHHQDVRQHRI(PHUVRQ·VNH\WHUPVDQGKLVHSLVWHPRORJLFDOSRLQW·DSRLQWZHPD\
extend beyond the confines of Nature·VFRQWHQWWRKLVUHODWLRQWRZULWLQJDQGWRWH[W
more generally.42 $FNQRZOHGJLQJUHODWLYLW\LQRQH·VSHUVSHFWLYHPHDQVUHFRJQLVLQJWKH
IDFWWKDWRQH·VSHUVSHFWLYHLVSHUVRQDOSDUWLDODQGIRXQGHGRQGLIIHUHQFH43 Again and 
again in Nature, this is exactly how perspective is described. Apprehending that we 
perceive passively and are not simply continuous with the world is more or less given to 
be the object of all natural science and philosophy. For the naturalist, Emerson claims, 
                                                 
41 9DQ/HHUS7KHPDMRUZRUNGHWDLOLQJ.DQW·VWKHRU\RIREMHFWLYLW\LV3)6Wrawson, The Bounds of 
6HQVH$Q(VVD\RQ.DQW·VCritique of Pure Reason (1966) (London: Routledge, 2005). In a 1983 essay, 
5REHUW$EUDPVSXUVXHVDUHDGLQJRI(PHUVRQ·VSV\FKRORJ\ZKLFKILJXUHVKLVUHIOH[LYHLQWURVSHFWLYHVHOI-
DQDO\VLVDV¶DNLQGRISUD\HU·WKHQHFHVVLW\RIZKLFKWXUQVRQYHU\VLPLODUFRQFHSWVWRWKRVHXQGHU
GLVFXVVLRQKHUH$V$EUDPVZULWHVEHFDXVHLQ(PHUVRQ·V¶SRVW-.DQWLDQXQLYHUVH·DQDXWKRULW\ZKLFK
validates and permits cognition is indeterminable or inaccessible, and because EmersoQ·VFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQ
RILWDVWKH¶2YHUVRXO·LVDOZD\VRQO\D¶projected GLVFRYHU\·LWLVQHFHVVDULO\WKHFDVH¶WKDWPDQ·VSUDFWLFDO
inquiry into himself becomes placed in permanent cognitive suspense·%HFDXVHRXULGHDVDUHGHSHQGHQWXSRQ
experience, and because experience is, as it were, forced upon us³we cannot exist and refuse it (Abrams, 
OLNH9DQ/HHUQRGVWR.DQW·VREMHFWLYLW\UHTXLUHPHQWLQWKLVUHVSHFW³then the disjuncture in subjectivity 
is characterised by this effective submission to being determined by the unknowable outside power of the 
thing-in-itself. As a consequence of this, Abrams argues, Emerson advocates a worshipful condition of 
UHFHSWLYLW\SHUSHWXDO¶´SDWLHQFHDQGSDWLHQFHµWKLVVLGHRIDOHDSRIIDLWKZKLFK(PHUVRQIRUDOOKLV
metDSK\VLFDO\HDUQLQJFDQQRWFRQYHUWLQWRFHUWLWXGH·5REHUW$EUDPV¶(PHUVRQDWWKH/LPLWVRI
0HWDSK\VLFDO3V\FKRORJ\·Pacific Coast Philology, 18 (1983), 14-22. Emphasis in original. 
42 Van Leer, p. 234 n. 16. 
43 See Van Leer once again for further detail on the Kantian parallel here. As he says, against the 
K\SRWKHVLVRIDQLPPDQHQWNQRZOHGJHLGHQWLFDOZLWKH[SHULHQFHEDVHGRQ¶SXUHVHHLQJ·LQNature, 
perception necessitates a fundamental separation from the thing perceived in non-dogmatic idealism, for 
¶>Z@HUHP\SHUFHSWLRQVDOZD\VLGHQWLFDOWRREMHFWLYHWKLQJV>DV&KDL·V)LFKWHDQK\SRWKHVLVKDGLW@WKHQVHOI-
consciousness could not semantically exist³IRU´,WKLQN;µZRXOGPHDQVLPSO\´;µ·,QRWKHUZRUGV
grammar once again intervenes and aligns with perception in refuting the realisation of immanence. Van 
Leer, p. 50. 
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¶>L@WLVQRWVRSHUWLQHQWWRNQRZDOOWKHLQGLYLGXDOVRIWKHDQLPDONLQJGRPDVLWLVWR
know whence and whereto is this tyrannising unity in his constitution, which evermore 
VHSDUDWHVDQGFODVVLILHVWKLQJVHQGHDYRULQJWRUHGXFHWKHPRVWGLYHUVHWRRQHIRUP·
(CW I, 39-%XWWKLV¶W\UDQQLVLQJXQLW\· this extreme generalisation, is in fact a 
method toward affirming difference, the more categorical difference which makes 
perception an issue of relation, between the perceiving observer and that which is 
perceived. Hence the repeated rhetorical questioniQJRI¶ZKDWLVWKHGLIIHUHQFH·ZKHWKHU
or not the idealist premise is true; rather, it is compelling because it is itself an 
instrument of radical generality in making manifest the issue of relation between 
SKHQRPHQDDQGSHUFHSWLRQDQGLQ(PHUVRQ·VZRUGVEHFRPHVD¶XVHIXOLQWURGXFWRU\
hypothesis, serving to apprise us of the eternal distinction between the soul and the 
ZRUOG·CW I, 38). Polarising the world, generalising it as NOT ME into homogeneity, 
PHDQVWKDW(PHUVRQ·VEHODWHG0(FDQEHSURSHUO\VXSSOLed as grammatical object, but 
this object is supplied, or deduced, by recourse to a characteristic circumlocution of 
JUDPPDUEHLQJGLIIHUHQWLDWHGDVDJDLQVWDJHQHUDOL]HG1270(LWPXVWEH¶QRW-NOT 
ME· and as such it is the product of a double negative. 
 This tendency had contemporary currency. Emerson himself wrote more 
candidly of it in the journals of these years: LQ-XQHKHZURWHRI¶IHHO>LQJ@WRRWKH
IRUFHRIWKHGRXEOHQHJDWLYHWKRXJKFOHDQFRQWUDU\WRRXUJUDPPDUUXOHV·$QGDJDLQ
later that same year, he praises the habit of children and their forceful speech, not least 
LQ¶WKHVWURQJGRXEOHQHJDWLYHZKLFKZH(QJOLVKKDYHORVWIURPRXUERRNV·JMN VII, 
374, 505). Elsewhere, Orestes Brownson in 1842 convinced himself of the uniquely 
American character of a philosophy of the subject based on a similar model, oblivious 
to the fact that Emerson had anticipated him by several years.44 At the same time, 
                                                 
44 7KLVUHYHODWLRQFDPHWR%URZQVRQJUDGXDOO\,QKHKDGGHFODUHGKLPVHOIDQDGYRFDWHRI&RXVLQ·V
HFOHFWLFLVPDQGHVSHFLDOO\KLVG\QDPLFRIWKH¶PRL·DQG¶QRQ-PRL·LQDQDUWLFOHLQWKe Christian Examiner in 
ZKLFKWKHGLVMXQFWXUHEHWZHHQWKHUHIOHFWLQJ¶,·DQGDQRULJLQDOSUHUHIOHFWLYHPRGHRIFRQVFLRXVQHVVZDV
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however, whatever the possibilities in turning against linguistic and philosophic 
convention, the efficacy of this circumlocutory method of apophatic self-affirmation 
leads Emerson to some inevitable doubts, and to self-conscious farce. The following 
H[KRUWDWLRQWRVHHNWKHDSSUHKHQVLRQRIRQH·VRZQSHUVSHFWLYHLVDFDVHLQSRLQW 
 
A small alteration in our local position apprises us of a dualism [«] The least 
change in our point of view, gives the whole world a pictorial air [«] Turn the 
eyes upside down, by looking at the landscape through your legs, and how 
agreeable is the picture, though you have seen it any time these twenty years! 
In these cases, by mechanical means, is suggested the difference between the 
observer and the spectacle, between man and nature. Hence arises a pleasure 
mixed with awe; I may say, a low degree of the sublime is felt from the fact, 
                                                                                                                                          
observed. Brownson, along with Cousin, was persuaded of the viability of attempts to restore that original 
and elemental consciousness by way of an interrogation, in the first instance, of our perception of nature, 
continuing toward a more fundamental self-UHJDUG¶2XURQO\WUXHPHWKRGLVWREHJLQE\DVFHUWDLQLQJZKDW
is; from what is, the actual, we may pass to its origin, from that to its legitimacy, and thus attain the 
$EVROXWH·,QDVHFRQGHVVD\RIKRZHYHU%URZQVRQKDVDOWHUHGKLVSRVLWLRQHere, he rejects 
outright the premise of innate ideas as attainable aspects of knowledge, calling such a supposition 
¶REMHFWLRQDEOH· and fully recantVKLVEHOLHILQWKHSUDFWLFDOLW\RI&RXVLQ·VSV\FKRORJ\LQZKLFK¶>W@KHVRXO
can study itself by immediate consciousness· IRULWVWUDQVJUHVVLRQRIDODZRIORJLF¶>7KHVRXO@WKHQVWDQGV
face to face with itself, and may be both the subject studying, and WKHREMHFWVWXGLHG>«But t]he simple 
fact is, that the ME being the subject, that is, the thinker, is not and cannot be the object·+HJRHVRQWR
correct his earlier writings on a crucial point³¶By intuition we have in none of our writings understood 
seeing by looking in, but as the word itself says, seeing by looking on.  The soul sees nothing by looking 
into itself.  Nay, it can never turn itself round so as to look at, much less into itself.  It is the looker, the 
seer, and the seer and the seen are as distinct in fact, as they are in logic·³something he erroneously 
claims to be a step forward from ¶.DQW>ZKR@DVVXPHVWKDWWKH0HGHYHORSVLWVHOIZLWKRXWDIRUHLJQ
object, in cognition·$VVXPLQJWKHUHIRUHWKDWLWLVRQO\E\ZD\RIUHFRXUVHWRDQHFHVVary and a priori 
world of experience that cognition can first arise (the Kantian centrality of this being lost on Brownson), 
KHSURXGO\DVVHUWVWKDWDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRIWKLVSULPDF\WKDW¶PDQ·VSRZHUWRSHUFHLYH>«@LVRXWRIWKH
soul, out of the me and not in it, that [perceived objects] exist, and that we perceive them, we depart from 
ZKDWZHVXSSRVHLVDFKDUDFWHULVWLFIHDWXUHRI$PHULFDQ7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVP·%URZQVRQHYHQJRHVVRIDU
DVWRGHFODUHWKDW¶KLV·ILQGLQJFRQVWLWXWHVWKHJURXQGVRIDXQLTXHO\American philosophy, encompassing 
¶(QJOLVKSKLORVRSK\DVLWVVWDUWLQJSRLQW>«@DOOWKRVHPRUDOVSLULWXDODQGUHOLJLRXVUHVXOWVIRUZKLFKZH
DQGRWKHUVKDYHYDOXHGWKHPHWDSK\VLFDOVSHFXODWLRQVRIPRGHUQ)UDQFHDQG*HUPDQ\·DQGDKHDOWK\
GRVHRI¶RXUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU·$OWKRXJK%URZQVRQDQG(PHUVRQZHUHIRUDWLPHFRUUHVSRQGHQWVDQG
DFTXDLQWDQFHVWKHUHLVQRHYLGHQFHWRVXJJHVWVLJQLILFDQWLQIOXHQFHRQHLWKHUSDUWEXW(PHUVRQ·V
precedence should be assumed, given that Nature prefigures those doubts which occurred to Brownson 
only in his 1842 article. See Brownson, ¶5HYLHZRI7KUHH:RUNVE\&RXVLQ·, The Christian Examiner and 
General Review, 21 (1836), 33-64 (pp. 40-1); ¶5HYLHZRI&KDUOHV(OZRRG·, The Boston Quarterly Review, 5 
(1842), 129-83. 
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probably, that man is hereby apprised, that, whilst the world is a spectacle, 
something in himself is stable. (CW I, 30-1. Emphasis added) 
 
As Emerson concedes, the most that might be effectively affirmed from an act as 
palpably ridiculous as this is that an originary consciousness as a basis of perspective, a 
SUHGLFDWH0(¶SUREDEO\·H[LVWV45 At this early stage in his career, any doubts are 
guarded, but there is nevertheless enough evidence to advance the supposition that if 
nature is, in EPHUVRQ·VZRUGV¶QRWRQO\WKHPDWHULDOEXW[«] also the process and the 
result· WKHQDV9DQ/HHURIIHUVWKH¶PLQGPD\EHWRRFRPSOHWHO\´DSDUWRIWKHQDWXUH
of thingsµ·, that the ME is merely derivative, not original, and that, in the end, Locke 
and company were correct (CW I, 11).46 
 Of course, in the context of the Emerson of 1836, we are getting ahead of 
ourselves by extrapolating too far from these speculations. Nature remains a text which 
performatively figures optimism in its declared convictions, even as it prefigures the 
WHUPVRIWKHSUREOHPVZKLFKZLOOQHFHVVLWDWHPDMRUUHYLVLRQVRILWVDXWKRU·VSRVLWLRQ
throughout the works of the 1840s. But if this apophatic model is at least theorised in 
Nature, then a fuller exposition of its practical mode of realisation is what Emerson 
VHHNV$VZHKDYHDOUHDG\VHHQLQJUDPPDU·VFRUURERUDWLRQof theory, language 
possesses a privileged role with respect to the conditions of perspective and locatedness 
ZKLFKXQGHUSLQ(PHUVRQ·VFRQFHUQVDQGLQGHHGWKHUHDUH further suggestions that it 
PLJKWEHFRPHWKDWPHGLXPE\ZKLFKZHFDQGHILQHD¶IL[HGSRLQWZKHUHE\ZHPD\
PHDVXUHRXUGHSDUWXUH·CW I, 39). In Nature, linguistic structures and formal 
tendencies, with their legal and economic norms of use, their establishment of 
                                                 
45 See DOVRWKHRSHQLQJVHQWHQFHVRI¶3URVSHFWV·ZKHUH¶WKHKLJKHVWUHDVRQ·LVJLYHQRQO\WREH¶>W@KDW
ZKLFKVHHPVIDLQWO\SRVVLEOH·CW I, 39). 
46 $V9DQ/HHUDOVRQRWHV¶WKHDUJXPHQWRI>Nature] works to undermine its own questions about 
SULRULWLHV·³Coleridge·VSDLUHGK\SRWKHVHVWKXVQHYHUUHVROYHLQ(PHUVRQ·VERRNHDFKLQVWHDGUHFXUV
consciously or unconsciously  in contradiction of the other. Van Leer, p. 69, 55. 
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commonality, consensus, and convention, figure the conditions of the secular world of 
WKH8QGHUVWDQGLQJDQGWKH1270($V(PHUVRQZULWHV¶>Z]ords are finite organs of 
the infinite mind. They cannot cover the dimensions of what is in truth. They break, 
FKRSDQGLPSRYHULVKLW·CW I, 28).47 This is why concessions to periphrastic grammar 
in the logic of the ME are critical and ineluctable; equally, it qualifies the decision to turn 
an exaltation of being into a convoluted piece of propositional logic wholly distinct 
IURPDQ\VHQVHRILPPHGLDF\RIDIIHFWLRQ¶:KDWQREOHHPRWLRQVGLODWHWKHPRUWDODVKH
enters the counsels of creation, and feels by knowledge the privilege to BE·CW I, 25. 
Emphasis added). 
 7KHLGHDOVHVSRXVHGLQWKHERRN·V¶/DQJXDJH·FKDSWHUWKHUHIRUHVHHPTXLWHDW
odds with the compositional exigencies apparent everywhere in the text. But this 
appearance tells only half the story. If WKHFHQWUDOSDUDGR[LQ(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWZKLFK
has been well observed throughout his critical history, concerns the conditions and 
limits of personal freedom and agency, then we ought to ask how such exigencies also 
affect his investment in language. Hence while adherence to linguistic convention 
represents conformity, a passiveness toward a condition of the NOT ME detailed most 
HPSKDWLFDOO\LQ¶7KH$PHULFDQ6FKRODU· so the proper use of language³in which original 
ZLOOUHWXUQVDQG¶ZLVHPHQSLHUFHWhis rotten diction and fasten words again to visible 
WKLQJV·³is, in actual fact, also passive, albeit now to the terms of the genius of Reason 
(CW ,$VKHZRXOGZULWHLQRIDFRQGLWLRQZHVKRXOGFRQVLGHU¶WUDQVIHUDEOHWR
the literary life· the LGHDORIFRQVDQJXLQLW\ZLWK5HDVRQLQYROYHV¶JODGDQGFRQVSLULQJ
reception,³reception that becomes giving in its turn, as the receiver is only the All-
*LYHULQSDUWDQGLQLQIDQF\·CW I, 122-3). 
                                                 
47 6HHDOVR·V¶0HWKRGRI1DWXUH·LQZKLFKthe impossibility of properly figuring infinite truth in this 
¶LQWULQVLFDOO\GHIHFWLYH·RUJDQinevitably OHDGVWRH[FHVVDQGHXSKXLVP¶/DQJXDJHRYHUVWDWHV6WDWHPHQWVRI
WKHLQILQLWHDUHXVXDOO\IHOWWREHXQMXVWWRWKHILQLWHDQGEODVSKHPRXV·CW I, 124). 
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 The problem for the aspiring student of the elemental ego, therefore, is to locate 
the point at which passivity before the conforming world of the NOT ME may be 
differentiated from the acts of Reason, and complicity with the exigencies of the secular 
world seen as distinct from the elective affinities figured by verbal choices made by 
some facet of the prelinguistic soul. If it is a principle of linguistic form that it marks the 
record of a constant sequence of choice toward the fullest expression of the thought or 
concept at stake, then, in a sense, the extant text is a negative image of all possible 
choices, the impress of exigency on all that might have been said, the world connate 
with thought in the fact of expression. For its author, therefore, the text potentially says 
a great deal more than it contains; it speaks, for instance, everything he might have said 
instead of what he did say, and especially of what he excised from prior texts in the 
processes of reading and reinscription for publication. On a few occasions in the later 
VOHDGLQJXSWR·VEssays, Emerson makes reference to a comment of Aristotle 
that is peculiarly relevant to his own life in and with text, particularly so with respect to 
the substantial and growing corpus on the shelves of his study that he reread, mined and 
refined in composiWLQJ)URP3OXWDUFK·V¶/LIHRI$OH[DQGHU· (PHUVRQTXRWHV$ULVWRWOH·V
UHSO\WR$OH[DQGHU·VFULWLTXHWKDWE\SXEOLVKLQJWKHWRWDOLW\RIKLVVFLHQWLILFWKRXJKWKH
lessened the distinction of the learning of those who had studied personally with him. 
This reSO\LQ(PHUVRQ·VTXRWDWLRQZDVWKDWVXFKWKRXJKWV¶´DUHSXEOLVKHGDQGQRW
SXEOLVKHGµ·CW II, 85).48 $ULVWRWOH·VHVVHQWLDOSRLQWRIFRXUVHLVWKDWDSSUHKHQVLRQ
GHSHQGVXSRQWKHDFXPHQRIWKHUHDGHUQRWWKHIDFWRIWKHWKRXJKW·VEHLQJLQWKH
public domaLQ%XWZKHQWKDWUHDGHULVWKHWH[W·VRZQDXWKRUWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHFRPHV
more concrete. What is published and not published in this sense are exactly those 
excisions and elisions alluded to above³the substructure of the piece without which it 
can stand, EXWZKLFKQHYHUWKHOHVVDFFRPSDQLHGLWLQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFH7KHDXWKRU·V
                                                 
48 7KLVLVWKHZRUGLQJXVHGLQ¶6SLULWXDO/DZV·6OLJKWYDULDWLRQVH[LVWLQYHUVLRQVUHFRUGHGLQ1RYHPEHU
1834 and November 1836 (JMN IV, 337; V, 245). 
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reading, against this distinction, becomes the means by which he or she attains 
perspective of the coherence of the purely essential and necessary in that text, and as 
such proper reading reconstructs the creative mood which collaborated with and 
UHSUHVHQWHG5HDVRQLQ(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWDVKHSXWLWLQDPD[LPRINature¶WKH
IXQGDPHQWDOODZRIFULWLFLVP·LVWKDW¶´>H@YHU\VFULSWXUHLVWREHLQWHUSUHWHGE\WKHVDPH
spirit which gave iWIRUWKµ·CW I, 23).  
It is this possibility that underlies the processes Emerson undergoes in relation 
to his own writing as he brings the mature works³Nature being the first³to print. For 
from Nature forward, with increasing focus and methodological seriousness into the 
early-1840s, Emerson cribs from his journal and notebook writings to compile the 
works which would reach publication. And in this process of self-reading and rewriting, 
RIWKHFRQFHQWUDWLRQRIRQH·VGLVSDUDWHutterances into the singularity of the literary 
work, Emerson is essentially seeking to compile the clearest textual traces of insight in 
KLVZULWLQJWROLQN¶ILUVWDQGWKLUGWKRXJKWV·LQWKHDFWRIUHYLVRU\UHZULWLQJWRJHQHUDWH
what is, in terms of his personal relation to the texts, a restorative reading. His theory 
being in place, we can now turn to a consideration of the works and journal writings 
which followed Nature to examine the form that he finds in practice.
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Labours of 6W\OH5HDVRQ·V:ULWLQJDQGWKH0HWKRGRIDQ(OHPHQWDO
Language 
 
Aspirants to a realised elemental self through the medium of language have always, quite 
reasonably, been subject to criticism. From its first statements onward, the principles of 
intuitive knowledge at the heart of transcendental idealism were developed via 
apparently inevitable recourse to an esoteric, unorthodox, and fundamentally personal 
vocabulary which was not always understood and often unappreciated. Kant famously 
published the Prolegomena to seek to overcome the indifference with which the first 
Critique was received, an indifference founded, among other things, upon a highly 
idiosyncratic terminology that left even his most astute contemporaries bemused by a 
ERRNZKLFKVHHPHGWR¶FRQVLVW>«RI@QRWKLQJEXWKLHURJO\SKLFV·1 As the Kantian 
inheritance moved away from philosophical formalism and toward a more conventional 
VHQVHRI¶LQWXLWLRQ· personalism in language became more pronounced. By 1829, when 
James Marsh came to write his preIDWRU\HVVD\WR&ROHULGJH·VAids to Reflection, linguistic 
personalisation had become a critical tool of the transcendental philosopher, for if the 
English writer was restoring a binary forgotten by sensualist thought³that of Reason 
and Understanding³then ¶>L@QWKHYHU\QDWXUHRIWKLQJVLWLVLPSRVVLEOHIRUDZULWHUWR
express by a single word any truth, or to mark any distinction, not recognised in the 
language of his day, unless he adopts a word entirely new, or gives to one already in use 
a new and more SHFXOLDUVHQVH·2  
Both in America and in Europe, however, contemporary hostility to this habit 
was rooted in the tradition against which the idealists were set. Francis Bowen, writing 
                                                 
1 -RKDQQ6FKXOW]TXRWHGLQ*DU\+DWILHOG·V¶,QWURGXFWLRQ·WR,PPDQXHO.DQWProlegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics (1783) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. ix-xliv (pp. xx-xxi). 
2 0DUVK¶3UHOLPLQDU\(VVD\·SO[YLLL 
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in defence of the Lockean thesis of a language defined and held stable by consensus, 
stated in 1837 that: 
 
Philosophical truth, of which the subject is man and the end is action, is the 
exhibition of things as they are, and demands the utmost severity of expression. 
The value of a principle consists in its unity and entireness. An error in part 
vitiates the whole. Algebraic simplicity of language is therefore required in its 
enunciation.3 
 
In other words, by way of their use of an exclusive language, Bowen levels the charge 
that the Transcendentalists do not participate in nor contribute to the philosophical 
HFRQRP\$VKHJRHVRQWRVD\LWVZULWHUVKDYHQRW¶ZRUNHGWKURXJK·WKHLUDUJXPHQWV
¶E\SHUVHYHULQJODERXUDQGKXPEOHWUXVW·DQGFRQVHTXHQWO\WKHLUZULWLQJVFDQKDYHQR
¶HQG·LQLQVWLJDWLQJZRUOGO\¶DFWLRQ·4 
 As may be clear from these comments, the terms of philosophical objections to 
models of intuition and spontaneous knowledge reappear in critiques of the language 
that represents such models, and this remained the case throughout the twentieth-
century. Joel Porte, for LQVWDQFHFODLPHG(PHUVRQ·VSKLORVRSKLFDOLQHSWLWXGHZDVEHKLQG
WKHIDFWWKDWKH¶REYLRXVO\DOZD\VPHDQWWKHVDPHWKLQJ·ZKHQXVLQJDUDQJHRIWHUPVEH
LW¶VHQWLPHQW·¶VHQVH·¶ODZ·¶LQWXLWLRQ·RU¶5HDVRQ·5 Even critics who have set out to 
defend EmeUVRQ·VSKLORVRSKLFDOFUHGHQWLDOVVHHKLVOLQJXLVWLFKDELWVDVDFRUROODU\RIKLV
weaker arguments, as David Van Leer implies when he justifies his thesis by proposing 
WKDWLWPLJKWEH¶YDOXDEOH·DQGQHFHVVDU\¶WRWU\WRWUDQVODWH(PHUVRQ·VSULYDWHYRFDEXODry 
                                                 
3 )UDQFLV%RZHQ¶/RFNHDQGWKH7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVWV·The Christian Examiner and General Review, 23 (1837), 
170-94 (p. 191). 
4 %RZHQ¶/RFNH· pp. 187-8, 194. 
5 Porte, p. 69. 
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LQWRWKHPRUHSXEOLFRQHRIWUDGLWLRQDOSKLORVRSK\·6 The issue here lies in the 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQODQJXDJHDQGWKRXJKWDQGWKH¶ZRUN·HQWDLOHGLQDUULYLQJDWWUXWK
by way of the conjunction of these two. The commonplace that the romantic author 
writes by virtue of a workless spontaneity, that the arduous task of precise expression 
familiar to every other era simply does not apply to these post-Kantian intuitionists, has 
EHHQUHPDUNDEO\SHUVLVWHQW)RUH[DPSOH+DQQDK6XOOLYDQ·VUHFHQWVWXG\RIUHYLVion as 
the epitome of literary labour in the twentieth-century is respectably nuanced in its 
H[SRVLWLRQRIUHZULWLQJ·VLQFUHDVLQJLPSRUWDQFHDVFRPSRVLWLRQDOKDELWVDOWHUHGLQ
correlation with historical and technological changes, but its valorisation of tKH¶ZRUN·RI
revision still implies the denigration of a non-revisory romanticism as literary hubris 
built upon intellectual idleness. Romanticism, unlike modernism, always its theoretical 
FRXQWHU¶WHQGHGWRLPDJLQHWKHWH[WH[LVWLQJLQLWVIXOOHVWIRUPLn the past, in pre-
linguistic shape, and even the first rendition on paper as already a transcription of 
ZDQLQJLPDJLQDWLRQ5HYLVLRQZDV>«@DWKUHDWWRDZRUN·VRUJDQLFXQLW\DQGIUHVKQHVV·7 
While this statement is undoubtedly representative of the romantic ideology of genius in 
                                                 
6 Van Leer, p. xii. 
7 Sullivan, p. 3. See also pp. 9, and 25-32. It should perhaps be noted in passing that the critique of 
workless spontaneity is every bit as typical a romantic habit as was the advocacy of the same. Kant 
notoriously dismissed the neo-3ODWRQLVPRIVRPHRIKLVFRQWHPSRUDULHVLQGHFODULQJWKDW¶things have 
lately gone so far that an alleged philosophy is openly proclaimed to the public, in which one does not 
have to work, but need only hearken and attend to the oracle within [«] to accomplish by a single 
piercing glance within them everything that industry can ever hope to achieve, and a good deal more 
besides [«] the philosopher of intuition, who makes his demonstration, not by the Herculean labor of 
self-knowledge from below upwards, but soaring above this, by an apotheosis (which costs him nothing) 
IURPDERYHGRZQZDUGV>«thus] speak[s] from his own observation, and is not obliged to be answerable 
to anyone else· .DQW¶2QDRecently Prominent Tone of Superiority in PKLORVRSK\·LQTheoretical 
Philosophy after 1781, ed. and trans. by Henry E. Allison and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp. 425-45 (pp. 431-2). Porte refers to this very SDVVDJHVXJJHVWLQJWKDWLW¶PLJKW
DOPRVWKDYHEHHQ·ZULWWHQRQ(PHUVRQLQEmerson and Thoreau, p. 87. Indeed, in the eagerness to defend 
RQH·VK\SRWKHVLVHGPHWKRGRIDWWDLQLQJWKHNQRZOHGJHRIFRQVFLRXVQHVV·VVWUXFWXUHWKHGLVSDUDJHPHQWRI
the methods RIRWKHUVEHFDPHDPRQJWKHPRVWV\PSWRPDWLFDQGHIIHFWLYHRIHYLGHQFHVRIRQH·VRZQ
philosophical seriousness. Thus on pretty well exactly the same terms as Kant, Coleridge wrote of his own 
bête noir)UHQFKHFOHFWLFLVPWKDWLWZDVPHUHO\D¶SRSXODUSKLORsophy, at once the counterfeit and the 
mortal enemy of all true and manly metaphysical research· As with Kant and others, the language of a 
pseudo-SKLORVRSK\ZDVLQGLFDWLYHRILWVIDLOLQJVWKH\¶SLFNDQGFKRRVHZKDWHYHULVPRVWSODXVLEOHDQG
showy; [«] select whatever words can have some semblance of sense attached to them, without the least 
expenditure of thought· Coleridge, Biographia, S)LQDOO\RQHPLJKWFRQVLGHU(PHUVRQ·VRZQLURQLFDO
and self-FRQVFLRXVUHPDUNVLQ¶7KH7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVW·¶QRW only [do the Transcendentalists] withdraw 
them[selves] from the conversation, but from the labours of the world; they are not good citizens, not 
good members of society [«] The philanthropists inquire whether Transcendentalism does not mean 
VORWK·CW I, 210-11). 
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DQRUPDWLYHVHQVH,FRQWHQGKHUHWKDW(PHUVRQ·VLQFUHDVLQJGLVLOOXVLRQPHQWZLWKWKH
idea leads to a radical and original refiguration of textual relationship which is wholly 
focused on the practices of self-reading and rewriting. This chapter will trace first the 
LQWHOOHFWXDOMXVWLILFDWLRQVIRUUHDGLQJRQH·VRZQZRUNDVSKLORVRSKLFDQGWKHRORJLFDO
labour in early-to-mid nineteenth-century New England, before examining its specific 
SULQFLSOHVDQGHIIHFWVLQ(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKW0\REMHFWLVWRLQWHUURJDWHKRZ(PHUVRQ·V
compositional theories contradict or undermine the normative principle of spontaneous 
composition, and how, exactly, his processes of textual self-relation can be understood 
as a form of philosophical labour in keeping with the models developed in the last 
chapter. 
 )LUVWWKHGHVLJQDWLRQRIVSRQWDQHRXVDUWLVWLFSURGXFWLRQDV¶RUJDQLF·QHHGV
analysis. Originally deriving from Coleridge, but with significant contributions too from 
Germany, the principle of organic production was most extensively analysed in the mid 
twentieth-century by M. H. Abrams, and explicitly applied to Emerson by a number of 
critics, but has more recently become part of the tradition most sharply criticised by 
scholars objecting to romantic disengagement.8 The organic theory is more nuanced 
WKDQVRPHWUHDWPHQWVWHQGWRDGPLWKRZHYHU$FFRUGLQJWR$EUDPV·VGHILQLWLYH
handling of the subject, a properly organic relation to language would necessitate that a 
personal relation to it would be universal rather than exclusive. Production under these 
conditions is consistently associated with a prereflective, prelinguistic consciousness: 
¶$QLQVSLUHGSRHPRUSDLQWLQJLVVXGGHQHIIRUWOHVVDQGFRPSOHWHQRWEHFDXVHLWLVDJLIW
                                                 
8 )RU$EUDPV·VRYHUYLHZVVHHThe Mirror and the Lamp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 
156-)RUWUHDWPHQWVRIWKHRUJDQLFSULQFLSOHLQ(PHUVRQ·VWKHRULHVDQGSUDFWLFHVRIFUHDWLYLW\VHH
1RUPDQ)RHUVWHU¶(PHUVRQRQWKH2UJDQLF3ULQFLSOHLQ$UW·PMLA, 41 (1926), 193-208; Richard P. 
$GDPV¶(PHUVRQDQGWKH2UJDQLF0HWDSKRU·PMLA, 69 (1954), 117-30; 0HUWRQ56HDOWV-U¶0XOEHUU\
/HDYHVDQG6DWLQ(PHUVRQ·V7KHRU\RIWKH&UHDWLYH3URFHVV·, Studies in the American Renaissance (1985), 79-
94. In her defence of the sophisticated literary formalism of the romantics, Susan Wolfson notes that the 
SULQFLSOHRIRUJDQLFSURGXFWLRQKDVEHFRPHVLPSO\D¶V\QHFGRFKHIRUURPDQWLFLVP·DQGWKHJURXQGVRI
critique by figures as diverse as Terry Eagleton and Paul de Man, who both take for granted the notion 
that organic form is an ideology incapable of self-analysis, which leads inevitably to social disengagement 
or an aesthetics of solipsism. See Wolfson, Formal Charges, pp. 5, 10-15. 
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from without, but because it grows of itself, within a region of the mind which is 
LQDFFHVVLEOHHLWKHUWRDZDUHQHVVRUFRQWURO·9 %HLQJERWK¶LQVSLUHG·DQLPSRUWDQWFRQFHSW
in the epistemic dimensions of this discussion, as I will demonstrate shortly) and 
¶JURZLQJRILWVHOI·RQH·VUHODtion to it is passive and determined. So Emerson can 
SURSRVHWKDW¶ZRUGVDUHVLJQVRIQDWXUDOIDFWV·VLQFHDFFRUGLQJWRWKHRUJDQLFWKHRU\WKH
choice of words to represent such facts is determined by a natural principle. In the same 
way, this manner of spHDNLQJZLOOQHJDWHWKHSDUWLDOLW\RIRQH·VXWWHUDQFHDQG
SHUVSHFWLYHEHFDXVHMXVWDV¶WKHSODQWDVVLPLODWHVWRLWVRZQVXEVWDQFHWKHDOLHQDQG
GLYHUVHHOHPHQWVRIHDUWKDLUOLJKWDQGZDWHU·VRZLOOWKHDEVRUSWLRQRIWKHQDWXUDO
world under the homogenising effect of perspective also constitute the immersion of 
that perspective in the organic and universal processes of the natural world.10 Hence 
QDWXUHLQSHUFHSWLRQDQGPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\LQUHSUHVHQWDWLRQZLOOEH¶WKHV\PERORI
VSLULW·WKHUHIOHFWLRQ (and confirmation) of its necessary order.11 
 However, the hypothesis is also potentially destabilised by its own exigencies. 
For Abrams, the extent to which organicism is purely fatalistic was better observed by 
German critics than English, but Coleridge nevertheless perceived its essential dilemma: 
 
&ROHULGJH·VFHQWUDOSUREOHP>«@ZDVWRXVHDQDORJ\ZLWKRUJDQLFJURZWKWR
account for the spontaneous, the inspired, and the self-evolving in the 
psychology of invention, yet not to commit himself so far to the elected figure 
as to minimise the supervention of the antithetic qualities of foresight and 
choice.12 
 
                                                 
9 M. H. Abrams, p. 192. 
10 M. H. Abrams, p. 171. 
11 See NatureZKHUH¶WKHSRHWFRQIRUPVWKLQJVWRKLVWKRXJKWV·LQDQLGHDOLVHGSRUWUDLWRIWKLVSULQFLSOH
(CW I, 31). 
12 M. H. Abrams, p. 224. 
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&ROHULGJH·VUDWKHULQFRQFOXVLYHQHJRWLDWLRQRIWKLVSUREOHPUHIHUUHGXOWLPDWHO\EDFNWR
his conviction in the precedence of consciousness. As he wrote of Shakespeare, in the 
case of genius, the subjective consciousness maintains a special degree of control: 
¶KLPVHOIDQDWXUHKXPDQLVHGDJHQLDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJGLUHFWLQJVHOI-consciously a power, 
DQGDQLPSOLFLWZLVGRPGHHSHUWKDQFRQVFLRXVQHVV·13 For Coleridge, all falls back in line 
ZLWKWKHZLOOVXFKLVWKHGHPDQGRIDFRQWLQXRXVO\LGHQWLFDO¶,·DOWKRXJKWKHPHUH
assertion of his given example does not quite provide the evidence to make the 
hypothesis stick. However, as we have seen already, and as I will demonstrate further 
here, the same conditions do not apply with Emerson. If, as Julie Ellison has written, 
what distinguishes him from Coleridge is precisely this issue of the predominance of the 
subject, against which Emerson insists upon the irrevocaEOH¶GLVWDQFHRUGLIIHUHQFH
EHWZHHQVXEMHFWDQGREMHFWPLQGDQGZRUOG·WKHQWKHLQWUXVLRQRIDQHIIHFWLYHO\
primary NOT ME means that, practically speaking, passivity precedes activity, world 
FRQWLQXHVWRSUHFHGHPLQGDQGKLVRUJDQLFRU¶LQVSLUHG·SURGXctions will bear the 
evidence of this.14 As such, what Emerson will endeavour to find on reading his own 
work is a way to negotiate that primary passivity, to decipher what is received as given 
and what consciousness must contribute in kind; in short, to identify what, if anything, 
LQRQH·VZULWLQJVLVWUXO\VRYHUHLJQDQGRULJLQDO7KXVE\ZD\RILQWHUSUHWLYHDFXPHQKH
seeks to glimpse the essential perspective by which one relates originally to the world, 
and, by extension, to the hypothesised universal. What is sought, in other words, is a 
transpersonal ability to recognise that one possesses an innate style. 
 Inquiries of this nature in the period inevitably owe much to the hermeneutical 
UHYROXWLRQWDNLQJSODFHLQ*HUPDQ\WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH¶+LJKHU&ULWLFLVP·, which 
reread scripture according to humanist and enlightenment principles in order to 
                                                 
13 &ROHULGJH¶6KDNHVSHDUH·V-XGJPHQW(TXDOWRKLV*HQLXV·LQShakespearean Criticism, ed. by 
Thomas Middleton Raysor (London: J. M. Dent, 1960), I, pp. 194-8 (p. 198). 
14 Julie Ellison, (PHUVRQ·V5RPDQWLF6W\OH (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 180. 
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challenge dogmatic assumptions about the identity of its authors and other irrational or 
supernaturalist theologies. These ideas were being carried into a receptive audience 
DPRQJVW1HZ(QJODQG·VLQWHOOHFWXDOFXOWXUHE\QXPHURXV\RXQJVFKRODUVDXWKRUVDQG
WHDFKHUVZKRKDGEHHQHQWKXVLDVWLFVWXGHQWVLQ*HUPDQXQLYHUVLWLHV(PHUVRQ·VEURWKHU
William studied under Eichhorn at Göttingen in the mid-1820s, while Edward Everett, 
(PHUVRQ·VLQIOXHQWLDOWXWRUDW+DUYDUGKDGEHHQDWWKHVDPHXQLYHUVLW\DGHFDGH
previously. Meanwhile, major texts of the movement were being translated and 
advocated by a new generation of ministers, and Emerson had read Rosenmüller, 
Griesbach, and Schleiermacher in the years after leaving Harvard divinity school.15 The 
primary significance of this, as a number of critics have argued, is that the power 
granted the hermeneut in the higher criticism had a significant part to play in the ability 
of Emerson and others to declare themselves free of the constrictions of theological or 
ecclesiastical formalism, and therefore free to reinterpret religion, philosophy, and the 
social structure as they saw fit.16 But newly energised interpretive freedoms also fed into 
another theological debate taking place in these years in New England which has barely 
                                                 
15 The influence of higher criticism in New England in the early nineteenth-century has been well 
GRFXPHQWHG7KHPDMRUPRQRJUDSKRQWKHVXEMHFWUHPDLQV-HUU\:D\QH%URZQ·VThe Rise of Biblical 
Criticism in America: 1800-1870 (Middletown CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1969). For its influence on 
language and belief in Unitarian contexts close to and incorporating Emerson, see Philip F. Gura, The 
Wisdom of Words: Language, Theology, and Literature in the New England Renaissance (Middletown CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1981), and Richard Grusin, Transcendentalist Hermeneutics: Institutional Authority and the 
Higher Criticism of the Bible (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1991). For a treatment which focuses 
more explicitly on how it reached Emerson, see BarbaUD3DFNHU¶2ULJLQDQG$XWKRULW\(PHUVRQDQGWKH
+LJKHU&ULWLFLVP·LQReconstructing American Literary History, ed. by Sacvan Bercovitch (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 67-)RUWKLVDFFRXQWRI(PHUVRQ·VUHDGLQJVHH5REHUW'
Richardson, Emerson: The Mind on Fire (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1995), p. 58. 
16 %RWK(OOLVRQDQG5LFKDUG*UXVLQHPSKDVLVHWKLVSRLQW)RU(OOLVRQ¶WKHKLJKHUFULWLFLVPOHQWLWVHOIWR
being treated by Emerson as a theory of influence. By depULYLQJWKHZRUOG·VPRVWLQIOXHQWLDOWH[WRIWKH
XQLWDU\PHDQLQJWKDWSURYHG*RG·VDXWKRUVKLSLWGHPRQVWUDWHGWKHSRZHURILQWHUSUHWDWLRQWRGLPLQLVK
WKHLQWLPLGDWLQJDVSHFWRIZULWHUVDQGWUDGLWLRQV·6HH(OOLVRQS*UXVLQZRUNLQJIURPDVLPLODUEDVH, 
proposes that the professionalisation of the ministry in New England engendered by theological schools 
such as Harvard and Andover was reflected in a new understanding of the responsibilities of the 
PLQLVWHULDOUROHWKDWLVWKHGHYHORSPHQWRID¶FULWLFDOFRQVFLHQFH·DQGWKHDFFHSWDQFHRIWKHQHHGWRPDNH
SHUVRQDOO\UHDVRQHG¶MXGJHPHQWV·UDWKHUWKDQIRUPDOLVWLFUHLWHUDWLRQVRIGRJPD7KHVHRIFRXUVHDUH
KHUPHQHXWLFDOUHTXLUHPHQWVDQG*UXVLQSURSRVHVWKDWLQWKH¶/RUG·V6XSSHU·VHUPRQDQGWKH'LYLQLW\
6FKRRO¶$GGUHVV·(PHUVRQHPERGLHVWKHVHSULQFLSOHVIDULQH[FHVVRIZKDWZDVGHHPHGQHFHVVDU\E\
Unitarian orthodoxy. See Grusin, Transcendentalist Hermeneutics, pp. 1-79. It has long been the case that 
Transcendentalist thought was given to have emerged as a literal and necessary extension of Unitarian 
principles, and a still-SHUWLQHQWDUWLFOHE\&+)DXVWWUDFHVWKLVFRQYLFWLRQDPRQJVRPHRI(PHUVRQ·V
contemporaries, as well as analysing its ramifications from a twentieth-century perspective. See Faust, 
¶7KH%DFNJURXQGRIWKH8QLWDULDQ2SSRVLWLRQWR7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVP·, Modern Philology, 35 (1938), 297-324. 
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received any scholarly attention, and which has significant bearing on the relationship 
between language and divinely granted, spontaneous thought. The concern here was 
with the status of divine inspiration and Holy Scripture³a concept that the German 
humanists had been calling into question with increasing forcefulness.  
8QLWDULDQLVPDVWKHWLWOHRIRQHRI:LOOLDP(OOHU\&KDQQLQJ·VPRVWVLJQLILFDQW
sermons PDGHSODLQZDVD¶UDWLRQDOUHOLJLRQ·EXWWKHKLVWRU\RIUHYLYDOLVPLQ$PHULFD
throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth-century, and the role that affection and 
enthusiasm played in these eruptions of religious fervour, ensured that antagonistic 
forces were always present when discussions of the relative merits of detached 
intellectualism and unquestioning faith returned to the public arena. Fundamentally, for 
&KDQQLQJDQGRWKHUV8QLWDULDQLVPKHOGD¶SURQRXQFHG>«@GLVWUXVWRIVXGGHQ
conversion expHULHQFHV·³LQVWHDGWKHUHOLJLRXVOLIHGHSHQGHGXSRQD¶ULJRURXVDQG
continuous effort of self-FXOWXUH·EDVHGDERYHDOORQWKHFRQYLFWLRQWKDWUHOLJLRXVWUXWK
might be attained by way of reasoned analysis.17 ,QWKH¶8QLWDULDQFRQWURYHUV\·RIWKH
1820s-30s, in which an emergent Unitarian theology came under sustained attack from 
orthodox Calvinists, predominantly by means of the journal Spirit of the Pilgrims, 
disputation focused on a couple of problematic doctrines. One major issue was the 
¶LPSHUVRQDO·XQLWDU\LGHQWLW\RI*RGDVRSSRVHGWRWKH¶WKUHHSHUVRQV·RIWKH7ULQLW\DQG
it is this principle that dominates the texts that tend to still be analysed with respect to 
WKHFRQWURYHUV\VXFKDV$QGUHZV1RUWRQ·VSROHPLFA Statement of Reasons for Not 
Believing the Doctrines of Trinitarians.18 But equally as significant in the opinion of the time 
was the question of the authorship of scripture. For orthodox theologians, holy texts 
were the product of divine, plenary inspiration, and they needed to be, for only by way 
of their divine status could they be looked to for infallible moral and spiritual guidance. 
                                                 
17 3DFNHU¶7KH7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVWV·S 
18 Andrews Norton, A Statement of Reasons for Not Believing the Doctrines of Trinitarians, Concerning the Nature of 
God and the Person of Christ (1819-33) (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, and Co., 1833). 
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)RU&KDQQLQJDQGKLVUDWLRQDOLVWFRQWHPSRUDULHVKRZHYHUWKHUHYHDOHGZRUG¶LVEXWD
PHDQVDQGLVGHVLJQHGWRFRQFXUZLWKQDWXUHSURYLGHQFHDQG*RG·VVSLULWLQFDUU\LQJ
forward reason to LWVSHUIHFWLRQ·,QGHHGLWLVQRWWKHUHYHDOHGZRUGEXW¶RXUUDWLRQDO
QDWXUH>WKDW@LVWKHJUHDWHVWJLIWRI*RG·19 ,Q&KDQQLQJ·VWKRXJKWWKHXVHRIUHDVRQLV
the primary evidence of divine authority in the world³its universality and consistency 
working toward the unification of our acts and tendencies in a more rigorous system of 
PRUDOYLUWXH$VXEVLGLDU\FKDUDFWHULVWLFRIWKLVDIILUPDWLRQRIWKHIDFW¶WKDWUHYHODWLRQ
UHVWVRQWKHDXWKRULW\RIUHDVRQ·LVWKHGHPDQGWKDWVFULSWXUHLVVHFRQGDU\DQGWKXVPust 
conform³¶5HDVRQPXVWFROOHFWDQGZHLJKWKHYDULRXVSURRIVRI&KULVWLDQLW\·20 The 
inevitable consequence of this was that interpretive attempts to distinguish between 
authoritative articles of scripture and the interpolations of scribes or false claims of 
religious enthusiasts were seen by orthodox scholars as blasphemous rejections of 
Biblical authority, and hence as infidelity. 
 :KHQ(PHUVRQXVHVWKHWHUPV¶HQWKXVLDVP·DQG¶LQVSLUDWLRQ·LQKLVZRUN
therefore, he was writing to a contemporary audience who would have likely held a 
personal opinion on the meaning and validity of these terms. Indeed, in amongst his 
frequent use of one or the other word, occasional caveats indicate a self-conscious play 
RQWKLVFRQWHQWLRXVLVVXH,Q¶7KH2YHU-6RXO·RI after proposing a mode of 
WUDQVFHQGHQWDO¶FRPPXQLFDWLRQ>ZKLFK@LVDQLQIOX[RIWKH'LYLQHPLQGLQWRRXURZQ
PLQG·(PHUVRQIROORZVZLWKDQLPSRUWDQWFRQGLWLRQ¶%\WKHnecessity of our constitution, a 
FHUWDLQHQWKXVLDVPDWWHQGVWKHLQGLYLGXDO·VFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIWKDWGLYLQHSUHVHQFH·CW 
II, 167. Emphasis added). 7KHUHLVOLWWOHHYLGHQFHLQ¶7KH2YHU-6RXO·DVWRZK\D
prejudice to affirm enthusiasm should be a necessity of our constitution, but a hint is 
JLYHQLQ¶,QWHOOHFW·ODWHULQEssays: First Series, as to what Emerson is suggesting. Here, he 
                                                 
19 :LOOLDP(OOHU\&KDQQLQJ¶&KULVWLDQLW\D5DWLRQDO5HOLJLRQ·LQWorks (Boston: Walker Wise and Co., 
1862), IV, pp. 31-65 (p. 32). For a discussion of some of the prehistory of the development of this 
doctrine, see Gura, Wisdom, pp. 16-8. 
20 Channing, pp. 40 and 31-65 passim. 
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GLVFXVVHVDQDORJXHVIRUDVLPLODUFRQFHSWEXWLVFDUHIXOWRWDJLWDVLQVSLUDWLRQ¶,WVHHPV
as if the law of the intellect resembled that law of nature by which we now inspire, now 
expire the breath; by which the heart now drains in, then hurls out the blood,³the law 
RIXQGXODWLRQ·CW II, 197). That inspiration can be depicted as a trope with empirical 
and scientific overtones implies that it is to be conceived of on contrary terms to 
enthusiasm, which had been OHIWDQXQDQDO\VHGIDFHWRIWKH¶LQGLYLGXDO·VFRQVFLRXVQHVV·
presumably because it was excessively subjective, emotional, or sentimental, and 
incompatible with analytic explanation. It is within this polarity, between a reasoning 
PRGHWHUPHG¶LQVSLUDWLRQ· DQGDVHQVHRI¶HQWKXVLDVP·WKDWKDVWRGRZLWKDIIHFWLRQVWKH
body, and the conditions of our constitution, that the debate with which Emerson 
would have been familiar lay, and in it lay also the basis of a properly scientific method 
for the elucidation of a transpersonal sense of self-accordance irrespective of mere 
DIIHFWLYHDZDUHQHVVRIRQH·VXQLWDU\EHLQJ 
 
Inspiration, Intellection, and Textual Relation in Unitarian Theology 
Quite apart from concerns specific to the American context, differentiation between the 
Greek-GHULYHG¶HQWKXVLDVP·DQGWKH/DWLQDWH¶LQVSLUDWLRQ·FDQEHPDGHRQHW\PRORJLFDO
lines, and the consequences of the semantic difference are borne out in the relative 
histories of the two words. Inspiration, deriving from the Latin inspirare, the act of 
breathing in, has in its literal sense an implication of transitivity that is just as evident in 
its figurative usage as the reception of divine influence. Ontologically, the influence or 
breath of God derives from an extrinsic source, to which the recipient is a transcendent 
subsidiary. Hence acts carried out under its influence will be characterised by a degree of 
suspension of personal agency, and the effects of such action may be deemed 
inexplicable or alienating either in the moment of their manifestation, or afterward in 
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non-inspired consideration of the thing produced.21 The logical consequence of this is 
WKDWLQVSLUDWLRQFDQQRWEHYRXFKHGIRUE\WKH¶LQVSLUDGR·LQWKHDFWRIEHLQJLQVSLUHG
Subject only in an immediate sense to the feeling of alienation, the inspired individual 
FDQUHIOHFWRQWKHH[SHULHQFHRQO\ZKHQWKHPHQWDOIDFXOWLHVKDYHUHWXUQHGWRD¶QRUPDO·
state. 
 Enthusiasm, on the other hand³which derives via the Greek enthousiasmos from 
en-theosPHDQLQJOLWHUDOO\¶JRGZLWKLQ·³bears a suggestion of ontological parity between 
deity and enthusiastic being which its lexical history confirms. As Timothy Clark has 
written, it was the religious upheaval of the Civil War and Interregnum in Britain which 
JDYHHQWKXVLDVP¶WKHSUHGRPLQDQWVHQVHRIDGHOXGHGFODLPWRLQVSLUDWLRQ·HYHQWKRXJK
it had always connoted this meaning.22 From the mid seventeenth-century and 
throughout the enlightenment, the term was used pejoratively to denigrate the claims of 
sectarians of a nearer relationship or immanent being with God³not least, of course, in 
the American colonies. Its opponents often sought to drain such claims of their 
potentially dangerous supernaturalism by appeal to the psychological and intellectual 
weaknesses of the claimants. EnthusiasPZDVFRQVLGHUHG¶DSDWKRORJ\RIWKHSDVVLRQV·
and described in metaphors of disease which depicted its cause as the improper 
valorisation of the fervours of emotion and prejudice over the evidences of reason and 
the labour of intellect.23 In characteristic manner, John Locke wrote that the conviction 
RIWKHHQWKXVLDVWZDV¶IRXQGHGQHLWKHURQUHDVRQQRUGLYLQHUHYHODWLRQEXWULVLQJIURP
                                                 
21 6HHIRUH[DPSOH7LPRWK\&ODUN·VGHILQLWLRQ¶,QVSLUDWLRQLVKHOGWREOXUFRQFHSWLRQVRIDJHQF\WKH
ZULWHULVSRVVHVVHGRUGLVSRVVHVVHG>«@&RPSRVLWLRQPD\VHHPWREHHIIRUWOHVVHYHQDXWRPDWLF7KH
writer is often astonished by what he or she has written, yet the result is also seen as a matter of personal 
FUHGLW·Clark, The Theory of Inspiration: Composition as a Crisis of Subjectivity in Romantic and Post-Romantic Writing 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 3. 
22 Although Clark notes eDUO\LQKLVVWXG\WKDW¶In-spiration is a late Latin term, usually translating the Greek 
enthousiasmos·KHLVDOVRFRJQLVDQWRIWKHIDFWWKDWWKLVWUDQVODWLRQLVRIOLPLWHGHTXLYDOHQFHVLQFHLWLVDOVR
WKHFDVHWKDW¶WKHXVHRIWKH*UHHNenthousiasmos [as a substitute for the Latin term] to mean deluded 
LQVSLUDWLRQGDWHVIURPWKHHDUO\&KULVWLDQSHULRG·&ODUNS 
23 Clark, pp. 63-4. For a much more extensive history of the uses of the term in religious contexts, 
predominantly in Britain, between 1640 and 1800, see R. A. Knox, Enthusiasm: A Chapter in the History of 
Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950). For a discussion of enthusiasm in America see David S. 
Lovejoy, Religious Enthusiasm in the New World: Heresy to Revolution (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1985). 
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the conceits of a warmed or over-ZHHQLQJEUDLQ·$VVXFKWKHLUGHIHQFHZRXOG
necessarily be passionate rather than intellectual, and Locke facetiously provides his 
UHDGHUZLWKLW¶7KLVLVWKHZD\RIWDONLQJRIWKHVHPHQWKH\DUHVXUHEHFDXVHWKH\DUH
VXUHDQGWKHLUSHUVXDVLRQVDUHULJKWRQO\EHFDXVHWKH\DUHVWURQJLQWKHP·24 
 By the early nineteenth-century, in spite of the modernisation of the term 
¶HQWKXVLDVP·WRGHQRWHVRPHWKLQJFORVHUWRLWVFRPPRQXVDJHWRGD\WKHWKHRORJLFDO-
SKLORVRSKLFDOPHDQLQJZDVFHUWDLQO\QRWIRUJRWWHQ$PRQJVW1HZ(QJODQG·V
intelligentsia, debates over the nature and range of a theistic deLW\·VVHFXODUDXWKRULW\
rumbled on interminably, and an enthusiast remained first of all a deluded claimant of 
divine preference or special gnosis. When used, the term was usually accompanied with 
the sort of responses typical of seventeenth-century England, ranging from genuine 
concern at the effects on the populace to an amused disdain. In a series of articles in the 
Christian Examiner through 1835, the Unitarian clergyman John Brazer treats of the 
GDQJHUVRIWKDWVSHFLHVRIWKRXJKWZKLFK¶SHUYDGHVLPDJLQative and enthusiastic minds; 
and which, in a world of sense, imperfection, and sin, leads them to seek an unearthly 
DEVWUDFWLRQIURPSUHVHQWREMHFWVDQGDQLPSRVVLEOHDSSURDFKWR*RG·7KHVH
&KULVWLDQVVD\V%UD]HU¶ZLOOHDVLO\ILQGLQWKH&KULVWLDQGRFtrine of Divine Influence, the 
HOHPHQWVRIDSHUYHUVHQXUWXUHDQGXQKHDOWK\JURZWK·25 In the second part of the article, 
%UD]HUTXRWHV/RFNHDSSURYLQJO\RQWKHVXEMHFWRIKLVH[SRVLQJ¶DOOWKHGHOXVLRQVDQG
H[FHVVHVRIIDQDWLFLVPDQGHQWKXVLDVP·DQGQRWHV again the totality of the delusion of 
LPPDQHQFH¶7KHUHLVQRWDUHOLJLRXV]HDORWLQ&KULVWHQGRPZKRLVPRUHIXOO\FRQVFLRXV
more entirely convinced of his peculiar illumination, than is the poor maniac of the 
                                                 
24 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), ed. by Roger Woolhouse (London: 
Penguin, 1997), pp. 616-17. 
25 -RKQ%UD]HU¶(VVD\RQWKH'RFWULQHRI'LYLQH,QIOXHQFH·>3DUW2QH@LQThe Christian Examiner and 
General Review, 17 (1835), 311-32 (p. 311). 
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existence and reality of those images which DUHWKHFUHDWLRQRIKLVRZQVLFNEUDLQ·26 
(OVHZKHUH%UD]HU·VFRQWHPSRUDULHVZHUHKDSS\WRWUHDWWKHLVVXHZLWKOHVVLQWHOOHFWXDO
rigour, as in an article in The American Quarterly Review of 1830 where the reviewer 
ridicules the author of a text under consLGHUDWLRQIRUFODLPLQJWRKDYHEHHQ¶RIDQ
RSLQLRQZLWK*RG·RQDJLYHQWRSLF$VWKHUHYLHZHUH[SODLQVDWOHQJWKKHZRXOGSUHIHU
WRFRQVWUDLQWKHGHILQLWLRQRIWKHHQWKXVLDVWVRPHZKHUHEHWZHHQWKHWHUPV¶GXSH·
¶PDGPDQ·DQG¶LPSRVWRU·27  
Emerson was certainly aware of the essence of these debates. In 1823, at 20, he 
was still evidently in thrall to Locke on the matter of enthusiasm, as his journal testifies: 
  
(QWKXVLDVPLV>«@DSWWRJHQHUDWHLQXQFXOWLYDWHGPLQGVDUDVKDQGLJQRUDQW
contempt for the slow modes of education and the cautious arts of reasoning by 
ZKLFKHQOLJKWHQHGPHQDUULYHDWZLVGRP>«@7KHERRUEHFRPHVSKLORVRSKHUDW
once, and boldly issues the dogmas of a religious creed from the exuberance of 
coarse imagination. The tumults of a troubled mind are mistaken for the 
inspiration of an apostle, and the strength of excited feelings is substituted for 
the dispassionate and tardy induction, the comparison of scripture and reason, 
which sanctions the devotions of moderate and liberal men. (JMN II, 84) 
 
$EVROXWHO\FRQVLVWHQWZLWK8QLWDULDQWKLQNLQJRQWKHPDWWHU(PHUVRQ·VGHVFULSWLRQRI
WKHHQWKXVLDVWDVD¶FORZQRQDGXQJKLOO·DOVRFRUURERUDWHVWKHWHQGHQF\WRSURYRFDWLRQ
LQWKHUDWLRQDOLVW·VGLVWDVWHIRUUHYLYDOLVPEXWWKHSUHVHQFHRIUHDVon in these discussions 
was not necessarily intended to constitute the hubris that traditionalists saw in it.28 In 
                                                 
26 -RKQ%UD]HU¶(VVD\RQWKH'RFWULQHRI'LYLQH,QIOXHQFH&RQWLQXHG·>3DUW7ZR@LQThe Christian 
Examiner and General Review, 18 (1835), 50-84 (p. 59, 58). 
27 ¶)DQDWLFDO*XLGHV·The American Quarterly Review, 8.15 (1830), 227-42 (p. 233-35). 
28 Emerson in 1823 may have been very much more in thrall of Lockean epistemology than he would be a 
decade or more later, but this does not mean that he ever fully renounced the conviction that enthusiasm 
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principle, the careful reasoning of the Unitarian approach to scripture demanded a non-
domineering type of intellectualism, not a reduction of the Divine to human knowledge 
but an increased deference to what one writer in the Christian Examiner FDOOHG¶RXU
Heaven-LQVSLUHGUHDVRQWKHJLIWDQGOLJKWRIWKH/RUG·29 What was perceived by 
orthodox Calvinism to be an excess of rationalism in Unitarian thinking was a 
corruption of this model: the projection of human reason into the form of a cognisable 
Deity³D¶*RGWKHLVVXHRIKLVRZQEUDLQ·³which is specifically designated an 
¶´HQWKXVLDVPRIVLPSOLILFDWLRQµ·.30 As is to be expected in a round of theological 
polemicising, however, the two sides were not in fact in absolute disagreement. 
Unitarianism did not reject inspiration entirely as a point of doctrine, and, even if they 
did not care to admit as much, those on both sides of the argument were in favour of 
WKHXVHRI¶ULJKWUHDVRQ·WRZDUGWKHFOHDUHUDSSUHFLDWLRQRI+RO\6FULSWXUHDQG
developed hermeneutical practices appropriate for their doctrinal preference 
accordingly. It is in these processes that a more intellectually complex version of the 
modHORIGLYLQHLQIOXHQFHXVLQJWKHWHUP¶LQVSLUDWLRQ·HYROYHG 
 An article in the January 1830 issue of the combative Calvinist journal Spirit of the 
Pilgrims offers exemplary evidence of the centrality of inspiration to accusations of 
religious infidelity aWWKHKHLJKWRIWKHFRQWURYHUV\,WVWDWHVWKDW¶DPDQPD\EHDQ
infidel, without avowedly rejecting &KULVWLDQLW\·RU¶WUHDW>LQJ@WKHFKDUDFWHURIWKH6DYLRXU
ZLWKRSHQLUUHYHUHQFHRUGLVUHVSHFW·5DWKHUWKHODZWUDQVJUHVVHGWRLQILGHOLW\LV
provided in no uncertain terms: 
  
                                                                                                                                          
alone is mere delusion. In 1·V¶6SLULWXDO/DZV·KHZRXOGZULWHWKDWWKHQRWLRQRU¶pretense that [one] 
KDVDQRWKHUFDOODVXPPRQVE\QDPHDQGSHUVRQDOHOHFWLRQDQGRXWZDUG´VLJQVWKDWPDUNKLP
H[WUDRUGLQDU\DQGQRWLQWKHUROORIFRPPRQPHQµLVIDQDWLFLVPDQGEHWUD\VREWXVHQHss to perceive that 
there is one mind in all the individuals, anGQRUHVSHFWRISHUVRQVWKHUHLQ·(CW II, 82). 
29 6DPXHO*LOPDQ¶8QLWDULDQ&KULVWLDQLW\)UHHIURP2EMHFWLRQDEOH([WUHPHV·The Christian Examiner and 
General Review, 8 (1830), 133-46 (p. 136). 
30 The first citation is by the author of the piece, the second a quotation from the work under review. 
¶5HYLHZRI,VDDF7D\ORU·VNatural History of Enthusiasm ·The Spirit of the Pilgrims, 3 (1830), 256-79 (p. 
261, 275). 
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7KHWUXH&KULVWLDQEHOLHYHVWKDW¶DOO6FULSWXUHLVJLYHQE\LQVSLUDWLRQRI*RGDQG
is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in 
ULJKWHRXVQHVV·%XWWKHLQILGHORIWHQGRHVQRWEHOLHYHWKDWany Scripture is the 
fruit of a Supernatural inspiration. At most, he believes that only a part of the 
sacred volume is entitled to be thus regarded, and in determining what this part 
is, as it is wholly undefined, every one must consider and judge for himself. 
Whatever strikes any person agreeably, as reasonable in itself, and worthy of 
God, he is entitled to regard as the word of God; but whatever strikes him in a 
different manner, he may properly reject as no part of the revelation.31 
 
In many respects, this article provides a reasonably accurate, if over-generalised, account 
of Unitarian hermeneutics as they stood at the time. After all, the Christian Examiner had 
UHFHQWO\SXEOLVKHGDQDUWLFOHZKLFKFODLPVWKDW¶WKRXJKLWPD\VHHPYHU\SUHVXPSWXRXV
of us to say so, [«@WKHIXOOVWUHQJWKRIWKHargument for Christianity has not yet been 
exhibited. We think that the clearer development of certain moral truths, and of the mind 
LWVHOILVWKURZLQJDOLJKWXSRQWKLVVXEMHFW·32 In consequence, the Unitarian defences 
which first appeared in 1830 and continued throughout the decade tended to be based 
on careful elaborations of the intellectual and theological benefits of their model rather 
than holistic refutations of the Trinitarian claims. 
 Central among the defences of the Unitarian position was the inappropriateness 
of language to divine communication. For Norton, who was by no means a liberal 
theologian, but was an attentive student of Locke and an acute reader, the excessively 
credulous and literalist reading of key New Testament passages fails to acknowledge a 
                                                 
31 ¶:KDW&RQVWLWXWHV,QILGHOLt\"·, The Spirit of the Pilgrims, 3 (1830), 1-17 (p. 1, 4, 8). The rest of the article is 
dedicated to proving the point by example, quoting liberally from Unitarian writings on inspiration to 
demonstrate what the author perceives to be sacrilegious hubris. 
32 ¶5HYLHZRI7KH1HZ7HVWDPHQWLQWKH&RPPRQ9HUVLRQFRQIRUPHGWR*ULHVEDFK·V6WDQGDUG*UHHN7H[W·The 
Christian Examiner and General Review, 6 (1829), 353-69 (p. 358). Emphasis added. 
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VLPSOHIDFWRIODQJXDJH7KLVLVLWV¶intrinsic ambiguity·LQVRIDUDVDQ\JLYHQZRUGRUSKUDVH
GHSULYHGRIFRQWH[WLV¶FDSDEOHRIH[SUHVVLQJQRWRQHPHDQLQJRQO\EXWWZRRUPRUH
dLIIHUHQWPHDQLQJV·33 Norton adheres to the Lockean condition that language is based 
RQFRQVHQWWRUHJXODWRU\FRQGLWLRQVDQGLVKHQFH¶FRQYHQWLRQDO·IXUWKHUPRUHWKHVH
FRQYHQWLRQVDUHPXWDEOHWKURXJKRXWKLVWRU\IRU¶>Q@RXQLIRUPVWDQGDUGKDVH[LVWHGE\
whLFKWRPHDVXUHWKHH[SUHVVLRQRIPHQ·VFRQFHSWLRQVDQGIHHOLQJV·34 Consequently, all 
books, including inspired scripture, for it too was written by men, were subject to 
conditions of composition³whether tropes, idioms, or rhetorical strategies³enforced 
by the contemporary language usage. Norton thus proposes an essentially historicist 
DSSURDFKWRWKH%LEOH·VWH[WZKHUHE\WKH¶WUXHPHDQLQJ·RIDQ\SDVVDJH¶LVWREH
GHWHUPLQHG62/(/<E\DUHIHUHQFHWR(;75,16,&&216,'(5$7,216·³in other 
words, by a scholarly grasp of the historical context, which would itself be governed in 
OLQHZLWK&KDQQLQJ·VOLEHUDO&KULVWLDQLW\¶VROHO\E\DSURFHVVRIUHDVRQLQJ·35 
 Against the orthodox conviction in plenary and verbal inspiration, or 
theopneusty, in which the scriptures were infallibly and precisely the exact phrasing 
willed by the divine, the Unitarian approach inevitably devalued the Bible as object of 
veneration.36 In response to critique from outside, however, the draining of divinity 
from scriptural language was moderated by others within the church. In January 1830, a 
contributor to the Unitarian Christian Examiner argued for a more measured relationship 
between the holy scribes, divine influence, and the text they came to compose: 
 
                                                 
33 Norton, Statement, p. 90. 
34 Norton, Statement, p. 94. 
35 Norton, StatementS6HHDOVR*XUD·VPRUHH[WHQVLYHGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHKLVWRULFLVWPHWKRGRI
8QLWDULDQVVXFKDV1RUWRQDQGKLVFRQYLFWLRQWKDWWKHWKHRORJLDQRIKLVGD\KDGWREH¶LQWKHPRVW
FRPSUHKHQVLYHVHQVHRIWKHZRUGDSKLORORJLVW·*XUDWisdom, pp. 23-30. 
36 The following definition of inspiration as effectively unmediated theopneusty was offered by The Spirit 
of the Pilgrims LQ$SULO¶>T]he sacred writers were so guided by the divine Spirit, that, in every part of their work, 
they were rendered infallible, and wrote just what God willed they should write; so that the sacred volume entirely answers to 
the mind of God, and has nothing, either as to matter or form, which He did not see to be suited to the great object of a 
divine revelation·¶,Qspiration of the Scriptures, No.VI: What views are we to entertain respecting the nature 
DQGH[WHQWRIGLYLQHLQVSLUDWLRQ"·The Spirit of the Pilgrims, 2 (1829), 185-95 (p. 187). Emphasis in original. 
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7KHVFULSWXUHV>«@DUHQRWWKHDFWXDl communication made to the minds that 
ZHUHLQVSLUHGIURP$ERYHEXWWKH\DUHD¶declaration of those things which were 
PRVWVXUHO\EHOLHYHGDPRQJWKHP·7KH\DUHQRWWKHDFWXDOZRUGRI*RGEXW
WKH\DUHD¶UHFRUGRIWKHZRUGRI*RG·7KH\DUHRIWKHQDWXUe of a testimony 
>«@,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRPDNHWKHGLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGWRVD\WKDWWKH
communication of light and truth was one thing, and the record of that 
communication another. The communication was divine; the record was human. 
It was, strictly speaking and every way, a human act. The manner, the style, the 
phraseology, the choice of words, the order of thought, the selection of figures, 
comparisons, arguments, to enforce the communication, was altogether a 
human work. It was as purely human, as peculiarly individual in the case of every 
witness, as his accent, attitude, or gesture, when delivering his message.37 
 
This is a conciliatory position, since it explicitly upholds the doctrine of inspiration in 
principle, but at once it also develops the complexity of the Unitarian hermeneutic 
ZKLFKWDNHVDUDWLRQDODWWLWXGHWRLWVSURGXFWV5HLWHUDWLQJ1RUWRQ·V/RFNHDQWKHVLVWKH
DXWKRUDFNQRZOHGJHVWKDWWKH¶VW\OH·RIWKHVFULSWXUHVLVQRWWKHSURGXFWRIYHUEDO
inspiration but determined by context. But more tKDQWKLVLWZDV¶DOWRJHWKHUDKXPDQ
DFW·,QRWKHUZRUGVHYHQWKRXJKLQVSLUHGWKHVFULEHQHYHUFHDVHVWREHKXPDQDQG
never loses the idiosyncrasies of individuality. The apostle or evangelist relates to the 
divine in terms defined by his very personality, an unavoidable exigency, since he writes 
as a secular being from a perspective within place and history. This proposition is 
theologically significant, for if the scribe is not ontologically raised to parity with the 
                                                 
37 ¶6RXUFHVRI,QILGHOLW\WKH7HQWK'LVFRXUVHLQWKHnew Volume of %XFNPLQVWHU·V6HUPRQV·The Christian 
Examiner and General Review, 7 (1830), 345-65 (pp. 346-7). The prominent Unitarian clergyman and 
theologian Orville Dewey³ZKRZDVDOVR(PHUVRQ·VFRXVLQE\PDUULDJHDQGZKRPKHGHVFULEHGLQD
journal passDJHRIDVDFULWLFDO¶EHQHIDFWRU·³repeated this argument in almost identical terms in the 
VDPHSXEOLFDWLRQODWHULQWKH\HDU6HH>'HZH\@¶5HYLHZRILectures on the Inspiration of the Scriptures·The 
Christian Examiner and General Review, 8 (1830), 362-91 (pp. 381-)RU(PHUVRQ·VFRPPHQWVRQ'HZH\
see JMN V, 385. 
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deity³WKDWLVLVQRWDQ¶HQWKXVLDVW·LQDQRQ-pejorative sense³then there must surely be 
a shortcoming of conviction in the veracity of the experience. Not having been 
consciously immanent with the mind of God, how can the thing that they have written 
be of the mind of God? What is revealed by this problem is an extension of a partial 
UHYHODWLRQLPSRUWDQWQRWRQO\WRWKHPRGHUQKHUPHQHXW·VRZQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH
text, but also, more significantly, to his ability to interpret the character of the faith and 
relation to God of the ancient sFULEH+HQFHDJDLQVWWKH¶GLFWDWLRQ·PRGHOSURSRXQGHG
by advocates of verbal inspiration, the Unitarians drew on the evidences of the New 
Testament itself for their defence: 
  
[Though the scriptures] were written by inspired men, they are not, in the 
commRQVHQVHLQVSLUHG>«@WKH\ZHUHQRWSURGXFHGXQGHUWKHPLUDFXORXV
supervision of the Deity. We do not conceive ourselves warranted in attributing 
so remarkable a dictation to the productions of the apostles and evangelists, 
when they themselves intimate nothing of the kind. If they felt, if they knew, 
that what their pens traced was proceeding, not from their own minds, but from 
the Supreme Mind within them, taking the place of their own, would not so 
remarkable a fact have been noticed by them, and prominently registered?38 
 
Precisely because the New Testament does not declare unambiguously the divine 
conditions of its composition, but rather features multiple instances of irrelevant, 
FRQYHQWLRQDOFRPPRQSODFHV3DXO·VUHTuest for his cloak and books in II Timothy 4: 13 
being a favourite example), the divine authors could not have been conscious of the 
scale and significance of their task during the act of writing. Hence the mechanism of 
divine influence in Unitarian thinking operates behind the scenes, psychologically 
                                                 
38 Gilman, p. 138. 
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speaking, as writers in the Christian Examiner would make more explicit over the 
following years.  
John Brazer tentatively speculated in 1835 that the faculty of consciousness 
ZKLFKZDVSDUW\WRLQVSLUDWLRQZDVDQDORJRXVWRRULGHQWLFDOZLWK¶WKat part of our 
mental constitution, by which thoughts, feelings, suggestions arise, and states of mind 
WDNHSODFHLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIRXUYROLWLRQV·39 It is, of course, little more than a faint and 
inadequate hypothesis of a form of subconscious, but it maintains a basic principle of 
what inspiration is not, and cannot be. Actual immanent consciousness of the divine 
would be enthusiasm, and enthusiasm is a delusion, as Brazer reminds us: 
  
The impression, or state of mind, bears with it, it is said, the marks of its divine 
origin, and of this they are conscious. But of what are they conscious? Of nothing 
certainly, but the impression or state of mind itself. That it has these marks of 
divinity is merely a matter of inference >«6R@DOOWKDWLVPDGHNQRZQE\
consciousness is the existence of the impression; but that this impression is 
supernatural, which is the very point to be proved, is only an inference which the 
mind itself makes >«@7KHUHLVWKHQQRHYLGHQFHRIFRQVFLRXVQHVVZKDWVRHYHU40 
 
As such, if the apostles and evangelists were not to be considered enthusiasts, then they 
cannot have known of the divine aspect in their endeavour. And this, indeed, is precisely 
how some Unitarians came to understand the epistemology of inspiration.  
In 1842, the Unitarian minister Andrew Preston Peabody published an article in 
the Christian Examiner which saw fit to facetiously declare the essence of the old dispute 
GHDG¶1RRQHZHSUHVXPHDWWKHSUHVHQWGD\ZRXOGPDLQWDLQWKDWWKHYHU\ZRUGVRI
scriSWXUHZHUHGLFWDWHGE\WKHGLYLQHVSLULW>RU«@WKDWWKHUHZDVDQ\WKLQJVXSHUQDWXUDO
                                                 
39 Brazer, [Part One], p. 315. 
40 Brazer, [Part Two], p. 56. Emphasis in original. 
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LQ3DXO·VVHQGLQJIRUKLVFORDNDQGSDUFKPHQW·41 The correlative of this is the 
downgrading of the status of the apostles and evangelists from mouthpieces of the deity 
to ¶IDOOLEOH\HWKRQHVWPHQ·ZKRPLWPLJKWEHSURSRVHG¶PD\E\WKHIUDLOW\RIWKHLU
own understandings and memories, have grossly misrepresented the language and spirit 
RI-HVXV·42 Under these conditions, the modern reader of scripture should be conscious 
of a critical condition. Based on the gospels themselves, the author points out the 
necessary human frailty of the disciples in the company of Christ: 
 
according to their own account, they were ignorant of his true character till after 
his ascension. On WKHYHU\DVFHQVLRQPRUQLQJWKH\DVNHGKLP¶/RUGZLOWWKRX
DWWKLVWLPHUHVWRUHWKHNLQJGRPWR,VUDHO"·7KH\PXVWWKHUHIRUHKDYHOLVWHQHGWR
him all along with erroneous impressions. They understood not a large part of 
what he said, at the time when he uttered it. His true glory was veiled from them, 
while they were with him.43 
 
This is the exemplary instance of failing to be conscious of a divine presence in the 
PRPHQWRIWKDWSUHVHQFHDQGDVWKHDXWKRUZULWHV¶>D@FFRUGLQJWRWKHFRPPRQODZVRI
the minG·VXFKDIDLOXUHRXJKWWRPHDQWKDW¶WKH1HZ7HVWDPHQWPXVWKDYHEHHQWLQJHG
WKURXJKRXWE\WKHHDUO\PLVDSSUHKHQVLRQVRILWVDXWKRUV>«@:HWKXVVKRXOGKDYHKDG
LQVXIILFLHQWDQGXQVDWLVI\LQJ6FULSWXUHV%XWWKLVLVQRWWKHFDVH·44 7KHJRVSHOVDUH¶HQWLUH 
DQGVHDPOHVV>«@WKURXJKRXWDGDSWHGWRWKHKLJKHUYLHZVRIWKHLU0DVWHU·VPLVVLRQDQG
                                                 
41 $>QGUHZ@3>UHVWRQ@3>HDERG\@¶2Q,QVSLUDWLRQ·The Christian Examiner and General Review, 32 (1842), 
204-18 (p. 205). Peabody was not immediately related either to Elizabeth Palmer Peabody or Ephraim 
Peabody, both of whom were Transcendentalist acquaintances of Emerson. However, he would go on to 
be a major figure in the Unitarian establishment, being editor of the North American Review from 1853 to 
1863, and preacher to Harvard University from 1860 to 1881. 
42 Peabody, p. 204. 
43 Peabody, p. 208. Emphasis added. This position is borne out by numerous passages in the gospels 
which LQGLFDWHWKHDSRVWOHV·DVVXPSWLRQRINQRZOHGJHRI&KULVWRQO\DIWHUKLVGHDWK6HH/XNH
31-2 and 45; John 1: 10, 7: 5, 13: 7, 14: 25-6. 
44 Peabody, p. 208. 
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FKDUDFWHUZKLFKHQVXHGXSRQKLVGHSDUWXUHIURPHDUWK·45 How can this be so? The 
proposal is for an inspiration that only conditions the putting into writing of the 
scriptures, which draws the conventional aspects of the biography of Jesus together, 
providing as consistent fabric the divinity of Christ in each act. Hence, referring to the 
relatively quotidian or domestic incidences that appear often in the New Testament, the 
author writes: 
 
In this wide diversity of detail we see always the same majestic and god-like 
image, in no circumstances, however narrow or humble, shorn of a ray of its 
glory; and when the authors confess that, while the divine original was upon the 
earth, they knew him not, we cannot help believing, that the image was 
reproduced and sustained before their inward vision by the spirit of God.46 
 
The evangelists did not set out to record a holistic view of Jesus Christ³they could not, 
for they were restricted from doing so by their perspectival ignorance³but only an 
account of the acts of Jesus. It is through writing that the coherence and universalising 
SRZHURIWKH¶6SLULWRI*RG·ZRUNVXSRQWKHDFFRXQWVWRHQQREOHWKHELRJUDSK\RI-HVXV
with the unified and consistent meaning of Christ. Indeed, such harmonising power is 
RQO\WREHUHFRJQLVHGDIWHUWKHIDFWZKHQ¶>W@KHUHFXUUHQFHRIWKHVDPHKDUPRQLHVDW
GLVWDQWLQWHUYDOVLQWKHVSKHUHPXVLFRIWLPH·FDQEHVRMX[WDSRVHGDVWREHFRPH
apparent.47 The subtext of this is that the writing practice of the evangelists and apostles 
becomes the beginning of a hermeneutic as well as the process of engendering 
inspiration, for only by recording those quotidian incidents and utterances can the 
presence of divinity be brought within the range of intellectualisation. From John 14: 23, 
                                                 
45 Peabody, p. 208. 
46 Peabody, pp. 212-3. 
47 Peabody, p. 217. 
87 
 
DSDVVDJHRIWHQUHIHUUHGWRE\8QLWDULDQWKHRORJLDQV%UD]HUTXRWHV¶,IDPDQORYHPHhe 
will keep my words; and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make 
our abode wLWKKLP·48 That is, the retention and reiteration of the conventional in the 
words of Jesus will reveal the universal underlying harmony of the doctrine. Or, in other 
ZRUGV¶+DYLQJWKHDIIHFWLRQDWHWKDWLVWKHEHOLHYLQJGLVSRVLWLRQLWZRXOGKDYH´WKH
witness LQLWVHOIµ'RLQJ´WKHZLOORI*RGLWZRXOGknow of the doctrineµ·.49 
 There are, of course, many flaws in this rejoinder to the excessively credulous 
model of plenary inspiration. Central among them is the conservative objection of 1830 
that the mHDQVRIHVWDEOLVKLQJH[DFWO\ZKDWSDUWRIVFULSWXUHLVLQVSLUHGUHPDLQV¶ZKROO\
XQGHILQHG·LQ8QLWDULDQWKRXJKW50 As both contemporaries and twentieth-century critics 
have noted, the Unitarian model of reading for inner consistency is undermined by their 
own theory that religious truth has for centuries been confused by the embeddedness of 
writers in their own contextual and perspectival understanding. In short, having 
rationally accepted that the exigencies of history change the meaning of religious acts 
and texts, it seems bizarre that Unitarian theologians should presume their own 
exceptionality to this condition.51 2QDQRWKHUQRWHEHFDXVH(PHUVRQ·VFRQYLFWLRQLQD
FRQVWDQWSHUVRQDOUHODWLRQWR5HDVRQLVPLUURUHGLQKLVFRQWHPSRUDULHV·XVHRIQHJDWLYH
theology to deduce the consistent Christ from the secular acts of Jesus recorded by the 
evangelists, the apparent impossibility of a positive assertion on the part of the Unitarian 
DGYRFDWHVRIWKLVPRGHOZLOODOVRKDYHSHUWLQHQFHIRU(PHUVRQ·VRZQLQTXLULHV To a 
large extent, this avenue of Unitarian theology does not provide a hermeneutic toward a 
better understanding of faith, but rather posits hermeneutics as the practice and 
meaning of faith itself. It excels at providing methodologies and theoretical processes 
for reading, but the valorisation of the deductive element renders affective qualities 
                                                 
48 Quoted in Brazer, [Part One], p. 328. Emphasis added. 
49 ¶6RXUFHVRI,QILGHOLW\·S(PSKDVLVDGGHG 
50 ¶:KDW&RQVWLWXWHV,QILGHOLW\"·S 
51 See, for instance, Gura, Wisdom, p. 30. 
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more obscure than they might have been to begin with³it may even seem as though 
the deduced self arrived at by this method is more a construction of the intellect than 
the discovery of its own native condition.  
However, perhaps this realisation is precisely what is needed so that more 
critical questions can be asked. The Unitarian defence of the deductive method usually 
proceeded by subtracting the conventional oU¶FDUQDO·IURPWKHWH[WVOHDYLQJD
¶&KULVWLDQLW\ZKLFKUHPDLQVDIWHUWKHVHDUHJRQH>«@IUHHGIURPLWVGHDWKEDQGDJHVDQG
JUDYHFORWKHVUHVWRUHGWRLWVSULVWLQHYLWDOLW\DQGKHDOWK>«@GLVHQFXPEHU>HG«@IURP
ZKDWZHEHOLHYHWREHLWVFRUUXSWLRQV·52 It is, of course, arguable whether this effect is 
YLWDOLVLQJRUZKHWKHUDV(PHUVRQZDVZRQWWRFRPSODLQLWLV¶PXUGHULQJWRGLVVHFW·
DQRWKHULQVWDQFHRI¶FRUSVH-FROG8QLWDULDQLVP·%XWHYHQLI(PHUVRQH[SUHVVHGKLV
dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, they remained ineluctable. 
In Nature, the power of the Understanding which Emerson seeks to disempower 
LQIDYRXURI5HDVRQPD\EHGHVFULEHGDVD¶ZLQWU\OLJKW·EXWDWWKHVDPHWLPHDOORIKLV
recollections of epiphanic moments fall under the same climatic trope: before the 
transparent eye-EDOODQRWKHUHSLSKDQ\EHJLQVZLWKDQHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDZLQWHU·V
setting³¶&URVVLQJDEDUHFRPPRQLQVQRZSXGGOHVDWWZLOLJKW·ODWHURQKHGHFODUHV
WKDWKHFDQ¶SOHDVHP\VHOIZLWKWKHJUDFHVRIWKH winter scenery, and believe that we are 
DVPXFKWRXFKHGE\LWDVE\WKHJHQLDOLQIOXHQFHVRIVXPPHU·CW I, 44, 10, 14). So 
diffuse does Reason appear, therefore, that the cold and dissecting Understanding must 
figure in its decipherment, something Emerson hints at in every one of these tropes 
from Nature. For a brief period, Emerson will try, or at least theorise trying, to trace the 
acts of Reason in practice. But what is more significant is where the necessarily 
apophatic intellectual approach will take him, and his writing, as his conviction in his 
ideal gradually fades. 
                                                 
52 Gilman, p. 36. 
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Double Writing; or, How to Abandon Responsibly 
Now we are come & will put our own interpretation on things & moreover our 
own things for interpretation. (JMN VII, 7) 
 
-XVWLILDEO\(PHUVRQ·VHQJDJHPHQW with the often petty theological disputes of his day 
KDVDOZD\VEHHQGRXEWHG7KH'LYLQLW\6FKRRO¶$GGUHVV·DIWHUDOOUHMHFWVUHOLJLRXV
IRUPDOLVPLQXQFRPSURPLVLQJWHUPVDVKDGWKH¶/RUG·V6XSSHU·VHUPRQVL[\HDUV
previously. Yet the vigour and prominence, not to mention the potential significance of 
the hermeneutical possibilities, of the discussions of inspiration in the 1820s-30s could 
QRWKDYHHVFDSHG(PHUVRQ·VDWWHQWLRQQRWOHDVWVLQFHKHVXEVFULEHGWRPDQ\RIWKH
periodicals quoted in the preceding section.53 So although at times he wrote 
GLVSDUDJLQJO\RI¶RXUVLOO\UHOLJLRXVSDSHUV·KHQHYHUWKHOHVVRQRFFDVLRQHPERGLHV
Unitarian convictions, not only in his journals but also in the published work (JMN VII, 
21). On the subject of plenary, verbal inspiration, he entirely endorses Unitarian 
RUWKRGR[\DV¶7KH2YHU-6RXO·GHPRQVWUDWHV 
  
An answer in words is delusive; it is really no answer to the questions you ask 
>«@0HQDVNFRQFHUQLQJWKHLPPRUWDOLW\RIWKHVRXOWKHHPSOR\PHQWVRI
heaven, the state of the sinner, and so forth. They even dream that Jesus has left 
replies to precisely these interrogatories. Never a moment did that sublime spirit 
speak in their patois. (CW II, 168) 
 
                                                 
53 Indeed, it seems certain that Emerson would have had some knowledge of at least the majority of the 
articles discussed. .HQQHWK:DOWHU&DPHURQ·VELEOLRJUDSK\RI(PHUVRQ·VUHDGLQJLQSHULRGLFDOVXSWR
1836 includes very nearly every issue of the Christian Examiner published between 1824 and 1836, as well 
as a wide range of other theological journals. See Cameron, (PHUVRQ·V:RUNVKRS$Q$nalysis of his Reading 
in Periodicals Through 1836, with the Principal Thematic Key to his Essays, Poems, and Lectures, 2 vols (Hartford: 
Transcendental Books, 1964). He also knew some Unitarians at the heart of the discussions, such as 
Orville Dewey, well, and was of course known to those who opposed Transcendentalism from its 
emergence, such as John Brazer and Andrews Norton. 
90 
 
As Emerson continues, the utility of scripture in fulfilling religious exigencies is brought 
IXUWKHULQWRGRXEW¶7KHVHTXHVWLRQVZKLFKZHOXVWWRDVNDERXWWKHIXWXUHDUHD
confession of sin. God has no answer for them. No answer in words can reply to a 
TXHVWLRQRIWKLQJV·-XVWDVKHSRLQWHGRXWWKDWWKH¶LGLRPVRI>&KULVW·V@ODQJXDJHDQGWKH
ILJXUHVRIKLVUKHWRULFKDYHXVXUSHGWKHSODFHRIKLVWUXWK·DW+DUYDUG'LYLQLW\6FKRRO
VRKHUHWKHLOOHJLWLPDWHXVHRIVFULSWXUHLVDQLUUHOLJLRXVLQGHHG¶VLQIXO·DFWCW I, 81). 
8VLQJ(PHUVRQ·VRZQORJLFWKHUHFRXOGEHQRZRUVe use for scripture than its being 
sacralised as verbally inspired. Indeed, of all books, the canonical texts of the Bible are 
WKHW\SH(PHUVRQUHIHUVWRZKHQKHZULWHVLQ¶7KH$PHULFDQ6FKRODU·RIWKHWHQGHQF\
E\ZKLFK¶>W@KHVDFUHGQHVVZKLFKDWWDFKHVWo the act of creation,³the act of thought,³
is instantly transferred to the record. The poet chanting, was felt to be a divine man. 
+HQFHIRUWKWKHFKDQWLVGLYLQHDOVR·CW I, 56).54 
 His stated alternatives emphasise his Unitarian affinities. Like John Brazer, who 
in 1835 speculated on the prereflective element of consciousness through which God 
LQIOHFWVWKHPLQGVRIWKHIDLWKIXO(PHUVRQZULWHVLQ·V¶,QWHOOHFW·WKDW¶*RGHQWHUV
by a private door into every individual. Long prior to the age of reflection, is the 
thinking of the mind. Out of darkness, it came insensibly into the marvellous light of to-
GD\·CW II, 194). The insensibility of this event, its location in prereflective and 
unconscious mind, endorses the postulate arrived at by philosophical means in Nature 
and promotes epistemology as theological practice. Introspection becomes a process of 
learning to live in godly manner, and this type of egotism is, nominally at least, a 
development of Unitarian self-culture. 
                                                 
54 The MRXUQDOSDVVDJHIURPZKLFKWKLVGHULYHVPDNHWKHUHOLJLRXVVXEWH[WPRUHDSSDUHQW¶7KHUHDUHEXW
two things, or but one thing & its shadow³Cause & Effect, and Effect is itself worthless if separated 
from Cause. It is Cause still that must be worshipped in Effect; so that it is only one thing. The worship 
of Effect is Idolatry. The Church including under the name, Doctrine, Forms, Discipline, Members, is the 
LQVWDQW(IIHFW:HDNPDQDGKHUHVWRWKH(IIHFW	OHWV*RGJR·JMN V, 356). 
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 But the additional dimension EPHUVRQ·VDSSURDFKKLJKOLJKWVLVWKHFRPSOH[LW\
of the hermeneutical principle at stake in the process, a complexity which, as we will see, 
has the potential to dissuade the hermeneut of his conviction in its efficacy. As Ellison 
KDVHPSKDVLVHG(PHUVRQ·VZRUNRIWKHODWHUVXSWR·VEssays is primarily 
concerned with hermeneutics and the role of the reader.55 7KH¶$PHULFDQ6FKRODU·
IRFXVHVRQWKHSURSHUDQGLPSURSHU¶XVH·RIERRNVDQGE\H[WHQVLRQRIFDQRQLFDO
KLVWRU\LQJHQHUDO7KHDGYRFDF\RI¶FUHDWLYHUHDGLQJ·IRXQGKHUHLVLQLWLDOO\DFRQGLWLRQ
intended to empower an independent American intellectual culture, but its ramifications 
go beyond this purpose (CW ,,QWKH'LYLQLW\6FKRRO¶$GGUHVV·RI
meanwhile, it is the misinterpretation of the deeds and language of Christ that has 
stymied the church in rigid formalism and ritual. As Emerson writes, Jesus himself was 
EXWDKHUPHQHXWDQGKLVH[DPSOHZKLFKWKHDXWKRU·VFRQWHPSRUDULHVZRXOGGRZHOOWR
IROORZZDVWRIHHO¶UHVSHFWIRU0RVHs and the prophets; but no unfit tenderness at 
postponing their initial revelations, to the hour and the man that now is; to the eternal 
UHYHODWLRQLQWKHKHDUW·CW I, 81). 
 Besides these two canonical addresses, Emerson was utterly preoccupied in his 
lectures of the period with considerations of literature and its uses. Multiple lectures 
WLWOHG¶/LWHUDWXUH·RQHWLWOHG¶7KH3RHW·DQGDQHQWLUHVHULHVRQUHDGLQJ(QJOLVKOLWHUature 
were given between 1833 and 1842. At the heart of all of these hermeneutical 
disquisitions, meanwhile, and the origin of their critical theories, was the ongoing 
inquiry into originary consciousness and the personal relation to Reason, manifested in 
journal and notebook writings. Although his journal keeping began as a conscious 
undertaking and a function of self-tutelage, in later years the exact nature of its primary 
role often eluded him in his ruminations on the practice, even if the primacy he granted 
                                                 
55 Ellison, pp. 5-7, 97-113. 
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it was never itself in question.56 Indeed, the existence of a primary body of text 
increasingly took on a logical necessity within his epistemological theories. Throughout 
the later 1830s into the 1840s, the formula Emerson employed depended upon a 
teleological model of belated self-UHFRJQLWLRQLQ¶7KH2YHU-6RXO·RI¶WKHVRXOZLOO
QRWKDYHXVUHDGDQ\RWKHUFLSKHUWKDQWKDWRIFDXVHDQGHIIHFW·LQ¶>W@KHZRUVKLS
RI(IIHFWLV,GRODWU\·KHQFHLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHSULQFLSOHVHVSRXVHGLQa variety of 
FRQWH[WVRYHUWKHVH\HDUV¶>L@WLV&DXVHVWLOOWKDWPXVWEHZRUVKLSSHGLQ(IIHFW·CW II, 
168; JMN V, 356). The intellectual difficulty for this Emersonian hermeneut is that, 
DFFRUGLQJWRWKH¶$PHULFDQ6FKRODU·KHPXVWGXSOLFDWHWKHFRQGLWLRQVRIWKH¶RULJLQDO
UHODWLRQ·LQKLVLQWHUSUHWLYHSHUVSHFWLYHXSRQWKHZRUOG¶7KHVFKRODURIWKHILUVWDJH
received into him the world around; brooded thereon; gave it the new arrangement of 
KLVRZQPLQGDQGXWWHUHGLWDJDLQ·CW I, 55). This necessitates the logical primacy of 
RQH·VRZQWH[WXDOERG\IRULQWKHFDVHRIWKLVSVHXGR-Adamic scholar there are no prior 
texts, no canon or tradition of the sort Emerson criticises our dependence upon. For 
this scholar, if he is to read, he must first write the text in order to do so. And yet, of 
course, if realising his being depends upon the scholarly attribute³that is, he is defined 
in and by the act of reading, by a reflection requiring textual proxy³then his existence 
is belated with regard to the text. The ontology of the Emersonian scholar depends 
upon a curious paradox³to read, he must write, but to write, he must be, which begins 
with reading³but he declines to explicitly confront or interrogate these demands at this 
stage in his career. 
                                                 
56 In terms of the first of these claims, JMN I opens with the seventeen-year-old Emerson making the 
IROORZLQJLQYRFDWLRQ¶7KHVHSDJHVDUHLQWHQGHGDWWKLVWKHLUFRPPHQFHPHQWWRFRQWDLQDUHFRUGRIQHZ
thoughts (when they occur); for a receptacle of all the old ideas that partial but peculiar peepings at 
antiquity can furnish or furbish; for tablet to save wear and tear of weak Memory & in short for all the 
various purposes & utility real or imaginary which are usually comprehended under that comprehensive 
WLWOH &RPPRQ 3ODFH ERRN· JMN I, 3-4). Innumerable instances might be given to evidence the latter 
claim, but a typical example appears in a passage of 1838. Wondering, as he often did, about the value of 
his compulsive writing, he instructs himself to write on unquestioning, that every anecdote recorded is 
VLJQLILFDQW¶'RQRWIRUWKLVDPRPHQWGRXEWWKHLUYDOXHWR\RX7KH\UHODWHWR\RXWR\RXUSHFXOLDUJLIW
Let them have all their weight & do not reject them & cast about for illustration & facts more usual in 
(QJOLVKOLWHUDWXUH·JMN VII, 158). 
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 Nonetheless, assuming for now that this primary form of writing can and does 
exist as Emerson believed, it then enters into a more complex dynamic of self-reading 
and rewriting as the journals and notebooks were revisited in the composition of the 
published works. Between these two layers of text that Emerson bequeaths to us lie 
thoughts, reflections, and comments upon the phenomenology of all aspects of the 
process³the spontaneous primary writing, the process of initial reading, the act of 
UHZULWLQJDVDFRQGLWLRQHG¶XWWHULQJDJDLQ·RU¶ZLWQHVVLQJ·RIZKDWZDVUHDG³which 
correlate with the epistemological structures of the type of inspiration discussed so far 
in this chapter. As I will illustrate, Emerson does not discover the immanent self-
identity he speculates upon in his more idealist moments, but in the exigencies of the 
apophatic process alternative protocols emerge which will significantly shape his 
experiments in language over the following years. 
 The foundation of my discussion here needs to be stated plainly: Emerson 
believed in inspiration in principle. He believed, or clearly wanted to believe, that it 
described the influx of Reason into the mind, that his best moments of spontaneity in 
the journals were its product, and that tracing the source of this influx was to pursue the 
path to immanent consciousness of divinity.57 In spite of this, however, his writings on 
WKHVXEMHFWGXULQJWKHSHULRGLQTXHVWLRQDUHGLIIXVHDQGLQVXEVWDQWLDO2QO\LQ·V
Letters and Social Aims did an essay treating of inspiration under his name finally appear, 
DQGWKHLVVXHVDWWHQGDQWRQWKLVYROXPH·VDXWKRUVKLSJLYHQLWVSXEOLFDWLRQGXULQJWKH
years of the so-FDOOHG¶(PHUVRQIDFWRU\·PHDQWKDWLWLVSUREOHPDWLFWRUHDGLWDVLILW
contained his definitive thought on the matter, a shortcoming evident in the fact that 
two of the three scholarly considerations of Emersonian inspiration/enthusiasm use it 
toward concluding that his ideas were hamstrung by irresolution and philosophical 
                                                 
57 )RULWVSLWKLHVWDQGPRVWD[LRPDWLFUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVHHDFRPPHQWLQWKHMRXUQDOVIRU¶7KHUHLV
RQHPLQG,QVSLUDWLRQLVDODUJHUUHFHSWLRQRILWIDQDWLFLVPLVSUHGRPLQDQFHRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO·JMN V, 
169). 
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vagueness.58 HRZHYHUJLYHQWKDWWKHHVVD\¶,QVSLUDWLRQ·ZDVFULEEHGIURPQRWHVRQWKH
topic Emerson had made throughout his life, a flexible and necessarily selective reading 
reveals consistency in certain points which have a bearing on the ideas structuring the 
self-rHDGLQJUHZULWLQJG\QDPLFPXFKHDUOLHULQ(PHUVRQ·VFDUHHU&HQWUDOO\WKH
inspiration principle possesses attributes which circumscribe the psychology of creativity 
in a more secular, and hence contemporary, sense, and aptly figures an experience of 
dislocated and postponed subjectivity which depends upon a very tangible sense of the 
intrusion of textuality into the realisation of self-consciousness. Most critical of all, the 
modus of inspiration incorporates a sophisticated model of paradoxically simultaneous 
wilful agency and receptive passivity in the act of literary production, which will form 
the parameters of my interrogation here.59 
 6R·V¶,QVSLUDWLRQ·VHWVWKHVFHQHZLWKDFDYHDWOLPLWLQJWKHVFRSHRIZKDW
ZLOOIROORZ¶2IWKHmodus of inspiration we have no knowledge. But in the experience of 
                                                 
58 As Ronald Bosco writes in the introduction to the recent Harvard-Belknap Collected Works edition of 
this volume, Emerson was sufficiently ill by 1876 that the majority of Letters and Social Aims was the 
product of his earlier journals and notebooks, along with some dictation, edited into essays by his 
daughter Ellen and his newly-employed literary executor James Elliot Cabot. Indeed, Bosco writes that 
(PHUVRQGLVSOD\HGRQO\¶DFRUGLDOEXWGLVHQJDJHGLQWHUHVWLQWKHSURJUHVVRIWKHERRN·GXULQJLWV
composition. See %RVFR·V¶+LVWRULFDO,QWURGXFWLRQ·WRWKH+DUYDUG%HONQDSHGLWLRQRILetters and Social 
Aims, CW VIII, pp. xix-ccxiii (pp. xxx-xxxii). Of the critics, Timothy Clark discusses Emerson only in the 
endnotes of his Theory of Inspiration, and only in the context of this late essay. Clark discovers there the 
measured passivity and incomplete abandonment which characterises Unitarian and Emersonian 
inspiration, and of which I will have more to say here, but finds this simply illogical and problematic and 
consequently dismisses Emerson out of hand. See Clark, p. 167 n. 27. David Herd uses Emerson to 
establish his claim that the enthusiastic tendency characterises American literature, and while his thesis 
offers original ideas in the instance of a number of his subjects, his treatment of Emerson is flawed 
insofar as he straightly equates inspiration and enthusiasm, thus obfuscating the critical distinction I am 
seeking to emphasise here, and then collapses his career into two texts³Nature DQG¶,QVSLUDWLRQ·³
concluding that the latter is simply an inadequate development of the former, in spite of the fact that forty 
\HDUVDQG(PHUVRQ·VGHFOLQHLQWRGHPHQWLDVHSDUDWHWKHP6HH+HUGpp. 1-17. 
59 The third extant treatment of Emersonian inspiration, ElizDEHWK'XQQ·V¶´$'HUDQJHG%DODQFHµ
Emerson on Inspiration·WUHDWVRIWKLVSULQFLSOHDOEHLWLQDPDQQHUWKDWFOHDYHVSHUKDSVDOLWWOHWRRFORVH
WRWKHOHWWHURI(PHUVRQ·VLGHDOVDQGWKHHVVD\ODFNVFULWLFDOLQVLJKWDVDFRQVHTXHQFH'XQQdesignates 
EmerVRQ·VSRVLWLRQD¶GHUDQJHGEDODQFH·EHWZHHQWKHVHFXODUVHOI-possession of the Understanding and 
the abandonment to divine afflatus in pure attention to Reason, but her argument turns on what she takes 
WREH(PHUVRQ·VGHVFULSWLRQVRIHPSLULFDOVWDWHVUDWKHr than philosophical metaphor, and hence the 
imperative to ¶RVFLOODWHEHWZHHQVROLWXGHDQGH[SHULHQFH· is explained in terms of formulaic credulity: since 
¶WKHXQFRQVFLRXV5HDVRQPXVWEHDOORZHGWRVSHDN(PHUVRQSURSRVHGWKDWPHQWHPSRUDULO\UHWLUHIURP
their active lives in society to a secluded setting that makes few demands on the Understanding, causing it 
to relax and thereby allowing the Reason to become conscious·6HH'XQQ¶´$'HUDQJHG%DODQFHµ
(PHUVRQRQ,QVSLUDWLRQ·, in The Cast of Consciousness: Concepts of the Mind in British and American Romanticism, 
ed. by Beverly Taylor and Robert Bain (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 141-50. 
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PHGLWDWLYHPHQWKHUHLVDFHUWDLQDJUHHPHQWDVWRWKHFRQGLWLRQVRIUHFHSWLRQ·CW VIII, 
153). Nine of these conditions are then given, and at first they look very much like 
romantic truisms, a point which is undoubtedly liable to diminish the interest of critics. 
But there is more to them than is immediately evident. The list can be paraphrased thus: 
  
1. +HDOWK¶7KHSHUIHFWLRQRIZULWLQJLVZKHQPLQGDQGERG\DUHERWKLQNH\· 
2. Letters: Or, more specifically: ¶7KHH[SHULHQFHRIZULWLQJOHWWHUVLVRQHRIWKH
keys to the modus RILQVSLUDWLRQ· 
3. ¶>'@LXUQDODQGVHFXODUUHVW>«@WKHGDLO\UHQRYDWLRQRIVHQVLELOLW\· 
4. 7KH¶SRZHURIWKHZLOO>ZKLFK@LVVRPHWLPHVVXEOLPH· 
5. 1DWXUH·VXQH[SHFWHGSURYRFDWLRQV'HVFULEHGDV¶WKHDWPRVSKHUH>DV«@DQ
H[FLWDQW· 
6. ¶6ROLWDU\FRQYHUVHZLWKQDWXUH·DSRLQWZKLFKLVUHLQIRUFHGE\WKHQH[W
condition: 
7. 7KH¶HVVHQWLDOVROLWXGHRIKDELW·E\ZKLFKLVPHDQWWKHDELOLW\WRILQGRUFUHDWH
solitude anywhere. The suggestion of creativity here bears another important 
implication of will. 
8. &RQYHUVDWLRQ¶1RW$ULVWRWOHQRU.DQWRU+HJHOEXWFRQYHUVDWLRQLVWKHULJKW
PHWDSK\VLFDOSURIHVVRU· 
9. 1HZSRHWU\¶E\ZKLFK,PHDQFKLHIO\ROGSRHWU\WKDWLVQHZWRWKHUHDGHU·³in 
other words, the radical personalisation of literature. (CW VIII, 156-65) 
 
With a little analysis, each of these conditions figures an aspect of the dichotomy of 
impersonal abandonment and retained personal relation which characterises inspiration 
observed by way of intellection. Considering first the figures of abandonment, or the 
UHQXQFLDWLRQRISHUVRQDOZLOO(PHUVRQ·VPHWKRGVLQLWLDOO\VHHPEDOGO\HPSLULFDO¶,KDYH
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found my advantage in going in summer to a country inn, in winter to a city hotel, with 
a task which would not proVSHUDWKRPH·CW VIII, 161). There is, however, a 
VRSKLVWLFDWHGWURSHDWZRUNLQWKLVSDVVDJH7KDWVXFKWUDYHOOLQJDOORZVRQHWR¶FRPPDQG
DQDVWURQRPLFOHLVXUH·KLQWVDWERWKWKHSKLORVRSKLFDODVSHFWRIVROLWXGHDVVRFLDWHGZLWK
stellar contemplation which is arrived at by such means, as well as the paradoxical 
relation of will in the context of this solitude. The latter principle is elaborated on the 
QH[WSDJHLQ¶WKHH[SHULHQFHRISRHWLFFUHDWLYHQHVVZKLFKLVQRWIRXQGLQVWD\LQJDW
home, nor yet in travelling, but in transitions from one to the other, which must 
therefore be adroitly managed WRSUHVHQWDVPXFKWUDQVLWLRQDOVXUIDFHDVSRVVLEOH·CW 
VIII, 162. Emphasis added). Abandonment seems to be wilful³the state of receptivity 
aspired to is instigated by an act of personal agency³but deprivation of the same 
agency is nevertheless the type of the inspired experience proper. In the context of 
(PHUVRQ·VDGYRFDF\RIWUDYHOOLQJLWPLJKWEHFRQVLGHUHGDQDEDQGRQPHQWRIKRPH
overseen by the continuance of domestic order.60 
 As the essay continues, other conditions are developed as this principle expands 
in scope. Conversation, like travel, represents a transition out of personal consciousness, 
LQVRIDUDVLQLWVSUDFWLFH¶RXUWKRXJKWKLWKHUWRZUDSSHGXSLQRur consciousness, 
GHWDFKHVLWVHOIDQGDOORZVLWVHOIWREHVHHQDVDWKRXJKW·CW VIII, 164). The phrasing 
E\ZKLFK(PHUVRQHPSKDVLVHV¶>W@KHexperience RIZULWLQJOHWWHUV·LVDFULWLFDOLQGLFDWRURI
what we should be attending to in the contemplation of the expulsion of the personal 
into objective form; writing and reading constitute acts which may seem ordinary, even 
easy, natural, and automatic when the writing being done is a letter addressed to a friend 
or loved one, but Emerson implies that the phenomenon is worthy of a more acute 
                                                 
60 Indeed, Emerson had experimented with this idea in a more practical sense in July 1846, when he and 
his family invited a Mrs E. C. Goodwin to run their Concord home as a boarding-house, then contracting 
from her four rooms in which to live, in an arrangement that seems to have been primarily addressed to 
the practice of social and familial principles rather than financial exigencies. See Richardson, Mind on Fire, 
pp. 429-32. 
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interrogation. We ought to look at this spontaneous and supposedly natural 
FRPPXQLTXpDVZHPLJKWWRD¶ORRNLQJ-JODVV·LQDVPXFKDVLWSURYLGHVDQHZ¶ZHDOWKRI
PLQGLQWKLVUHVSHFWRIVHHLQJ·E\ZKLFK(PHUVRQSODLQO\LPSOLHV self-regard and self-
knowledge (CW VIII, 157. Emphasis added). Indeed, the essay constantly emphasises 
that text in general is a predicate for a transition out of our quotidian perspectives³¶,
find mitigation or solace by providing always a good book for P\MRXUQH\V>«@VRPH
ERRNZKLFKOLIWVPHTXLWHRXWRISURVDLFVXUURXQGLQJV·³a purpose which, it might be 
VDLGLVDOVRVHUYHGE\WKHIUDJPHQWLQJRIOLIHLQWRGD\VE\¶GLXUQDODQGVHFXODUUHVW·CW 
VIII, 165, 157). All of these processes of depersonalisation, objectification, and 
alienation practise the expulsion of a sense of the empowered ME into the spaces of 
NOT ME, and hence enable it to take on some of the roles given the NOT ME in 
Nature: here, this is the provocation of the unexpected, but also a view outside of lived 
time, the perspective as seen from the potentially immortal text rather than spontaneous 
mind. 
 Other conditions develop the paradoxes of agency within this context. The 
GHFODUDWLRQWKDWWKHZLOOLV¶VRPHWLPHVVXEOLPH·LVFXULRXVVLQFHVRPXFKRI(PHUVRQ·V
early work endeavours to propose the absolute secularity of individual wilfulness. But 
the machinations of inspiration under the requirements stipulated necessitate 
FRPSURPLVHDQGWKH¶DGURLWPDQDJHPHQW·ZHDUHWRLPSRVHDFFRUGLQJWRthe essay 
requires that the inspirado acknowledge this fact. The lesson of Nature is that we cannot 
forego our personality, or the intellectual power that defines us. Reason can only be 
hypothesised; we are always belated by the time we get around to thinking reflectively. 
1RWORQJLQWR¶,QVSLUDWLRQ·DIDPLOLDU(PHUVRQLDQLVPGLUHFWO\UHIHUHQFHVWKLVWHPSRUDO
GLVMXQFWXUH¶+HLVIDLQWRPDNHWKHXOWHULRUVWHSE\PHFKDQLFDOPHDQV,WFDQQRWVREH
GRQH·CW VIII, 151). Yet the mechanistic interventions of will are the only means by 
which he is willing to countenance an effective resolution to his problem. Philosophical 
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solitude is a challenging attitude to sustain, Emerson admitting that his own endeavour 
WRZDUGLWUHTXLUHVWKDWDOOVHFXODU¶FRQGLWLRQV>«DUH@ right for my success, slight as that 
LV·,WVSUHPLVHVGHPDQGWKDWZHORRNDWLWZLWKLQWHOOHFWXDOO\DVWXWHUHVSHFWZKLFKPHDQV
WRUHFRJQLVHSUHFLVHO\WKH¶LQFRQFHLYDEOHGHOLFDF\·RIWKLV¶PDFKLQHZLWKZKLFKZHDUH
GHDOLQJ·DFRQVLGHUHGSKUDVHZKLFKEOXntly reneges on his commitment to its essential 
organicity (CW VIII, 162). Because of the vacillations that this essay performs, it is by 
QRPHDQVXQUHDVRQDEOHWRFRQVLGHU¶,QVSLUDWLRQ·DIDLOXUHRIORJLFDQLQFRPSOHWHDQG
ambivalent attempt at its subject. But then its closing lines should at least alert us to the 
fact of its failure, portraying in both subject matter and syntax a febrile and complex mix 
of coexisting principles of will and passive obedience which simultaneously seem the 
product of a disordered mind and one at the height of its powers of expression. Indeed, 
RQHPLJKWVD\WKDWLWLVWKHNLQGRIXWWHUDQFHPDGHE\RQHZKRVH(PHUVRQLDQ¶PLQGDQG
ERG\·³the types of agency and passivity³DUH¶ERWKLQNH\· 
  
These are some hints towards what is in all education a chief necessity, the right 
powers of government, or, shall I not say, the right obedience to the powers of 
the human soul. Itself is the dictator; the mind itself the awful oracle. All our 
power, all our happiness, consists in our reception of its hints, which become 
ever clearer and grander as they are obeyed. (CW VIII, 166) 
 
 7KHURRWVRIWKLVLUUHVROXWLRQDUH(PHUVRQ·VSUHRFFXSDWLRQLQWKHODWHUV
The hopeful inspirado of that decade still expressed his desires in his journal³¶:KDW·
KHUHFRUGVLQ¶FDQEHWUXHUWKDQWKHGRFWULQHRILQVSLUDWLRQ"RIIRUWXQDWHKRXUV"·
(JMN 9,QGHHGZKHQKHFDPHWRZULWHWKHILUVWGUDIWSDVVDJHVRIWKH¶$PHULFDQ
6FKRODU·LQKHLQYRNHG¶WKH$OOZLVH·WR¶JLYHPHOLJKW·WKDWKHPLJKWVXcceed (JMN 
9<HWE\·VEssays, another voice has crept into his thoughts on the subject. 
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7KHSULQFLSOHRILQVSLUDWLRQLWVHOISHUVLVWVEXWWKHWRQHLVGLIIHUHQWLQ¶+LVWRU\·LWLV
LQYRNHGDVDQLGHDOLQVRIDUDVWKHDUWZRUNVKRXOG¶DIILUP>«@that it was done by us and 
QRWGRQHE\XV·EXWDWRQFHWKHSDUDGR[RIZLOIXODEDQGRQPHQWEHFRPHVWURXEOHVRPH 
 
The universal nature, too strong for the petty nature of the bard, sits on his neck 
and writes through his hand, so that when he seems to vent a mere caprice and 
ZLOGURPDQFHWKHLVVXHLVDQH[DFWDOOHJRU\+HQFH3ODWRVDLGWKDW¶SRHWVXWWHU
JUHDWDQGZLVHWKLQJVZKLFKWKH\GRQRWWKHPVHOYHVXQGHUVWDQG·CW II, 7, 19) 
 
7KH¶H[DFWDOOHJRU\·LQWKLVH[WUDFWUHIHUVWRDSUHYLRXVO\PHQWLRQHG¶XQFHDVing 
VXFFHVVLRQRIEULVNVKRFNVRIVXUSULVH·LQLQVSLUHGSURGXFWLRQDWZKDWWKHZULWHUKDV
done, though apparently not done by himself. But the significant tonal change here lies 
with the oppressive nature of the experience. Emerson might easily have opted for a 
PRUHOLJKWVRPHWURSHWKDQWKDWRIDQLQVSLULQJFDXVHVLWWLQJRQWKHSRHW·VQHFN
Throughout EssaysWKLVWRQHHPHUJHVDJDLQLQUHODWHGFRQWH[WV7KH¶OLJKWRIDOORXUGD\·
UHPDLQVDWRXUEDFNVKHUHDVLWKDVEHHQWKURXJKRXW(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWDQGDWWempts to 
turn toward it remain impossible, but now, in addition, the reader is warned against any 
aspiration of doing so. There is an implication of the effects of submission to 
HQWKXVLDVPZKHQKHZULWHVWKDW¶>D@FHUWDLQWHQGHQF\WRLQVDQLW\KDVDOZD\VDWtended the 
RSHQLQJRIWKHUHOLJLRXVVHQVHLQPHQDVLIWKH\KDGEHHQ´EODVWHGZLWKH[FHVVRIOLJKWµ·
(CW II, 167). And not only is this dazzling and disorientating, but specifically 
RSSUHVVLYH7KHVWDWHPHQWLQ¶7KH2YHU-6RXO·WKDW¶HYHU\PRPHQWZKHQWKHindividual 
IHHOVKLPVHOILQYDGHGE\>HQWKXVLDVP@LVPHPRUDEOH·VHHPVIDLUO\LQQRFXRXVEXWLW
perhaps ought to be considered in relation to a later analogue in the same essay between 
WKHHQWKXVLDVWLFIRUFHDQGWKDWRIWKH¶VDLQWVDQGGHPLJRGVZKRPKLVWRU\ZRUVKLSV>«
for] though in our lonely hours we draw a new strength out of their memory, yet, 
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pressed on our attention, as they are by the thoughtless and customary, they fatigue and 
LQYDGH·CW ,,6XFKKHURHVDV(PHUVRQZULWHVLQ¶+HURLVP·HPbody the 
¶PLOLWDU\DWWLWXGHRIWKHVRXO·DQGLQVSLWHRIWKHLUYLUWXHVRQZKLFKKHZDVXQGRXEWHGO\
LQIRUPHGE\&DUO\OH(PHUVRQDOVRVKDUHV&DUO\OH·VUHFRJQLWLRQRILWVOLPLWHGXWLOLW\DVDQ
LGHDOWURSH¶>W@KHUHLVVRPHZKDWQRWSKLORVRSKLFDOLQKHURLVP there is somewhat not 
KRO\LQLW·CW II, 148).61 
 The philosophical, and the holy, lie instead with the processes of intellection, 
and with the security of method. The Unitarian uneasiness with the pure abandonment 
RIHQWKXVLDVPLVUHIOHFWHGLQ(PHUVRQ·Vwillingness only to trace cause from effect, to 
DGRSWD¶SKLORVRSK\·KHGHVFULEHVDV¶DIILUPDWLYH·LQVRIDUDVLW¶UHDGLO\DFFHSWVWKH
WHVWLPRQ\RIQHJDWLYHIDFWVDVHYHU\VKDGRZSRLQWVWRWKHVXQ·CW II, 90). Again 
drawing on his knowledge of optics, the principles of light and vision are raised to 
UHLQIRUFHFRQGLWLRQVRIUHODWLRQDQGPHGLDF\UDWKHUWKDQLPPDQHQFH,Q¶,QWHOOHFW·LWLV
REVHUYHGWKDW¶>W@KHUD\RIOLJKWSDVVHVLQYLVLEOHWKURXJKVSDFHDQGRQO\ZKHQLWIDOOVRQ
DQREMHFWLVLWVHHQ·CW II,Q¶7KH7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVW·DQDGGUHVVJLYHQODWHULQ
WKHWURSHLVGHYHORSHG¶7KHOLJKWLVDOZD\VLGHQWLFDOLQLWVFRPSRVLWLRQEXWLWIDOOV
on a great variety of objects, and by so falling is first revealed to us, not in its own form, 
for iWLVIRUPOHVVEXWLQWKHLUV·CW I, 201). The implication of these points is that self-
regard becomes a process undergone by literally looking at our own shadows, which 
PLJKWEHGHILQHGDVDFUHDWLRQ¶GRQHE\XVDQGQRWGRQHE\XV·7KHVKDGRZLVQRWGRQe 
by us insofar as we cannot create this impression of ourselves without the sun behind 
us. But it is done by us inasmuch as it is not irresistible³we might retire into the shade, 
for example³and in that the shadow we cast is like a daguerreotype, a unique ¶IRUP·
                                                 
61 Enthusiasm also carries this dual aspect throughout Essays. The kind of passionate conviction which 
UHODWHVEDFNWRWKHUHOLJLRXVPHDQLQJKDVLWVYLUWXHVVWLOO$V(PHUVRQZULWHVLQ¶&LUFOHV·¶1RWKLQJJUHDW
ZDVHYHUDFKLHYHGZLWKRXWHQWKXVLDVP·%XWLQDQ\DFWRIWKLVVRUWWKHWHQGHQF\WRGHVWDELOLVDWLRQDQG
excess³¶DVLQJDPLQJDQG ZDUWRDSHLQVRPHPDQQHUWKHVHIODPHVDQGJHQHURVLWLHVRIWKHKHDUW·³
punctures the efficacy and validity of the virtue (CW II, 190). 
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punctuating the formlessness of the light that surrounds it, the very type of a semi-
willed impression of our unique identity upon visible matter. 
 These instances from 1840-1 represent developed thinking on a concept which 
had been increasing in relevance up to the publication of Essays. The significance of 
XQLTXHRULJLQDOIRUPLQJLVILUVWSRVWXODWHGDPRQJVWZRUNVSXEOLVKHGLQ(PHUVRQ·V
OLIHWLPHLQWKH¶$PHULFDQ6FKRODU·ZKHUHLQVRXOWRQDWXUHLVDV¶VHDOWRSULQW·¶LQ
proportion as a man has anything in him divine, the firmament flows before him, and 
WDNHVKLVVLJQHWDQGIRUP·CW ,$VKHZRXOGHODERUDWHLQ¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·WKH
essay which does most to invoke the necessity of originality in thought and actions, 
form that is not originaOE\GHILQLWLRQ¶FRQIRUPV·DQG¶>W@KHREMHFWLRQWRFRQIRUPLQJWR
usages that have become dead to you, is, that it scatters your force. It loses your time 
DQGEOXUVWKHLPSUHVVLRQRI\RXUFKDUDFWHU·CW II, 31-2). The prevention of a kind of 
¶ORVWWLPH·DQGWKHXUJHQF\RIDGHILQHG¶LPSUHVVLRQ·EHFRPHVWKHIRFXVRI(PHUVRQ·V
attention in all theoretical ruminations on this principle throughout Essays. First, the 
contingency and temporal mutability of secular manifestations of spirit is acknowledged: 
 
Through all the bruteness and toughness of matter, a subtle spirit bends all 
things to its own will. The adamant streams into soft but precise form before it, 
and, whilst I look at it, its outline and texture are changed again. Nothing is so 
fleeting as form; yet never does it quite deny itself. (CW II, 8) 
 
%DVHGRQLWVHPHUJHQFHLQKLVRZQGLYHUVHDFWV(PHUVRQODEHOVWKLV¶P\3URWHXVQDWXUH·
elsewhere in the same essay (CW II, 8). The inconsistency of the effects of what is 
conceived to be a singular power is exactly what intellectual practice is directed toward 
UHVROYLQJ6RLQWKHFRQFOXGLQJSDVVDJHVRI¶&LUFOHV·(PHUVRQHXORJLVHV¶&KDUDFWHU·DV
SRVVHVVLQJDPRUHVLQJXODUDVSHFWWKDQZHDUHFRPPRQO\DEOHWRGHWHFW¶&KDUDFWHUGXOOV
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the impression of particulDUHYHQWV·CW II, 190). If the particularity of impression 
UHJLVWHUHGLQSKHQRPHQDOH[SHULHQFHLVGXOOHGLWLVEHFDXVHZKDWKHWHUPV¶FKDUDFWHU·KDV
the capacity to homogenise it, to impose singularity of habit, of perspective, upon it. 
$JDLQVWWKH¶IRROLVKFRQVLVWHQF\·RIFRQIRUPLW\DQGVXSHUILFLDOVHOI-accordance damned 
LQ¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·KHLPSOLFLWO\SRVLWVDproper, innate consistency identified in intellectual 
reflection.62 $VKHXQHTXLYRFDOO\SXWVLWLQ¶+LVWRU\·¶7KHSKLORVRSKLFDOSHUFHSWLRQRI
identity througKHQGOHVVPXWDWLRQVRIIRUPPDNHVKLPNQRZWKH3URWHXV·CW II, 18). 
 These published statements seem to me to reflect back upon the revisory use of 
the journals that preceded them. Within their pages, Emerson had long been theorising 
whether and how his MRXUQDOZULWLQJSUDFWLFHPLJKWKHOSUHDOLVHKLVVWXG\RI¶FDXVH·LQ
DPRQJVWWKHGHWULWXVRIWH[WXDO¶HIIHFWV·7KHIUXVWUDWLRQDVLWZDVPRVWSUHFLVHO\
IRUPXODWHGLQWKHHVVD\¶/RYH·OD\ZLWKWKHODFNRISHUVSHFWLYHWKDWFKDUDFWHULVHGOLYHG
time: 
 
[A]ll is sour, if seen as experience. Details are melancholy; [whereas] the plan is 
seemly and noble. In the actual world³the painful kingdom of time and 
place³dwell care, and canker, and fear. With thought, with the ideal, is 
immortal hilarity, the rose of joy. Round it all the muses sing. But grief clings to 
names, and persons, and the partial interests of to-day and yesterday. (CW II, 
100) 
 
Not that the days and hours of life never offered exceptions to this anguish, however. 
Epiphany, clearer visions of the world and the mind occasionally arose within 
H[SHULHQFHDQGVXFKPRPHQWVZHUH(PHUVRQ·VEHVWJXHVVDVWRZKDWWKHLQIOX[LRQVRI
                                                 
62 ,QGHHGWKLVUHYHUVDORIWKHLPPHGLDWHVHQVHRI¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·LVHQDFWHGE\WKHHVVD\LWVHOI,QWKH
sentence which IROORZVWKDWFRQWDLQLQJWKHGLVFXVVLRQRID¶IRROLVKFRQVLVWHQF\·(PHUVRQGHFODUHVWKDWKH
¶PD\DVZHOOFRQFHUQKLPVHOIZLWKKLVVKDGRZRQWKHZDOO·DVKDUSO\LURQLFVWDWHPHQWJLYHQLWVIODW
GLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKH¶DIILUPDWLYHSKLORVRSK\·RI¶QHJDWLYHIDFWV·GLVFXVVHGDERYHCW II, 33). 
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5HDVRQORRNHGOLNH6RZKHQKHZURWHLQWKDW¶>W@KHGD\V	KRXUVRI5HDVRQZLOO
shine with steady light as the life of life & all other days & weeks appear as hyphens to 
MRLQWKHVH·DOLQJXLVWLFPHWDSKRULVKLVFUXFLDOKLQWDVWRWKHPHWKRGRIDVLQJXODU
representation of his own being and his own divinity (JMN V, 200). At the head of 
¶-RXUQDO&·ZKLFK(PHUVRQNHSWEHWZHHQ837-8, he copies from Montaigne an 
HSLJUDSKRI+RUDFHZKLFKGHVFULEHGERRNVDV¶IDLWKIXOIULHQGV·WRZKRPRQHZRXOGDVLW
ZHUHZULWHVRWKDWLQWLPHWKHUHFRUGZRXOGILJXUHDQDSSUHKHQVLEOHUHVLGXHKLV¶ZKROH
OLIH>«@RSHQWRYLHZDVLISULQWHGRQD YRWLYHWDEOHW·JMN V, 278). Emerson, however, 
was so attuned to this idea that the epigraph is little more than confirmatory. Not only 
had he already been acting in this manner for a decade or more, he had also already 
theorised it to his satisfaction. AVKHZURWHLQ¶7KHOLIHRIDFRQWHPSODWRULVWKDWRI
a reporter. He has three or four books before him & now writes in this now in that 
RWKHUZKDWLVLQFRQWLQXRXVO\VDLGE\RQHRUWKHRWKHURIKLVFODVVHVRIWKRXJKW·JMN V, 
82). In the manner of this simple accretion, Emerson presumed he would be gradually 
recording the history of his own innate tendencies. 
 Such a mode of writing is stereotypically romantic. As Ellison has written with 
UHVSHFWWRWKLVIDFHWRI(PHUVRQ·VFRPSRVLWLRQDOLGHRORJ\WKH¶extraordinary instability 
RIDOLPLWHGQXPEHURISRVLWLRQVPD\EHWKHGHILQLWLYHDWWULEXWHRI(PHUVRQ·VVW\OH·DQG
LWVPRGXODWLRQFRPHVVLPSO\IURPWKHPDQQHULQZKLFKTXRWLGLDQ¶DQHFGRWHV·DUH
UHFRUGHGJLYLQJWKHLPSUHVVLRQ¶WKDWOLIHLVWDNLQJVKDSHWKDWWLPHLWVHOIEHVWRZVIRUP·63 
This certainly embodies the principle of passive abandonment, of submission to organic 
necessity, although the fact that Emerson does not stop here means that we must refrain 
from assuming his simple adherence to organicist doctrines. As both inscriber of these 
fragments and their reader, secondary layers reveal the intervention of intellection. 
Within Essays, some strikingly explicit and optimistic reflections on the process are 
                                                 
63 Ellison, pp. 83-4, 191. 
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HYLGHQW,Q¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·¶OHWPHUHFRUGGDy by day my honest thought without 
prospect or retrospect, and, I cannot doubt, it will be found symmetrical, though I mean 
LWQRWDQGVHHLWQRW·CW ,,2ULQPRUHGHWDLOHGWHUPVLQDSDVVDJHIURP¶&LUFOHV·
which was copied verbatim from the journals: 
 
Today, I am full of thoughts, and can write what I please. I see no reason why I 
should not have the same thought, the same power of expression to-morrow. 
What I write, whilst I write it, seems the most natural thing in the world; but 
yesterday, I saw a dreary vacuity in this direction in which I now see so much; 
and a month hence, I doubt not, I shall wonder who he was that wrote so many 
continuous pages. (CW II, 182) 
 
Given its content, it demands this verbatim reproduction. The object in this 
readLQJUHZULWLQJDV(PHUVRQVWDWHVXQFRPSOLFDWHGO\LQ¶+LVWRU\·LVWRLQYRNHD
GHWDFKHGLQWHOOHFWLQUHIOHFWLRQDQGE\GRLQJVRUHDGLQWHUURJDWLYHO\¶UHPHG>\LQJ@WKH
GHIHFWRIRXUWRRJUHDWQHDUQHVVWRRXUVHOYHV·CW II, 4). Again, on the same page of the 
VDPHHVVD\¶,WLVUHPDUNDEOHWKDWLQYROXQWDULO\ZHDOZD\VUHDGDVVXSHULRUEHLQJV·7KH
MXVWLILFDWLRQIRUWKLVOLHVZLWKDOLWHUDU\SUHURJDWLYH)RU¶OLWHUDWXUH·LQ(PHUVRQ·V
RSLQLRQ¶LVDSRLQWRXWVLGHRXUKRGLHUQDOFLUFOHWKURXJKZKLFKDQHZRQHPD\be 
described. The use of literature is to afford a position whence we may command a view 
RIRXUSUHVHQWOLIHDSXUFKDVHE\ZKLFKZHPD\PRYHLW·CW II, 185).64 Submitting 
ourselves to the literary, we return to it as readers, and in this capacity he proposes that 
                                                 
64 7KHRWKHUZLVHVRPHZKDWFU\SWLFUHIHUHQFHLQ¶6SLULWXDO/DZV·WR¶RXUSUHSRVWHURXVXVHRIERRNV·DOVR
seems to relate to this point. ¶3UHSRVWHURXV·LVDZRUGRIWZRSUHIL[HVHW\PRORJLFDOO\VSHDNLng, since it 
derives from the Latin prae (before) and posterous (coming after). Hence its figurative meaning of 
QRQVHQVLFDOLW\RIVRPHWKLQJ·VEHLQJEDFN-to-front. What Emerson seems to be suggesting, however is 
that if the point of books is that they are outside the hodiernal, then preposterous they must be, being 
both before and after the problematic present. $VVXFKWKHTXDOLW\RI¶SUHSRVWHURXVQHVV·LVLQIDFWWKH
correct use of books, properly understood. T. S. McMillin, working from a similar basis, make much of the 
temporal subtext of this term in his Our Preposterous Use of Literature: Emerson and the Nature of Reading 
(Urbana IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), pp. 9-11 and passim. 
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the renounced will returns LQWKHDELOLW\WR¶FRPPDQG·WRKROG¶SXUFKDVH·2UWRSXWLW
DQRWKHUZD\DV(PHUVRQGRHVLQ¶3UXGHQFH·LWLVWKHSUXGHQWLDOEHQHILWRI¶NHHSLQJ
RQH·VZRUG·DVSHUWKHJRVSHOLPSHUDWLYH 
 
[L]et him likewise feel the admonition to integrate his being across all these 
distracting forces, and keep a slender human word among the storms, distances, 
and accidents, that drive us hither and thither, and, by persistency, make the paltry 
force of one man reappear to redeem its pledge, after months and years, in the most distant 
climates. (CW II, 139. Emphasis added) 
 
The Limits of Romantic Self-Reading 
(PHUVRQ·VH[WHQVLYHXVHRIKLVMRXUQDOVLQWKHDFWRILQWHUURJDWLYHVHOI-reading may be 
unusual, but he does have precedents. Literary interpretation as psychological inquiry, 
particularly with respect to the ideology of genius, had become something of a romantic 
convention by the mid nineteenth-century. As M. H. Abrams notes in The Mirror and the 
Lamp¶>I@RUJRRGRULOOWKHZLGHVpread use of literature as an index³as the most 
reliable index³to personality was a product of the characteristic aesthetic orientation of 
the early nineteenth-FHQWXU\· 65 Abrams dedicates a chapter of his book to this principle, 
tracing its emergence in the late Renaissance as the principle of style by which an 
DXWKRU·VPRUDODVZHOODVDHVWKHWLFYLUWXHVPLJKWEHMXGJHGWRWKHURPDQWLFIL[DWLRQZLWK
the holy trinity of immortal, impersonal stylistic perfection³Shakespeare, Milton, and 
Homer.66  
Although Emerson clearly borrowed much from Coleridge and others in the 
valorisation of the eternal style of this trinity of authors, his own inquiries are of a 
somewhat different and more interesting nature. The hermeneutical system he 
                                                 
65 M. H. Abrams, p. 227. 
66 M. H. Abrams, pp. 226-62. 
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advocates, deriving as it does from new attitudes in Biblical criticism, duplicates in 
several critical respects the thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher, intersecting with and 
WKHQGLYHUWLQJIURPLWLQDZD\WKDWDQWLFLSDWHVWKHODWWHU·VFULWLFVDQGXOWLPDWHO\
complicating notions of psychologism in literary interpretation.67 As Hans George 
*DGDPHU·VLQIOXHQWLDOWZHQWLHWK-century account in Truth and Method puts it, 
6FKOHLHUPDFKHULVODXGHGLQWKHPRGHUQHUDQRWVLPSO\IRUKLVUHPDUNVRQ¶JUDPPDWLFDO
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ·ZKLFKDUHQRQHWKHOess of no mean significance, and deal with the issues 
WKDWDULVHLQWKHVXEMHFWLYHXVHRIDOHJDOO\VWUXFWXUHG¶SUH-JLYHQWRWDOLW\RIODQJXDJH·EXW
UDWKHUIRUSRVWXODWLQJDVFLHQWLILFDQGXQLYHUVDOSULQFLSOHE\ZKLFK¶SV\FKRORJLFDO
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ·³that is, the divination of intent and of the personality behind the text³
might be organised.68 ,Q6FKOHLHUPDFKHU·VZRUGVRQHUHFRJQLVHVDXWKRULDOSUHVHQFH
LQLWLDOO\DVD¶FROODERUDW>RU@LQWKHODQJXDJH·EXWWKHSURFHVVRILQWHUURJDWLRQWKDWIROORZV
necessitates GLYLQLQJEHWZHHQWKRVHSDUWVRIWKHODQJXDJHKHVLPSO\¶SUHVHUYHV·E\
repeating and reproducing its conventions and formalisms, and those occasions on 
ZKLFKKH¶SURGXFHVVRPHWKLQJQHZLQLW·DFFRUGLQJWRWKHFRQGLWLRQVRIKLVXQLTXH
personality.69 He terms WKHODWWHURIWKHVHSULQFLSOHV¶VW\OH·EXWLWUHTXLUHVKHUPHQHXWLFDO
labour to trace, primarily because, as with Emerson, production may be unconscious or 
only semi-conscious (Schleiermacher too entertained the idea of genius), and because its 
                                                 
67 Schleiermacher was well known in New England by the mid nineteenth-century. Emerson had read 
parts of his Critical Essay on the Gospel of St. Luke as part of his extra-curricular theological training in the 
late-1820s. See Richardson, Mind on FireSDQG(PHUVRQ·VQRWHVRQWKHYROXPHJMN VIII, 486-8). 
Later, his treatises on religion were popular reading for the wider Transcendentalist circle. This is not to 
VXJJHVWKRZHYHUWKDW(PHUVRQ·VKHUPHQHXWLFDOWKHRULHVZHUHLQDny way directly influenced by the 
German, whose Hermeneutik und Kritik, a collection of posthumously compiled lecture notes and 
transcripts, was published only in 1838 and did not reach an English translation until late in the twentieth-
century. Rather, EmHUVRQ·VSDUDOOHOLVPZLWK6FKOHLHUPDFKHULVDTXLUNRILQWHOOHFWXDOKLVWRU\ZKLFKKDV
SRWHQWLDOO\LQWHUHVWLQJFRQVHTXHQFHVDV,ZLOOH[SORUHKHUH)RUPRUHRQ6FKOHLHUPDFKHU·VUHFHSWLRQLQ
1HZ(QJODQGVHH5REHUW'5LFKDUGVRQ¶6FKOHLHUPDFKHUDQGWKH7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVWV·LQTransient and 
Permanent: The Transcendentalist Movement and its Contexts, ed. by Charles Capper and Conrad Edick Wright 
(Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1999), pp. 121-47. 
68 Hans George Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd 
revised edn (London: Shed and Ward, 1989), pp. 186-7. 
69 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism, and Other Writings (1838), ed. and trans. by Andrew 
Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 91. 
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singularit\LVQRWDEVROXWH¶,QGLYLGXDOLW\RIVW\OHLVVXSSRVHG>«@WREHDEOHWREH
PRGLILHGYLDIRUPVEXW\HWUHPDLQWKHVDPH·70 
6FKOHLHUPDFKHU·VREMHFW³predominantly within the context of New Testament 
studies, but applicable to secular texts as well³was to attain understanding of the 
singularity lying behind textual production, hence the significance of his work to 
historicist theology and religious history. More pressing with respect to Emerson is the 
methodological clarity with which Schleiermacher developed his thesis, and the 
parameters of what it claimed to be able to identify. As Gadamer paraphrases it, 
¶>L@QVRIDUDVXWWHUDQFH>«@KDV>«@DQH[WHUQDOIRUPLWLVQRWVLPSO\WKHLPPHGLDWH
manifestation of the thought but presupposes reflection. This is primarLO\WUXH>«@RI
ZKDWLVIL[HGLQZULWLQJDQGKHQFHRIDOOWH[WV·71 This is an important point, for Emerson 
presumes that spontaneous writing is precisely that³it does not refer to the power of 
reflection, or at least his own power of reflection. If they are as a matter of necessity the 
SURGXFWRIUHIOHFWLRQLIWKHZULWWHQRUVSRNHQZRUGPXVWEHD¶FRQVWUXFWLRQ·DQGE\
GHILQLWLRQFDQQRWEH¶VSRQWDQHRXV·LQWKHSURSHUVHQVHWKHQWKHSRZHUUHIOHFWLQJLV
presumably not that of the fully conscious mind. So, aV*DGDPHUVWDWHV¶HYHU\DFWRI
understanding is for Schleiermacher the inverse of an act of speech, the reconstruction 
RIDFRQVWUXFWLRQ7KXVKHUPHQHXWLFVLVDNLQGRILQYHUVLRQRIUKHWRULFDQGSRHWLFV·72 
This has the consequence of making the reader³the hermeneut³not only 
SDUW\WRWKHFUHDWLYHSURFHVVKHQFHWKHUHFDQEH(PHUVRQ·V¶FUHDWLYHUHDGLQJDVZHOODV
FUHDWLYHZULWLQJ·EXWDOVRHOHYDWHVKLPEH\RQGWKHDXWKRULQWHUPVRIWKHDXWKRU·VVHOI-
knowledge. As Schleiermacher famously had it, the task of the hermeneut is: 
 
                                                 
70 Schleiermacher, pp. 96-7. 
71 Gadamer, p. 188. 
72 Gadamer, pp. 188-9. 
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[T]o understand the utterance at first just as well as and then better than its 
author. For because we have no immediate knowledge of what is in him, we 
must seek to bring much to consciousness that can remain unconscious to him, 
except to the extent to which he himself reflectively becomes his own reader. [However, o]n 
the objective side he has even here no other data than we do.73 
 
6RZHDOZD\VUHDGDV¶VXSHULRUEHLQJV·VLQFHZHUHDGZLWKUHODWLYHO\PRUHVDSLHQFHDQG
necessarily with a detached, disinterested impartiality toward distinguishing between 
universal original and the TXRWLGLDQDQGFRQYHQWLRQDO,Q(PHUVRQ·VRZQGHILQLWLRQVRI
VW\OHWKLVLVH[DFWO\WKHSRLQWKHSXUVXHVLIWKH¶DGRSWLRQRID>JXLGLQJ@SULQFLSOH
transform[s] DSURVHULQWRDQRUDWRU·WKHQZHUHFRJQLVHLWLQ¶>H@YHU\WUDQVJUHVVLRQWKDWLW
PDNHVRIURXWLQH>ZKLFK@PDNHVPDQ·VEHLQJVRPHWKLQJZRUWK·JMN V, 70). Indeed, 
IUHTXHQWO\LQ(PHUVRQ·VMRXUQDOVWKHUHDGHU·VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLVERWKWKHRULVHGDQG
anticipated as absolutely necessary. Given that the context of the journal is private, it 
additionally suggests acknowledgement that this reader will always be Emerson 
himself.74 $VKHZULWHV¶:KDW·VDERRN"(YHU\WKLQJRUQRWKLQJ7KHH\HWKDWVHHVLWLVDOO
>«@DVDJHVKDOOVHHLQLWVHFUHWV\HWXQUHYHDOHGVKDOOZHLJKDVKHUHDGVWKHDXWKRU·V
mind; shall see the predominance of ideas which the writer could not extricate himself 
IURP	RYHUVHH·JMN 92QFHDQGIRUDOOWKHUHIRUHWKHERRNVDYHV¶ORVWWLPH·as 
it were, by enabling its reader to transcend the temporal strictures that bound the author 
DQG¶RYHUVHH·¶6RZULWHRQ	E\	E\ZLOOFRPHDUHDGHUDQGDQDJHWKDWZLOOMXVWLI\DOO
your context. Do not even look behind. Leave that bone for them to pick 	ZHOFRPH·
(JMN VII, 118). 
                                                 
73 Schleiermacher, p. 23. Emphasis added. 
74 2QWKLVSRLQWVHHDUDWKHUFU\SWLFHQWU\RI0DUFK¶,ZLOOUHDG	 write. Why not? All the snow is 
shovelled away, all the corn planted & the children & the creatures on the planet taken care of without my 
KHOS%XWLI,GRQRWUHDGQRERG\ZLOO·JMN V, 25). 
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 Yet there remains, in the last-quoted extract from Schleiermacher, a curious 
point which specifically differentiates him from Emerson, demonstrating the turn in the 
ODWWHU·VDWWHQWLRQVDZD\IURPWKHLPSUDFWLFDEOHLGHDOLW\RIWKe theory so far discussed, if 
not yet completely from its egotLVWLFRYHUWRQHV2QWKH¶REMHFWLYHVLGH·WKHDXWKRURIWKH
text has no more to go on than any other reader might have on picking it up after the 
completion of the act of writing. Does, therefore, he have a subjective insight enabling 
enhanced understanding? Common sense would suggest so, and Schleiermacher appears 
to agree. Indeed, his whole hermeneutical enterprise ultimately turns on what he termed 
¶FRQJHQLDOLW\·³that is, the capacity to presume an empathy with the author to complete 
the interpretive puzzle, a putting-himself-in-SODFHKHGHVFULEHGDVWKH¶GLYLQDWRU\
PHWKRG·75 What is fascinating in Emerson is the way in which, within his attempts to 
realise his ideas within the reading/rewriting process, he gradually finds himself 
renouncing a presumption of self-identity between his author and his reader, between 
two temporally distinct aspects of himself. 
 $VZLWKWKHZKROHWHQGHQF\RI(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWLQWKHVH\HDUVWKHUHLVQR
Damascene moment whence his attitudes irrecoverably alter. Doubts intrude into the 
journals only to be rebuffed by later entries, even if the overall scheme is a slide into a 
more fundamental questioning of his idealist convictions. But some points do stand out 
nevertheless. For example, the central dilemma emerges in what seems to be an error of 
judgement, a momentary oversight, in the opening pages, inscribed in 1837, of Journal 
C. This is the volume headed by the Horatian epigraph copied from Montaigne quoted 
earlierLQZKLFKWKHZULWHUHQWUXVWVKLVVHFUHWVWRERRNVDV¶IDLWKIXOIULHQGV·WKDWKH
might return to read them in future and find the vista of his life arranged before his 
eyes. In the entry on the following page, however, there is no suggestion of temporal 
GLVMXQFWXUH¶$SRHPDVHQWHQFHFDXVHVXVWRVHHRXUVHOYHV,EH	,VHHP\EHLQJDWWKH
                                                 
75 For a definition, see Schleiermacher, pp. 92-3. See also GadaPHU·VHOXFLGDWLRQRIWKH¶FRQJHQLDO·DFW¶WKH
possibility of which depends on a pre-H[LVWLQJERQGEHWZHHQDOOLQGLYLGXDOV·*DGDPHUS 
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VDPHWLPH·JMN V, 278). This statement seems to reflect an idealistic mood, but how 
PLJKWWKDWFKDQJHLQWKHUHUHDGLQJLIWKDWUHDGHUVHHV¶UH-YLVLRQV·RUUHYLVHV it, with a less 
receptive, perhaps less credulous eye? Can the reader and author merge, do they share 
traits, and if so, are these traits positive or negative with respect to the principles 
Emerson has theorised? The inevitable singularity of a literary form modulated by time 
is a critical prejudice of his in the mid-1830s, a notion that finds expression in numerous 
VWDWHPHQWVWRWKHHIIHFWWKDWDV¶FKDUDFWHULVOLNHDTXLQFXQ[RUDQ$OH[DQGULDQVWDQ]D³
read it forward, or backward or across, it still spelOVWKHVDPHWKLQJ·JMN V, 184).76 In 
other words, we cannot read anything but what character infuses into the text, just as 
the author cannot but write as his character dictates.77 In a sense, therefore, they share 
this virtue of receptivity. 
 Yet, in a number of entries in the same period, the inevitability of right 
H[SUHVVLRQFRPHVLQWRTXHVWLRQ,Q2FWREHU¶7KHGLDPRQG	ODPSEODFNLWVHHPV
DUHWKHVDPHVXEVWDQFHGLIIHUHQWO\DUUDQJHG/HWLWWHDFKWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI&RPSRVLWLRQ·
(JMN V, 233). Whose is WKHZLOOGHHPHGKHUH¶LPSRUWDQW"·,QDVLJQLILFDQWVHTXHQFHRI
pages from the early summer of 1837, Emerson openly acknowledges that this agency 
might, in fact, be not that of nature but his own, either conscious or unconscious, and 
not therefore necessar\RUGLYLQH¶/HWQRWDPDQGHFOLQHEHLQJDQDUWLVWXQGHUDQ\
greenhorn notion of intermeddling with sacred thought. It is surely foolish to adhere 
ULJLGO\WRWKHRUGHURIWLPHLQSXWWLQJGRZQRQH·VWKRXJKWV	WRQHJOHFWWKHRUGHURI
thought. I put like thLQJVWRJHWKHU·JMN V, 335). Twice in the following pages, he 
expresses critical and original concerns relevant to his own practice. The first is the 
IDPRXVHQWU\ZKLFK¶ILQG>V@OLWWOHDFFHVVWRWKLV0HRI0H·GHUDLOLQJKLVPHWDSK\VLFDO
                                                 
76 6HHDOVR¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·DQG¶6SLULWXDO/DZV·IRUWZRIXUWKHULQVWDQFHVSOXVDQRWKHUMRXUQDOHQWU\RI
November 1836 (CW II, 34, 86; JMN V, 236). 
77 See also an entry a few pages on that reinforces the textual element in this inevitable expression of 
FKDUDFWHU¶DFHUWDLQVXEOLPHVHUHQLW\LVJHQHUDWHGLQWKHVRXORIWKH3RHWE\WKHDQQR\DQFHVRIWKHSUHVV
He sees that the spirit may infuse a subtle logic into the parts of the piece which shall defy all accidents to 
EUHDNWKHLUFRQQH[LRQ·JMN V, 190-1). 
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aspirations of the mid-decade. The second directly undermines the self-reading 
K\SRWKHVLV¶:K\UDNHXSROG066WRILQGWKHUHLQDPDQ·VVRXO"<RXGRQRWORRNIRU
FRQYHUVDWLRQLQDFRUSVH·JMN V, 336-7). 
 The fuller consequences of this are disclosed in a further passage from 1839, 
which Emerson himself cross-referenced back to the just-quoted entries of summer 
+HUHWKHMRXUQDOVDUHDJDLQEULHIO\LQRSWLPLVWLFPRRGZLWKWLPH·VIRUPDWLYH
element and the impartiality of observation once again at the centre of his thought. If 
lived time seems not to move in a consistent direction, but pulls us in myriad directions: 
 
%HLWVR,VDQ\PRWLRQGLIIHUHQW">«@7KHYR\DJHRIWKHEHVWVKLSLVD]LJ]DJ
line on a hundred tacks. This is only microscopic criticism. See the line from 
sufficient distance & it straightens itself to the average tendency. All these verses 
	WKRXJKWVZHUHDVVSRQWDQHRXVDWVRPHWLPHWRWKDWPDQDVDQ\RQHZDV>«
Yet] coming from so narrow an experience as one mortal, they must be strictly 
UHODWHG>«@DQd seen at the perspective of a few ages will appear harmonious & 
univocal. (JMN V, 216-7) 
 
It is impossible to assert definitively whether the cross-referencing linking this passage 
back to the selection from 1837 was conscious and roughly contemporary with its 
LQVFULSWLRQRUZKHWKHULWZDVSDUWRIRQHRI(PHUVRQ·VODWHUMRXUQDOLQGH[LQJ
programmes. But whether he was fully or only partly conscious of his reversal, it is a 
reversal nevertheless: he is, effectively, writing back to himself, yet in a manner that 
GRHVQ·WH[DFWO\VXEVWDQWLDWHWKHLPSDUWLDOLW\KHFODLPVRIWKHUHDGHUWRZDUGKLVWH[WXDO
HIIHFWV'HFOLQLQJWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKH¶IRROLVKQHVV·RIUHO\LQJRQWLPH·VPRGXODWLRQRI
form, of the confession of will he had recognised two years earlier, he instead 
reinscribes his ideal, a process which looks, it must be granted, like wilful intervention. 
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 Judging by the tendency of the journals between 1837 and 1839, however, we 
ought not to be surprised at how Emerson has allowed wilfulness to appear in the 
reading principle, just as, over the same period, he acknowledges his personal agency in 
composition. From 1837 onward, he repeatedly expresses doubt in the ability to identify 
with or interpret the self who once wrote these pages, just as he evinces distrust in the 
self who will come to read them. It begins that summer with an isolated and at this stage 
highly abstruse VWDWHPHQWDSURSRVRIQRWKLQJ¶,I-HVXVFDPHQRZLQWRWKHZRUOGKH
would say³<RX<28+HVDLGWRKLVDJH,·JMN V, 362). He makes no similar 
theoretical propositions later that might shed light on his meaning, but what does 
emerge shortly afterward is a sharp, ironical, and sometimes aggressive second-person 
DGGUHVVWRVHOIZKLFKFRQWLQXHVRYHUWKHIROORZLQJ\HDUV,QWKHDXWXPQRI¶Who 
VHW\RXXSIRU3URIHVVRURIRPQLVFLHQFH"	FLFHURQHWRWKH8QLYHUVH"·WKHIROORZLQJ
-XQHLQFRPPHQWRQDVRPHZKDWPRRQVWUXFNHQWU\¶'RQ·WODXJK,DPLQHDUQHVW·LQ
6HSWHPEHU¶&DQ\RXQRWJHWDQ\QHDUHUWRWKHIDFWWKDQWKDW\RXROGJUDQQ\"·JMN V, 
416; VII, 38, 91). During the same period, he makes the point yet more explicit in 
ZULWLQJWKDW¶>%URQVRQ@$OFRWWZDQWVDKLVWRULFDOUHFRUGRIFRQYHUVDWLRQVKROGHQE\\RX
	PH	KLP·LQZKLFK(PHUVRQDQG(PHUVRQDSSHDUWREHWKHILUVWDQGVHFRQG
persons of the trio (JMN VII, 67-8). By virtue of the attempt to realise it in practice, the 
ideality of his own theory has gotten the better of him; the text interrupts and extends 
self-difference rather than collapsing it, a necessity which, he implies, is a fact of secular 
being to which not even Jesus would have been immune. 
 And so a note of anxiety creeps into his writing. It is hardly correct to say that 
he agonises in any way³indeed, his acceptance of the need to redact his theory seems 
easy and blithe given that he continued to write, lecture, and publish over the years in 
question. But it does gradually distort the principles of the doctrine of style, at least 
insofar as Emerson is convinced of his possession of one. For the belief in style as 
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concept dRHVQ·WHEE³WKHGHILQLWLRQRI¶JRRG·VW\OHWKDW¶>Q@RWKLQJFDQEHDGGHGWRLW
QHLWKHUFDQDQ\WKLQJEHWDNHQIURPLW·RIVXPPHULVH[DFWO\UHSURGXFHGLQDQRWKHU
HQWU\RIODWH¶,WLVWKHPHULWRIWKH3RHWWREHXQDQDO\VDEOH:HFDQQRWVHYHUKLV
woUG	WKRXJKW·JMN V, 364; VII, 471). But against the backdrop of distrustful 
writing-to-self, the keenly felt sense of subjective disjuncture, a different literary object 
emerges, a sense of a theoretical or conceptual poetics in place of organic and 
sponWDQHRXVJHQHVLVZKLFKVWDUWVWRWUDQVIRUP(PHUVRQ·VUHODWLRQWRKLVRZQWH[W 
 From the evidence of the journals, Emerson found little of what he sought in 
the act of self-reading. Over time, he became increasingly candid, and in the summer of 
1841 he simply renounces all faith once held in his hermeneutical endeavour: 
 
We animate as much as we can, and we see no more than we animate. I find a 
few passages in my biography noticeable. But it is the present state of mind 
which selects these anecdotes and the selection characterises the state of mind. 
All the passages will in turn be brought out. (JMN VIII, 48) 
 
6RPXFKIRU¶K\SKHQDWHG5HDVRQ·LQGHHGVRPXFKIRUUHDGHUO\LPSDUWLDOLW\ ,I¶DOOWKH
SDVVDJHV·DUHH[FHUSWDEOHDFFRUGLQJWRWKHUHDGHU·VPRRGLWLVKDUGO\OLNHO\WKDWDQ\
possess divine emphasis. Not that it causes Emerson much distress: three pages later, he 
LVVLQJLQJWKHSUDLVHVRIZULWHUO\DJHQF\DQG¶PHWKRG·78 But there is a model for this 
method present already in the text of the journals. 
 A couple of years earlier, he had been expressing doubts about another facet of 
self-reading, perhaps its most concentrated and uncomfortable aspect: that of reading 
DORXGRQH·VRZQWext to an audience in the lecture theatre. His misgivings emerge in the 
                                                 
78 ¶,WLVPXFKWRZULWHVHQWHQFHVLWLVPRUHWRDGGPHWKRG	ZULWHRXWWKHVSLULWRI\RXUOLIHV\PPHWULFDOO\
>«@Wo arrange many general reflections in their natural order so that I shall have one homogenous piece 
>«@WKLVFRQWLQXLW\LVIRUWKHJUHDW·JMN VIII, 49). 
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UHFRUGRIDGUHDPLQ'HFHPEHU¶,VDZDPDQUHDGLQJLQWKHOLEUDU\DW&DPEULGJH
DQGRQHZKRVWRRGE\VDLG´+HUHDGHWKDGYHUWLVHPHQWVµPHDQLQJWKDWKHUHDGIRUWKH
market only & not for truth. Then I said,³'R,UHDGDGYHUWLVHPHQWV"·JMN VII, 327). 
A few weeks later, doubts resurface: 
 
These lectures give me little pleasure. I have not done what I hoped when I said, 
,ZLOOWU\LWRQFHPRUH,KDYHQRWWUDQVFHQGHGWKHFROGHVWVHOISRVVHVVLRQ>«@
Alas! alas! I have not the recollection of one strong moment. A cold mechanical 
preparation for a delivery as decorous,³fine things, pretty things, wise things,³
but no arrows, no axes, no nectar, no growling, no transpiercing, no loving, no 
enchantment.³ 
 And why? 
I seem to lack the constitutional vigour to attempt each topic as I ought. (JMN 
VII, 338-9) 
 
Mere sermonising, in other words, and not the revivification of epiphanic moments into 
a singular literary experience. So, a few weeks later again, he proposes what seems to be 
DQDOWHUQDWLYHVW\OLVWLFSULQFLSOH¶%\FRQIHVVLRQZHKHOSHDFKRWKHUE\FOHDQVKULIWDQG
QRWE\GLFWDWLRQ·JMN VII, 340). 
 Emerson had always seen confession as a function of great writing: in 1834, he 
QRWHGWKDWLQWKHFDVHRIWKHPDMRUSRHWVDQGSKLORVRSKHUV¶WKHJUHDWHVWSDVVDJHVWKH\
have writ, the infinite conclusions to which they owe their fame are only confessions. 
Throughout Goethe prevails the undersong of confession & amazement; the apothegm 
RI6RFUDWHVWKHUHFDQWDWLRQRI0DQ·JMN IV, 298). By the later 1830s, confession has 
been reconfigured in light of the failure to discover innate style. Instead, Emerson is 
considering whether a willed confession might be made to structure a text that accepts 
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the failure of personal revelation, but yet advances the philosophical protocols to which 
that revelation aspired. It is not only the journals that propose this possibility³the 
published work reprRGXFHV(PHUVRQ·VGRXEWVDQGKLVDOWHUQDWLYHK\SRWKHVHVWR
UHIOH[LYHO\ILJXUHWKHQHZV\VWHP,Q¶7KH2YHU-6RXO·WKHSULQFLSOHRIVW\OHLVLQYRNHG
EXWRQWKLVRFFDVLRQLQDPRUHDPELJXRXVPDQQHUWKDWILJXUHVD¶QHJDWLYHIDFW·UDWKHU
than simple, positivisWLFDIILUPDWLRQ7KHDPELJXLW\FLUFXPVFULEHVWKHVKLIWLQ(PHUVRQ·V
thought: 
 
Character teaches over our head. The infallible index of true progress is found in 
WKHWRQHWKHPDQWDNHV>«@,IKHKDYHQRWIRXQGKLVKRPHLQ*RGKLVPDQQHUV
his forms of speech, the turn of his sentences, the build, shall I say, of all his 
opinions will involuntarily confess it, let him brave it out how he will. (CW II, 
169) 
 
In other words, the necessary conclusion, the truth of the matter, will find expression, 
EXWWKDW¶FRQIHVVLRQ·ZLOOQRWQHFHVVDULO\HFKRWKHH[SUHVVHU·VDVSLUDWLRQVWRJUDQGHXU
7KHVDPHSULQFLSOHDSSHDUVDOVRLQ¶6SLULWXDO/DZV·¶$PDQSDVVHVIRUWKDWKHLVZRUWK
What is, engraves itself upon his face, on his form, on his fortunes, in letters of light. 
Concealment avails him nothing; boasting, nothing. There is confession in the glances 
RIRXUH\HVLQVDOXWDWLRQVDQGWKHJUDVSRIKDQGV·CW ,,$QGILQDOO\IURP¶7KH
Over-6RXO·RQFHPRUH ¶%XWLIDPDQGRQRWVSHDNIURPZLWKLQWKHYHLOZKHUHWKH word 
LVRQHZLWKWKDWLWWHOOVRIOHWKLPORZO\FRQIHVVLW·CW II, 170). 
 Is this, therefore, what Emerson comes to do? Essentially, yes, although his 
¶ORZOLQHVV·PLJKWVWLOOEHTXHVWLRQHG$WWLPHVLQEssays, he lapses into the conditional to 
WKHGHWULPHQWRIWKHLGHDRIWKHKHUPHQHXWLFVRIVW\OHWKH¶UHDVRQIRUWKHODVWIORXULVK·
RIDQ\LQGLYLGXDO·VDFWLRQVPLJKWEHREYLRXVWRRXUH\HV¶could ZHOD\KLPRSHQ·ZKLOH
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WKHRWKHUZLVHIRUWKULJKW¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·LVFRQVWUDLQHGby the strikingly ambivalent 
UHPDUNWKDW¶,VXSSRVHQRPDQFDQYLRODWHKLVQDWXUH·CW II, 91, 34. Emphasis added). 
(PHUVRQ·VGHFLVLRQWRFRS\DQRWKHURIKLVSLHFHVRILURQLFVHFRQG-person self-address 
GLUHFWO\IURPMRXUQDOLQWRWKHSXEOLVKHGHVVD\¶&LUFOHV·DOVRSOD\IXOO\DQGSXEOLFDOO\
undermines his philosophical authority.79 But most of all, the relation between 
confession and a willed abandonment, a statement that affirms not commitment but 
neutrality, is what Emerson seeks to understand. On numerous occasions in the journals 
of these years, curious analogical statements appear and reappear, being always slightly 
different, but always also the same. Consistently, they touch on notions of a will not to 
do something, an active expression of indifference which seems philosophically 
VLJQLILFDQW7KHILUVWDSSHDUVMXVWDIWHUKDYLQJJLYHQWKH'LYLQLW\6FKRRO¶$GGUHVV·¶,Q
preparing to go to Cambridge with my speech to the young men, day before yesterday, it 
occurred with force that I had no right to go unless I were equally willing to be 
SUHYHQWHGIURPJRLQJ·JMN VII, 43). Thereafter, recurrences appear intermittently. In 
6HSWHPEHU¶7KRVHRQO\FDQVOHHSZKRGRQRWFDUHWRVOHHS	WKRVHRQO\FDQDFWRU
ZULWHZHOOZKRGRQRWUHVSHFWWKHZULWLQJRUWKHDFW·LQ0D\¶&ULWLFLVPPXVWEH
transcendental, that is, must consider literature ephemeral & easily entertain the 
VXSSRVLWLRQRILWVHQWLUHGLVDSSHDUDQFH·ODWHULQDQXQGDWHGHQWU\EXWFHUWDLQO\DIWHU
¶7KHWUDQVFHQGHQWDO	GLYLQHKDVWKHGRPLQLRn of the world on the sole condition 
RIQRWKDYLQJLW·JMN VII, 244, 352; VIII, 528). The aspiration, it would seem, is to 
arrive at a system which permits the performance of agency while acquitting him of 
investment in it, allowing him, at least in principle, to return to a condition of polar 
neutrality. By mid-KHLVMXVWDERXWDEOHWRGHILQHLWDQG¶GHPDQGRIPHQWKDWWKH\
                                                 
79 The square brackets in the following indicate the additions made in the version which appears in 
¶&LUFOHV·RWKHUZLVHWKHWZRYHUVLRQVDUHLGHQWLFDO¶$QGWKXV2FLUFXODUSKLORVRSKHU>,KHDUVRPHUHDGHU
exclaim,] you have arrived at a fine Pyrrhonism, at an equivalence & indifferency of all actions & would 
fain teach us that if we are true, forsooth, our crimes may be lively stones out of which we shall construct 
WKHWHPSOHRIWKHWUXH*RG·CW II, 188; JMN VII, 521). The insertion, of course, becomes a significant 
ironical statement in the context of the self-reading as self-undermining common in EmerVRQ·VZRUNE\
the time of its composition. 
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VKRXOGH[KLELWDFRQGXFWZKLFKLVDWRQFHFRQWLQHQFH	DEDQGRQPHQW´DZDQWRQKHHG
	JLGG\FXQQLQJµ·JMN VIII, 241). This is SRVVLEOHEHFDXVHLQ·VEssays, he has 
finalised a theorisation of what this mode of poetics might be, and it is to the 
elucidation of that poetics I now turn.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
A Poetics of Reiteration: Essays (1841) 
 
 
$PDQ·Vstyle is his intellectual Voice only in part under his control. It has its 
own proper tone & manner which when he is not thinking of it, it will always 
assume. He can mimic the voices of others, he can modulate it with the occasion 
& the passion, but it has its own individual nature. (JMN III, 26) 
 
 
Emerson wrote the above in 1826, when he was 22 years old, and had by no measure 
attained to his intellectual maturity. Still, it demonstrates well enough the genesis of a 
hopeful presumption that there is an ideal conception of style, an asserted signature of 
Reason through oneself, which preoccupied him throughout the 1830s. By the end of 
that decade, however, the exigencies of language, of the world without the self, and 
generally of the insufficiency of personal will had intervened to problematise the 
UHVROXWLRQWKDWWKHGLVFRYHU\RIRQH·VLQQDWHVW\OHZRXOGKDYHFRQVWLWXWHG,KDYHDOUHDG\
VXJJHVWHGWKDWOHDUQLQJWR¶FRQIHVV·FRQVWLWXWHVDPHWKRGRIQHJRWLDWLQJRQH·V
insufficiencies while continuing to write, but the nature of a confessionary language 
remains to be analysed. To do so, it is necessary to reconsider certain principles 
discussed in the last chapter: specifically, the mode by which an ideal and natural style 
might have been identified, which is to say its fundamental internal consistency. In 
Essays, consistency in word or action is something Emerson directly interrogates, and 
aspects of his inquiry lead to interesting consequences. 
 ,Q¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·KHDVNVDUKHWRULFDOTXHVWLRQZKLFKKDVEHFRPHIDPRXVLQ
American cultXUDOKLVWRU\¶:K\GUDJDERXWWKLVFRUSVHRI\RXUPHPRU\OHVW\RX
contradict somewhat you have stated in this or that public place? Suppose you should 
FRQWUDGLFW\RXUVHOIZKDWWKHQ"·CW II, 33). I will have more to say on the general sense 
of this passage later, but for now, I want to emphasise that last sentence. I am inclined 
WRUHDGWKHGLVVLSDWLRQRIWKLV¶VXSSRVLWLRQ·³¶ZKDWWKHQ"·³not merely rhetorically; that 
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is, not merely as it functions rhetorically to register indifference to conventional 
conceUQVWRZDUGFRUURERUDWLQJ(PHUVRQ·VPDLQSRLQWVLQ¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·)RUH[DPSOH
SXWWKLVVXSSRVLWLRQLQWKHFRQWH[WRIDK\SRWKHVLVHGLQHYLWDEOHVW\OH,IKLV¶VXSSRVH·
means that I can contradict myself, is this contradiction founded in fact, so that the 
thesis of inevitability in style is squarely dismissed by virtue of a radical freedom of will? 
Or does it flag up our partial understanding of the concept of stylistic likeness, by which 
we assume that how we act or write ought to look or to mean consistently along 
principles of similitude? Furthermore, based on the latter of these points, if there is a 
PRGHRIVHFXODU¶OLNHQHVV·DSSDUHQWLQODQJXDJHZKLFKLVQRWFRUUHODWLYHZLWKDVLQJXODULW\
of style, then what might be inferred from the action of such likeness/unlikeness, 
whether the product of conscious will or circumstance?  
 These are formal questions in two senses of the term. First, the appearance of 
likeness may be said to play analogically into the field of concepts of pure identicality 
and pure difference, or, in other words more common in Emerson, the universal and 
the particular. The paradox of perceiving unity in the atomised world of particulars is 
what we speak of when we speak of repetition, and repetition, in the abstract, is the 
mode of unchanging similitude on the temporal plane when seen from the point of view 
of one whose temporal experience is constituted by a linear sequence of moments.1 
Repetition becomes interesting, philosophically speaking, because it permits an infusion 
of the universal into the particular, so long as we deem it to be possible. Hence, on 
                                                 
1 Hence the tendency, early in philosophical treatments of repetition, to acknowledge that it is a formal 
category impossible in any real sense. See Gilles Deleuze, for instance: ¶,IUHSHWLWLRQLVSRVVLEOHLWLVdue to 
miracle rather than law. It is against the law [«] If repetition exists, it expresses at once a singularity 
opposed to the general, a universality opposed to the particular [«] an eternity opposed to permanence. 
In every respect, repetition is a transgression·To these models of antinomianism at the heart of 
UHSHWLWLRQZHFDQDGG0DXULFH%ODQFKRW·VUHPDUNVRQWKHVDPHVXEMHFWSXEOLVKHGD\HDUDIWHU'HOHX]H: 
¶5HSHWLWLRQLVWUDQVJUHVVLRQLQVRIDUDVWUDQVJUHVVLRQGLVSODFHVWUDQVJUHVVLYHUHSHWLWLRQUHndering it 
impossible·That is, while repetition itself would seem to transgress the law of instances which asserts an 
ever present différence RQWRORJLFDOWHPSRUDOHWFWUDQVJUHVVLRQDVD¶JRLQJ-DFURVV·LPPHGLDWHO\UHDVVHUWVD
topographic difference, stripping repetition of its possibility. See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition 
(1968), trans. by Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 3; Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation 
(1969), trans. by Susan Hanson (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 272. 
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WKHVHJURXQGV,ZRXOGOLNHWRVXJJHVWWKDW(PHUVRQ·V¶ZKDWWKHQ"·GRHVQRWUHJLster the 
irrelevance of the question of what happens when one is either openly repetitive or 
openly contradictory, but is rather a speculative lunge at the meanings attendant on 
secular likeness and unlikeness, repetition and contradiction (but more especially the 
formal, impossible principle of repetition), at almost exactly the same time as the most 
UDGLFDOSKLORVRSKLFDOYRLFHLQ(XURSH6¡UHQ.LUNHJDDUGSXWWKHTXHVWLRQRI¶ZKHWKHU
UHSHWLWLRQZDVSRVVLEOHDQGZKDWLWPHDQW·2 
 Secondly, it is worth noting that Emerson refers specifically to language in this 
extract, and with good reason. The law of language is its necessary repeatability: its 
economy depends upon transferability across contexts and demands. It would be 
patently useless if each word could be used only once, only in the particular instance of 
its coining. But there remains a distinction between repeatability in language practice 
and repetition³the former facilitates the apprehension of unique semantic properties 
by making language available to us, while the latter erases difference and therefore 
prevents semantic identification. In other words, while repetition is the necessary quality 
RIODQJXDJH·VVHPDQWLFSRVVLELOLW\WKLVGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWODQJXDJHSHUPLWVUHSHWLWLRQWR
simply appear as such. So the appearance of repetition which openly flouts this condition 
means that we are looking away from what we might habitually dismiss as the tedium of 
too apparent repetition in a narrative, for example.3 
                                                 
2 Søren Kirkegaard, Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs (1843-4), trans. by M. G. Piety (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 3. 
3 *pUDUG*HQHWWH·VGLVFXVVLRQVRI¶IUHTXHQF\·LQOLWHUDU\ODQJXDJHDUHLOOXVWUDWLYHLQWKLVUHVSHFWVLQFHWKH\
GHPRQVWUDWHKRZRUWKRGR[VW\OLVWLFGHYLFHVVXFKDVZKDWKHWHUPV¶LWHUDWLYLW\·WKHV\QWKHWLFQDUUDWLYLVDWLRQ
of repeated instances, such as ProuVW·V¶IRUDORQJWLPH,ZHQWWREHGHDUO\·DQG¶VLQJXODWLYHQDUUDWLYH·
(where a single instance becomes paradigmatic, standing as type for all other repetitions) negotiate having 
to simply repeat oneself in every instance. In doing so, the iterative or singulative enables the inflection of 
repetition with new meanings arrived at by virtue of narrative synthesis. Genette goes on to stress that, 
WUDGLWLRQDOO\DQXQDOWHUHGUHSHDWHGXWWHUDQFHVHHPV¶SXUHO\K\SRWKHWLFDODQLOO-formed offspring of the 
combinatLYHPLQGLUUHOHYDQWWROLWHUDWXUH·H[FHSWLQKLJKO\IRUPDOLVHG¶PRGHUQWH[WV·VLQFHLWVSUHVHQFH
undermines the progressive quality of narrative. See Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. 
by Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 113-60. 
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Elsewhere, linguistic repetition is attended to only in specialised contexts, such 
as the study of poetic diction. Metrical rhythms, rhyme, alliteration, assonance, etc.; all 
GHSHQGXSRQWKHUHDGHU·VFDSDFLW\WRUHFRJQLVHDXUDORUYLVXDOSDUDOOHOLVPZKLFKJLYHVDQ
impression of repetition, and these principles lead to my final remark on this theme. My 
reading of Emerson so far has been based on an assumption that he is theorising 
something he never openly discusses in theoretical terms, certainly not openly in the 
published works. Rather than see a problem in this, I hope that I have demonstrated 
that an effective way of bringing intellectual consistency to his work is to trace the 
parallels in repeated tropes, phrases, words, and so on, in order to deduce the theoretical 
constants. This admittedly very literary way of reading for tropological reflections is 
hinted at by Emerson as the proper way to read any and every text: as he writes in 
¶+LVWRU\·¶HDFKPDQ>«@PXVWDWWDLQWKDWORIW\VLJKWZKHUHIDFWV\LHOGWKHLUVHFUHWVHQVH
and poetry and annalVDUHDOLNH·ZKLFKVLJQLILHVWKDWWKHIRUPDOLVWLFUHDGLQJVWUDWHJLHV
applied to one must equally be turned on the other (CW II, 6). It is under such 
FRQGLWLRQVWKDWZHDUHWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHSURSHUO\(PHUVRQLDQ¶VW\OH·,QWKLVVHQVHKLV
philosophical engDJHPHQWZLWKODQJXDJHDOORZVSOD\ZLWKLQWKH¶IRUPV·RISRHWLFV³
interference in the particular, contextual uses of language³to inflect analogically the 
¶IRUPV·RISKLORVRSK\WKHSULQFLSOHVRIVLQJXODULW\DQGXQLW\ZKLFKOD\DWWKHEDVHRIKLV
central ideas. 
 
Singularity and Repetition on a Personal Level 
7REHJLQWRXQGHUVWDQGZK\WKLVLVWKHFDVHLW·VZRUWKORRNLQJDWWZRVWXGLHVIURPWKH
slim scholarly history of Emersonian repetition which both turn on a specific theoretical 
concern of critical interest to my thesis, even as they approach the issue from very 
122 
 
different angles.4 The two appraisals were published a year apart in the mid-1980s. In 
-XOLH(OOLVRQ·V(PHUVRQ·V5RPDQWLF6W\OH (1984), repetition is conceived to be a necessary 
practice in the poetics of the fragment characteristic of a late romantic literary style. 
Drawing heavily on Phillippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-/XF1DQF\·V/·$EVROX/LWWpUDLUH
(1978), Ellison develops their thesis of metaphysical singularity indicated through 
literary fragmenWDWLRQLQ(PHUVRQ·VZRUNV,Q/DFRXH-Labarthe and Nancy, the 
LPSRVVLELOLW\RI¶VD\LQJHYHU\WKLQJ·DQGDFKLHYLQJromantic holism is displaced by the 
SRHW·VJHQHUDWLRQRIDSDWHQWO\LQFRPSOHWHZRUNGHPDQGLQJWKHLQWHUIHUHQFHRID
reader/critic, which thus both alludes to the possibility of the absolute work by positing 
a structure in the form of disconnected poles, and claims its potential for itself by 
integrating reading practice into its very realisation as a work.5 Within this framework, 
Ellison posits that repetition has two significant effects: 
 
Repetition forces us to take out one interchangeable part and insert another. To 
DGRSW(PHUVRQ·VWHUPLQRORJ\LWFUHDWHVWKH¶LQWHUYDO·¶EUHDNLQFRQWLQXLW\·>«@
                                                 
4 Lawrence Buell was the first scholar to draw attention to the fact that Emerson, the archetypal critic of 
conformity, imitation, and forthright advocate of spontaneity, was actually a strikingly repetitive writer. In 
Literary TranscendentalismKHHPSKDVLVHGWKDWWKHIRUPDOW\SHRI¶FDWDORJXHUKHWRULF·ORQJUHFRJQLVHGLQ
:KLWPDQZDVDOVRDIL[WXUHRI(PHUVRQ·VZRUN)RU%XHOOWKHFDWDORJXHRIUHSHWLWLRQVFRQVWLWXWHVWKH
necessary poetic form to corroborate the TranscendentalLVWLQVLVWHQFHRIWKH¶UHODWLRQVKLSDQGWRWDOLW\·RI
DOOWKLQJV%XHOO·VDUJXPHQWUHFRJQLVHVWKHOLPLWHGWRWDOLW\RIZKDWFDQEHUHSUHVHQWHGE\WKHWH[WDQG
hence the way in which he sees the partial text aspiring to holism by way of a formal gesture is actually 
very close to French theoretical treatments of the romantic fragment, which I will touch on in a moment. 
See Buell, Literary Transcendentalism, pp. 166-87. Besides Ellison and Wayne Anderson, the two scholars 
who I will discuss centrally, there has EHHQYHU\OLWWOHDWWHQWLRQSDLGWRWKLVWHQGHQF\LQ(PHUVRQ·VZRUN
after Buell. The only relatively recent treatment is by Lisa Steinmann, who features a chapter on Emerson 
in her Masters of Repetition, although her use of the term relates only to those gHQHULF¶LQKHULWHGOLWHUDU\
PRGHOV·ZKDWSRHWU\LVVXSSRVHGWR¶ORRNOLNH·ZKLFKVKHILQGVUHFXUULQJLQ7KRPVRQ:RUGVZRUWK
6KHOOH\DQGILQDOO\(PHUVRQ·VSRHWU\6WHLQPDQQ·VSULPDU\LQWHUHVWLVKRZWKLVWUDGLWLRQFRKHUHVZLWKWKH
oft-stated claims of thHVHSRHWVIRUPRGHVRI¶SRZHU·GHFODUHGWRH[LVWLQSRHWLFSURGXFWLRQDQGE\WKLV
she means, emphatically, how print culture is to be seen as a socio-political actor. Hence her thesis is 
generally extrinsic to my concerns regarding the literary-philosophical status of the meaning of repetition, 
particularly so insofar as for Steinmann repeated romantic tropes such as solitude, idleness, reveries in 
QDWXUHHWFDUHPHUHO\¶UHKHDUV>HG@ORQJ-VWDQGLQJFRPPRQSODFHVDERXWSRHWU\·LQ(PHUVRQ·VZRUNDQG
are reduFHGWRVWDQGDVWKHFRQYHQWLRQVZKLFKSUREOHPDWLVH(PHUVRQ·VVWDWHPHQWVHOVHZKHUHRQSRHWU\
DQGWKLQNLQJSRHWLFDOO\DVPRGHVRIZRUOGO\¶DFWLRQ·DFRQFHSWZKLFK6WHLQPDQQUHDGVYHU\OLWHUDOO\/LVD
M. Steinmann, Masters of Repetition: Poetry, Culture, and Work in Thomson, Wordsworth, Shelley, and Emerson. 
(New York: St. Martin's, 1998), pp. 135-96. 
5 Phillippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German 
Romanticism, trans. by Phillip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1988), pp. 39-58 and 
passim. 
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Such intervals affect the reader by intensifying the figurative or fictive quality of 
language and thus diminishing its capacity for true and final naming.6 
 
(OOLVRQ·VDUJXPHQWKHUHWKDWODQJXDJHFKDQJHVVRPHZKDWLQUHSHWLWLRQEHFRPLQJ
¶ILJXUDWLYHDQGILFWLYH·VXJJHVWVDQDOWHUDWLRQLQLWVEDVLFVHPDQtic function that reveals 
repetition to be a classical formal device.7 As the Russian Formalists argued in the early 
twentieth-FHQWXU\LQFLGHQWVLQ¶GHIDPLOLDULVDWLRQ·RIODQJXDJHDUHFULWLFDOWRGHYHORSLQJ
philosophical conceptions of literary form, and, as I argue later, Emerson has his own 
distinct take on the principle of defamiliarising.8 Ellison uses similar concepts here to 
H[SODLQKRZWKHDSSDUHQWOLNHQHVVEHWZHHQUHSHDWHG¶LQWHUFKDQJHDEOH·SDUWV¶VWUHQJWKHQV
the distinction between part and whole UDWKHUWKDQVXEVXPLQJWKH´SDUWLDOµLQWRWKH
´FRPSOHWHµ·OHDGLQJWRDGHIHUUDORIDFODLPWRKROLVPZKLFKSDUDGR[LFDOO\HIIHFWVD
more authentic potential singularity according to Lacoue-/DEDUWKHDQG1DQF\·VPRGHO9 
(VVHQWLDOO\LQ(OOLVRQ·VWKHVLVUHSHtition interferes with our normative relation to 
language, but it is worth noting briefly that in this model defamiliarisation returns us³
once again, paradoxically³WRDPRGHRIGRPHVWLFDWLRQLQRQH·VRZQVXEMHFWLYLW\%\
ZD\RI¶SRLQW>LQJ@XVWRZDUGDQXQDvailable wholeness of vision and becom[ing] 
LGHQWLILHGZLWKWKHLQWXLWLRQRIFRPSOHWHQHVVWKH\SUHFLSLWDWH·UHSHDWHGIUDJPHQWVDOLJQ
                                                 
6 Ellison, p. 173. 
7 +HQFHODQJXDJH·V¶GLPLQLVKHGFDSDFLW\IRUWUXHDQGILQDOQDPLQJ·XQGHUVXFKFRQGLWLRQVDOWKRXJKWKLV
FODLPDQGWKDWRQWKHSULRUSDJHRI(OOLVRQ·VWH[WRQKRZUHSHWLWLRQ¶GUDLQV DZD\PHDQLQJ·QHHGWREH
considered with caution as relatively conventional utterances of the post-VWUXFWXUDOLVWFRQWH[WRIWKLVWH[W·V
composition. Fictive and figurative qualities should, perhaps, also generate meaning, or at least new loci for 
meaningDQGWKLVLVZKDW,·OOEHH[DPLQLQJKHUH(OOLVRQS 
8 6HHIRULQVWDQFH9LNWRU6KNORYVN\ZKRZULWHVWKDWWKH¶WHFKQLTXHRIDUWLVWRPDNHREMHFWV´XQIDPLOLDUµ
WRPDNHIRUPVGLIILFXOWWRLQFUHDVHWKHGLIILFXOW\DQGOHQJWKRISHUFHSWLRQ·6KNORYVN\¶$UWDV7HFKQLTXH·
(1917), trans. by Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, (Lincoln NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1965), pp. 3-24 (p. 12). The idea itself is older, however. As Susan Wolfson 
has emphasised, it ZDVDURPDQWLFFRQYLFWLRQ3HUF\%\VVKH6KHOOH\GHFODUHGLQ¶$'HIHQFHRI3RHWU\·WKDW
SRHWLFIRUPKDVWKHSRZHUWR¶SXUJH>«@IURPRXULQZDUGVLJKWWKHILOPRIIDPLOLDULW\·DQG¶VWULS>«@WKH
YHLORIIDPLOLDULW\IURPWKHZRUOG·$VVXFKWKHUHLVSUHFHGHnt for supposing that Emerson made formal 
decisions toward a similar effect. See Wolfson, Formal Charges, p. 21, see also pp. 3-4, 7. 
9 Ellison, p. 167. 
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with the expression of the intuitive and the felt; that is, a more proximal relation of 
language to subjective experience.10 
 In an article published in 1985, Wayne Anderson makes a similar point by way 
RIDYHU\GLIIHUHQWDSSURDFK)RFXVLQJRQZKDWKHWHUPVWKH¶UKHWRULFRIUHLWHUDWLRQ·LQ
Emerson, Carlyle, and Coleridge, Anderson highlights the common denominator among 
these three as the concept of intuitive Reason. Based on the fact that Reason is of 
QHFHVVLW\¶ZLWKRXWSURRI·$QGHUVRQDUJXHVWKDWLQWKHLUVKDUHG¶DWWHPSWWRH[SUHVVWKH
indemonstrable premises of faith, imagination, and intuition, ideas that are by definition 
prior to syllogistic development, they rely on declaration and reiteration much more 
RIWHQWKDQRUWKRGR[VSHDNHUVRUZULWHUV·11 While evidently taking a more empirical line 
WKDQ(OOLVRQVWUHVVLQJWKDWUHSHWLWLRQFRQVWLWXWHVD¶VLPSOHLQVLVWHQFH>WKDW@Fan be seen 
DVSHUVXDVLYH·LQUKHWRULFDOWHUPV$QGHUVRQQHYHUWKHOHVVDOVRHPSKDVLVHVWKHVHPDQWLF
differences attending repeated utterances, and sees this as specifically relevant to the 
exposition of otherwise inexpressible concepts of subjective experience.12 
 What is foregrounded, in other words, is the fact that repetition has a special 
significance within the intersections between relative personal and impersonal qualities 
of language. That both critics align it with the apparently personal and familiar, because 
intuitive and subjective, experience of Reason is provocative: surely, one might claim, 
nothing is more impersonal, linguistically speaking, than a recognition of the sense that 
repetition illustrates the disconnection of context from language, of ODQJXDJH·V 
transferability and indeterminate signification, and, finally, of the impersonalisation of 
the utterances of the language user. The paradox evident here has recognisable qualities, 
of course. Reason working through consciousness is both personal and impersonal in 
                                                 
10 Ellison, p. 174. 
11 :D\QH&$QGHUVRQ¶´3HUSHWXDO$IILUPDWLRQV8QH[SODLQHGµ7KH5KHWRULFRI5HLWHUDWLRQLQ&ROHULGJH
&DUO\OHDQG(PHUVRQ·The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 71 (1985), 37-51 (p. 37). 
12 ,QGHHGGHVSLWHWKHPHWKRGRORJLFDOGLIIHUHQFHV$QGHUVRQ·VFODLPIRU¶the power of such rhetoric to 
FUHDWHSUHVHQFHDQGKHQFHDGKHUHQFH·LQGLVWLQFWLRQWRWKH¶GU\XQGHUVWDQGLQJ·RIWKHHSLVWHPRORJLHVRI
Locke and Kant precisely echoes the type of linguistic turn in romantic poetics highlighted by Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy. Anderson, p. 49. 
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(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWRQLQVSLUDWLRQ³¶GRQHE\XVDQGQRWGRQHE\XV·$V5LFKDUG
Poirier has argued, and all assertions on linguistic legality corroborate, this phrase might 
equally be applied to language use in general.13 Such is the basiVQRWRQO\RI3RLULHU·V
own arguments for pragmatist interventions in the linguistic field, but also of the whole 
KLVWRU\RIVWUXFWXUDOLVWOLQJXLVWLFVEDFNWR6DXVVXUH·VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQlangue and parole. 
But there are questions of method and of utility in labelling language in this way: 
method, because seeing language in this respect while using it is a practice that demands 
some suspension of both belief and sincerity; utility, because the recognition of altered 
semantic facility demands an alteration in the thinking and the perceived ends of 
language practice. Or, to put it another way, this is Emerson on the correct if 
GLVFRPILWLQJ¶XVH·RIDIULHQGZKRZHUHFDOOLV¶GRQHZLWK·LQWKHVDPHZD\DVDERRN 
 
$IULHQG>«@LVDVRUWRISDUDGR[LQQDWXUe. I who alone am, I who see nothing 
in nature whose existence I can affirm with equal evidence to my own, behold 
now the semblance of my being in all its height, variety and curiosity, reiterated 
in a foreign form; so that a friend may well be reckoned the masterpiece of 
nature. (CW II, 120) 
 
$PDVWHUSLHFH¶RIQDWXUH·LVGHILQHGDVVXFKEHFDXVHLWSHUIHFWO\VXVWDLQVWKHKLJKOLJKWHG
paradox of personality in impersonality, which means to sustain doubleness, to maintain 
at once attraction and repulsion in the nature of magnetic poles. To translate this into 
literary terms, reproducing such a masterpiece as a book would involve isolating the 
kind of linguistic form in which the necessity of impersonality is acknowledged and 
confessed, but making it in a way that is confessionary: that has the inflection of the 
                                                 
13 Poirier, Poetry and Pragmatism, pp. 3-33. 
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personal and the quality of avowal, and is not an impersonal language reducing the 
subject-agent to a reproducer of forms. 
 The consequence of this distinction is that Emerson is not necessarily making a 
general claim about all language. It can stagnate in traditions, as he often observed. In 
2FWREHULQWKHZDNHRIWKHFRQWURYHUV\RYHUWKH'LYLQLW\6FKRRO¶$GGUHVV·
Emerson wrote in his journal of the characteristic of ecclesiastical writing and 
sermRQLVLQJ¶+RZVDGWREHKROGDXJKWFRPLQJLQWKDWQDPH>RI*RG«@ZKLFKJLYHV
no light, which confounds only, which shines on nothing, affirming meantime that it is 
DOOOLJKWZKLFKGRHVQRWKLQJDIILUPLQJVWHDGLO\WKDWLWGRHV	LVDOO·JMN VII, 121). 
Affirming without action³this is the conventional, formal, ritual use of language 
(PHUVRQUHMHFWV7KHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI¶JUHDW·ZULWLQJRQWKHRWKHUKDQGDUHJLYHQLQ
¶7KH2YHU-6RXO·DVZKDWLVGLVFRYHUHG¶LQ+RPHULQ&KDXFHULQ6SHQVHULQ
ShakespeareLQ0LOWRQ·¶7KH\VHHPIULJLGDQGSKOHJPDWLFWRWKRVHZKRKDYHEHHQ
VSLFHGZLWKWKHIUDQWLFSDVVLRQDQGYLROHQWFRORXULQJRILQIHULRUEXWSRSXODUZULWHUV·
(CW ,,(PHUVRQXVHVWKHWHUPV¶IULJLG·DQG¶SKOHJPDWLF·LQSUDLVHRIFRXUVH$V
such, good writing is initially characterised by an impersonal aloofness. It is, in this basic 
VHQVH¶QHXWUDO·WRRXUDIIHFWLRQV%XW(PHUVRQ·VWHUPVDUHFKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\HIILFLHQWLQ
expressing another signification. Phlegmatic derives from the Greek phlegein³to burn; 
frigid, the Latin frigus³cold. Hence Emerson places such writing precisely between the 
tropes of the fire of the affections and the chill of intellect, between body and mind, 
instinct and reflection, suspended between poles, and consequently neutral in a more 
literal sense. 
 ,QWKLVHW\PRORJLFDOVOHLJKWRIKDQGWKHUH·VDKLQWRIWKHW\SHRIVXVWDLQHG
double sense of language Emerson manifests throughout Essays. The simple 
juxtaposition of two terms whose dominant meanings depend on figurative 
constructions of their etymological roots returns us to Nature and the attention paid 
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WKHUHWRWKLVIDFWRIODQJXDJHZKHUH¶Right originally means straight; wrong means twisted·
etc. (CW I, 18). The effect is to strip away the accretions which have given the terms a 
WRRXQLIRUPVXUIDFHFKDUDFWHUDQGVHWWOHGLQWRIRUPDOLVPDQGLQVWHDGUHYHDOODQJXDJH·V
EDVLFPHWDSKRULFDOGHSHQGHQFH7KLVLQDVHQVHLVDUHDOLVDWLRQRILWV¶ILJXUDWLYHDQG
ILFWLYH·TXDOLW\%XWWKLVLVPHUHO\DVXJJHVWLRQ(PHUVRQ·VRWKHUPHWKRds of realising 
linguistic doubleness are more emphatic, and by exposing the tiers of repetition, one can 
make such methods manifest. The necessary first step in this direction involves 
developing his thesis on the acknowledgement of neutrality in language. 
 $PRQJWKHVWDUNHVWHYLGHQFHVRIUHSHWLWLRQLQ(PHUVRQ·VZRUNDUHKLVDQDSKRULF
reiterations of words and phrases from work to work, and within works themselves. It 
occurs in many different contexts³at its most basic, it involves terms which, by virtue 
of repetition, take on a special significance within the Emersonian system. For example, 
there are those which I have already raised in one or another context: the scholar, the 
significance of the stars, of the sun, of warmth, and of light. The redefinitions 
DFFRPSDQ\LQJWKHVHVSUHDGRXWDFURVV(PHUVRQ·VZRUNJLYLQJLWDQLQWHUQDOVHPDQWLF
logic, although one might fairly say that this is a characteristic of most writers. More 
striking, then, is the manner in which terms cluster or recur suggestively in apparently 
XQUHODWHGFRQWH[WV7KHSKUDVH¶>F@URVVLQJDEDUHFRPPRQ·ZKLFKRSHQVWKHSRUWUD\DORI
the transparent eye-ball experience in NatureHFKRHVDFURVV(PHUVRQ·VODWHUZRUNDQGLW
is an echo which once again draws attention to the semantic blurring of verb, adjective, 
DQGQRXQHPSOR\HG,Q¶+LVWRU\·(PHUVRQGHSLFWVDQRWKHUZLQWU\VFHQHDQGQRWHVWKDW
¶RQHZLOOVHHDVUHDGLO\WKHRULJLQRIWKHVWDLQHGJODVVZLQGRZZLWKZKLFKWKH*RWKLF
cathedrals are adorned, in the colours of the western sky seen through the bare and 
crossing EUDQFKHVRIWKHIRUHVW·CW II, 12).14 To the attentive reader of Emerson, such 
                                                 
14 $VZHOODV¶FURVVLQJ·DQG¶EDUH·ZKLFKDSSHDUVRVWULNLQJO\KHUHWKHZRUG¶FRPPRQ·LVXVHGIUHTXHQWO\
by Emerson, and its employment within even only loosely related contexts invokes parallelism. For 
H[DPSOHDIWHUWKH¶FRPPRQ·LVFURVVHGLQNature, Emerson later exhorts that we aspire to similar 
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repetition evokes a sudden sense of déjà vu; a shock of recognition in language by which 
semantic clarity is not necessarily attained, but a sense of importance for the evoking 
SKUDVHLV7KHFORVHVWDQDORJXHLQ(PHUVRQ·VZULWLQJPLJKWEHVDLGWREHWKHSUDLVHRI
GHWDFKHGWKRXJKWIURP¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·¶,QHYHU\ZRUNRIJHQLXVZHUHFRJQLVHRXURZQ
rejected thoughts: they come back to us with a certain aOLHQDWHGPDMHVW\·CW II, 27). A 
skeptical reader might argue that this is merely Emerson deceiving us into believing in 
the efficacy of his own rhetorical project³if a reader finds words, concepts, or phrases 
HFKRLQJDV¶WKRXJKWV·LQKLVZULWLQJLWLVRQly because Emerson has previously put them 
in his or her mind. But any writer practising such a technique runs a significant risk, 
which Emerson recognises. In NatureKHZULWHVRIWKHSRVWODSVDULDQ¶FRUUXSWLRQ·RI
ODQJXDJH¶ROGZRUGVDUHSHUYHUWHGWRVWDnd for things which are not; a paper currency is 
HPSOR\HGZKHQWKHUHLVQREXOOLRQLQWKHYDXOWV·CW ,$QG¶SDSHUPRQH\·DVKH
ZULWHVLQ¶&RPSHQVDWLRQ·¶PD\EHFRXQWHUIHLWHGRUVWROHQ·CW II, 67). 
 7KHVHWZRWHUPVLGHQWLI\(PHUVRQ·VSULQFLSDOLQWHUHVWV¶&RXQWHUIHLW·
acknowledges the transferability (and perpetual economic validity) of the disconnected 
VLJQLILHU¶VWROHQ·WKHIDFWWKDWLWPD\EHXVHGHQWLUHO\ZLWKRXWRQH·VLQWHQWLRQRU
permission. The consequence is that such a language is purely impersonal. Whether 
counterfeited or stolen, it retains use value, making it not void of meaning per se, but 
certainly void of me. Though we may anticipate Emerson recoiling from this, he does 
not. Rather, the impersonal, and the disjuncture it signifies, is elevated to a position of 
fascination and awful praise. If we posit that the process of defamiliarisation and 
depersonalisation in language consists of an interruption or overturning of our accepted 
relation to material form, then analogues begin to appear in striking instances from 
                                                                                                                                          
WUDQVFHQGHQWPRPHQWVE\OHDUQLQJ¶WRVHHWKHPLUDFXORXVLQWKHFRPPRQ·CW ,,WFRQWLQXHVLQ¶7KH
$PHULFDQ6FKRODU·ZKHUH(PHUVRQH[KRUWVWKH¶SRHWLVDWLRQ·DQG¶HPEUDFLQJ·RI¶WKHFRPPRQ·DQGLQ
Essays comes to stand for the Over-6RXOUHSHDWHGO\DVWKH¶FRPPRQDOLW\·RIWKHXQLYHUVDOPLQGZKLFKLV
RIFRXUVHZKDW(PHUVRQILUVWFODLPVWRKDYHVXEOLPHO\H[SHULHQFHGLQOLWHUDOO\FURVVLQJWKH¶FRPPRQ·LQ
Nature (CW I, 67; CW II 3, 159, 164-5). Eric Wilson emphasises the polysemantic nature of these terms in 
some detail, with specific attention to the religious subtexts, in (PHUVRQ·V6XEOLPH6FLHQFH (New York: St 
0DUWLQ·V3UHVVSS-44. 
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(PHUVRQ·VWH[WV$YHUVLRQIURPWKHIDPLOLDULVHW\PRORJLFDOO\OLQNHGWRDYHUVLRQIURP
the familial, and, for all that Emerson seldom quotes directly from scripture, three times 
LQ·VEssays KHHYRNHV&KULVW·VWKUHDWWRWKHIDPLO\¶,VKXQIDWKHUDQGPRWKHUDQG
ZLIHDQGEURWKHUZKHQP\JHQLXVFDOOVPH·CW II, 30).15 ,QGHHGLQ¶,QWHOOHFW·KH
effectively makes Christ the exemplar of this tendency toward an aversion to the 
familiar, and marks the aversive tendency as among the most meaningful principles of 
the gospel.16 
7KLVOLQNVWRDPRUHVHYHUH¶GHIDPLOLDOLVDWLRQ·ZKLFKRFFXUVRQO\LQWKHMRXUQDOV
although its relevance goes well beyond these textual limits. In amongst entries written 
in the winter of 1839-40 on the subject of friendship, many of which would find their 
way into the essay of that title in Essays, Emerson writes of one of his semi-
DXWRELRJUDSKLFDOSHUVRQDV¶*X\·¶*X\ZLVKHGDOOKLVIULHQGVGHDGRQYHU\VOLJKW
occasion. Whoever was privy to one of his gaucheries, had the honour of this Stygian 
RSWDWLRQ+DG-RYHKHDUGDOOKLVSUD\HUVWKHSODQHWZRXOGVRRQKDYHEHHQXQSHRSOHG·
(JMN VII, 333). In this brief and tongue-in-cheek narrative, Guy goes on to learn that 
ideal relations might be sustained by other means than death. That said, death in the 
IUDPHRIIULHQGVKLSFRQWLQXHVWRSOD\RQ(PHUVRQ·VPLQG$IHZSDJHVODWHUKH
SDUDSKUDVHVIURPDOHWWHUKHKDGZULWWHQWR6DPXHO*UD\:DUG¶,VHHSHUVRQVZKRP,
WKLQNWKHZRUOGZRXOGEHULFKHUIRUORVLQJ·JMN VII, 340). Emerson was no stranger to 
the experience of the death of those closest to him, as has been extensively documented. 
But death comes to refer to more than just SHUVRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQ(PHUVRQ·VZRUN
As such, he contextualises his comment to Ward in the next entry in the journal, 
GHVFULELQJGHDWKDVLWLVSUHVHQWHG¶LQDQRYHORUSRHP·DV¶EXWWKHPHFKDQLFDO
                                                 
15 See Matthew 10: 34-5, and Luke 14: 26. For the other instances in EssaysVHH¶&RPSHQVDWLRQ·CW II, 
58-DQG¶,QWHOOHFW·CW II, 203). 
16 +HUH(PHUVRQWXUQVWKHLPSHUDWLYHWRVWDQGIRUDJHQHUDOWUXWK¶-HVXVVD\V/HDYHIDWKHUPRWKHU
house and lands, DQGIROORZPH:KROHDYHVDOOUHFHLYHVPRUH7KLVLVDVWUXHLQWHOOHFWXDOO\DVPRUDOO\·
(CW II, 203). 
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VXEOLPH·³DFUXGHVHFXODUPHWDSKRULFDOLPDJHRIWUXHVXEOLPDWLRQVRWKDW¶WKHIDLQWHVW
thought must always be superior to the most imposing deDWKLQWKHIDEOH·(JMN VII, 
341). :LWKKLVDWWHQWLRQIRFXVHGWRZDUGWKHLGHDO(PHUVRQ·VDQDORJ\RIWKHDWWDLQPHQW
RIWKRXJKWZLWKGHDWKLVSXUHO\GLDOHFWLFDO7KH¶WKLQJ·GLHVRQWRORJLFDOO\VSHDNLQJLQWKH
sublimation to thought.  
By the time Emerson caPHWRZULWH¶&RPSHQVDWLRQ·WKHFRPSHQVDWRU\VWDWXVRI
WKRXJKWDVV\QWKHWLFEHQHILWRIWKHGHDWKRIWKH¶UHDO·ZDVZHOOHVWDEOLVKHG 
 
The death of a dear friend, wife, brother, lover, which seemed nothing but 
privation, somewhat later assumes the aspect of a guide or genius; for it 
commonly operates revolutions in our way of life, terminates an epoch of 
infancy or of youth which was waiting to be closed, breaks up a wasted 
occupation, or a household, or style of living, [etc.]. (CW II, 73) 
 
This loss of famLO\DQG¶IDPLOLDUV·LQWKHVHYHUDQFHIURPWKHUHGXQGDQWPDWHULDO
¶KRXVHKROG·LVUHSHDWHGZKHUHYHU(PHUVRQWUHDWVRIWKHGHPDQGVRISXUHFRQVFLRXVQHVV
in Essays. If we aspire to self-FRQVFLRXVQHVVWKHQWKHKRXVHKROGRI¶&RPSHQVDWLRQ·KDV
correlate in the cRQFHSWLRQRIWKHERG\RIPDQDVWKH¶KRXVHRIUHDVRQ·DV(PHUVRQ
ZURWHLQ¶7KH0HWKRGRI1DWXUH·LQPLG-1841, and it must be treated in the same way, 
by death and dissection (CW ,+HQFHWKHK\SRWKHVLVRI¶+LVWRU\·WKDWZHPLJKW
find Reason in man HDVLO\¶FRXOGZHOD\KLPRSHQ·CW II, 11). The corpus/corpse of 
our writing is akin to this, and I have already discussed how our writing can be 
optatively posited as the location for a restorative reading of the operation of 
prereflective consciousness (albeit in a manner exhibiting an inescapable temporal 
disjuncture). If we abide with the ideal premise of this thesis, then we perceive writing 
DQGGHDWKXQLWLQJLQ(PHUVRQ·VZRUNWRIRUZDUGWKHSRVLWLYHYLUWXHVRIGLVHPERGLPHQW
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as the facilitator of highHUWKRXJKW+HVXPPDULVHVWKLVWKHVLVLQ¶,QWHOOHFW·VWDWLQJWKDW
DQ\DFWRIWKRXJKW¶GLVHQWDQJOHGIURPWKHZHERIRXUXQFRQVFLRXVQHVVEHFRPHVDQ
REMHFWLPSHUVRQDODQGLPPRUWDO,WLVWKHSDVWUHVWRUHGEXWHPEDOPHG>«@,WLV
HYLVFHUDWHGRIFDUH·CW II, 194). Yet there is a word in this extract³¶HPEDOPHG·³
ZKLFKGRHVQ·WDJUHHZLWKWKHLGHDOVHQVHRIWKHGLDOHFWLF 
7RSXWWKLVLQWRFRQWH[WLW·VZRUWKUHFDOOLQJWKDWZKHQ$QGUHZV1RUWRQSXEOLFO\
DWWDFNHG(PHUVRQLQWKHZDNHRIWKH'LYLQLW\6FKRRO¶$GGUHVV· in 1838 his objections 
were specific. Mainly, he reproached both Emerson and the organisers for permitting an 
unorthodox thinker to vent his ideas at the heart of New England Unitarianism, but he 
DOVRUDLVHGFRQFHUQVRYHUWKH¶LQFRKHUHQW·GRFWULQHVHVSRXVed, none more so than 
(PHUVRQ·Vsuperficially EL]DUUHGHVFULSWLRQRI¶WKHUHOLJLRXVVHQWLPHQW·DV¶WKHHPEDOPHU
RIWKHZRUOG,WLVP\UUKDQGVWRUD[DQGFKORULQHDQGURVHPDU\·CW I, 79).17 We can 
MXVWLI\(PHUVRQ·VNQRZLQJXVHRIWKLVWHUPE\UHFRXUVHWRWhe thesis of inspiration 
GLVFRYHUHGWKURXJKSUR[\KHQFHWKH¶UHOLJLRXVVHQWLPHQW·LVQRWPHUHHQWKXVLDVPEXW
WKDWZKLFK¶HPEDOPV·WKHZRUOGLQRUGHUWKDW,PD\DSSUHKHQGLWDSURGXFWRIWKHDFWRI
perception as described in Nature. But this preservation belies a critical fact. In a 
sublimatory dialectic, the thing which dies on the way to thought must disappear for the 
thought to attain self-VXEVLVWHQFHDQGFRKHUHQFH7KH¶HPEDOPHG·FRUSVHZLOOGR
anything but³indeed, it is an affront to and an intervention in a natural process of 
dissolution which we might otherwise expect Emerson to find beautiful. 
 The meaning of this becomes more pressing when we consider how Emerson 
formally mirrors the discussion of the ideal dialectic in Essays. The previously quoted 
passage on that subject constituted the basis of the concluding paragraph of 
¶&RPSHQVDWLRQ·,QWKHQH[WHVVD\¶6SLULWXDO/DZV·DQGRQZKDWLVHIIHFWLYHO\WKHQH[W
                                                 
17 Andrews Norton, always an acute if reactionary reader, drew attention to this phrase in a letter to the 
Boston Daily Advertiser, published on the 27th $XJXVWDVHYLGHQFHRIZK\(PHUVRQ·V¶$GGUHVV·ZDVDQ
¶LQFRKHUHQWUKDSVRG\·1RUWRQ¶7KH1HZ6FKRROLQ/LWHUDWXUHDQG5HOLJLRQ·reprinted Transcendentalism: A 
Reader, pp. 246-50 (p. 249). 
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page of text, the introductory passage offers a very different conception of death, 
retDLQLQJWKHXQVHWWOLQJSUHVHQFHWKDWWKHGLDOHFWLFQHJDWHV¶(YHQWKHFRUSVHWKDWKDVODLQ
LQWKHFKDPEHUVKDVDGGHGDVROHPQRUQDPHQWWRWKHKRXVH·CW II, 77). The 
¶RUQDPHQWDO·FRUSVHSODLQO\KDVQR¶XVH·EXWLVVROHO\DGRUQPHQWDQREMHFWRILQWHUHVW
and fascination.18 The consequence of this is that we must revise our understanding of 
(PHUVRQ·VUHODWLRQWRWKHERGLO\ZKLFKQHYHUVHHPVPRUHDOLHQDSULQFLSOHWKDQLQWKH
corporeal remnant of death. There is a long and consistently reproachful critical 
trDGLWLRQDGGUHVVLQJ(PHUVRQ·VDSSDUHQWGLVLQWHUHVWLQERGLO\H[LJHQFLHVDQGLWVHIIHFWV
along with those of secular reality, on the mind.19 But this is a construction which notes 
only one side of his continual play between poles. In the journals, wherever Emerson 
writes of a purely ideal relation to the world³VXFKDVWKHDVVHUWLRQWKDW¶VXQVHWV	
VWDUOLJKWV>«@VZDPSVDQGURFNV>«@DUHQRGRXEWD6DQVFULWFLSKHUFRYHULQJWKHZKROH
UHOLJLRXVKLVWRU\RIWKHXQLYHUVH·³he will within days inevitably balance the text with 
the absolute contrary. In the instance of this example, Emerson writes in the same week 
LQ-XQH¶,WKLQNZHFDQQHYHUDIIRUGWRSDUWZLWKPDWWHU+RZGHDU	EHDXWLIXOLWLV
to us! As water to our thirst, so is this rock to our eyes & hands 	IHHW·JMN VII, 375, 
377). In the space of a week, Emerson swings from the dogmatic idealism of Bishop 
Berkeley to the refutation of Samuel Johnson in reflecting on his rock. 
                                                 
18 7KHUHLVIDPRXVDQHFGRWDOHYLGHQFHWKDW(PHUVRQZDV¶IDVFLQDWHG·LQWKLVZD\E\WKHERGLO\DVSHFWRI
death. Some fourteen months after the death of his first wife, Ellen, he entered the family tomb and 
opened her coffin. Recorded in a tantalising and uncharacteristically guarded entry in his journal for 
March 29thWKHVLQJOHOLQH¶,YLVLWHG(OOHQ·VWRPE	RSHQHGWKHFRIILQ·LVIROORZHGLQFRQJUXRXVO\E\
DQXQUHODWHGTXRWHIURP$ULVWRWOH·VEthics (JMN III, 7). Emerson repeated the act in July 1857: when 
moving the coffins of his mother and of his first-born son, Waldo, to his family plot in the recently 
FRQVHFUDWHG6OHHS\+ROORZ&HPHWHU\KHUHFRUGVLQKLVMRXUQDOWKDW¶>W@KHVXQVKRQHEULJKWO\RQWKH
FRIILQVRIZKLFK:DOGR·VZDVZHOOSUHVHUYHG³QRZILIWHHQ\HDUV,YHQWXUHGWRORRNLQWKHFRIILQ·JMN 
XIV, 154). Richardson HPSKDVLVHVWKH¶HVVHQWLDOO\·(PHUVRQLDQQDWXUHRIWKHLQWHUHVWVKRZQLQWKLVDFWLQ
the introduction to his Mind on Fire, p. 3. 
19 This tendency begins in a letter Thomas Carlyle wrote to Emerson on having read Essays for the first 
WLPH¶7KHVHYRLFHVRI\RXUVZKLFK,OLNHQWRunembodied souls, and censure sometimes for having no 
body,³how can they have a body? They are light-rays darting upwards in the East; they will yet make 
PXFKDQGPXFKWRKDYHDERG\·Correspondence, p. 296. The breadth of instances in modern scholarship 
FDQQRWSRVVLEO\EHFRYHUHGKHUHVLQFHRQHPLJKWFRQVLGHUHYHU\FULWLTXHRI(PHUVRQ·VLGHDOLVPWRWXUQRQ
this concept to a certain extent. For an example which demonstrates that the tendency remains resolutely 
FRQWHPSRUDU\VHH7KRPDV&RQVWDQWLQHVFR·VSV\FKRVH[XDOUHDGLQJRIKRZ(PHUVRQQHJRWLDWHVWKHERGLO\
LQWUXVLRQVRIIULHQGVLQ¶´'LVFRUGDQW&RUUHVSRQGHQFHµ5DOSK:DOGR(PHUVRQ·V´)ULHQGVKLSµ·New 
England Quarterly, 81 (2008), 218-51 (pp. 247-50). 
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 But death takes us a step farther, precisely because of its special power of 
SHUVLVWHQFHLWVGLVDUPLQJDQGIDVFLQDWLQJ¶RUQDPHQWDO·TXDOLW\'UDLQHGRIYLWDOLW\WKH
corpse nonetheless remains, continuing to condition our relation with it after the fact of 
WKLQNLQJRI¶RULJLQDO·EHLQJ-with the world, ought to have passed on to a QHZ¶RULJLQDO·
moment. 2QWKHVHWHUPVZHPLJKWUHFRQVLGHUWKHTXHVWLRQRI¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·¶:K\
drag about this corpse of your memory, lest you contradict somewhat you have stated in 
this or that public place? Suppose you should contradict yourself; what WKHQ"·6HWWLQJ
WKHWURSHVRIWKHLPSHUVRQDOEDFNLQWROLWHUDU\WHUPV(PHUVRQGUDJJHGWKH¶FRUSVH·RU
¶FRUSXV·RIKLVPHPRU\HYHU\ZKHUHKHZURWHLQWKHIRUPRIWKHUHDSSHDUDQFHRIWKH
past writings of the journals. The presumed virtues of this modulated form of repetitive 
consistency, detailed in the last chapter, survive in occasional comments within Essays, 
DVLQWKHDOUHDG\TXRWHGOLQHVIURP¶3UXGHQFH·ZKHUHE\WKHSUXGHQWLQGLYLGXDOZRXOG
¶IHHOWKHDGPRQLWLRQWRLQWHJUDWHKLVEHLQJ>«@DQGNHHSDVOHQGHr human word among 
the storms, distances, and accidents, that drive us hither and thither, and, by persistency, 
PDNHWKHSDOWU\IRUFHRIRQHPDQUHDSSHDUWRUHGHHPLWVSOHGJHDIWHUPRQWKVDQG\HDUV·
(CW II, 139). The notion that time bestowed form, that the act of rewriting was merely 
FRQFHQWUDWLRQDQGUHYHODWLRQRIRQH·VLQQDWHWHQGHQFLHVSHUVLVWHGVWLOOLQPLG-1839, 
ZKHQKHSRVLWVKRZZKDWZHUHGLVSDUDWHXWWHUDQFHVRISDUWLFXODUPRPHQWVQRZ¶RFFXS\
but four lines & I cannot read these together without juster view of each of them than 
ZKHQ,UHDGWKHPVLQJO\·VRPHWKLQJZKLFKKHZRXOGUXPLQDWHRQWZRPRQWKVODWHULQ
GHIHQGLQJKLVRZQ¶SUDFWLFHRI&RPSRVLWLRQZKLFKVHHPVWR\RXQJSHUVRQVVR
PHFKDQLFDO	VRXQLQVSLUHG·JMN VII, 191, 216). 
 But these pages from 1839 revisit something that Emerson had already 
acknowledged his doubts about, and by the time he was focused on bringing his older 
writings to bear in the composition of Essays another philosophic sense of the meaning 
of repetition and the consistency it engenders begins to emerge. The processes of 
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repetition may not be comfortable³LQ¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·KHVSHDNVRIWKHZD\LQZKLFKZH
¶UHSHDWE\URWHWKHVHQWHQFHVRIJUDQGGDPHVDQGWXWRUV>«@SDLQIXOO\UHFROOHFWLQJWKH
H[DFWZRUGVWKH\VSRNH·DQGDQH[SHULHQFHRI¶SDLQIXOO\·DQGSUHFLVHO\¶UHFROOHFWLQJ·KLV
RZQ¶H[DFWZRUGV·LVDUWLFXODWHGXQDPELJXRXVO\LQSULYDWHZULWLQJVRIWKHSHULRGCW II, 
39).20 Yet, as he came to discover, in this mechanical, coldly intellectualised view which 
developed from the apophatic method explored over the prior years, the principle of 
repeatability, of trans-temporal and trans-contextual singularity, seemed to possess a 
power verging on the occult. In the early summer of 1839, he wrote the following lines 
reflecting on a walk with Caroline Sturgis: 
 
I thought how charming is always an analogy, as, for example, the iteration 
which delights us in so many parts of nature, in the reflection of the shore & the 
trees in water; in Architecture, in the repetition of posts in a fence, or windows 
or doors or rosettes in the wall, or still finer the pillars of a colonnade; in poetry 
UK\PHV	VWLOOEHWWHUWKHLWHUDWLRQRIWKHVHQVHDVLQ0LOWRQ·V 
  ¶WKRXJKIDOOHQRQHYLOGD\V 
  2QHYLOGD\VWKRXJKIDOOHQ	HYLOWRQJXHV· 
and the sublime death of Sisera,³¶$WKHUIHHWKHERZHGKHIHOOZKHUHKH
ERZHGWKHUHKHIHOOZKHUHKHERZHGWKHUHKHJDYHXSWKHJKRVW·ZKHUHWKHIDFW
is made conspicuous, nay colossal, by this simple rhetoric. (JMN VII, 210)21 
 
7RZKDW¶IDFW·LV(PHUVRQUHIHUULQJKHUH? Simply the meaning of the individual line 
which is repeated, or the power and aspect of repetition itself? He is not forthcoming 
                                                 
20 See the journal entry for October 7th, 1840, when Emerson was nearing the completion of the volume 
of Essays¶,KDYHEHHQZULWLQJZLWKVRPHSDLQV(VVD\VRQYDULRus matters as a sort of apology to my 
FRXQWU\IRUP\DSSDUHQWLGOHQHVV·(PHUVRQJRHVRQWRGHVFULEHWKHUHZULWLQJSURFHVVDV¶VXFKD
mechanical work, a seeming wise,³DFROGH[KLELWLRQRIGHDGWKRXJKWV·JMN VII, 404-5). 
21 7KHSDVVDJHLVUHYLVLWHGLQ¶3RHWU\DQG,PDJLQDWLRQ·LQLetters and Social Aims (1876) (CW VIII, 24-5). 
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enough to leave a clear indication in this journal passage, but by a process of 
comparison the latter possibility gains in strength. The reiteration of vocabulary and 
SKUDVLQJLQHDFKTXRWHGLQVWDQFHLQGLFDWHVWKDWRQH·VUHODWLRQWRWKHSKUDVHZKHWKHUDV
writer, or reader, or both) is not complete. The phrase does not disappear in thought 
but is instead reasserted, different in vitality precisely insofar as it is seen to be 
UHDVVHUWHG7KHDOUHDG\FRPSOLFDWHGLVVXHVVXUURXQGLQJWH[WXDO¶SRVVHVVLRQ·LQ
(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWEHFRPHHYHQPRUHFRPSOH[DVWKHWH[WLWVHOIEHJLQVWRH[HUWD
power of fascination and persistence at odds with the expectation of its dissolution in 
thought. 
Indeed, in Essays, the principle is explicitly put into consideration. Take, for 
LQVWDQFHWKHGHFODUDWLRQLQ¶/RYH·WKDW¶>Z@KRKHDUVPHZKRXQGHUVWDQGVPHEHFRPHV
mine,³DSRVVHVVLRQIRUDOOWLPH·CW II, +HUHRQH·VSHUVRQDOLQYHVWPHQWLQWKH
text directly leads to its efficacy as a rhetorical tool, where language is a faculty of 
DFKLHYHGZLOIXOQHVV<HWHOVHZKHUHDTXLWHGLIIHUHQWDWWLWXGHLVDGRSWHG¶7REHJUHDWLV
WREHPLVXQGHUVWRRG·LV(PHUVRQ·VLQIDPRXVDQGSURYRFDWLYHGHFODUDWLRQLQ¶6HOI-
5HOLDQFH·DQGWKHUHDVRQLQJEHKLQGWKLVOLHVLQWKHUHQXQFLDWLRQRIFODLPVRIRZQHUVKLS
that greatness comes not in being misunderstood as such, but in wilfully accepting that 
possibility (CW II, 34). The theoretic ideal for Emerson³who wrote, lectured, and 
conversed at length on writing, speaking, and conversation³LVWR¶NQRZWKDWWKHUHLV
somewhat more blessed and great in hearing than in speaking. Happy is the hearing 
PDQXQKDSS\WKHVSHDNLQJPDQ>«@LI,VSHDN,GHILQH,FRQILQHDQGDPOHVV·CW II, 
202). If we must speak (and we must, for utterance, or the proxy of text, is necessary to 
self-NQRZOHGJHWKHQ(PHUVRQVHHNVWRILQGDZD\WRVSHDNZLWKRXWWKH¶FRPPLWPHQW·
accompanying claims to full ownership of the utterance. Rather, he articulates the telling 
GHVLUHWKDWRQHFRXOGILUVWVSHDNDQGWKHQ¶WKDWKHFRXOGSDVVDJDLQLQWRKLVQHXWUDOLW\
Who can thus avoid all pledges, and having observed, observe again from the same 
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unaffected, unbiased, XQEULEDEOHXQDIIULJKWHGLQQRFHQFHPXVWDOZD\VEHIRUPLGDEOH·
(CW II, 29. Emphasis added). 
What here is given as a will to neutrality concentrates the kind of contradiction 
in terms that VXFKDSKUDVHVLJQLILHVZLOOHGQHXWUDOLW\EULQJV¶IRUPLGDELOLW\·³power and 
agency, not neutered inefficacy³DQGZHPLJKWHPSKDVLVHWKHSXQRQWKH¶DELOLW\·WR
¶IRUP·3XWWLQJWKLVEDFNLQWROLQJXLVWLFWHUPVLWLVDSRZHUWRVSHDNRUZULWHLQDPRGH
that consciously renounces the presumption of dialectical power or ordinary semantics. 
Rather than being a language of declaration and presumptive authority, Emerson tells us 
WKDWWKHPRGHRIVSHHFKZHQHHGUHTXLUHVDUDGLFDOUHWKLQNLQJ¶:HKDYH\HWWROHDUQWKDW
the thing uttered in words is not therefore affirmed. It must affirm itself, or no forms of 
logic or of oath can give it evidence. The sentence must also contain its own apology for being 
spoken·CW II, 88-9. Emphasis added). Not only is this to be starkly different from 
HFFOHVLDVWLFODQJXDJHZKLFK¶DIILUP>V«@VWHDGLO\WKDWLWGRHV	LVDOO·EXWGRHVQRWKLQJ
it is also to be in opposition to the dialectical mode of negation in which language 
FRQYHQLHQWO\YDQLVKHVRU¶GLHV·LQWKHPRPHQWRIEHLQJXQGHUVWRRG,QRWKHUZRUGVLWLV
a language that goes forth, but withouWFRPPLWPHQWDVWKRXJKLWKDG¶QRULJKWWRJR
XQOHVVLWZHUHHTXDOO\ZLOOLQJWREHSUHYHQWHGIURPJRLQJ·DVLVWKHWHQGHQF\RIKLV
confessionary statements during these years. 
(PHUVRQ·VODQJXDJHRIFRQIHVVLRQLVWKHUHIRUHEXLOWDURXQGWKHDELOLW\WRPDNH it 
¶DIILUP·LQDZD\WKDWGRHVQRWRSHUDWHE\QHJDWLRQUDWKHULWDIILUPVLWVHOIOLNHD
confession of faith, or evangelism, which, as Ernesto Grassi has pointed out, involves a 
¶VKRZLQJ·DPDNLQJ-SUHVHQWZKHUHLQODQJXDJH¶OHDGVEHIRUHWKHH\HVDVLJQLILFDQFH·
adhering to the materiality and bodily residue of the text itself.22 Of course, we cannot 
simply expect language to declare WKDWLWLVGRLQJWKLVLQWKHQRUPDOPDQQHU,WPXVW¶DFW·
                                                 
22 Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy (University Park PA and London: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1980), pp. 19-20. This model can, of course, lead to the veneration of the book if misconstrued, 
slipping back toward the convention of verbal inspiration. 
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and not simply aim to tell. The kind of doubleness necessary to enact this process 
demands something akin to style, or rather, perhaps³to use the term which Emerson 
often employs as its synonym³tone.23 There are suggestions of such a function 
occasionally apparent in the more orthodox linguistic mode in Essays,Q¶7KH2Yer-
6RXO·ZKLFKZHPXVWUHPHPEHULVZKHUH(PHUVRQPDNHVKLVPRVWHPSKDWLF
declarations regarding the inadequacy of language³¶>P@\ZRUGVGRQRWFDUU\LWVDXJXVW
VHQVH·³KHDOVRPDNHVUHIHUHQFHWRWKHWURSHVRI¶ZDQWDQGLJQRUDQFH·DVEHLQJUHDOO\
¶WKHILQH LQQXHQGRE\ZKLFKWKHVRXOPDNHVLWVHQRUPRXVFODLP·DQGWRWKHZD\LQ
ZKLFKRWKHUWURSHVRIDYHUVLRQ¶FRQYHUVDWLRQ>«@VXUSULVHV>«@WKHLQVWUXFWLRQVRI
GUHDPVZKHUHLQZHRIWHQVHHRXUVHOYHVLQPDVTXHUDGH·DUH¶WKHGUROOGLVJXLVHVRQO\
magnifying and HQKDQFLQJDUHDOHOHPHQWDQGIRUFLQJLWRQRXUGLVWLQFWQRWLFH·CW II, 
160, 159, 161). If innuendo can be said to rely on an inflection of tone, then we are 
looking again for that in the language which bears the stylistic marks of the intervention 
of wilO$QGWKLVLVZKHUH(PHUVRQ·VLGHDOSUHPLVHVDUHPRGLILHGE\WKHH[LJHQFLHVRIWKH
utterance to be made. 
 
 
 
Neutralising Language 
Throughout the summer of 1839, the points of style and wilfulness were to intersect 
UHSHDWHGO\LQ(PHUVRQ·VMRXUQDO,QWKLVSHULRG(PHUVRQLVintent on remedying the 
                                                 
23 $OWKRXJK-RQDWKDQ%LVKRS·VZRUNRQ(PHUVRQLDQ¶WRQH·GRHVQ·WHQWLUHO\HFKRWKHDUJXPHQW,PDNH
here, he does raise certain principles which are worthy of consideration. For %LVKRS¶>W@RQH>«@LVDOZD\V
SHUVRQDOZLWKWRQHRQHHQWHUVDZRUOGZKHUHSHRSOHH[LVW·7KHH[LVWHQFHRISHUVRQVLVJLYHQWREHD
ZKROO\LQGHSHQGHQWTXHVWLRQWRWKDWRIWKHH[LVWHQFHRIODQJXDJHDQGDVVXFKLPSUHVVLQJ¶WRQH·XSRQ
language constitutes a unique personal intervention into the legally-VWUXFWXUHGOLQJXLVWLFILHOG%LVKRS·V
FRPPHQWVWKDW(PHUVRQ¶SHUVRQDWHV·UDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\H[SUHVVLQJKLVSHUVRQDOLW\DUHSDUWLFXODUO\
pertinent given the turn away from any expectation of a revelation of style in the works of the later 1830s 
onwards, although the manner of the personation I am tracing here is less a constructed personality than 
the construction of a language which neutralises all investment of personality³DQ¶LPSHUVRQDWLRQ·
therefore, that emphasises impersonal nature. See Bishop, pp. 128-43. 
138 
 
IODZVRIHFFOHVLDVWLFDOODQJXDJHLQZKLFKEHFDXVH¶ZHSUD\QRWDORXG>EXW«@LQIRUP
ZHDUHFRQVWUDLQHGWRH[FXVHRXUVHOYHVWRRWKHUVZLWKZRUGV·JMN VII, 207). A month 
later, in early July, Emerson has turned the focus of doubt onto himself, evidently 
concerned by the lack of an emergent personal style. Over two days, he enters the 
following into his journal: 
 
Ah could I hope to enact my thought! Do not covet nor hide nor sneak in 
relation to MSS. or thoughts or Literature. 
I went to the woods & heard the wood thrush sing Ah Willie Willie, He Willio 
Willio. 
 
:HZDQWDOOWKHHOHPHQWVRIRXUEHLQJ>«@ 
Yet a majestic soul never unfolds all these in speech. They lie at the base of what 
LVVDLG	FRORXUWKHZRUGEXWDUHUHVHUYHG>«@ 
The rich inventive genius of the painter must all be smothered & lost for want 
of the power of drawing and when I walk in Walden Wood as on 4th July I seem 
WRP\VHOIDQLQH[KDXVWLEOHSRHWLIRQO\,FRXOGRQFHEUHDNWKUR·WKHIHQFHRI
silence, & vent myself in adequate rhyme. (JMN VII, 227-8) 
 
Besides the significance of a general focus on the doubt in style throughout this extract, 
there are a few points worth emphasising. First, the wood thrush, whose ease of 
expression invokes envy; not least, perhaps, because its onomatopoeic song emphasises 
LWVRZQ¶ZLOO·DQG(PHUVRQ·VODFNRIDELOLWy to apply the same to his own productions. 
6HFRQGWKHSODFHLQVSHHFKZKHUHWKHVHFULWLFDO¶HOHPHQWVRIRXUEHLQJ·UHPDLQDWWKH
IRXQGDWLRQDQGDVWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIVSHHFKEXWDOZD\VRFFXOW7KLUGWKDW¶DGHTXDWH
UK\PH·LVWKHVXSHULRULPDJLQHGPRGHRf expression.  
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 6L[GD\VDIWHUKDYLQJZULWWHQWKHDERYH(PHUVRQ·VGRXEWVVHHPVRPHZKDW
PLWLJDWHG¶:LOO·KDVHYLGHQWO\EHHQWKHVXEMHFWRIVRPHUHIOHFWLRQ³¶%HDXW\GZHOOVDOVR
LQWKH:LOO·³and the possibility of style is being contemplated again, even demanded: 
¶ZHDVNWKDWDSLFWXUHVKDOOQRWJLYHXVRQO\DVXSHUILFLDOSOHDVXUH:HPXVWKDYH
DXWKHQWLFSURRIWKDWDQDUWLVWKDVEHHQWKHUHDOVR·JMN VII, 229-30). At the same time, 
throughout this period, Emerson is reiterating phrases in the journal with unusual 
frequency. On May 28th¶7KHUHLVQRKLVWRU\7KHUHLVRQO\%LRJUDSK\·-XQHth¶,VDLG
DOO+LVWRU\EHFRPHVVXEMHFWLYHDQGUHSHDWVLWVHOI·-XQHth¶7KHUHLVQRKLVWRU\RQO\
ELRJUDSK\·JMN VII, 202, 211, 216). On the 3rd RI-XO\¶3HUFHSWLRQnot whimsical but 
IDWDO·WKHQDJDLQRQ-XO\th¶3HUFHSWLRQLVQRWZKLPVLFDOEXWIDWDO·JMN VII, 223, 
230). Intimation that these thoughts of style and incidents of repetition might be related 
comes in entries for the 14th and 18th September. In that of the 14th, he laments our 
FRUUXSWLRQE\ODQJXDJHRQFHDJDLQDQGRXUWHQGHQF\WRIRUPDOLVPLQWKHZD\WKDW¶>W@KH
VLQJHUUHSHDWVKLVROGVRQJWKHSUHDFKHUKLVROGVHUPRQWKHWDONHUKLVROGIDFW·<HWKH
closes this entry with an acknowledgement that contradicts the pessimism of what 
SUHFHGHVLW¶:RUGLQHVVLVQRWWKHIDXOWRIWKLVWLPHRQO\RURIDQ\FODVV,WLVLQFLGHQWWR
Man[;] Saints & Heroes have not escaped. George Fox lapses into booksfull & George 
:DVKLQJWRQ·JMN VII, 240-1). And, as if to condition the preceding remarks on 
stagnation in repetition, he writes on September 18th (so immediately following the 14th 
in textual terms³there are no entries for the 15th, 16th or 17th) of having heard a former 
pupil of Margaret Fuller, Jane Tuckerman, siQJLQJWKDWDOWKRXJK¶>W@KHWRQHRIKHUYRLFH
LVQRWLQWKHILUVWKHDULQJTXLWHSXUH	DJUHHDEOH·QHYHUWKHOHVV¶>K@HUVRQJVZHUHEHWWHU
with every repetition. I found my way about in the hollows & alleys of their music better 
HDFKWLPH·JMN VII, 241). 
As such, although Emerson frequently declared his lack of interest in 
retrospection, it is fact that ¶WKHQHZLQDUWLVDOZD\VIRUPHGRXWRIWKHROG·and so one 
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might as well investigate the inevitability of repetition as a locale of meaning in a work, 
as well as a potential opportunity for stylistics (CW II, 210). Consider, therefore, this 
SDVVDJHIURP¶,QWHOOHFW·ZKLFKKDVQRSUHFHGHQWLQJMN, and so perhaps reflects on 
(PHUVRQ·VPRUHGHYHORSHGWKLQNLQJRQWKHWRSLFE\early-1841: 
 
The thought of genius is spontaneous; but the power of picture or expression, in 
the most enriched and flowing nature, implies a mixture of will, a certain control 
over the spontaneous states, without which no production is possible. It is a 
conversion of all nature into the rhetoric of thought, under the eye of 
judgement, with a strenuous exercise of choice. And yet the imaginative 
vocabulary seems to be spontaneous also. It does not flow from experience only 
or mainly, but from a richer source. Not by any conscious imitation of particular 
forms are the grand strokes of the painter executed, but by repairing to the 
fountain-head of all forms in his mind. (CW II, 199) 
 
If we straightforwardly accept the confidence apparent in this last sentence, then we 
must reject the plain uncertainty of all of the preceding. So, instead, if we consider this 
last line more carefully within the context of what comes before, we note that Emerson 
FODLPVWKDWWKH¶JUDQGVWURNHV·RIWKHDUWLVWFRPHIURPWKLVSXUHLQWHUQDOLW\WKDWDVVXFK
great art coPHV¶PDLQO\·IURPLQWXLWLRQ%XWIRUWKH¶VFKRODUO\·ZULWHUVWUXJJOLQJWRDVVHUW
KLPVHOIZLWKWRQHDQGVW\OHWKHQHFHVVLW\RI¶DFHUWDLQFRQWURO·PXVWEHDFFRPPRGDWHG
'RHVWKLVSDVVDJHWHOOXVWKHUHIRUHWKDWXQGHUFHUWDLQFLUFXPVWDQFHVSHUKDSVZKHQ¶Whe 
VXQLVKLG·DV(PHUVRQSXWVLWHOVHZKHUHWKDWWKHZLOIXODFWRI¶FRQVFLRXVLPLWDWLRQ·
might be in some way revelatory? 
 &RQVLGHUDOVRKRZ(PHUVRQZULWHVERWKRIWKHXVHRI¶DGHTXDWHUK\PH·DQGRI
getting closer to the occult founding possibility of speech in the summer of 1839. 
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(PHUVRQ·VHQWU\IRUWKHth June is solely concerned with this principle of rhyme, and 
LWVLPSOLFDWLRQVDUHFRPSHOOLQJ+HEHJLQVZLWKWKHGLVWLQFWLRQ¶5K\PHQRWWLQNOLQJ
rhyme but grand Pindaric strokes·³immediately, a form of imitation in ordinary uses³
that of phonemes reflecting back on earlier phonemes³EHFRPHVFDSDEOHRI¶JUDQG
VWURNHV·%XWZHDUHGHFHLYHGLIZHWKLQNWKDt (PHUVRQ·VUK\PHLVPHUHO\OLWHUDO+H
FRQWLQXHV¶5K\PHZKLFKNQRFNVDWSURVH	GXOOQHVVZLWKWKHVWroke of a cannon ball. 
Rhyme which builds out into Chaos & Old night a splendid architecture to bridge the 
LPSDVVDEOH>«@,ZLVKWRZULWHVXFKUK\PHVDVVKDOOQRWVXJJHVWDUHVWUDLQWEXW
FRQWUDULZLVHWKHZLOGHVWIUHHGRP·JMN VII, 219. Emphasis added). 
 This is not mere rhetorical bluster. There are specific and relevant issues 
XQGHUO\LQJLW5K\PHDVWKDWZKLFK¶EULGJHVWKHLPSDVVDEOH·VXJJHVWVLWVFDSDFLW\WRELQG
if not resolve, a transitional tension as challenging as that between impersonal and 
personal, between ME and NOT ME, between the respective notions of universality 
and particularity. Wordsworth, in his own focused discussion of poetic form in the 1800 
preface to Lyrical Ballads, puts this in a manner peculiarly relevant to the concerns of this 
FKDSWHULQGHFODULQJIRUUK\PHDQGIRU¶PHWULFDOODQJXDJH·¶DSULQFLSOHZKLFKPXVWEH
well known to those who have made any of the Arts the object of accurate reflection; I 
mean the pleasure which the mind derives from the perception of similitude in 
dissiPLOLWXGH·24 If the orthodox conception of language argues for the radical 
particularity of utterance in context, then the category of rhyme at least weakens the 
manifestness of dissimilitude and hints at the re-rendering of the linguistic field, so that 
the shock of apparent unity irrelevant to ordinary semantics is foregrounded. So, this 
UK\PHZKLFKKLWV¶SURVHDQGGXOOQHVV·OLNH¶DFDQQRQEDOO·VHHPVGLUHFWO\DSSOLFDEOHWR
                                                 
24 :LOOLDP:RUGVZRUWK¶3UHIDFH·LQ:RUGVZRUWKDQG6DPXHO7D\ORU&ROHULGJHLyrical Ballads and 
Other Poems (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 2003), pp. 5-S,Q¶;HQRSKDQHV·DSRHPRULJLQDOO\
written in the late-VEXWSXEOLVKHGLQ·VPoems(PHUVRQUHFRUGVWKLVVHQWLPHQWLQWKHSLHFH·V
FORVLQJOLQHVDVDNLQGRIDSRHWLFHSLSKDQ\¶$QGXQLYHUVDO1DWXUHWKURXJKKHUYDVW_$QGFURZGHG
ZKROHDQLQILQLWHSDURTXHW_5HSHDWVRQHQRWH·CW IX, 269). 
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(PHUVRQ·VFRPPHQWDIHZPRQWKVODWHUWKDW¶WKRVHRQO\FDQDFWRUZULWHZHOOZKRGR
not respect WKHZULWLQJRUWKHDFW·JMN VII, 244).25 Rhyme transcends its literal 
UHVWUDLQWVXQGHUVXFKFRQGLWLRQVWREHFRPHDGHVWUXFWLYHIRUFHRQODQJXDJH·VRUWKRGR[
IRUPDOLVWPRGH$QGWKHVDPH¶UK\PLQJ·HIIHFWWKDWOLQNVWKHLQVWDQFHVRIWKHZRUGV
¶UK\PH·DQG¶JUDQGVWURNHV·LQSDVVDJHVDOUHDG\H[DPLQHGFRPHVLQWRSOD\DIHZSDJHV
IXUWKHURQLQWHUPVRIWKLVFRQFHSWRIGHIHUHQFHWRIRUPV¶1HYHUH[KRUWRQO\confess. All 
exhortation, O thou hoarse preacher! respects others & not thyself, respects appearances & 
not IDFWV	WKHUHIRUHLVFDQW·JMN VII, 253. Emphasis added). By way of inference, 
therefore, one can claim that confessionary writing would have the characteristics which 
rhyme possesses; it would explicitly disregard normative and formalistic patterns in 
language use³indeed, it would attack them in order to restore linguistic doubleness, and 
to test the principle of will as the realisation of personal intervention in language. 
 This, in sum, is why the writing of confession is also the writing of repetition. In 
a stance of antinomianism which breaks the law of language by making language speak 
only for its limited, legal status, repetition disavows RQH·VLQWHUHVWDQGVHOI-definition in 
what was said. Simultaneously, it severs language from the context of utterance, in doing 
so restoring the visibility of its radical impersonality. As such, Emerson to some extent 
DFKLHYHVWKHREMHFWLYHKHVHWVKLPVHOILQ¶7KH2YHU-6RXO·WR¶LQGLFDWHWKHKHDYHQRIWKLV
GHLW\DQGWRUHSRUWZKDWKLQWV,KDYHFROOHFWHG·LQ¶SURIDQH·DQGVHFXODUODQJXDJHCW 
,,,QWKHLGHDOUHDOPRISXUHLQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\SXUHLPPHUVLRQLQWKH¶RQHPLQG
                                                 
25 7KLVRIFRXUVHLVDOVRDQRWKHURI(PHUVRQ·VDQDORJLFDOVWDWHPHQWVRIQHXWUDOLVHGFRPPLWPHQWRIJRLQJ
only under the condition that one is equally willing to be prevented from going. The radicalism of 
(PHUVRQ·VLQTXLU\LQWRWKHVHSULQFLSOHVLQWKHPLGQineteenth-century is underlined by way of comparison 
ZLWKODWHUSRHWV·LQWHUURJDWLRQRIWKHVDPHLGHDVDV&DWKHULQH0DUWLQZULWHVStéphane Mallarmé·V
LQYHVWLJDWLRQRIUK\PHDVSLUHGWR¶XQORFNWKHGUHDPRIDFRPSOH[EXWFRKHUHQWV\VWHPZKHUHWKHVRXQGV
thDWPDNHXSZRUGVKDYHVRPHKLWKHUWRXQUHFRJQLVHGLQWULQVLFPHDQLQJ·EXWDWRQFHWKH)UHQFKSRHW
¶IHDUHG·WKDWWKHVDPHPLJKW¶VLJQDO>«@DPHDQLQJOHVV´DEVXUGµUHIOH[RIODQJXDJHZKHUHVRXQGV>PHUHO\@
invoke the other sounds from which they distinguish WKHPVHOYHVLQRUGHUWRVLJQLI\·(PHUVRQ·VZLOOHG
renunciation of will opens him to the chaos attendant on this possibility, and I will return to this topic 
with respect to its most significant manifestation in Poems LQFKDSWHUILYH6HH0DUWLQ¶7Ke Gift of 
WKH3RHP0DOODUPpDQG5REHUW'XQFDQ·VGround Work: Before the War·The Modern Language Review, 103 
(2008), 364-82 (p. 377). 
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FRPPRQWRDOOPHQ·RIWKH2YHU-Soul, language would be irrelevant. This is precisely 
why it is declared to be profane. This fact recurs again and again in (PHUVRQ·VZRUNDQG
ODQJXDJHLWVHOIEHFRPHVWKHLQGLFDWRURIUHODWLYHSDUWLFXODULW\$VKHZULWHVLQ¶&LUFOHV·
¶7KHOHQJWKRIWKHGLVFRXUVHLQGLFDWHVWKHGLVWDQFHRIWKRXJKWEHWZL[WWKHVSHDNHUDQG
the hearer. If they were at a perfect understanding in any part, no words would be 
QHFHVVDU\WKHUHRQ,IDWRQHLQDOOSDUWVQRZRUGVZRXOGEHVXIIHUHG·CW II, 184-5).  
But these hypotheses need to be qualified. The restoration of a prelapsarian 
immediacy of thinking and acting, which has long been referred to as the ideal which 
GULYHV(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWLVQRWFRQVLVWHQWO\WUHDWHGZLWKFUHGXOLW\ Emerson, like many 
other late romantic thinkers, identifies with the philosophical exigencies of the 
postlapsarian condition.26 First among these is the dependence on the world, the NOT 
ME as it is discussed in NatureRUWKH¶LPSVRIPDWWHU·DVKHWHUPVLWLQ·V
¶7KRXJKWVRQ0RGHUQ/LWHUDWXUH·DQGWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIDSHUSHWXDOUHFRXUVHWRWKLVLV
embodied in the persistence of material language which thwarts the sublimatory 
dialectic.27 /LNH&KULVWZKRHQMRLQVKLVGLVFLSOHVLQ-RKQ¶,IDPDQORYHPHKHZLOO
NHHSP\ZRUGV·(PHUVRQSRVLWVDUHOLJLRXVVHQVHDWWHQGDQWRQWKHPDWHULDOLW\RIWH[WLQ
DGYRFDWLQJWKH¶NHHS>LQJRI@DVOHQGHUKXPDQZRUG·LQ¶3UXGHQFH·7KLVKDVQRQHRIWKH
ritual sacredness that imbues the text in the instance of theopneusty, however. For 
Emerson, the repetition of the individual word reveals first its broader range of 
meanings³historical, etymological, etc.³and then its simple existence as an indicator 
RIODQJXDJH·VJHQHUDOLVHGLPSHUVRQDOLW\DQGLQPDLQWDLQLQJWKLVWHUPLQWKHcorrect way, it 
becomes (like the confessions of faith of Christ) even a valid object of worship. 
                                                 
26 Stanley Cavell was among the first to make this point a precondition for the proper understanding of 
Emerson. See CaveOO¶%HLQJ2GG·S2QHPLJKWDOVRQRWHWKHQHFHVVLW\RIWKHSULPDF\RIWKHVHFXODU
LQWKLVSDVVDJHIURP¶6SLULWXDO/DZV·¶/HWXVGUDZDOHVVRQIURPQDWXUHZKLFKDOZD\VZRUNVE\VKRUW
ways. When a fruit is ripe, it falls. When the fruit is despatched, the leaf falls. The circuit of the waters is 
PHUHIDOOLQJ7KHZDONLQJRIPDQDQGDOODQLPDOVLVDIDOOLQJIRUZDUG·CW II, 80). 
27 ¶,PSVRIPDWWHU·LVHPSOR\HGDVDJHQHUDOWHUPIRUWKHVHFXODULQWHUUXSWLRQVWRWKHSRHW·VLGHDOUHYHULHV
which prevent him from being absorbed into the circuit of his own thought. I will discuss this term, and 
LWVFRQQRWDWLRQVLQPRUHGHWDLOLQFKDSWHUIRXU6HH¶7KRXJKWVRQ0RGHUQ/LWHUDWXUH·The Dial, 1 (1840), 
137-58 (p. 138). 
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$ILQDOH[DPSOHRI(PHUVRQ·VUHSHDWHGWURSHV, and the etymological decay of 
formalistic usages involved, will serve to clarify why this is the case. Emerson spoke of 
proverbs and fables in a manner that, to the modern eye, is perhaps old-fashioned. First, 
LQ¶+LVWRU\·KHFRQIODWHVIDEOHKLVWRU\DQGOLWHUDWXUH¶7KHDGYDQFLQJPDQGLVFRYHUV
how deep a property he has in literature,³in all fable as well as in all history. He finds 
that the poet was no odd fellow who described strange and impossible situations, but 
that universal man wrote by his pen DFRQIHVVLRQWUXHIRURQHDQGWUXHIRUDOO·CW II, 
:K\ZHPLJKWDVNLVWKLV¶FRQIHVVLRQ·WUXHIRURQHDQGDOO"(PHUVRQHODERUDWHV
VOLJKWO\LQ¶&RPSHQVDWLRQ·DOWKRXJKPXFKRILWLVUHSHWLWLRQ¶7KHKXPDQVRXOLVWUXHWR
these facts in the painting of a fable, of history, of law, of proverbs, of conversation. It 
ILQGVDWRQJXHLQOLWHUDWXUHXQDZDUHV·+HUHLWHUDWHVWKHGHFODUDWLRQRQWKHQH[WSDJH
DOWKRXJKKHUHVRPHKLQWVRIWKHVLJQLILFDWLRQEHJLQWRFRPHWKURXJK¶6WLOOPRUHVWULNLQJ
is the expression of this fact in the proverbs of all nations, which are always the 
OLWHUDWXUHRI5HDVRQRUWKHVWDWHPHQWVRIDQDEVROXWHWUXWKZLWKRXWTXDOLILFDWLRQ·CW 
II, 62-3). A proverb, as Emerson suggests here, is an aphoristic, unchallengeable 
utterance. By definition, it commands universal assent, and transcends normal linguistic 
FRQGLWLRQVWREHFRPHRQHRI(PHUVRQ·VPXFKYHQHUDWHG¶IDFWV·6XFKXQLYHUVDODVVHQW
indicates absolute truth, and so, when spoken, they DUHD¶SODLQFRQIHVVLRQRIWKH
inworking of WKHDOO·DV(PHUVRQDOVRFODLPVKHUHCW II, 62) 
 %XWWKHUHDUHRWKHUIDFWVGHPDQGLQJXQLYHUVDODVVHQWDQGWKHWHUP¶IDEOH·EULQJV
us toward realisation of these. Fable derives from the Latin fabula¶VWRU\·EXWPRUHWKDQ
this, it links back further to the verb fari³¶WRVSHDN·:KDW(PHUVRQOLQNVWRJHWKHULQ
typically abstruse fashion is the manner in which simply saying, preferably in a way that 
GRHVQRWFRQIXVHWKHLVVXHZLWKFRPPLWPHQWVXFKDV¶NHHSLQJDVOHQGHUZRUG·GHPDQGV
universal assent insofar as it reveals the radical, universal impersonality of language. As 
such, when Emerson comes to write on shared language in the mode of conversation 
145 
 
later in EssaysKHGUDZVDWWHQWLRQWRRXUSDUDGR[LFDOLQYHVWPHQWLQLW¶&RQYHUVDWLRQLV
an evanescent relation,³QRPRUH·CW II, 122). Why, exactly? Emerson does, at least, 
ODWHUPDNHKLVSRLQWIDLUO\H[SOLFLW¶,QDOOFRQYHUVDWLRQEHWZHHQWZRSHUVRQVWDFLW
reference is made as to a third party, to a common nature. That third party or common 
nature is not VRFLDOLWLVLPSHUVRQDOLV*RG·CW II, 164). The use of language in this 
context reveals us to ourselves, and reveals our distance from the impersonal, in which 
we are nevertheless invested, and into which, by an act of will, we can invest. By way of 
an XWWHUDQFHRIZLOOHGUHSHWLWLRQDQG(PHUVRQ·VUHSHWLWLRQVVRRIWHQSUHIDFHG¶,KDYH
VDLG·DUHFRQVFLRXVO\DQGZLOIXOO\WDXWRORJLFDOWKHLPSHUVRQDOLVSHUFHLYHGWRHFKREDFN
to us³by confessing our exclusion in repetition, we are absolved, to a certain extent, by 
DPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIWKHLPSHUVRQDODVHFXODU¶LQGLFDWLRQ·DV(PHUVRQZRXOGKDYHLWRI
the impersonal and of God. In this way, by virtue of an intellectualised attitude of 
fascination in a conventional image of likeness, language becomes extensively 
FRUUHVSRQGHQWZLWK(PHUVRQ·VFRQFHSWLRQRIGLYLQLW\,QRXU¶XVH·RILWZHDUHUHTXLUHG
WRKDYH¶IDLWK·WKDWZHPLJKW¶PHDQZKDWZHVD\·DVZHDEDQGRQRXUVHOYHVWRLWDV&DYHOO
KDVSXWLW%XWPRUHWKDQWKLV(PHUVRQ·VHPSOR\PHQWRILWV¶SDUWVDQGSDUWLFOHV·WRWKH
end of figuring radical likeness constitutes a willed intervention that is both 
confessionary of its humility while nevertheless reifying the divine as present 
LPSHUVRQDOZRUGV¶DFWLQJ·DQGQRWPHUHO\¶H[KRUWLQJ·E\ZKLFKWKHPDQLIHVWHG divine is 
partially an act of the self, and fulfils the criteria of inspiration properly understood. 
  
 
Postscript 
I remember when a child in the pew on Sundays amusing myself with saying 
RYHUFRPPRQZRUGVDV´EODFNµ´ZKLWHµ´ERDUGµ	FWZHQW\RUWKLUW\ times, 
until the word lost all meaning & fixedness, & I began to doubt which was the 
right name for the thing, when I saw that neither had any natural relation, but all 
ZHUHDUELWUDU\,WZDVDFKLOG·VILUVWOHVVRQLQ,GHDOLVPJMN VIII, 30) 
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The practice of repetition is never quite substantial enough to sustain the theoretical 
model it aspires to, and, as the above extract from August 1841 illustrates, Emerson 
soon wrote of finding it callow. However, even though its poetic expediency was 
fleeting, it still exhibits a certain power. Accepting it meant accepting certain conditions, 
RIZKLFK(PHUVRQZDVFRQVFLRXV,Q·V¶7KRXJKWVRQ0RGHUQ/LWHUDWXUH·KH
recorded another of his figurations of the assumption of neutrality and here the 
linguistic element is critical. Emerson asserts WKDWWKH¶HUHFWPLQG>VKRXOG@GLVSDUDJH>«@
DOOERRNV·DVPHUH¶SULPHUOHDUQLQJ·WKDWZHPXVWHYHQWXDOO\¶OHDUQWRMXGJHERRNVE\
DEVROXWHVWDQGDUGV·DFFHSWLQJ¶WKDWDOOOLWHUDWXUHLVHSKHPHUDO·DQGUHDG\LQJRXUVHOYHVIRU
¶WKHVXSSRVLWLRQRILWVXWWHUGLVDSSHDUDQFH·28 Ephemerality and disappearance are the 
IXQFWLRQVRIDOLWHUDWXUHRIUHSHWLWLRQDVLWDFWVRQODQJXDJHWRPDNHRQH·VUHODWLRQWRLW
apprehensible only on the most foundational level. 
 For clarification of how Emerson conceived of this principle, one can examine a 
final example which rehearses the conditions just described. It is a passage inscribed into 
WZRRI(PHUVRQ·VMRXUQDOV³one being a notebook carried on walks, the other the long-
WHUP¶-RXUQDO(·+HUHDspects of the point under consideration come into conjunction 
in an unresolved paradox. It begins with an intense confection of the claims and 
counterclaims of particularity and ideality: 
 
Why should I wish to do or write many things,³since any one well done 
contains my history? Why should I see with regret the felling of the woods, & 
fear lest my son should lack the lessons his father drew from nature, when I 
have known myself entertained by a single dewdrop or an icicle, by a liatris, or a 
                                                 
28 (PHUVRQ¶7KRXJKWVRQ0RGHUQ/LWHUDWXUH· p. 140. 
147 
 
fungus, and seen God revealed in the shadow of a leaf? Nature is 
microscopically rich, as well as cumulatively. (JMN VII, 373; VIII, 468) 
 
Opening in a supposition that one particular act or piece of writing could function, 
paradigmatically, as the type of his whole character, Emerson immediately states its 
apparent opposite³that if one particular speaks of all, then another might do the job 
just as well, and nothing about that first particular is of specific value. The woods, which 
ZHUH(PHUVRQ·VLQLWLDOW\SHFDQZHOOEH¶IHOOHG·DWHUPZKLFKPDNHVH[SOLFLWLWVODSVDULDQ
connotations: one particle implies other particles, a continuous reminder of 
VXFFHVVLYHQHVVDQGDSHUSHWXDOO\HQDFWHG¶IDOO·EDFNLQWRWKHH[SHULHQWLDODQG
differentiated world. Writing reflects this. Reinscription intimates a new particular, even 
if it exactly resembles the prior inscription. In this way, we are reminded that even if 
UHSHWLWLRQFRQVWLWXWHVDQDQWLQRPLDQ¶WUDQVJUHVVLRQ·WKHHW\PRORJ\RIWKLVWHUPUHVWRUHV
topological difference.29 Hence repetition is always also a return to particularity, and it 
can, naturally, be read singularly in this respect.  
When Lawrence Buell remarked on how Emersonian repetition had gone 
unnoticed, he speculated on the reason by pointing to the fact that his readers had 
always been inclined to focus on the pithiest aphorisms alone, not noting the network of 
analogical parallels which reinforce their strength.30 So here, once again, we see the 
restoration of matter, of experience over the pure forms of philosophy, since Emerson 
always goes back to the material text to refigure the moment of sublimation in that same 
WH[W·VGLVVROXWLRQ, and must accept the risk of departing from his unorthodox relation to 
language in every cyclical repetition of the process. In this reVSHFWLV(PHUVRQ·V
fascination with the textual to be understood, and this facet is never more potently 
suggested than in these instances from his journals for 1840, where the mutually 
                                                 
29 6HH%ODQFKRW·VUHPDUNVLQQDERYH 
30 Buell, Literary Transcendentalism, p. 174. 
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exclusive concepts of universality appearing in infinite plurality and paradigmatic 
singularity cohere around the double writing of the same thing. Were his writing ideal, 
WKHQKHVKRXOGQRWQHHGWRZULWH¶PDQ\WKLQJV·LQFOXGLQJWKHUHSHWLWLRQRIWKLVSDVVDJH
A single inscription would be philosophically sufficient. Yet, in 1841, he remains 
XQZLOOLQJWROHDYHWKHTXHVWLRQWR¶IDOO·WRXWWHUFRQWLQJHQF\7KHUHPXVWEHDZLOOHG
retainer, and in this repeated effort to emphasise sustained, material singularity, he finds 
his stylistic opportunity in a mode which will return him perpetually, and as if transfixed, 
to the writing/reading/writing of his journals. 
As the decade progressed, however, the provisionality of a poetics of repetition 
ZDVVZLIWO\QHJDWHGDVQHZSUHRFFXSDWLRQVUHIUDPHGWKHUHODWLRQWRWH[WLQ(PHUVRQ·V
thought. In the second part of this thesis, I illustrate how his concerns were reversed. 
The investment he seems unable to recoup from text is now accepted as personal loss, 
his writing no longer restitutive but an act of bequest; a change which will, of necessity, 
require a revision of his poetic theory and practice.  
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Part Two: 
¶+RQRXU\RXUSODFH·)RUPPower, and Personas of 
Text: 1841-1850 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
¶,QIRUDPLOOLQIRUDPLOOLRQ·Essays: Second Series (1844) 
 
 
 I am not solitary whilst I read and write, though nobody is with me. (CW I, 8) 
 
 
/DWHLQ¶([SHULHQFH·SXEOLVKHGLQ·VEssays: Second Series, Emerson confesses a very 
specific sense of maturation: ¶,DPQRWWKHQRYLFH,ZDVIRXUWHHQQRU\HWVHYHQ\HDUV
DJR·CW III, 47). 7KHLPSOLHGGDWHVDUHVLJQLILFDQWRQHVLQ(PHUVRQ·VFDUHHU7KH
modern reader, informed by biography, will note that 1829-30 saw Emerson ordained a 
minister and married, before he lost his wife Ellen to tuberculosis early in 1831. But 
even his contemporaries would likely note the significance of the period 1836-7, which 
saw the publications of Nature DQG¶7KH$PHULFDQ6FKRODU·WKHWZRPDMRUVWDWHPHQWVRI
a nascent Transcendentalism prior to its confrontation with the establishment in the 
DivinLW\6FKRRO¶$GGUHVV·RI7KLVVHQVHRIPDWXUDWLRQLVUHIOHFWHGLQRWKHUWKHPHV
present in the opening pages of the essay which suggest emergent differences in his 
thought. One is the troublesome allusion to society, which is nevertheless a somewhat 
unusual concession given the indifference of many of his earlier statements on the topic: 
¶/HWXVWUHDWWKHPHQDQGZRPHQZHOOWUHDWWKHPDVLIWKH\ZHUHUHDOSHUKDSVWKH\DUH·
(CW III, 35). The other, which influences the change in attitude toward sociality and 
GRPLQDWHVWKHHVVD\LQJHQHUDOLVWKHFDWDFO\VPLQ(PHUVRQ·VSHUVRQDOOLIH³the death in 
early-1842 of his five-year-old son, Waldo. 
 Since 6WHSKHQ:KLFKHU·VFreedom and Fate of 1953, which aligns the period 
VXUURXQGLQJ:DOGR·VGHDWKZLWKWKHPRVWSURQRXQFHGVKLIWLQ(PHUVRQ·VPRYHPHQW
from optativity to fatalism, critics KDYHH[WHQVLYHO\GUDZQRQWKHUHIHUHQFHVWR:DOGR·V
GHDWKLQ¶([SHULHQFH·LQ¶7KUHQRG\·DQGLQWKHMRXUQDOVWRH[SODLQWKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQKLV
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writing apparent throughout the 1840s.1 The journals in particular take on a new tone: 
DOWKRXJKKHQHYHUUHFRUGVDVSHFLILFLQVWDQFHRI:DOGR·VVXIIHULQJUHFROOHFWLRQVRIWKH
child are interlaced with musings on death, and on the look of a world shrunk by the 
death of his son. At the same moment, this worldview inflects and alters his thinking on 
his relation to text, and the role that textuality plays in sociality and ethics. In his early 
career, Emerson directed his studies of literary composition and formal exigency toward 
a recursive realisation of an elemental personal consciousness. The implausibility of this 
principle of expression, which is likely to be pretty clear to the modern reader, had also 
by 1841 disclosed itself to Emerson, and his attentions were directed instead towards 
means of negotiating the failure of language to reveal him to himself in salvaging his 
philosophical convictions by way of increasingly complex poetic contrivances. With the 
death of Waldo, however, questions of obligation and ethical investment, of what it 
means to define RQH·VSHUVRQLQWKHOLPLWHGIRUPVRIODQJXDJHFRPHWRWKHIURQWRI
(PHUVRQ·VZRUOGYLHZDQGKLVZULWLQJ 
 Death is significant because it marks the cessation of personhood; it is the most 
palpable of the conditions of finiteness which preoccupied Emerson. Of the many 
potential parameters that might limit the scope of the person, none is so exacting and 
ubiquitously recognised as death.2 :DOGR·VGHDWKVHWVILQDOERXQGVRQKLVIDWKHU·V
FRQFHSWLRQRIWKHFKLOG·VSHUVRQ%XWWKLVLPSRVLWLRQRIERXQGVRQWKHIDWKHU·V
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHVRQDOVRIHHGVLQWRDEURDGHUVHWRIWKHPHVWRXFKLQJRQ(PHUVRQ·V
sense of his own person (and the personally felt grief which evoked a sense of 
maturation), the concept of interpersonality, and the role of the literary text in all this. 
                                                 
1 Whicher, pp. 94-122. In biographical contexts, Richardson acknowledges the imperative that attends 
:DOGR·VGHDWKLQKLVMind on Fire, see p. 382. 
2 There are vHU\IHZGHILQLWLRQVRIWKH¶SHUVRQ·ZKLFKGLVDJUHHZLWKWKLVSHUKDSVWKHRQO\PDMRU
theological model is the Augustinian hypothesis of the persistence of both the immaterial soul and the 
material body in the afterlife. Otherwise, the view that death terminates personality was common at least 
as early as Epicurus, and was restored in Renaissance and early Enlightenment thinking. This, of course, 
need not mean the cessation of the soul. See Augustine, City of God, ed. and trans. by Marcus Dods 
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1871), II, pp. 384-92. 
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(PHUVRQZRXOGKDYHNQRZQZHOO/RFNH·VGHILQLWLRQ³that a person is constituted as 
¶WKHVDPHQHVVRIDUDWLRQDOEHLQJ·RYHUWLPHDPLQGZKLFKUHWDLQVLGHQWLW\LQDERG\
which retains identity³and this sense of continuity has remained a fundamental 
predicate in philosophies of the self throughout the following centuries and up to the 
present.3 I have illustrated how Emerson employed text to try to assay and determine 
his own ongoing literary personality throughout his earlier career, and the failure to 
achieve this has increasingly emphasised its opposite, the sense that language imposes a 
finitude that leaves its living author outside of the text. Personal finitude, however, 
enables sociality: foregoing aspirations to the infinitude of oQH·VSULYDWHPLQGDQG
instead becoming partial in a world in which other minds are countenanced, means 
SOD\LQJD¶SDUW·RUSDUWLFOHDQGDFNQRZOHGJLQJWKHUDWKHUVLPSOHIDFWWKDWRQHis only in 
relation to the world or NOT ME. 
The sense that linguistic finitude too might have something to do with sociality 
KDGDOZD\VEHHQSUHVHQWLQ(PHUVRQ·VZRUNDVWKHHSLJUDSKDERYHIURPNature, 
indicates. In this respect, the roles of author and reader represent bounded distinctions 
in relation to text that interfere with the singularity and continuity of personhood, and 
LQWKLQNLQJRIWKLVZHPLJKWUHFDOOWKHIROORZLQJSDVVDJHIURP¶&LUFOHV· 
 
Our moods do not believe in each other. To-day I am full of thoughts and can 
write what I please. I see no reason why I should not have the same thought, the 
same power of expression, to-morrow. What I write, whilst I write it, seems the 
most natural thing in the world; but yesterday I saw a dreary vacuity in this 
                                                 
3 Locke, pp. 312, and 296-314 passim/RFNH·VDUJXPHQWVLQWKHFKDSWHUWLWOHG¶2I,GHQWLW\DQG'LYHUVLW\·
remain a critical starting point for many approaches of the philosophical definition of personhood. Rachel 
&ROH·VUHFHQWDQDO\VLVRIWKHSHUVRQLQ(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWQRWHVWKDWWKLVSULQFLSOHDOVRXQGHUOLHVWKH
major inquiries on the subject published in the last twenty years by George Kateb and Sharon Cameron. 
See Cole, pp. 68-70. 
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direction in which now I see so much; and a month hence, I doubt not, I shall 
wonder who he was that wrote so many continuous pages. (CW II, 182) 
 
Singularity is explicitly replaced by differing capacities here, as Emerson distinguishes in 
himself the person of then (the author) and the person of now (the reader), never 
assuming that the ontological distinction be collapsed to grant both roles to a single 
being at a single moment. In the twentieth-century, the ontological relationship between 
the writing subject and text, or between the writing and the reading subject, became 
H[SOLFLWO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKGHDWK$V0DXULFH%ODQFKRWZURWHLQ·V¶/Lterature and the 
Right to Death·, ¶for [the author] the work has disappeared, it has become a work 
belonging to other people, a work which includes tKHPDQGGRHVQRWLQFOXGHKLP·³in 
it, he is finite, bounded, essentially (if not actually) dead.4 And death, Emerson finds in 
1842 (though it was something he knew well enough beforehand), being the most 
radical of the measures of distinction between personVDFWXDOO\FKDUDFWHULVHVRQH·V
fundamental relationship with them. This is why all other persons were categorised 
NOT ME in Nature, a distinction which permits no means by which we can distinguish 
them from the other aspects of the world lying under this designation, among which are, 
of course, the corpses of the dead. 
 The thesis of repetition offered an avenue away from this discontinuity, 
disruption, and boundedness, and enabled Emerson to claim for neutrality, of being 
absolved of having to commit, which potentially conferred infinitude on personal 
FRQVFLRXVQHVV,QVXFKDZD\ZDVKHDEOHLQ¶7KH2YHU-Soul· to simply turn other 
persons into another faculty of personal self-UHYHODWLRQ¶3HUVRQVDUHVXSSOHPHQWDU\WR
                                                 
4 As Blanchot goes on to say, in hiVLGLRV\QFUDWLFZD\¶ZKHQ,VSHDNGHDWKVSHDNVLQPH·7KHJLYLQJ
oneself over to everyone described here is, of course, another iteration of the recognition that submitting 
WRODQJXDJHHTXDWHVWRDUHQXQFLDWLRQWRFODLPVRIVRYHUHLJQW\¶:K\PDNHLWSXElic if the splendour of the 
pure self must be preserved in the work, why take it outside, why realise it in words which belong to 
HYHU\RQH"·%ODQFKRW¶/LWHUDWXUHDQGWKH5LJKWWR'HDWK·LQThe Work of Fire, trans. by Charlotte Mandell 
and Lydia Davis (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 300-44 (p. 306, 323). 
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the primary teaching of the soul. In youth we are mad for persons. Childhood and youth 
see all the world in them. But the larger experience of man discovers the identical nature 
DSSHDULQJWKURXJKWKHPDOO3HUVRQVWKHPVHOYHVDFTXDLQWXVZLWKWKHLPSHUVRQDO·CW 
,,+RZHYHUWKH¶ODUJHUH[SHULHQFH·SUHVHQWHGKHUHLVVXUSDVVHGE\WKHUHFROOHFWLRQ
or discovery of the primacy of sociality Emerson seems to recognise in the death of his 
son. This prefaces a radical volte face in his authorial attitude, since, for the first time, he 
openly and publicly discusses the role of the author as one of defining and delimiting, and 
the act of writing as legacy undertaken not for his personal (authorial) benefit, but for 
the benefit of the reader to come. This may still be a person who goes by the name of 
Emerson: in his compositional model, the text continues to constitute the development, 
while limiting the scope, of subjectivity. In the Emersonian model of self-reading as a 
hermeneutic of personal consciousness, the author is patently not a coherent subject, 
since the text is written without clear authority³only in this proxy is full realisation to 
be discovered. So a realised subject can be read from the text, but it is necessarily in the 
form of an absence: that of the author Emerson, whom the reader Emerson no longer 
is. It is more important, however, that the reader of the text is equally likely to be 
DQRWKHUSHUVRQHQWLUHO\DQG(PHUVRQ·VWH[WZLOOQRWEHSLFNHGXSE\VRPHRQHZKRKDV
the desire to identify so readily with its author.5 Naturally, this will entail a sharp revision 
of what the text and its forms mean, or ought to mean, with respect to the persons 
constituted by it, associated with it, or connected through it. 
 The parameters of this concern, which will come to be manifested in new 
figurations of form, are PRVWHYLGHQWLQ¶([SHULHQFH· the second essay of Second Series. 
                                                 
5 This principle has many precedents³initially, perhaps, Heraclitus offered Emerson a model of plural 
DQGVHTXHQWLDOSHUVRQKRRGV%UDQND$UVLýSRLQWVWRDQRWKHUSRVVLEOHVRXUFHLQQRWLQg how Montaigne 
TXRWHVOLQHVIURP3OXWDUFK·V¶(DW'HOSKL·LQWKHFRQFOXGLQJUHPDUNVRIKLVApology for Raymond Sebond with 
ZKLFK(PHUVRQZDVOLNHO\WRKDYHEHHQIDPLOLDU¶1RERG\UHPDLQVRQHSHUVRQQRULVRQHSHUVRQEXWZH
EHFRPHPDQ\SHUVRQV>«@)RUZLWKRXWFKDQJHLWLVQRWUHDVRQDEOHWKDWDSHUVRQVKRXOGKDYHGLIIHUHQW
experiences and emotions; and if he changes, he is not the person; and if he is not the same person, he 
KDVQRSHUPDQHQWEHLQJEXWFKDQJHVKLVYHU\QDWXUHDVRQHSHUVRQDOLW\LQKLPVXFFHHGVWRDQRWKHU·
4XRWHGLQ$UVLýSS-300. 
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%XWWKHSUHOXGHWRWKLVLQWKHILUVWHVVD\¶7KH3RHW· offers a chance to perceive the 
break in thinking before the new model is foregrounded. Here, Emerson reiterates 
priQFLSOHVRISRHWLFLGHDOLW\WKHRUJDQLFLVPRIWKHSRHW·VQDWXUDOVW\OHDQGWKHSRZHUWR
render the presence of the universal through rhyme, all familiar from the works 
published between 1836-41, but founders somewhat on an unusually clear expression of 
doXEW¶,ORRNLQYDLQIRUWKHSRHWZKRP,GHVFULEH·CW ,,,6RZKHQ¶([SHULHQFH·
opens in antipophora³¶:KHUHGRZHILQGRXUVHOYHV",QDVHULHVRIZKLFKZHGRQRW
NQRZWKHH[WUHPHVDQGEHOLHYHWKDWLWKDVQRQH·³the question relates in one way to the 
Second Series in which we now find ourselves, in the place and personae of readers in 
relation to this text, still immersed and unsure of its textual or intellectual bounds or 
¶H[WUHPHV· (CW III, 27). Meanwhile, having just passed through moments representing 
WKHILJXUDWLRQRIWKHLGHDOSHVVLPLVPDQGILQDOO\KRSHLQRXUUHDGLQJRI¶7KH3RHW· we 
DUHHTXDOO\XQFHUWDLQDVWKHDXWKRU·VSRVLWLRQ)URPKHUH¶([SHULHQFH·HODERUDWHVRQWKH
nature of textual relationship by way of metaphor, in a manner marked by stark 
differences from the earlier works. 
 Whereas in the past the emphasis had been exclusively on the meaning of the 
world, nature, the text³NOT ME³¶WRPH· to the person of the text whom we tend to 
assume to be the author, here Emerson articulates the grounds of a thesis of what 
aspects form should have in relation to hypothetical future persons. This entails a 
change in the authorial persona, the locus of the text becoming infinitely prospective 
and no longer the mediate reflexivity it had EHHQLQHDUOLHUZRUNV6RLQ¶([SHULHQFH·
(PHUVRQZULWHVRIRXUVHQVHRILQDGHTXDF\EHIRUHQDWXUH¶WKDWLWDSSHDUVWRXVWKDWZH
lack the affirmative principle, and though we have health and reason, yet we have no 
superfluity of spirit for new creation[.] We have enough to live and bring the year about, 
EXWQRWDQRXQFHWRLPSDUWRUWRLQYHVW·CW ,,,7KHZRUG¶UHDVRQ·PD\QRWEH
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capitalised, but its mere appearance is telling.6 Self-sufficiency and the old innate 
concepts are well and good, but alone they are no longer adequate to the exposition of 
(PHUVRQ·VSKLORVRSKLFDOSUHRFFXSDWLRQV%H\RQGWKHF\FOLFDQGUHSHWLWLYHPRWLRQRI
¶EULQJLQJWKH\HDUDERXW· ZHVKRXOGDVSLUHWRVXSHUIOXLW\¶LPSDUWLQJ· ¶LQYHVWLQJ· How 
does this pertain to literary form? The closing lines of the paragraph hint at an answer 
IRUERWKWKLVTXHVWLRQDQGWKDWRIZKHUHZH¶ILQGRXUVHOYHV·¶:HDUHOLNHPLOOHUVRQWKH
lower levels of a stream, when the factories above them have exhausted the water. We 
WRRIDQF\WKDWWKHXSSHUSHRSOHPXVWKDYHUDLVHGWKHLUGDPV·CW III, 27). This sense of 
EHODWHGQHVVLVXQLYHUVDOWKH¶WRR·GLVFORVHVWKDWDWHYHU\VWDJHXSVWUHDPWKHVDPH
experience of living at the end of history was felt. But the moral imperative here is 
against such dam-raising. Imparting superfluity is given to be incumbent upon us, and 
doing so has a secondary effect downstream in addition to any effect it has upon 
ourselves. 7 ,QRWKHUZRUGVLWLVLQWKLVRSHQLQJWR¶([SHULHQFH·WKDW(Person 
acknowledges that the theorisations which permit his own retreat to neutrality and his 
personal acquisition of infinite possibility do not necessarily enable his reader to 
experience the same effect. Indeed, these ideas are exhaustive, relentlessly consuming, 
and declare exemption from history. It is the full recognition, at last, that his project to 
date has been ethically questionable, and if Emerson is to begin to countenance the 
existence of other persons, his literary endeavours ought in some way to be of use to 
them. 
 This sense of obligation is what undermines the utility of the literary form of 
repetition. For repetition is renouncing form. I mean this in both senses. Repetition is a 
formal strategy, and as form it announces neutrality³itself a renunciation of what form 
                                                 
6 Not least, it is worth mentioning, because the capitalised ColeridgeDQ¶5HDVRQ·VRFRPPRQLQDOOKLV
work up to First Series never appears in this volume. 
7 6HHDOVRWKHDGGUHVV¶0DQWKH5HIRUPHU·LQZKLFK(PHUVRQSUHILJXUHVWKLVWURSHLQYDORULVLQJ
¶PHQZKRKDYHLQWKHJUDYLW\RIWKHLUQDWXUHDTXDOLW\ZKLFKDQVZHUVWRWKHIO\-ZKHHOLQDPLOO·CW I, 
160). 
157 
 
demands, which is commitment. Emerson had openly despised its partiality in 1841, as 
KHZURWHLQ¶,QWHOOHFW·¶+DSS\LVWKHKHDULQJPDQXQKDSS\WKHVSHDNLQJPDQ[«] if I 
VSHDN,GHILQH,FRQILQHDQGDPOHVV·CW II, 202). But, by 1844, he inverts the maxim, 
ZULWLQJLQVWHDGRI¶WKHQHFHVVLW\RIVSHHFKDQGVRQJ[«] these throbs and heart-beatings 
in the orator, at the door of the assembly, to the end, namely, that thought may be 
HMDFXODWHGDV/RJRVRU:RUG·CW III, 23). The obligation of the poet or orator 
standing on a threshold, declaring to those on the other side of that door, signifies a 
IRUPDODQGSRWHQWLDOO\RUDWRULFDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\ZKLFKLVWKHRSSRVLWHRIUHSHWLWLRQ·V
renunciation, the latter standing for an open resignation to equivocity. Being neutral 
may enable one to rest in the realm of infinite personal possibility, but such placid 
idealism always threatens to consume the world of matter we depend upon to realise 
ourselves, from the NOT ME of Nature through all modes of proxy so far discussed, 
and regurgitates nothing to restore the same benefit for the future but the sign of the 
satisfied exhaustion of the world. In the years leading up to the publication of Essays: 
Second Series in 1844, Emerson seeks a way in which to recalibrate his thought, and his 
conception of form and composition, so that it fulfils the conditions of this sense of 
commitment. 
 The evasion of a marginalising sense of belatedness was achieved by figuring 
nature as being in the service of a personal self-UHDOLVDWLRQD¶VWHDG\DQGSURGLJDO
provision [«] made for his support· D¶GLYLQHFKDULW\· as he put it in Nature (CW I, 11). 
But the notion of a given world from which we self-compose is problematic. The 
question of our entitlement is metaphysically and metaethically troublesome, while the 
Unitarian-derived modus of inspiration has made rather too comfortable the act of 
personal self-realisation via what can be considered exploitation of a deferred and occult 
agency. Hence Emerson comes to bring these issues closer to the centre of his ideas in 
the early-1840s. As he writes in his journal in March 1842: 
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Hell is better than Heaven, if the man in Hell honours his place, & the man in 
heaven does not. It is in vain you pretend that you are not responsible for the 
evil law because you are not a magistrate, or a party to a civil process, or do not 
vote. You eat the law in a crust of bread, you wear it in your hat & shoes. 
The Man³it is his attitude. The attitude makes the man. (JMN VIII, 207) 8 
 
Emerson belatedly acknowledges the condition his work has suggested since 1836. We 
do not simply give ourselves to ourselves through the proxy of nature: nature offers 
itself to us, and its laws shape the consciousness it forms. But this is not all that he is 
saying³we should pause to consider the dimensions of agency and formal relations one 
VWHSIXUWKHU7KHPDQLQKHOOLV¶EHWWHU·VLWXDWHGKDVJUHDWHUPRUDOVWDWXUHLIKH¶KRQRXUV
his place· That is to say that he pays homage to where he finds himself. And the mode 
of homage implicitly proposed is that of taking responsibility for that which nature has 
given us.  
This is not necessarily a kind of husbandry or preservation in a recognisable, 
secular sense, which may entail a manipulation of the material toward an intellectualised 
model of how nature should H[LVWLQUHODWLRQWRXV5DWKHULWLVDQ¶DWWLWXGH·E\ZKLFKZH
give our permission to be formed by the conditions of forms, while nevertheless 
accepting responsibility as though it were formed by our own will³we become 
complicit and accessory to the processes of nature, as it were, but must also shoulder 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ZKHQLWHUUVDYDULDQWRIWKH¶WHUULEOHUHVSRQVLELOLW\·UDLVHGLQWKHVE\
Cavell.9 Part of this obligation requires that we maintain and diversify the particularity of 
                                                 
8 This principle evidently preoccupied EmersoQ,Q¶0DQWKH5HIRUPHU·WKHSUHYLRXV\HDUKHKDG
H[SUHVVHGDQDOPRVWLGHQWLFDOVWDWHPHQW¶:HDUHDOOLPSOLFDWHGRIFRXUVHLQWKLVFKDUJHLWLVRQO\
QHFHVVDU\WRDVNDIHZTXHVWLRQV>«@WREHFRPHDZDUHWKDWZHHDWDQGGULQNDQGZHDUSHUMXU\DQGIUDXG
LQDKXQGUHGFRPPRGLWLHV·CW VIII, 147). 
9 &DYHOO¶$0DWWHURI0HDQLQJ,W·SS-7. 
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the realm of forms by contributing, or giving back in kind, while keeping the same 
attitude to the forms we restore as to those we take. What is implied in this sketch is 
essentially an economy which transcends the problematic ideal/material dialectic to 
make the subject a non-invasive conduit of a type of universal consciousness in relation 
to being, rather than a self-conscious last human bringing the world under dominion for 
the purposes of self-realisation, or maniSXODWLQJLWLPSHUIHFWO\WRGHFODUHRQH·VRZQ
DKLVWRULFLW\6RZKHQLQ·V¶7KH0HWKRGRI1DWXUH·(PHUVRQGHFODUHVWKDWLWLV¶>Q@RW
thanks, not prayer [that] seem[s] quite the highest or truest name for our 
communication with the infinite,³but glad and conspiring reception,³reception that 
becomes giving in its turn, as the receiver is only the All-Giver in part and in infancy· he 
describes this relation to nature in the framework of the gift, but as a gift with certain 
characteristics which will turn out to be essential: a gift not to be received with thanks, a 
conspiring which links the senses of complicity in a surreptitious act and the intake of 
GLYLQHEUHDWKDOUHDG\VHHQLQLQVSLUDWLRQDSKLORVRSKLFDO¶JODGQHVV· or, more correctly, 
¶KDSSLQHVV· which comes from a kind of personal abandonment (CW I, 122). It is not, 
however, the abandonment of the strictures of personality in aspirations to flux or 
perpetual mutability³UDWKHULW·VDERXWDFFHSWLQJSHUVRQKRRG¶DEDQGRQLQJ·LWDVIDFXOW\
of self, as it were, to fend for itself.  
In the chapter to follow,HODERUDWHXSRQKRZ(PHUVRQ·VUHODWLRQWRWKH
secular, Nature·V1270(RFFXSLHVWKHXQTXHVWLRQHGFHQWUHRIKLVWKRXJKWDQGZULWLQJ
in a development on the moods of the preceding years. As a consequence, he theorises 
WKHWHUPVRIDQDXWKRU·VHWKLFDODQGVRFLDOREOLJDWLRQVRQWKHOHYHORIWhe gift. In the 
FKDSWHU·VILQDO section, however, I illustrate that he fulfils his own expectations only on 
the level of another poetic contrivance, although, on this occasion, it might be deemed 
ineluctable. 
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Textual Economics I: Handsome Necessity 
7KHHVVD\¶([SHULHQFH·SHUKDSVWKHPRVWXQLYHUVDOO\DSSUHFLDWHGDQGGLVFXVVHGRI
(PHUVRQ·VZRUNVFRQWDLQVDQRWRULRXVSDVVDJHRQGHDWKH[SUHVVHGE\ZD\RIHFRQRPLF
PHWDSKRU¶,QWKHGHDWKRIP\VRQQRZPRUHWKDQWZR\HDUVDJR,VHHPWRKDYHORVWD
beautiful estate³no morH·CW III, 29). Perhaps the most curious aspect of this oddly 
repugnant sentiment, however, is not only that it befits the essay, but that it belongs to 
WKHWUDMHFWRU\RI(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWIURPWKHPLGGOH\HDUVRIWKHVXSWRWKH
publication of this eVVD\LQ,Q¶([SHULHQFH·WKHDQDORJ\ILJXUHVDGLVMXQFWXUHIURP
the worldly investment which we, along with Emerson, are wont to take as given. 
However, as Sharon Cameron has best noted, ¶([SHULHQFH·LV unusual simply because it 
¶LVWKHRQO\>HVVD\@WRWKHPDWLVHGLVVRFLDWLRQ·DVZHOODVHQDFWLQJLW10 Throughout his early 
career, he exhibited a similar sense of disjuncture, but his negotiation there of an 
essentially philosophical dualism was PRUHVXEWOH¶([SHULHQFH·E\FRQWUDVWVXFFHHGVE\
virtue of the bluntness of its analogy, but its role here, in describing an ontological and 
emotional investment in the processes of the world that fails, also echoes his sense of 
relation to himself and the world through text. 
Hence the use of economic terminology to interrogate the relation of the 
intellect to the exigencies of empirical reality is perhaps not so obtuse. Throughout 
Essays: Second Series, he incorporates economic vocabulary in a manner that renders it 
more fundamental; essentially, he emphasises simply that it is a discourse of relationality, 
and we ought to be wary of conceiving it otherwise. The analogy reveals a lack of 
VHFXULW\QRPRUHRIKLVSHUVRQZDVLQYHVWHGLQ:DOGRWKDQPLJKWEHLQD¶EHDXWLIXO
HVWDWH·OLNHZLVHWKHSUHVXPHGUHWXUQRIVHFXUHSHUVRQDOVRYHUHLJQW\E\YLUWXHRIWKH
                                                 
10 6KDURQ&DPHURQ¶5HSUHVHQWLQJ*ULHI(PHUVRQ·V´([SHULHQFHµ·Representations, 15 (1986), 15-41 (p. 
31). 
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labours of double writing has come to naught.11 The worlds (textual as well as empirical) 
in which Emerson presumed himself invested have granted no reciprocal affirmation, 
and as such his modes of incorporation to date appear spurious. So the odd phrasing of 
VRFLHWDOREOLJDWLRQLQ¶([SHULHQFH·FDQEHH[SODLQHG¶/HWXVWUHDWWKH men and women 
ZHOOWUHDWWKHPDVLIWKH\ZHUHUHDOSHUKDSVWKH\DUH·CW III, 35). The condition of a 
social and ethical structure in which Emerson, and his writing, is able to play a part 
requires his complicity to sustain the fabric of its reality. He must not shut down the 
SRVVLELOLW\FRQWDLQHGE\WKDW¶SHUKDSV· 
Second Series is, in many ways, a text advocating refoundationalism. In terms of 
the acceptance of realities, Emerson rhetorically returns us to absolute beginnings in 
search of the graspable. Even the most rudimentary of meetings warrants disclosure: 
 
As the first thing man requires of man, is reality, so, that appears in all the forms 
of society. We pointedly, and by name, introduce the parties to each other [«] 
WKH\ORRNHDFKRWKHULQWKHH\HWKH\JUDVSHDFKRWKHU·VKDQGWRLGHQWLI\DQG
signalise each other. It is a great satisfaction. (CW III, 79) 
 
The barely disclosed point underlying this extract touches on the dependence of mutual 
personal recognition through D¶SRLQWHG·LQWHUDFWLRQRUUHODWLRQZKLFKKDUNVEDFNWRD
discussion of the poet in the Dial essay of 1¶7KRXJKWVRQ0RGHUQ/LWHUDWXUH· Here, 
(PHUVRQFRLQHGWKHSKUDVH¶LPSVRIPDWWHU·WRUHSUHVHQWWKHUHFLSURFDOIDFWRURID
SRHWLFUHODWLRQWRWKHZRUOGDVZKHQWKH¶SRHWUDPEOLQJWKURXJKWKHILHOGVRr the IRUHVW·
ZRXOGQRWGHVFHQGIURPKLVLGHDVDQG¶awake to precise thought, if the scream of an 
                                                 
11 ,WLVZRUWKUHPDUNLQJWKDW(PHUVRQ·VLQYHVWPHQWLQKLVVRQ was always considered tenuous. He 
UHFRUGHGKLVHPRWLRQVRQWKHQLJKWRI:DOGR·VELUWKLQWKHIROORZLQJWHUPVDOWKRXJKKHIRXQGWKHFKLOG
EHDXWLIXOD¶ORYHO\ZRQGHU·KHFRXOG¶VHHQRWKLQJLQLWRIPLQH,DPQRFRQVFLRXVSDUW\WRDQ\IHDWXUH
any functiRQDQ\SHUIHFWLRQ,EHKROGLQLW,VHHPWREHPHUHO\DEUXWHRFFDVLRQRILWVEHLQJ·JMN V, 
234). 
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eagle, the cries of a crow or curlew near his head did not break the sweet continuity·12 
7KH¶LPSV·UHSUHVHQWDQ¶LPSHUDWLYH·WRDWWHQGWRWKHZRUOGMXVWDVPXFKDVWKH\
UHSUHVHQWWKDWZRUOG·VLQHYLWDEOHDQGQHcessary intrusion into the formation of our 
consciousness: the sense of ¶LPSDOH·FRQFHDOHGEHKLQG the word ¶SRLQWHGO\·VHFRQGLQJ
the essential physicality of this realisation. More than this, however, the evocation of the 
transparent eye-EDOOLQWKHVFHQH·VORFDOHGHPDQGVWKDWZHUHFRQVLGHUWKDWWURSH·V
YDOLGLW\UHYLVLQJDQGUHYLVLWLQJWKHVFHQHRI·VNature but doing so to restore the 
affective capacity of its particular realities. Lest we retain any allegiance to an idealist 
reading of the trope, a further DQGPRUHH[SOLFLWUHYLVLRQLQWKHHVVD\¶1DWXUH·LQSecond 
Series HQDFWVFRQFOXVLRQ,QWKLVHVVD\ZHDUHWDNHQRQFHDJDLQWR¶WKHJDWHVRIWKHIRUHVW·
ZKHUHWKHZRUOGIDOOVDZD\IURPWKHLGHDOLVW·VPLQGLQGHHGWKHRSHQLQJSDJHRI
¶1DWXUH·UHKHDUses the postures of transcendence of Nature with great precision. But lest 
ZH¶EHUDSWDZD\LQWRDOOWKDWZHGUHDPRIKHDYHQ·DQGKHHGOHVVO\PHDQGHUDPRQJVWWKH
¶XSSHUVN\· QDWXUHSURGVXVDZDNH¶WDNHVDJUDYHOLEHUW\ZLWKXVDQGVKDPHVXVRXWRI
our non[-@VHQVH·CW III, 99-100). 
 So much, therefore, are we pointedly and bodily pinned back by the secular, but 
there is more to be said on the way it affects (and effects) our own re-formations in the 
world. In this respect, the limits of affect, especially the limits of our interventionary 
SRZHUVLQWKHUHDOPRIZKDWLVIHOWDUHRIVSHFLILFUHOHYDQFH,Q¶([SHULHQFH· just after 
having touched on the inability even of death to give us a tangible sense of reality in 
KXPDQLQWHUDFWLRQ(PHUVRQZULWHV¶,WDNe this evanescence and lubricity of all objects, 
which lets them slip through our fingers then when we clutch hardest, to be the most 
XQKDQGVRPHSDUWRIRXUFRQGLWLRQ·CW ,,,6WDQOH\&DYHOO·VMXVWO\FHOHEUDWHG
GLVTXLVLWLRQRQWKLVH[WUDFWDQGWKH¶KDQG·RIKDQGVRPHQHVVLQDOHFWXUHVWUHVVHVWKH
underacknowledged frequency with which Emerson refers to the hand to make a 
                                                 
12 (PHUVRQ¶7KRXJKWVRQ0RGHUQ/LWHUDWXUH·SS-8. 
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SKLORVRSKLFDOSRLQW&DYHOO·VOHFWXUHwhich is as much about Heidegger and Nietzsche 
DVLWLV(PHUVRQVSHFLILHVD¶PRGHRIWKLQNLQJ·VLJQLILHGE\WKLVWRR-tight grasping 
hand³DQ¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI:HVWHUQFRQFHSWXDOLVLQJDVDNLQGRIVXEOLPLVHGYLROHQFH·³
DJDLQVWZKLFKDQDOWHUQDWLYHPRGHRINQRZOHGJHDV¶UHFHSWLRQ·ZLOOEHDGRSWHG13 &DYHOO·V
logic is wholly correct since it accurately figures a mode by which we must be complicit 
with and receptive of the secular, although to my mind he does not develop the thought 
along with Emerson sufficiently to expose all that is implied in unhandsomeness. Just 
before the above quoted passage IURP¶([SHULHQFH· a less violent trope is used to figure 
WKHLPSRUWRIQDWXUHDQGRXUW\SLFDOUHVSRQVH¶7KHGHDUHVWHYHQWVDUHVXPPHUUDLQDQG
ZHDUHWKH3DUDFRDWVWKDWVKHGHYHU\GURS·CW III, 29). Throughout his work, 
Emerson emphasises our wont to shield ourselves from nature, and from the 
LPSRVLWLRQVRIWKHNLQGRI¶UHDOLW\·KHKDVQRZPDGHFHQWUDOWRKLVWKHVLV, with 
FRQYHQWLRQDQGVWDLGIRUPDOLVPWKH¶ILQHKRXVHILQHERRNFRQVHUYDWRU\JDUGHQV
HTXLSDJH·DQGVRRQXVHG¶DVVFUHHQVWRLQWHUSRVe between himself and his guest· as he 
puts it elsewhere in this volume (CW III, 79). Not only are our sensitivities naturally 
weak, therefore, but we exacerbate the problem; a fact that Emerson responds to in his 
characteristically provocative use of tropes which suggest an exaggerated physicality, or 
an excessive literalism, points which I will return to later. What is intended is an atavistic 
reconsideration of how the hand teaches in its necessity. 
 7KHVHFRQGHSLJUDSKLFSRHPIRU¶&KDUDFWHU·RIIHUVDVimple and concise précis 
of this point: 
 
 Work of his hand 
                                                 
13 6WDQOH\&DYHOO¶$YHUVLYH7KLQNLQJ·LQConditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian 
Perfectionism: The Carus Lectures, 1988 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 38-41. Cavell had 
RULJLQDOO\UDLVHGWKHPHWDSKRULQ¶)LQGLQJDV)RXQGLQJ·DOHFWXUHJLYHQLQDQGILUVWSXEOLVKHGLQ
6HH&DYHOO¶)LQGLQJDV)RXQGLQJ·LQ(PHUVRQ·V7UDQVFHQGHQWDO(WXGHV (Stanford CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 110-40 (p. 117). 
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 He nor commends nor grieves: 
 Pleads for itself the fact; 
 As unrepenting Nature leaves 
 Her every act. (CW III, 52) 
 
The hand, unlike the conceptualising mind, is absolutely conditioned by the terms of 
natureLW¶SOHDGVIRULWVHOIWKHIDFW·DWKDQGVRWRVSHDNLQDPRYHZKLFKLVDOZD\VILUVW
conditioned by receptivity and acknowledgement. What I take Emerson to be 
suggesting is the manner in which the hand reveals to the mind the pliancy of any given 
SDUWLFXODU¶PDWWHU·³say the grain in wood or stone, the ductility, malleability, or 
brittleness of a metal. No element in nature being absolutely complicit with the willed 
intervention of the human mind, it is the task of the hand to assay qualities and 
weaknesses, and doing so requires attentive tactility and a receptive intellect. The pure 
conceptions of ideality weaken rather than strengthen us by virtue of their suspension of 
WKLVVHQVHRU¶QRQVHQVH·14 $V(PHUVRQVWDWHVLQWKHFORVLQJSDVVDJHVRI¶([SHULHQFH·¶,
have not found that much was gained by manipular attempts to realise the world of 
WKRXJKW·CW III, 48). What he now candidly espouses, in other words, is the necessity 
RI¶IHHOLQJ·IRUIRUP: that form precedes us; we must accommodate the particular 
qualities of any given form to be able to use it, and not expect form to materialise our 
every concept on demand. 
 /DQJXDJH·VIRUPDOOHJDOLW\PHDQVWKDWLWFRQVWLWXWes part of the same system, and 
in Second Series Emerson regularly acknowledges that our own ontological dependence 
on the particular impositions of nature makes the particular impositions of language 
precisely suited to the reciprocal exposition of our condition or place. 6RLQ¶1RPLQDOLVW
                                                 
14 A journal comment on Charles Lane, Bronson Alcott, and the Fruitlands project echoes this sentiment. 
/DQH(PHUVRQZULWHVKDV¶>Q@RH\HIRU1DWXUHDQGKLVKDQGVDVIDUIURPKLVKHDGDV$OFRWW·VRZQ·6HH
WRRDQHDUOLHUHQWU\RQ¶DSHUIHFWPDQ>ZKR@ZRXOGQHHGQRRWKHULQVWUXPHQWVWKDQKLVH\HV	KLVKDQGV·
(JMN VIII, 404, 194). 
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and Realist· (PHUVRQUHFDOOVWKHSULQFLSOHRIWKH¶LPSVRIPDWWHU·DQGUHJDUGVSXUH
conceptual idealism to be: 
 
[F]lat rebellion. Nature will not be Buddhist: she resents generalising, and insults 
the philosopher in every moment with a million of fresh particulars. It is all idle 
talking: as much as a man is whole, so he is also a part; and it were partial not to 
see it. 
 
As such, nature importunes us of our obligation to activity, and most symptomatic of 
our condition is the activity of literature: 
 
We fetch fire and water, run about all day among the shops and markets, and get 
our clothes and shoes made and mended [«] If we were not thus infatuated, if 
we saw the real from hour to hour, we should not be here to write and read, but 
should have been burned or frozen long ago. [Nature] would never get anything 
done. (CW III, 139) 
 
Much as this seems only a reminder of the dependency of literary acts on a substructure 
of labour, it is also a designation of such acts as functions of that same labour. Literary 
DFWVDUHDFWVRISDUWLFXODULVDWLRQ¶JHQLXV·EHLQJGHILQHGLQWKHMRXUQDOVLQWKLVSHULRGDV
¶GHWDFK>PHQW@IURPWKHPDVVRIOLIHDSDUWLFOHQRWEHIRUHGHWDFKHGVRWKDW,VHHLW
VHSDUDWHG·DQGVRWKHLURZQQRWLRQRI¶JHWWLQJWKLQJVGRQH·LVFXPXODWLYHSURGXFWLYH
and not self-consciously Sisyphean, as the not-getting-done of repetition patently is 
(JMN VIII, 190). As a newly detached particular, every production in the 
conceptualisation of the artwork after the failure of repetition signifies not superficial 
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VLPLODULW\EXWDQHZ¶EUHDN·LQRXUH[LVWLQJFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHZRUOG³a world again 
greater than our generalisations, and momentarily infinite. 
 By maintaining a perpetually renewed relation of being imposed upon by nature, 
WKHV\VWHPRIRXUSURGXFWLRQVGHPDQGVWKDWWKH\WKHPVHOYHVDUH¶LPSLVK·LQWKHVDPH
way. Reiteration, therefore, has not totally passed off if we seek to reciprocate and 
broaden the range of the forms which are agents in the development of consciousness, 
except now the reiterative similarity exists solely on a categorical, and not experiential 
level³it is the phenomenological process attendant on form, and not the particular 
parameters of the form itself, which recurs.15 As such, the currency value of any given 
form is irrelevant: the aspect of the forms of exposition may change radically, and does, 
as Emerson had realised earlier in his career.16 In this context, the recurrent economic 
metaphors of the text make more sense: (PHUVRQ·VREMHFWLVWREUHDN with any 
conventional understanding of the exchange rate between thought and language act, 
ODQJXDJHDFWDQGHIIHFW6RLQ¶7KH3RHW· the absent ideal starkly resets language. If the 
ZRUOGFRQVLVWVWRXVRI¶HPEOHPV· 
 
[W]e sympathise with the symbols, and, being infatuated with the economical 
uses of things, we do not know that they are thoughts. The poet, by an ulterior 
intellectual perception, gives them a power which makes their old use forgotten, 
and puts eyes, and a tongue, into every dumb and inanimate object. He 
SHUFHLYHVWKHWKRXJKW·VLQGHSHQGHQFHRIWKHV\PEROWKHVWDELOLW\RIWKHWKRXJKW
the accidence and fugacity of the symbol. (CW III, 12) 
 
                                                 
15 This, of course, was also the object of the prior iteration of repetition. The shift reflects the formal 
shortcomings of the prior model, rather than its conceptual flaws. 
16 See pp. 101-2 above. 
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And so on. The poet·V distinguishing feature is his lack of sympathy in his relation to 
language. As the master and manipulator of the symbolic economy, he is able to 
SLQSRLQWDQGVRPRGLI\ZKHQDQGKRZHDFKZRUG¶REWDLQHGFXUUHQF\· as Emerson goes 
on to say.17 This is not as simple as it sounds³after all, LQ¶7KH3RHW·(PHUVRQKDG
asserted that the poet does not and has not existed. Additionally, if this economy is to 
be broken through, he is not clear in this essay on how, precisely, that is to be done, 
H[FHSWQRWWKURXJKPDVWHU\DQGD¶JUDVSLQJ·PDQLSXODWLRQ%XWLQFRQWLQXDQFHZLWKWKH
motives and limited means of repetition, what we find in Second Series is that Emerson, 
short of mastery, recourses to elaborating a revolutionary model of writing which 
ostensibly negates the very ideological fallacy of our contemporary use of the term 
¶HFRQRP\· whether in the symbolic or monetary sense. 
 
Textual Economics II: The Sympathies of Reading 
By granting Emerson liberty from the exigencies of conventional economics, I am, of 
course, flouting the most central of the claims of New Historicism. The example most 
ILWWHGWRP\FRPPHQWVQRZDQGWKURXJKRXWWKLVFKDSWHULV-RVHSK)LFKWHOEHUJ·VCritical 
Fictions, in which Emerson is cast as one among a number of nineteenth-century 
American writers whose personal losses in the unstable antebellum economy led them 
to a sentimentalised critique and attempted rehumanisation of the market, displacing its 
impersoQDOLW\ZLWKUHQHZHG¶V\PSDWK\·DQG¶VLQFHULW\·18 ,QGHHG)LFKWHOEHUJ·VFODLPIRU
(PHUVRQ·VV\PSDWKHWLFUHODWLRQWRKLVUHDGHUVLVSDUWLFXODUO\SHUWLQHQWJLYHQZKDW,KDYH
to say here. But while the realisation that authorship can be considered a mere function 
                                                 
17 $V5LFKDUG3RLULHUSRLQWVRXW:LOOLDP-DPHV·VDGYRFDF\RIDQHPSRZHUHGUHFDOLEUDWLRQRIWKH¶FDVK
YDOXHRIZRUGV·LVSUHIDFHd in these thoughts of Emerson. See Poirier, Poetry and Pragmatism, p. 81. 
18 ,Q)LFKWHOEHUJ·VZRUGVWKHZULWHU·VVHQWLPHQWDOFULWLTXH³WKHLU¶FULWLFDOILFWLRQ·³VRXJKW¶WRKXPDQLVH
HFRQRPLFFULVLVDQGPDNHLWPRUHPDQDJHDEOH>«WR@WXUQ>«@YDVWLPSHUVRQDO economic events into 
intimate conspiracies³EHWUD\DOVRIPRUDOWUXVW·7KHREMHFWZDVWRLQFXOFDWHD¶WUXHHFRQRP\·ZKLFK
¶FRXOGEHIRXQGRQO\LQDJHQXLQHH[FKDQJHRIIHHOLQJ·DQGWUDQVIHUDEOHVHQWLPHQW,ZLOOH[SORUHWKH
ramifications of this latter point in Emerson, and my specific objections to it, in greater detail below. 
Joseph Fichtelberg, Critical Fictions: Sentiment and the American Market 1780-1870 (Athens GA: University of 
Georgia Press, 2003), pp. 14, and 1-22, 125-41 passim. 
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of a capitalist market has paid dividends in scholarship of the last twenty years, New 
Historicism can, on occasion, be strikingly reductive, and its tendency to assume the 
primacy of the most obvious visible referent whenever we historicise a literary text is the 
most egregious of such flaws. 
Reading therefore against assumptions that the appearance of economic 
WHUPLQRORJ\LQ(PHUVRQ·VZRUNLVPHUHO\HSLSKHQRPHQDRIKLVILQDQFLDOPLVIRUWXQHV
under the presidency of Martin van Buren, my intention is to elaborate on his 
understanding that all economic transvaluations³whether monetary, or linguistic³are 
relative and whimsical.19 This path has already been indicated by Richard Grusin, who, 
in 1988, demonstrated its necessary trajectory despite beginning an argument from a 
position sympathetic to New Historicist methods. Attempting to identify economic 
DVSHFWVLQ(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKW*UXVLQHPSOR\V(PHUVRQ·VDFFRXQWVOHWWHUVDQG
financial papers. )URPWKHVHPHWKRGRORJLFDORSHQLQJVKRZHYHU*UXVLQ·VWH[WHQGVin 
reiterating the same fatalistic principle over and over³¶WKHDFTXLVLWLYHORJLFRIWKH
marketplace cannot account for the economy of the soul [«] the discontinuity between 
the economy of the soul and the economy of the marketplace [«] Emerson represents 
the market economy of trade as discontinuous with the spiritual economy of 
H[SHQGLWXUH·³illustrating that the use of such tropes ought only to lead us away from 
blithe acceptance of what their primary signification should be.20 The effect of 
(PHUVRQ·VXVHRf economic metaphors, apparently linked to his financial situation, is 
actually a rhetorical performance illustrating a dead end: the terms used patently fail as 
                                                 
19 Indeed, Emerson constantly challenged his audiences on the value of such terms. In the most general 
sense, we might recall his exacting association between the semiotic status of words and a currency of 
SURPLVVRU\QRWHVWKHFXUUHQF\RIGHIHUUDOWRZKLFKWKH¶/DQJXDJH·FKDSWHURINature refers, suggesting 
awareness of the implication of coinage in the et\PRORJ\RIWKHZRUG¶VHPLRWLF·/DWHULQWKHDGGUHVV
¶0DQWKH5HIRUPHU·KHFDOOHGXSRQKLVDXGLHQFHWR¶OHDUQWKHPHDQLQJRIHFRQRP\·RWKHUWKDQWKDWRI
¶EDVHRULJLQ·ZKLFKZHVHHRQDGDLO\EDVLVCW I, 154). Finally, in Second Series, the reckoning that trade 
LQFXOFDWHV¶IDOVHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQPHQ·LVDUHSKUDVLQJRIDSDVVDJHIURPWKHMRXUQDOVFRQVLGHUHGIURPWKH
RSSRVLWHSHUVSHFWLYHWKDW¶>W@KHYLHZWDNHQRI7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVPLQ6WDWH6WUHHWLVWKDWLWWKUHDWHQVWR
LQYDOLGDWHFRQWUDFWV·CW III, 152; JMN VIII, 108). 
20 Richard *UXVLQ¶´3XW*RGLQ<RXU'HEWµ(PHUVRQ·V(FRQRP\RI([SHQGLWXUH·PMLA, 103 (1988), 
35-44 (p. 37, 39, 40). 
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DQHIIHFWLYHH[SRVLWLRQRID¶VSLULWXDOHFRQRP\· the context they are invariably used to 
depict.21 
$V%UDQND$UVLýKDVSHUKDSVPRVWHIIHFWLYHO\DQGH[WHQVLYHO\DUJXHG(PHUVRQ
is no philosopher of dwelling and habitation, no proto-Heideggerian, but one who 
theorises ways of departing from stasis and averting from habit.22 Within this paradigm, 
it is clear that the economics Emerson is exploring bears little obvious relation to that 
ZRUG·VHW\PRORJ\RI¶KRXVHKROGPDQDJHPHQW·³WKHUHFDQEHQR¶GZHOOLQJ·LQDQ
arbitrary and dislocated system with no basis of constancy.23 Having a feeling for 
language means renouncing aspirations to live in it³hence a possible reason for the 
QHFHVVLW\RIWKHSRHW·VQRQ-existence, for the kind of secure footing and abidance he 
ZRXOGQHHGWRKDYHLQODQJXDJHFDQQRWEHIRXQG¶DOOODQJXDJHLVYHKLFXODUDQG
transitive, and is good [«] IRUFRQYH\DQFHQRWDVIDUPVDQGKRXVHVDUHIRUKRPHVWHDG·
(CW III, 20). In his language, the poet is dead. If there is a way to live on somehow³
alongside it, in spite of it³the economics involved must relinquish aspirations of 
PDQDJHPHQWRUWKHPDQLSXODUDQGLWLVLQWKLVZD\WKDW(PHUVRQ·VPHWKRGVFDQEHJLQ
to be understood. 
The objective is to be, or at least seem to be, as it were, dead³to disappear, and 
E\GRLQJVRPDNHRQH·VODQJXDJHSXUHO\JHQHUDWLYHQRWSRLQWLQJWRWKHDXWKRU·VZRUOG
which is, in the context of the text, always of the past. There is more than one way of 
DFKLHYLQJWKLVHIIHFWDQG(PHUVRQ·VLQWHOOHFWXDOLVDWLRQVRILWVPRGHORQO\EHJLQWR
                                                 
21 $VKHZULWHVLQWKHMRXUQDOVIRU¶$OOKLVWRULHV>@DOOWLPHVIXUQLVKH[DPSOHVRIWKHVSLULWXDO
economy; so does every kitchen & hencoop. But I may choose then to use those which have got 
WKHPVHOYHVZHOOZULWWHQ·JMN VIII, 28). In other words, potential analogues are virtually unlimited but no 
one is specifically apposite³the effect comes in how the analogue is represented rather than from the 
subject it speaks of. 
22 $VPHQWLRQHGHDUOLHU,GLIIHUIURP$UVLýLQVRIDUDV,SHUFHLYHWKHUHWREHDSRLQWDWZKLFK(PHUVRQ
HQFRXQWHUVWKHOLPLWRIVXFKDPRGHO7KLVDQGWKHIROORZLQJFKDSWHUHODERUDWHRQ(PHUVRQ·VDFTXLVLWLRQ
of a kind of literary dwHOOLQJLQWKHILQDO\HDUVRIWKHV6HH$UVLýSS-17 and passim. 
23 (PHUVRQUDWKHUORRVHO\FRYHUVWKLVJURXQGLQWKHORQJHSLJUDSKLFSRHPWR¶3ROLWLFV·ZKLFKIROORZVD
narrative trajectory from relative economies³¶*ROGDQGLURQDUHJRRG_7REX\LURQDQGJROG_>«@1RU
NLQGQRUFRLQDJHEX\V_$XJKWDERYHLWVUDWH·³through allusions to Greek myth, whose original language 
JLYHVXVWKHIRXQGDWLRQRIRXUZRUGSODLQO\UHIHUHQFHGLQWKHILQDOOLQHV¶7KHQWKHSHUIHFWVWDWHLVFRPH_
7KHUHSXEOLFDQDWKRPH· (CW III, 115). 
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appear in the journals in the early-1840s, a point I will return to in a moment. Its 
precursor exists in a literary practice he had been working with for some years already; 
an excessive, exaggerated, superfluous seeming prose. This has its origins in the 
dissatisfaction with formal exigencies³DVKHQRWHGLQZULWLQJ¶DIWHU1DWXUH·PXVW
EH¶HQGOHVV·WKHUHVXOWZLOOVXUHO\EHD¶FXPEURXVHPEDUUDVVHGVSHHFK: [the writer] uses 
PDQ\ZRUGVKRSLQJWKDWRQHLIQRWDQRWKHUZLOOEULQJ\RXDVQHDUWRWKHIDFWDVKHLV·
(JMN V, 14, 51). This kind of crisis in language was by no means uniquely Emersonian. 
2QHPLJKWUHFDOO7KRUHDX·VGHFODUDWLRQLQWKHFRQFOXVLRQRIWalden¶,WLVDULGLFXORXV
demand which England and America make, that you shall speak so that they understand 
you [«] I fear chiefly lest my expression may not be extra-vagant enough·24 Or a recent 
essay by Alex Calder on Melville, which finds in his noveOVWKH¶H[FHVVLYHDQG
H[WUDYDJDQWTXDOLWLHV·ZKLFKLQPRVWLQVWDQFHVPLJKWVLPSO\EHZULWWHQRIIDV¶EDG
writing·25 &DOGHU·VDQDO\VLVVKDUHVVRPHWKLQJZLWK7KRUHDX·VGHVFULSWLRQRIKLVRZQ
prose³the etymological sense that Thoreau makes explicit in dividinJ¶extra-vagance· 
consciously striding outside of linguistic yards and bounds. As Calder writes, overdoing 
ZULWLQJFDQ¶JHVWXUH[«] beyond conventional signs to nominate a more essential quality 
of things· which is to say it transgresses normative symbolic economies. He goes on to 
GHVFULEHVXFKDWRQHDV¶PRGDOGLVVRQDQFH[«ZKDW@KDSSHQVZKHQDQDSSDUHQWO\
inappropriate or affected or off-key style of writing invades and infects a host text [«] it 
loses transparency·26  
This, of course, is exactly what occurs with the transparent eye-ball, a trope 
which seems designed to intervene in our complicity with semantic contracts, but the 
tendency which is evident as early as 1836 persists until 1844. IQ¶([SHULHQFH· for 
                                                 
24 Henry David Thoreau, Walden, or Life in the Woods (1854) (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 
427-8 
25 $OH[&DOGHU¶%OXEEHU0HOYLOOH·V%DG:ULWLQJ·LQ6DPXHO2WWHUDQG*HRIIUH\6DQERUQHGVMelville and 
Aesthetics, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), pp. 11-31 (p. 13). 
26 Calder, p. 23, 28. 
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instance, we may experience incredulity or alienation on reading excessively literal tropes 
and analogues like the comparison he makes between the death of his son and financial 
losses. Additionally, $UVLýQRWHVDQXPEHURIOLQJXLVWLFPDQQHULVPVIRXQGLQKLVZRUN 
which work in much the same way: ¶LPPLJUDQWZRUGV·DUHGUDZQIURPRWKHUGLVFLSOLQDU\
RUFRQWH[WXDOXVHV¶FDGXFRXV· IRULQVWDQFHLQ¶([SHULHQFH· an unusual term with both 
biological and legal meanings which I will discuss in chapter five), while at other times 
repetitions force us to recogniVH(PHUVRQ·V focus on interrogating or subverting 
conventions associated with individual words, something which this thesis has 
acknowledged throughout.27 Indeed, even the blasé habit of contradiction that so many 
readers have found unsatisfactory in (PHUVRQ·VZRUNFRXOGEHVDLGWRIDOOXQGHUWKLV
category.28 The broader question is how this principle plays out in terms of theorised 
SHUVRQDOUHODWLRQVWRWH[WXQGHUWKHQHZFRQGLWLRQVLQ(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWRIWKHearly-
1840s. 
Even if it does not always explicitly say so, most of the criticism treating of 
(PHUVRQ·VOLQJXLVWLFWKHRU\turns on this theme of a language gesturing beyond 
normative economies. The question of relation which accompanies it is revealed in the 
varieties of the responses of a range of (PHUVRQ·VUHDGHUV6R%DUEDUD3DFNHUZULWHV
that the method of excess is the reason that a number of his readers³from his 
contemporary Francis Bowen, to Yvor Winters, to Jonathan Bishop³have struggled to 
accommodate what seems to be overt and grotesque silliness or inappropriateness in his 
writing. Focusing on the eye-EDOOWURSHDQGDSDVVDJHIURP¶&LUFOHV· Packer considers 
                                                 
27 $UVLýSS-8. 
28 In this respect, one might consider a recent essay by Andrew Taylor which posits that Emerson is a 
¶UDGLFDOO\PRGHUDWH·ZULWHU7D\ORU·VSLHFHZHLJKVXSWKHDYHUVLRQWRstructural singularity which has put so 
many critics off Emerson and argues instead³in the tradition of Cavell³IRU(PHUVRQ·VSURFHVV-
oriented, performative, and provocative style. Essentially, Emerson is given to be a writer of imbalanced 
containment ratheUWKDQRIGLDOHFWLFDOV\QWKHVLVKLVSURVH¶H[KLELWLQJDJHQHURXVO\PRGHUDWLQJIRUFH
stylistically unsettled and unsettling, discursively unwilling to succumb to the paradoxically conventional 
VHGXFWLRQVRIH[WUHPLVP·,QRWKHUZRUGVPRGHUDWLRQLVJLYHQto be a modulation of dissonance, in 
SDUDOOHOZLWK&DOGHU·VK\SRWKHVLV$QGUHZ7D\ORU¶$0DQLV&RQVHUYDWLYHDIWHU'LQQHU5DOSK:DOGR
(PHUVRQ0LFKHOGH0RQWDLJQHDQGWKH$SSHWLWHVRI0RGHUDWLRQ·Forum for Modern Language Studies, 48 
(2012), 1-18 (p. 7, 15). 
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ZKHWKHUWKH¶IXQQ\·VRXQGRIVXFKSDVVDJHVFRPHVIURPIORULGXQSKLORVRSKLFDO
vocabulary and syntax (as the rationalist and staunch Lockean Bowen thought, branding 
(PHUVRQ·V¶2OG6D[RQLGLRP·DZULWLQJH[KLELWLQJ¶EDWKRVZLWKPDOLFHSUHSHQVH·RU
from the themes and images addressed, but, either way, the response has been one of 
QHDUXQLYHUVDOEHPXVHPHQWDQGFULWLTXHRI(PHUVRQ·VDXWKRrial decision. As Packer 
VXPPDULVHV¶>P@RVWFULWLFVVHHPWRDJUHHWKDWWKHODSVH>VZHUH@XQLQWHQWLRQDO·29 
Packer goes on to argue that (PHUVRQ·VUHYLVLRQVIURPJMN to published works 
offer a significant indicator to the marks of intention, and hence she proposes that this 
writing is a means of provocation developed to provide an alternative to the open 
attacks on theological dogmas of the time, the negative consequences of which 
Emerson had experienced in 1832 and 1838.30 Elsewhere, other sympathetically-minded 
critics have echoed and developed on the same idea. A writing of provocation is not 
GLUHFWDQGFHUWDLQO\QRWGLGDFWLF6RUHIOHFWLQJRQ(PHUVRQ·VXQJDLQO\LQWUXVLYHSURVH
Cavell describes (PHUVRQ·VZULWLQJ¶FDOOLQJ·XVWRWKRXJKWinciting us to see the 
¶YRFDWLRQ·LQSURYRFDWLRQZKLFKREOLJHVXVWRDFNQRZOHGJHRXUUHODWLRQWRFRQIRUPLW\
which is to say our relation to conventional economies, and the thinking thereon which 
in itself constitutes a severance with their order.31 Equally, when Richard Poirier 
SURSRVHVWKDWWKHYHU\FKDUDFWHURIOLWHUDWXUHLVWKDWLWLV¶ZRUGVLQH[FHVVRIWKH
minimum daily requirements of human beings· he means specifically that a language of 
¶YRODWLOLW\·GHPDQGVDQ¶LQWHQVHUHODWLRQ·RQRXUSDUWZH¶SDUWLFLSDWHDVUHDGHUV·LQZKDW
(PHUVRQH[SHULHQFHVRIODQJXDJHDQGLWV¶H[WUDYDJDQFH·VKRXOGLQZRUGV3RLULHUWDNHV
                                                 
29 %DUEDUD3DFNHU¶8ULHO·V&ORXG(PHUVRQ·V5KHWRULF·, Georgia Review, 31 (1977), 322-42 (p. 328, 327); 
)UDQFLV%RZHQ¶5HYLHZRINature·S 
30 Packer stays within a narrow context³WKDWRIDVLQJOHSDVVDJHLQ¶&LUFOHV·³because her focus is on 
how one writes out of a particular stranglehold: in this case, of a type of religious opinion. Given a choice 
RI¶GHQXQFLDWLRQ·RU¶SDURG\·DVKLVSXEOLFPHans of attack, Emerson chose the latter, Packer asserts, lest 
KHEHVHHQWREHD¶FRQWHPSWLEOH·VHOI-DSSRLQWHGSURSKHW6HH3DFNHU¶8ULHO·V&ORXG·S 
31 &DYHOO¶$YHUVLYH7KLQNLQJ·S 
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IURP:LOOLDP-DPHV¶´FRQWLQXDOO\EHWUD\WKHLQDGHTXDF\RIWKHUHVLGXDOVWDWHPHQWµ·
which is the normative economy.32 
But there is an aspect of such discussLRQVWKDWWLHVWKHPWR(PHUVRQ·VHDUOLHU
career, attitudes, and style. Each of these models posits an author who makes demands 
on us as readers, but they decline to consider what problems are raised and risks taken 
by the author who makes them. EssentiallyDOOSUHVXPHWKHDXWKRU·VDORRIQHXWUDOLW\%\
1844, however, Emerson has begun to revise his attitude, so that the manner of excess 
and exaggeration has firmer theoretical footing: 
 
Given the planet, it is still necessary to add the impulse; so, to every creature 
nature added a little violence of direction in its proper path, a shove to put it on 
its way; in every instance, a slight generosity, a drop too much. Without 
electricity the air would rot, and without this violence of direction, which men 
and women have, without a spice of bigot and fanatic, no excitement, no 
efficiency. We aim above the mark, to hit the mark. Every act has some 
falsehood of exaggeration in it. (CW III, 107) 
 
This is a complex and suggestive passage¶*LYHQ·SXQVRQDGRXEOHPHDQing³we are 
¶JLYHQ·WKHSODQHWEXWLWLVVRIXQGDPHQWDODFRQGLWLRQZHDUHZRQWWRWDNHLWZLWKRXW
DFNQRZOHGJHPHQWDQHFHVVDU\SUHGLFDWH¶DJLYHQ·UHFHLYHGZLWKRXWREOLJDWLRQRIWKDQNV
and so we remain merely self-VXIILFLHQW¶LWLVVWLOOQHFHVVDU\WRDdd the imp[-]ulse· 
Excess is energy, a superfluity which will yet power more mill-wheels. To reframe this in 
a linguistic context, if we cannot write with symbolic mastery, if we cannot write 
economically as just expending enough effort to have the controlled, intended effect 
which fulfils the poetic ideal, then we must write in a manner which conducts the 
                                                 
32 Poirier, Poetry and Pragmatism, p. 11, 12, 45, 58. 
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excesses and fanaticism appropriate to our condition, even if it is falsehood. The point is 
that the writing which extends its benefit to unknown futures may require a certain 
disregard of what one feels to be true, or, to put it another way, the renunciation of 
sincerity between author and reader. This means that the neutralised author can be 
UHFRQVLGHUHGIURPDQRWKHUSHUVSHFWLYH3DFNHU·VUHYLVHGYHUVLRQRIWKHHVVD\¶8ULHO·V
CORXG·SXEOLVKHGLQ(PHUVRQ·V)DOO (1982), loosely figures this alternative: ¶(PHUVRQ·V
tendency from the first is to efface himself, to leave the reader no clues as to how his 
text is to be privately performed. If his reticence leaves room for the freedom of the 
reader, it also invites his distortions and mistakes·33 
 (PHUVRQ·VRZQWKHRULVDWLRQs of this principle are a good deal clearer than is 
usually acknowledged, although³in the early-1840s, at least³there is no doubt that he 
vaFLOODWHVRYHUKLVSRVLWLRQ)RULQVWDQFHLQ-XO\KHH[WROVWKHUHDGHU·VSULYLOHJH
¶>W@KHSRZHUWRH[FLWHZKLFKWKHSDJHIRUPRPHQWVSRVVHVVHGLWGHULYHGIURP\RX<RX
read it as you read words in a dictionary or hear a sonorous name of some foreigner and 
LQYHVWWKHVWUDQJHUZLWKVRPHHPLQHQWJLIWV·JMN VIII, 191-2). Elsewhere, however, he 
declares his authorial investment uncompromisingly: ¶,ZRXOGKDYHP\ERRNUHDGDV,
have read my favourite books not with explosion & astonishment, a marvel and a 
URFNHWEXWDIULHQGO\DQGDJUHHDEOHLQIOXHQFH·JMN VIII, 106). Although phrased 
relatively benignly, this nevertheless demands a wholly receptive audience. Between 
these poles, other stances are implicitly postulated. Should one invest in that which 
declLQHVLQYHVWPHQWDQGWKHUHE\LQVWLJDWHDWUDJHG\QDWLYHWROLWHUDWXUH·VDVSLUDWLRQV"2U
must one become neutral, sincerely declining impossible investment? Perhaps there is 
even a way to appear to give sincerely, but actually do no such thing. Suffice it to say for 
QRZWKDWWKHFRQVHTXHQFHRI(PHUVRQ·VYDFLOODWLRQVLVWKDWFULWLFLVPZKLFKIRFXVHVRQ
the authorial function in his work diverges quite plainly on such lines. Packer recognises 
                                                 
33 Barbara Packer, (PHUVRQ·V)DOO$1HZ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH0DMRU(VVD\V (New York: Continuum, 1982), p. 
20. 
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the problem, but abides with the conviction that we should look for and countenance 
authorial intention, even if that intent discloses a desire to disappear into neutrality, 
VRPHWKLQJ$UVLý HFKRHVPRUHUHFHQWO\LQQRWLQJWKDW(PHUVRQ·VH[FHVVHV¶DLPDWYDULRXV
kinds of disidentification [«WKH\DUH@JXHUULOODOLNHWDFWLFV·.34 Cavell advocates receptivity 
since it is that which invokes genuine personal, and hence moral, thought. Poirier 
FRORXUVWKHUHODWLRQZLWKWUDJLFRYHUWRQHVFDVWLQJ(PHUVRQ·VDWWHPSWVDWH[SUHVVLRQLQ
DQXQSOLDQWXQVXEPLVVLYHODQJXDJHDVD¶FRQWLQXRXVVWUXJJOH·DJDLQVW¶UHVLVWDQFH· 
FKDUDFWHULVLQJ(PHUVRQDV¶WKHJUHDWHVWRIKLVH[WHQGHGWULEHEHFDXVHPRUHWKDQDQ\RI
the others he offers himself as a truly sacrificial figure·35 ,Q+DUROG%ORRP·VZRUNWKH
principle is fetishised to an extraordinary extent, anxiety of influence leading to an 
Oedipal will to power and usurpation as the dominant reason for the existence of 
literary writing.36 Julie Ellison, meanwhile, writing in more or less the same critical 
moment as Bloom, Poirier, Cavell, and Packer, wholly empowers the reader³any 
¶FULWLFDOUHDGHU· WKDWLVQRWMXVW%ORRP·VSRHW¶7KHFULWLFDOUHDGHULVVXGGHQO\IORRGHG
with a sense of his own power· VRPHWKLQJ(OOLVRQODEHOV¶Whe hermeneutical sublime·37 
 This disparity is indicative of a condition which needs greater exposition. The 
essential problem is that the relation between author and reader never seems equal or 
reciprocal. Provocation does not resolve into fellow feeling. The reader is either 
implored by the author to show some sympathy, or the reader disempowers the author, 
or the author the reader. On all counts, sympathy is presumed to be in short supply. As 
                                                 
34 $UVLýS 
35 Poirier, Poetry and Pragmatism, p. 67, 27, 31. 
36 Bloom, of course, has written extensively on Emerson. See his Ringers in the Tower (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1971), pp. 217-26; A Map of Misreading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 160-
76; Kabbalah and Criticism (New York: Continuum, 1975), pp. 95-126; Figures of Capable Imagination (New 
York: Seabury Press, 1976), pp. 46-75; Poetry and Repression: Revisionism from Blake to Stevens (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 235-66; Agon: Towards a Theory of Revisionism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), pp. 145-%ORRP·VZULWLQJVKDYHEHHQDQLPSRUWDQt and hugely influential 
contribution to scholarship, but his arguments are tendentious and can seem totalitarian. David 
:LWWHQEHUJODXQFKHVDVFDWKLQJDWWDFNRQWKLVDVSHFWRI%ORRP·VZHOO-known thesis, or, as Wittenberg calls 
LWWKHSRHWLF¶DWWHPSW>«@WRKDYHWKHODVWZRUG·LQKLVPhilosophy, Revision, Critique: Rereading Practices in 
Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Emerson (Palo Alto CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 112-130. 
37 Ellison, p. 8. 
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I see it, the presumption of writing to an unsympathetic reader is critical to 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ(PHUVRQ·VSKLORVRSKLFDOPRGHORIWKHOLWHUDU\WH[WLQSecond Series, but it 
does present dilemmas. Once again, these are reflected in the criticism. Traditionally, 
Emerson was given to be notoriously aloof, whether on personal terms, as Margaret 
Fuller found, or in relation to his audiences.38 Contemporary reviews alternately wrote 
of his quasi-mystic concealment behind a consciously arcane vocabulary or accuse him 
of cowardice or charlatanism for his refusal to engage either in person or in his writing 
with pressing socio-political concerns.39 
 0RUHUHFHQWO\KRZHYHU(PHUVRQ·VOLWHUDU\SHUVRQDOLW\KDVEHHQVXEMHFWWR
UHYLVLRQ5LFKDUGVRQ·VMind on Fire asserts his vivacity and charm (albeit mainly in 
comparison with the intransLJHQW7KRUHDXZKLOH)LFKWHOEHUJ·VUHDGLQJWKURXJKWKHOHQV
of nineteenth-century sentimentalisms demands that Emerson be seen as a more 
gregarious character. As he writes: ¶(PHUVRQUHGHHPHG>KLV@GHEWVWKURXJKDQLPDJHU\
of sympathy and sincerity. He aspired to be a transparent medium, an affectionate 
general equivalent like money itself, trading on feeling·40 Leaving aside for now this odd 
and suggestive analogy with money (I will pick it up later in the chapter), such notions 
                                                 
38 6HH(PHUVRQ·VUHPDUNVRQ)XOOHU·VFRPPHQWVDERXWKLVSHrsonality (JMN VII, 301-2). 
39 6HHIRULQVWDQFH6DPXHO*LOPDQ·VDUWLFOHIURPWKHSouthern Rose of November 1838, where the author 
¶VXEPLWV·VRPHRI(PHUVRQ·V¶LQFRPSUHKHQVLELOLWLHV·UHJDUGLQJWKHUHOLJLRXVVHQWLPHQWZKLFK¶EHZLOGHU
>«@KLVKHDUHUVDPLGVW ODE\ULQWKVRIEHDXWLIXOFRQWUDGLFWLRQV·RUDUHYLHZRI¶7KH0HWKRGRI1DWXUH·
which appeared in the Knickerbocker LQRIZKLFKWKHDXWKRUVWDWHVWKDW¶WKHUHLVQHYHUWKHOHVVQRWD
thought in it, which is worthy any thing, that would not have produced ten-fold more effect had it been 
OHIWRSHQWRWKHKHDUHURUUHDGHU·VPLQGLQVWHDGRIEHLQJFRYHUHGZLWKDJURWHVTXHJDUERIPRWOH\
ODQJXDJH·%RWKUHSURGXFHGLQ-RHO0\HUVRQHGEmerson and Thoreau: The Contemporary Reviews 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 57, 58, 109. 
40 Fichtelberg, p. 118. Such readings, it should be noted, have become increasingly popular. 7KHR'DYLV·V
2007 study of a similar set of principles in American literature posits that an emergent literary nationalism 
sought WRLGHQWLI\LWVHOIE\SURPXOJDWLQJDVHQVHWKDW¶H[SHULHQFH·LQ'DYLV·VVWXG\WKLVPHDQVFDWHJRULFDO
structures of feeling or responses to events) was nationally universal, and could be generated via the 
OLWHUDU\WH[W6R(PHUVRQDPRQJRWKHUZULWHUV¶Fonceived of experience as a domain of hypothetical, 
typical responses, and [«] their central literary project was the evocation and shaping of such typical 
experience· Like Fichtelberg, the sentimental experience becomes transferable; subjectivity is overcome 
toward secular ends and in a secular sense, the object of literature being mutuality and sympathetic 
LGHQWLILFDWLRQ/LWHUDU\H[SHULHQFHLQ'DYLVEHFRPHVH[SOLFLWO\¶IRUPDOLVHG·³singular, categorical, and 
trans-subjective. See Theo Davis, Formalism, Experience, and the Making of American Literature in the Nineteenth-
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 2 and 109-37. 
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of sympathy and transparency as factors of literary relationality can be tried against the 
theorisations advanced in Second Series. 
 (PHUVRQ·VH[SOLFLWUHIHUHQFHVWRWKLVNLQGRIUHODWLRQVKLSLQWKHYROXPHWHQGWR
be mocking and self-UHIOH[LYHDVLQ¶1DWXUH·¶%XWLWLVYHU\HDV\Wo outrun the sympathy 
of readers on this topic, which schoolmen called natura naturata, or nature passive. One 
FDQKDUGO\VSHDNRILWZLWKRXWH[FHVV·CW III, 103). Excess is exactly what Emerson 
has given us, of course. Since his poet is unsympathetic, we can hardly expect Emerson 
to confess his own desire for the sympathies of his readers, and so, twice more in the 
volume, he warns us off: sympathy is a false relation, or, at the very least, it is 
incommensurable with the relation of reciprocal provocatioQ¶1RWOHVV,GLVOLNHDORZ
V\PSDWK\RIHDFKZLWKKLVQHLJKERXU·VQHHGV0XVWZHKDYHDJRRGXQGHUVWDQGLQJZLWK
RQHDQRWKHU·VSDODWHV"·CW III, 81). The sympathetic individual, he writes elsewhere, 
gives himself up not for the benefit of others, but for their vices.41 So far as the 
WKHRULVDWLRQJRHVLWLVDZULWHU·VPRUDOLPSHUDWLYHWRWUDQVFHQGWKHGHPDQGRU
expectation of sympathy, and, in the more personal reflections of critics on Emerson, 
this is exactly what we find. This is not only the case with his harsher critics³Yvor 
Winters, Perry Miller, Francis Bowen³but with those who are, ultimately, more 
¶V\PSDWKHWLF·DQLQVWUXFWLYHSDUDGR[LQLWVHOI5LFKDUG3RLULHUIRULQVWDQFH¶(PHUVRQ
makes himself sometimes amazingly hard to read, hard to get close to·42 Or, more 
exactingly, Stanley Cavell, who explained his long delay in coming to read Emerson as 
EDVHGLQKLVIHHOLQJWKDW(PHUVRQ·VZRUNVIRUDORQJWLPH¶VHHPHGHPSW\WRPH7KH\
seemed to me repellent, quite as if presenting me with something for which I could not 
acknowledge my craving·43 The difficulty recognised here, to be conceptualised, needs 
                                                 
41 6HH¶([SHULHQFH·¶$V\PSDWKHWLFSHUVRQLVSODFHGLQWKHGLOHPPDRIDVZLPPHUDPRQJGURZQLQJPHQ
who all catch at him, and if he give so much as a leg or finger, they will drown him. They wish to be saved 
IURPWKHPLVFKLHIVRIWKHLUYLFHVEXWQRWIURPWKHLUYLFHV·CW III, 46-7). 
42 Poirier, Poetry and Pragmatism, p. 31. 
43 &DYHOO¶$Q(PHUVRQ0RRG·S 
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to be figured in terms which accommodate all of its relational conditions. First, no 
writing is apologia, nor can it carry over a specific intended effect. As writing of 
provocation, it can only energise: any reciprocal or compensatory effect on the writing 
subject cannot be anticipated. It is not, therefore, trade or exchange, nor is it 
speculation. What Emerson gives us comes with no conditions of acceptance. Indeed, 
its acceptance is something he appears to be indifferent about. Understanding it in 
economic terms requires recourse to principles on the margins of economic theory, and 
the theory best suited is that of the gift economy. 
 
Textual Economics III: The Gift of Writing 
Even from the outset of such a WKHRULVDWLRQKRZHYHULWLVHYLGHQWWKDW(PHUVRQ·V
approach has some idiosyncratic qualities. For most of the history of gift theory, a 
distinctly modern approach to economics which owes much to the rise of anthropology 
as a discipline, the economic emphasis in its thought demands that gifts operate on a 
principle of exchange. In other words, this alternative economic model still depends on 
a familiar set of relations: a debtor and creditor, the defined giving subject as well as the 
defined receiving subject. So it is interesting to note that when the renowned gift 
theorist Marcel Mauss touches on models which subvert this exchange function, it is to 
Emerson that he turns: 
 
The unreciprocated gift still makes the person who has accepted it inferior, 
particularly when it has been accepted with no thought of returning it. We are 
still in the field of Germanic morality when we recall the curious essay by 
(PHUVRQHQWLWOHG¶*LIWV· Charity is still wounding for him who has accepted it, 
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and the whole tendency of our morality is to strive to do away with the 
unconscious and injurious patronage of the rich almsgiver.44 
 
Mauss refers to WKHVKRUWHVVD\¶*LIWV·ZKLFKVLWVDWWKHKHDUWRISecond Series, of which 
more in a moment. His comment also plainly echoes (PHUVRQ·VWUHDWPHQWRIFKDULW\LQ
¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·CW II, 30-1). But if Emerson perceives harmfulness or weakness in the 
DFFHSWDQFHRIJLIWVWKLVGRHVQ·WPHDQWKDWKHZRQ·WHQGRUVHJLYLQJXQGHUFHUWDLQ
FRQGLWLRQV,Q¶1DWXUH· while still discussing the necessity of excess³of euphuism and 
the superlative³LQZULWLQJRQQDWXUH(PHUVRQEUDQGV¶>O@LWHUDWXUHSRHWU\VFLHQFH[«] 
the homage of man to this unfathomed secret· and in so doing alludes via an 
etymological pun on the homo LQ¶KRPDJH·WRDJLIWDWWhe limits of possibility, an ecce homo 
RIKXPDQLW\·VOLPLWLQLWVEHVWIRUPVJLYHQIRUQRDQWLFLSDWHGUHWXUQEXWRQO\DV
perpetuating offering (CW ,,,$VDPRGHRI¶KRQRXULQJRQH·VSODFH· it is a kind of 
HQGRUVHPHQWRIRQH·VGZHOOLQJ³household sustenance, or economy, in other words³
enacted via receptivity and complicity. In the ideal sense, we simply reiterate the world 
and render a state conceptually identical with that in which we found it by restoring the 
ontological break with understanding, manifested by way of the introduction of a new 
¶LPSLVK·SDUWLFXODU$V(PHUVRQSXWVLWLQ¶*LIWV· our greatest gift in perpetuating 
RXUVHOYHVLVHVVHQWLDOO\DPRGHRIVXUUHQGHUWR¶KDQGVRPH·QHFHVVLW\:HJLYHWRIXOILO
our obligation, because we are compelled, because that compulsion perpetuates the 
world, because the world provides us with the means of self-realisation. 45 The difficulty 
                                                 
44 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies (1925), trans. by W. D. Halls 
/RQGRQDQG1HZ<RUN5RXWOHGJHS*UXVLQDOVRUHIHUVWR0DXVV·VUHPDUNVLQKLVGLVFXVVLRQ
of an economy of gift, projection, and expendiWXUHLQ(PHUVRQ6HH*UXVLQ¶´3XW*RGLQ\RXU'HEWµ·S
35. 
45 ,Q'DYLG:LWWHQEHUJ·VFKDSWHURQ(PHUVRQLQPhilosophy, Revision, Critique, his argument³essentially 
DERXWWKHUHDGLQJDQGUHUHDGLQJRIKLVWRU\LQ(PHUVRQ·VZRUN³coincides with my own, and against 
%ORRPLQVRIDUDVKHHPSKDVLVHV(PHUVRQ·VLQWHUHVWLQSRWHQWLDOLWLHVPDGHSRVVLEOHE\WKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKH
QHZWH[WUDWKHUWKDQZKDWLWPHDQVWRWKHSRHWLFVXEMHFWKLPVHOI¶:KHUHDVIRU%ORRPWKHHQGRIWKH
process of revisionist reading remains the formation of the poetic subject over and against the precursor, 
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RIDJLIWLVRQO\WKDW¶WKHLPSHGLPHQWOLHVLQWKHFKRRVLQJ·LQIDFW¶RQHLVJODGZKHQDQ
imperative leaves him no option· DQGQHFHVVLW\GLFWDWHVFKRLFHWKHSOD\RQ¶LPSV·
effortlessly translating impediment to imperative, inaction to action (CW III, 93, 94).  
 But this kind of giving has certain conditions. Principally, it does not invoke 
exchange: the receiver does not accept the gift sympathetically; in fact, they seem not to 
DFFHSWWKHJLIWDWDOO2QWKHSDUWRIWKHJLYHU¶WKHH[SHFWDWLRQRIJUDWLWXGHLVPHDQDQG
LVFRQWLQXDOO\SXQLVKHGE\WKHWRWDOLQVHQVLELOLW\RIWKHREOLJHGSHUVRQ·CW III, 95). If a 
gift is to be a gift, it must be received without the sense of receipt, without the recipient 
entering a cycle of exchange by being obliged to the benefactor; with indifference, in 
RWKHUZRUGV)RUWKHVDPHUHDVRQDQDFWRIJLYLQJZKLFKLVFRQVFLRXVRILWVHOI¶LVIOat 
usurpation· DJLIWPDGHRQO\ZLWKVLJKWRIWKHUHFLSLHQW·VREOLJLQJUHWXUQCW III, 95). If 
a gift can only be received with indifference, so must it be made³¶/HWKLPJLYH
kingdoms or flower-OHDYHVLQGLIIHUHQWO\·DVJLIWDQ\JLYHQWKLQJKDVQRGLIIHUential 
value, but is defined solely by the conditions of being given (CW III, 96).  
 Emerson is caught in a curious bind here which encapsulates his interrogation of 
the economics of literary investment. On the one hand, in these remarks, he resembles 
no one so much as Jacques Derrida, for whom the principle of the pure gift is 
¶DQHFRQRPLF·³it absolutely precludes all modes of exchange and the relational factors 
on which exchange is predicated. This makes it very difficult to effectively discuss the 
economic principle on practical terms, and I will return to this startling modern parallel 
in a moment. On the other hand, Emerson, like many of his literary contemporaries, 
was a favoured author of the lucrative gift book vogue which was the primary project of 
a number of American publishing houses from the 1830s to the late-1840s.46 In this 
                                                                                                                                          
(PHUVRQ·VIDWDOJHVWXUHWRZDUGDIXWXUHLVDEVROXWHO\DQGLQH[WULFDEO\OLQNHGWRWKHFRQWLQXDOSURFHVVRI
DFFHSWDQFHE\IXWXUHUHDGHUV·:LWWHQEHUJS 
46 Two general histories of the gift book in America in the relevant period exist: Frederick Faxon, Literary 
Annuals and Gift Books: A Bibliography, 1823-1903 (1912), Reprint (Pinner: Private Libraries Association, 
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FRQWH[WWKHHFRQRPLFSULQFLSOHVHVSRXVHGLQ¶*LIWV·DUHGHVWDELOLVHGEHFDXVHWKH
FRQWUDGLFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHWKHRULVHGJLIW,·YHEHJXQWRRXWOLQHDQGWKHOLWHUDU\
commodity of the gift book could not be more evident. In handsomely bound gift 
books, Emerson published one piece of prose and six poems between 1844 and 1847, 
the years immediately following the publication of Second Series.47 His work appeared 
alongside that of fellow Transcendentalists Christopher Cranch, Frederick Henry 
Hedge, and William Henry Furness, the latter a close friend of Emerson and the editor 
of all volumes of The Gift and The Diadem to which he contributed. There were also 
popular authors, such as Lydia Sigourney, while in The Gift RI(PHUVRQ·VSRHPV
DSSHDUDORQJVLGHWKHILUVWSXEOLFDWLRQRI3RH·V¶3XUORLQHG/HWWHU· which is a coincidence 
worth pursuing for a number of reasons. 
 ,QDUHFHQWDUWLFOH$OH[DQGUD8UDNRYDDQDO\VHV¶7KH3XUORLQHG/HWWHU· in the 
context of its first appearance in The Gift, and, in view of the fact that there are no 
VFKRODUO\WUHDWPHQWVRI(PHUVRQ·VZRUNLQJLIWERRNVKHUILQGLQJVZLOODOVREHWKH
grounds upon which we can consider the relevance of the mode here. As Urakova 
ZULWHVWKHJLIWERRNZDV¶QRWMXVWDSHULRGLFDOLWZDVDOVRDQH[SHQVLYHSUHVHQWDQG
object of luxury: an exquisite artefact· As such, it was a conspicuous commodity: 
¶UHDGLQJLVUHSODFHGE\ORRNLQJDQGVKRZLQJ[«] the exaggerated care [taken of the 
ERRN@VWUHVVHVWKHVRXYHQLU·VHFRQRPLFDQGV\PEROLFYDOXH·48 In other words, therefore, 
the economy of the gift book described by Urakova is precisely what Emerson 
H[SUHVVHGKLVGLVWDVWHIRULQWKHHVVD\¶*LIWV· As Meredith McGill notes in American 
Literature and the Culture of Reprinting, the gift book operated within certain economic, 
                                                                                                                                          
1973), and Ralph Thompson, American Literary Annuals and Gift Books: 1825-1865 (New York: H. W. 
Wilson, 1936). 
47 7KHFRPSOHWHOLVWRI(PHUVRQ·VJLIWERRNFRQWULEXWLRQVLVDVIROORZV¶7KH*DUGHQRI3ODQWV·DSSHDUVLQ
7KH*LIW$&KULVWPDVDQG1HZ<HDU·V3UHVHQW (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1844), pp. 143-¶7KH3RHW·V
$SRORJ\·DQG¶'LUJH·LQThe Gift (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1845), pp. 77 and 94-¶/RVVDQG*DLQ·
¶$)DEOH·¶7KH)RUH-5XQQHUV·LQThe Diadem: A Present for All Seasons (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1846), 
SS¶7KH:RUOG-6RXO·LQThe Diadem (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1847), pp. 76-8. 
48 $OH[DQGUD8UDNRYD¶´7KH3XUORLQHG/HWWHUµLQWKH*LIW%RRN5HDGLQJ3RHLQD&RQWHPSRUDU\
&RQWH[W·Nineteenth-Century Literature, 64 (2009), 323-46 (pp. 330-1). 
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VRFLDODQGFXOWXUDOSRZHUVWUXFWXUHV'HVFULELQJWKH¶DV\PPHWULFDOFRQGLWLRQVRIJLIW
book circulation· McGill writes: 
 
Generally purchased by men and given to women³often as part of the 
courtship process³gift books are situated at a pivot point between economic 
and affective systems of exchange. As they pass from purchaser to receiver, 
suitor to woman sought, gift books also need to be transformed from mass-
produced commodities LQWRDQRWKHUNLQGRIFXUUHQF\¶WRNHQVRIDIIHFWLRQ· that 
will be rewarded by a return of the same.49 
 
Urakova adds that the fact that many gift books contained stories or poems detailing 
PHPHQWRHVRU¶IRUJHW-me-QRWV·WKHUHZDVHYHQD%ULWLVKgift book called The Forget-Me-
Not) was wholly correspondent with its extra-OLWHUDU\IXQFWLRQ¶PRUHRUOHVVH[SOLFLWO\
remind[ing] the reader of its functional, gift-related character·50 Hence the gift book 
existed as a token instigating the circuit of obligation Emerson saw and explicitly 
rejected³this literary gift has no specifically philosophical merit, but operates entirely 
within the economic and social criteria of genteel society: the expectation of a certain 
kind of response to a certain kind of gift. The form could be critiqued from within: as 
Urakova finds with Poe, the author might sympathetically comply with readerly 
expectation and market conditions, while simultaneously managing to disclose the true 
terms of the contract entered into. Urakova writes that the movement of the purloined 
letter between the persons of the text until it is rightfully restored to its proper addressee 
(in which process the facilitator, Dupin, receives a sizeable cheque) is a reflection on the 
economic function of the gift book itself³the story self-reflexively complies with 
                                                 
49 Meredith McGill, American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting, 1834-1853 (Philadelphia: University of 
3HQQV\OYDQLD3UHVVS8UDNRYD·VDUJXPHQWLVEDVHGLQSDUWRQWKLVVDPHGLVFXVVLRQLQ0F*LOO 
50 Urakova, p. 332. 
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H[SHFWDWLRQZKLOHUHYHDOLQJWKHSURMHFWRILWV¶IUDPH· this being an easing of the 
mechanism of social and affective economies in exchange for financial reward. In 
FRQWUDVWKRZHYHU(PHUVRQ·VRIIHUings comply with expectations only in loose and 
apparently circumstantial ways. 
,QKLVHDUOLHVWFRQWULEXWLRQ¶7KH*DUGHQRI3ODQWV· SUHVHQWHGDV¶$/HDIIURPD
Journal· Emerson recollects his trip to the titular garden in Paris. In this respect, he 
engages to some extent with a gift book convention: what Ralph Thompson has called 
¶IORZHUVDQGIORZHUODQJXDJH·the description of plants and fruit which themselves 
reference another kind of conventional gift.51 Yet Emerson very quickly turns away 
from the contextual currency of these symbols toward typically Emersonian 
preoccupations, recasting them in the symbolic economy of his own thought. From the 
first lines, he implicitly questions the rectitude of the approach of the French scientists, 
presenting it as D¶UDQVDFN·RIQDWXUH:HRXJKWWRUHDGWKLV¶%RWDQLFDO&DELQHW·QRWIRU
LWVVFLHQWLILFYLUWXHVQRULWVH[RWLFEHDXW\EXWDV¶DJUDPPDURIERWDQ\· D¶QDWXUDO
alphabet· In essence, we are being gently encouraged to read this description not for 
our store of knowledge³(PHUVRQHYHQLQVWUXFWVXV¶\RXQHHGQRWZULWHGRZQ·WKH
Latin name of a parrot described³but as token of a renewed hermeneutic of nature 
H[WULQVLFWRDQ\HFRQRP\RIQDWXUH·VXVH-YDOXHPXFKDV·VNature had done.52 ¶7KH
3RHW·V$SRORJ\· PHDQZKLOHZKLFKDSSHDUHGLQWKHIROORZLQJ\HDU·VGift and was later 
SXEOLVKHGLQ·VPoems DVVLPSO\¶7KH$SRORJ\· seconds these principles. As 
(PHUVRQ·VSRHWVD\V 
 
 Chide me not, laborious band, 
 For the idle flowers I brought; 
                                                 
51 7KRPSVRQFODLPVWKHUHZHUH¶DWOHDVWILIW\·JLIW books or annuals in Britain and America during the 
period which featured a title alluding to this convention. See Ralph Thompson, p. 17. 
52 (PHUVRQ¶7KH*DUGHQRI3ODQWV·LQThe Gift, (1844), pp. 143-6. 
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 Every aster in my hand 
 Goes home loaded with a thought.53 
 
Which thought, it ought to be stressed, is not the same as that which attaches to the 
thought of the gift of flowers, or the gift of the flowery gift book, but rather a facet of 
(PHUVRQ·VRUJDQLFDOO\LQIOHFWHGHSLVWHPology. More significant, however, is the very 
QRWLRQRIWKLVSRHPDV¶DSRORJ\·ZKHQLWLVDQ\WKLQJEXW7KHSRHWH[RQHUDWHVKLPVHOI
from both affective and social expectations (¶7KLQNPHQRWXQNLQGDQGUXGH_ That I 
ZDONDORQHLQJURYHDQGJOHQ·DQGHFRQRPLFSURGXFWLYLW\¶7D[QRWP\VORWK·DQG
SRVLWVWKDWKLVSRHPLWVHOILVWKH¶VHFRQGFURSWKLQHDFUHV\LHOG· In other words, it is not 
a justification based on the terms of the economies alluded to, but simply presents itself 
as pure and uncomplicated productivity, given (and given to be understood) with 
sympathy neither expressed nor expected. The poem operates solely on its own terms. 
 (PHUVRQ·VJLIWERRNFRQWULEXWLRQVDUHLWPXVWEHDFNQRZOHGJHGDWEHVWRQO\
minor infractions of the contractual obligation of the gift book. They do not expose the 
PDFKLQDWLRQVDWZRUNLQWKHSURMHFWDQG3RH·V¶3XUORLQHG/HWWHU· LQ8UDNRYD·VUHDGLQJ
seems to offer a much richer analysis of the extent of authorial liberty in this print 
culture. But they do indicate a degree of intransigence; that if the contract is not exactly 
rejected, nor is it necessarily given much consideration. 54 Emerson offered what he 
                                                 
53 (PHUVRQ¶7KH3RHW·V$SRORJ\·LQThe Gift, (1845), p. 77. 
54 Some additional context on how Emerson came to appear in these volumes in the first place offers a 
possible explanation for his acquiescence without concessions to the particular contractual expectations 
involved. His earliest contributions were solicited by his close friend, William Henry Furness, who was 
editor of The Gift5HFRUGVXUYLYHVLQ(PHUVRQ·VOHWWHUVRI)XUQHVV·VUHTXHVWVDQGHYLGHQFHFDQDOVREH
found there that most pieces were written for the express purpose of inclusion in these volumes. Initially, 
it seems as though Emerson sought to supply the work of his friends in place of his own, mentioning 
:LOOLDP+HQU\&KDQQLQJ·VYHUVHVEXWLQWKHVDPHOHWWHUKHDFFHSWVWKHLQYLWDWLRQWRZULWHVSHFLILFDOO\IRU
The Gift (L VII, 587-8). When the contributions are mentioned in correspondence with Furness, 
(PHUVRQ·VWRQHLVLQYDULDEO\VHOI-deprecating and offers little insight into his attitudes toward the gift 
book enterprise, although they do suggest that Emerson was paid $25 for his contributions (L VII, 591-2, 
595, VIII, 59). On one occasion, he acknowledges the lack of aesthetic credibility the volumes 
commanded, but at once implies that he had a peculiar interest in their phenomenon: in March 1846 
(likely to have been some months before the deadline for submissions for a book sold expressly for the 
&KULVWPDVPDUNHWKHZULWHVWR)XUQHVVHQTXLULQJDERXWWKH¶ODVWGD\RIJUDFHRURSSRUWXQLW\IRUWKH
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wanted to offer, what he had to offer. Nothing was rejected nor returned for changes. 
With the sketchy informatLRQZHKDYHDYDLODEOHWKLVGRHVQ·WFRQVWLWXWHDFRQFOXVLYH
demonstration of a properly indifferent literary gift by itself, but it is nodding in the 
right direction. In this respect, turning to the contemporary parallel in Derrida becomes 
instructive. It is perhaps correct to have reservations about the rectitude of introducing 
DWKLQNHUVRGLVSDUDWHDWWKLVMXQFWXUHEXW'HUULGD·VWKRXJKWRQWKHJLIWLVRISHFXOLDU
relevance here, not only in terms of its evident similarity, but more compellingly because 
the absolutist, theoretically uncompromising manner of deconstruction has much that 
echoes the position Emerson comes to find himself in with respect to the hypothesis of 
WKHJLIWQRWHGDERYHWKDWLWGRHVQ·WMXVWFRPSOLFDWHQRWLRQVRIH[FKDQJHDQGLQYRNHG 
REOLJDWLRQEXWIODWO\UHIXVHVWKHP,Q'HUULGD·VDQDO\VLVWKLVVDPHORJLFLVDSSOLHGWR
press the possibility of the gift out of any but theoretical existence, something Emerson 
VHHPVWRKDYHDFNQRZOHGJHG)RU'HUULGDWKHWUXHJLIWPXVWEH¶DQHFRQRPLF·¶)RU
there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, countergift, or debt. If 
the other gives me back or owes me or has to give me back what I gave him or her, there 
will not have been a gift [«7@KHJLIWLVDQQXOOHG[«] each time there is a restitution or 
countergift·55 
,QGHHGSUHFLVHO\ZKDW'HUULGDFODLPVDVGHSDUWXUH¶IURPWKHWUDGLWLRQ·RIJLIW
WKHRU\DQGDGLVVRFLDWLRQIURPWKH¶JLIW·WKDWWKHJHQUHRIWKHRU\FDQFODLPWREHWXUQV
on this point, and its correlative³that the gift, as in Emerson, depends on no fellow 
IHHOLQJEHWZHHQJLYHUDQGUHFHLYHUQRFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIWKHJLIW¶,I>WKHUHFHLYHU@
recognises it as gift, if the gift appears to him as such, if the present is present to him as 
                                                                                                                                          
contributors to the Diadem·IRUZULWLQJWRRUGHUVHHPHGWRDWWUDFW(PHUVRQ¶LQWKHVHQHJDWive ages it is 
RIWHQWKHVROHLQVSLUDWLRQ·L VIII, 71). But the fact that Emerson only published in volumes edited by 
Furness suggests, finally, that his obligation to the form extended only so far as his loyalty to his friend. 
His contributions were entirely of his own selection, and although on two occasions he offers limited 
editorial powers to Furness to alter the compositions within described parameters, Furness did not do so, 
and published all compositions intact. 
55 Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. by Peggy Kamuf (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 12. Emphasis in original. 
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present, this simple recognition suffices to annul the gift. Why? Because it gives back in 
the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a symbolic equivalent·56 The consequences of 
such a model are significant. The kind of relation demanded is not simply one which 
refuses sympathy, but one which destroys the basis of relationality entirely. In 
(PHUVRQ·VZRUGVWKHIXQFWLRQLQJLGHDOJLIW¶PXVWEHWKHIORZLQJRIWKHJLYHUXQWRPH
FRUUHVSRQGHQWWRP\IORZLQJXQWRKLP·CW III, 95). Which is to say a state of pure 
fluxion and boundlessness, anGLQ'HUULGD·VODWHWZHQWLHWK-century terms, it becomes a 
W\SHRIWKHDEVROXWH¶LIWKHUHLVDJLIWLWFDQQRWWDNHSODFHEHWZHHQWZRVXEMHFWV
exchanging objects, things, or symbols. The question of the gift should therefore seek 
its place before any relation to the subject, before any conscious or unconscious relation 
to self of the subject [«] the subject and object are arrested effects of the gift, arrests of 
the gift·57  
This is evidently not a disquisition on the kind of relation that exists between the 
courting giver of a gift book and the courted recipient. Instead, we are returned to the 
questions of mutual investment in the relationship focused on the text, an economy 
interrupted by any recourse to extratextual, normalising contexts. I realise, of course, 
WKDWLWLVSHUKDSVLPSODXVLEOHWRLQVLVWWKDWZHFDQWKLQNRIWKHUHEHLQJQR¶RXWVLGH-WH[W·
here³for this reason, all discussions of the literary gift are practically flawed. In a rare 
PRGHUQHVVD\RQWKHLQIUHTXHQWO\GLVFXVVHGHVVD\¶*LIWV· Gary Shapiro touches on this 
issue whilst invoking the same parallel that I have here between Emerson and a post-
VWUXFWXUDOLVWYHUVLRQRIWKHJLIWVHHQLQ'HUULGDDQGRWKHUV6KDSLUR·VDUWLFOHLVDIDLUO\
general influence study which speculatively posits that Emerson may have turned 
Nietzsche in a direction later followed by other Continental thinkers on the topic of the 
JLIW%XWLQDSRLQWZKLFKKDVVSHFLILFUHOHYDQFHWRP\FRQFHUQVKHFDOOV¶*LIWV·¶D
PHGLWDWLRQRQWKHLPSRVVLELOLW\RIWKHJLIW·³impossible precisely because its economic 
                                                 
56 Derrida, p. 13. Emphasis in original. 
57 Derrida, p. 24. 
187 
 
SULQFLSOHLVDQHFRQRPLFLQDSUDFWLFDOVHQVH¶(PHUVRQSURFHHGV[«] to evoke the idea 
of a primary economy; however, he does this only to contrast it with the actual world in 
which false gifts of gold and silver misrepresent both giver and recipient·58 In this sense, 
ZHFDQSHUKDSVWROHUDWH(PHUVRQ·VJLIWERRNFRQWULEXWLRQVEHFDXVHWKH\DUHVHOI-
consciously not really gifts at all. Instead, they are wry disquisitions in poetic or prosaic 
form suggesting their non-giftness by way of oblique reference to another kind of 
literary production.59 
But rather than settle in this conception of a merely impractical notion of the 
gift, I would like to pursue the theoretical point a step further, because common ground 
between this mode of impossibility and another more necessary one is not far away. In 
doing so, I am returning again to the hypothesis of a closed economy between author 
and reader, along with a gift concept which absolutely precludes sympathy and will not 
permit of the mutual existence of giver and receiver, something discussed explicitly in 
Second Series. In reflexive manner, Emerson writes of the author from the perspective of 
DUHDGHUVWDWLQJ¶KHWKLQNVZHZLVKWREHORQJWRKLPDVKHZLVKHVWRRFFXS\XV+H
greatly mistDNHVXV·CW III, 141). We do not, cannot, and must not acknowledge his 
VXEMHFWLYLW\7KHUHDGHU·VXVHRIWKHDXWKRULVJURVVO\XQV\PSDWKHWLF³LWLV¶RQO\WRPHOW
KLPGRZQLQWRDQHSLWKHWRUDQLPDJHIRUGDLO\XVH·CW III, 141). This denial of the 
authorial subject is simply the reduction of a life and oeuvre to part or particle of 
FXOWXUHDEHFRPLQJUHSUHVHQWDWLYH,Q·VRepresentative Men, the product of a lecture 
series Emerson had been delivering and developing since 1845 which takes this point as 
its general topic, the principle of the gift is firmly reiterated in the introductory essay. 
7KHERRN·VWLWXODUILJXUHVGRQRW¶JLYH·LQVXFKDZD\WKDWZHEHFRPHFRQVFLRXVO\
                                                 
58 *DU\6KDSLUR¶´*LYH0HD%UHDNµ(PHUVRQRQ)UXLWDQG)ORZHUV·The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 
13 (1999), 98-113 (p. 109). 
59 :KLFKLVH[DFWO\ZKDW8UDNRYDILQGVWREHWKHFDVHLQ3RHZKRFRQFHLYHGRIDQ¶RSSRVLWH·SURMHFWWR
that of the gift book in his own Stylus, wherein all content textual and pictorial would be ¶´LQVWULFWNHHSLQJ
ZLWKWKH0DJD]LQHFKDUDFWHUµ·DQGQRWDWWHQXDWHGE\VXEMHFWLRQWRWKHQHHGVRIDQH[WUDWH[WXDOHFRQRPLF
order. Predictably, the project never got further than its prospectus. See Urakova, pp. 338-9. 
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obliged to them³(PHUVRQ·VDEVROXWLVWVHQWLPHQWLQWKHVKRUWVHQWHQFH¶*LIWLVFRQtrary 
WRWKHODZRIWKHXQLYHUVH·PDNHVVHQVHEHFDXVHLWGHFODUHVFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIWKHJLYLQJ
DQGLQYRNHVUHVWLWXWLRQ¶6HUYLQJRWKHUVLVVHUYLQJXV·CW IV, 6). So the gift of writing 
truly conceived would need to be a writing which belied no notion of its being a gift, 
and no notion of an originating subject. 
%HFRPLQJ¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYH· DVWKHSRHWLVVDLGWRGRHQDEOHVKLPWR¶VWDQG[«] 
among partial men for the complete man· EXWWKLV¶VWDQGLQJIRU·DOVRUHQGHUVKLPDVLJQ
in the sense that he becomes identical to his work, reduced to the ¶HSLWKHWRULPDJH·WKDW
we make of him (CW III, 4). In this sense, the poet becomes synonymous with the 
conditions attendant on his form for the reader³ZKLFKLVWRVD\KLV¶FRPSOHWLRQ· or 
death, in becoming formal³an effect banally reflected in the reduction of life and 
oeuvre to an adjective, Emerson to the Emersonian. If the effect is banal, however, the 
DFWRIPDNLQJWKHJLIWLVQHYHUWKHOHVVSURIRXQG*LYLQJRQHVHOIWREH¶PHOWHGGRZQ· ¶WKH
artist is in some degree sacrificed· and is absolved of the conditions of subjective being 
in this act and the unconscious acquisitive act of the reader (JMN VIII, 108). In such a 
ZD\WKHUHIRUHE\LQILQLWLVLQJDQGUHVWRULQJDZRUOGDUHSRHWV¶OLEHUDWLQJJRGV· because, 
as Emerson writes in the seldom quoted sentence which follows this, they self-immolate 
so that others might be entitled WRILQG¶ZLWKLQWKHLUZRUOGDQRWKHUZRUOGRUQHVWRI
ZRUOGV·CW III, 17). 
Framing these discussions within the concerns which began this chapter, what 
takes place with respect to persons and the personal under such conditions? In the most 
LPPHGLDWHVHQVHD¶SHUVRQDO·UHVSRQVHwhich does not detect the gift as gift, such as that 
discussed by Sharon Cameron, would very likely declare it unnerving: one finds no 
DXWKRU·VYRLFHKHUHEHFDXVHLWZRXOGKDYHEHHQUHFHLYHGLQVXFKDZD\WKDWQRJLYHU
FRXOGEHSHUFHLYHG,WZRXOGDSSHDUOLWHUDOO\WREH¶QRRQH·VYRLFH·60 Or, if we see the 
                                                 
60 &DPHURQ¶:D\RI/LIH·S 
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gift being made, as Cavell seems to do, the other side of the coin has us repelled by the 
singularity and unrelenting usurpation of what is being thrust upon us. Cavell 
H[SHULHQFHVLWDVZKDWKHFDOOVD¶SKLORVRSKLFDOPRRG>JLYHQ@VRSXUHO\VRLQFHVVDQWO\
giving one little other intellectual amusement or eloquence or information, little other 
argument or narrative, and no other source of companionship·61 It is a mode of asking that is 
so fixated with the conditions circumscribing its own personality that it leaves no room 
for dialogue or fellow-feeling, but appears to possess the counter-person of the receiver. 
In either case, the effect does not seem stable or benignly productive, but then it never 
FRXOGEH$V'HUULGD·VODWHUWKHRULVDWLRQRIFRQFHUQVUHDOLVHGE\(PHUVRQDIILUPVWKH
gift, properly conceived in its aQHFRQRPLFVWDWHQHFHVVDULO\GHFOLQHVPDQLIHVWDWLRQ¶WKH
gift is the impossible. Not impossible but the impossible. The very figure of the 
impossible· Defined as being inexhaustible (since it ceases to be if it is received), it is an 
¶LQWHUUXSWLRQ· QHLWKHUSDUWRIWLPHQRURIWRSRORJ\¶DQatopic and utopic madness·62 In 
spite of the double bind whereby the gift is impossible on both practical and theoretical 
terms, however, Emerson cannot rescind on the effort to make it. The words from the 
opening SDJHVRI¶([SHULHQFH· (PHUVRQ·VGLVFRYHU\RIWKHREOLJDWLRQWRSURGXFe text³
WR¶LQYHVWLPSDUW·PHDQ that he cannot abscond from the demand that he produce the 
gift of writing. The obligation to produce the impossible leaves him awed by the power 
that text can be thought to possess, and the consequences lead towards a catastrophic 
destabilisation of authorial self-identity.  
:KHQ(PHUVRQZULWHVLQWKHMRXUQDOVWKDW¶>L@QZULWLQJWKHFDVWLQJPRPHQWLVRI
greatest importance· it is because everything depends upon the success of the impression 
made in the moment of inscription (JMN VIII, 113). To fulfil an obligation demands 
commitment to an act of particularisation and definition, and because that 
particularisation is inherently singular it cannot be revised or restated³except, of 
                                                 
61 CaYHOO¶$Q(PHUVRQ0RRG·S(PSKDVLVDGGHG 
62 Derrida, p. 7, 13, 28, 35. Emphasis in original. 
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course, as repetition, which announces itself by its stark antinomianism in this respect. 
1RWVXUSULVLQJO\(PHUVRQMXGJHV¶UHPDUNDEOH[«] the overfaith of each man in the 
importance of what he has to do or say. The poet, the prophet, has a higher value for 
ZKDWKHXWWHUVWKDQDQ\KHDUHUDQGWKHUHIRUHLWJHWVVSRNHQ·CW III, 109). If the 
XWWHUDQFHVXFFHHGVRQHLV¶KDSS\·KDSSLQHVVGHSHQGVXSRQ¶([SUHVVLRQ[«] That man 
is serene who does not feel himself pinched & wronged, but whose condition in 
particular and in general allows the utterance of his mind; and that man who cannot utter 
KLPVHOIJRHVPRXUQLQJDOOWKHGD\·JMN VIII, 106-7. Emphasis added). This is not the 
ZLOOWRSRZHUEXW¶VHUHQH·DQGXOWLPDWHO\FRQWLQJHQWDVWKH ¶KDS·RIKDSSLQHVVGLVFORVHV
It is a proper acquittal, in other words, with which subjective agency or contrivance has 
little to do. Yet, on the other hand, any failure is visible and traceable to the source in 
the subject as unfulfilled obligation. In terms of the notion of writing as gift, this means 
WKDWWKHHQWLUHKHUPHQHXWLFDOIXWXUHRIRQH·VXWWHUDQFHDQGLWVHYHU\IXWXUHPXWDWLRQ
UHPDLQVRQH·VUHVSRQVLELOLW\HYHQDVLWLVHQWLUely disassociated from oneself. 
,Q¶1HZ(QJODQG5HIRUPHUV· the address which concludes Second Series, 
Emerson writes of the reformers who are flawed precisely because they do not give, but 
merely restrict the world and demand assent to their opinions: 
 
The reason why any one refuses his assent to your opinion, or his aid to your 
benevolent design, is in you: he refuses to accept you as a bringer of truth, 
because, though you think you have it, he feels that you have it not. You have not 
given him the authentic sign. (CW III, 164. Emphasis added)63 
                                                 
63 Emerson accuses reformism generally of subtraction and withdrawal in the journals for October 1841: 
¶:HOOQRZ\RXWDNHIURPXVRXUFXSRIDOFRKRODVEHIRUH\RXWRRNRXUFXSRIZUDWK>«@<RXWDNHDZD\
EXWZKDWGR\RXJLYHPH">«@1RWKLVLVPHUHWKLHYLQJK\SRFULV\	SRDFKLQJ·JMN VIII, 116). His 
DOWHUQDWLYHLVHQFDSVXODWHGE\WKHFRQFOXGLQJSDVVDJHRI·V¶0DQWKH5HIRUPHU·DQGWKDWDGGUHVV·V
advocacy RIUHIRUPE\H[DPSOH7KHPRGHOSURYLGHGLVRQHRIFDVWLQJIRUWKRQH·VEHVWSURGXFWLRQV
JLYLQJSURIXVHO\DQGLQGLIIHUHQWO\¶,VWKHUHQRWVRPHZKDWVXEOLPHLQWKHDFWRIWKHIDUPHUZKRFDVWVLQWR
the ground the finest ears of his grain? The time will come when we too shall hold nothing back, but shall 
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And this principle leaves Emerson, he who would give, in an unenviable, nay 
impossible, position. For although he chides the reform movements for failing to offer 
WKH¶DXWKHQWLFVLJQ· this sign is nevertheless wholly problematic: it is madness. It is an 
attempt at the absolute utterance and the utterance of the absolute, while closedness and 
limitation are the fundamental nature of literary form and of the commitment that form 
entails. Emerson acknowledged as much when he noted, in July 1842, that every man is 
RIWZRSDUWV¶DVDQHDQGDQLQVDQH7KHVDQHWKLQNVWKHLQVDQHVSHDNV2XUWKRXJKWLVDV
great as the horizon & this wide cope overhead; our speech petty, sneaking; so that we 
seem mocked by our own organV·JMN VIII, 188). Cleaving close once again to 
'HUULGD·VLQWHUYHQWLRQVLQJLIWWKHRU\WRDVSLUHWRDEVROXWHH[SUHVVLRQLQWKHOLPLWHG
IRUPVRIODQJXDJHLVHVVHQWLDOO\¶WRWRUPHQWRQH·VPLQGWU\LQJWRILQGWKDWZKLFKE\
definition, cannot be found where one is looking for it [«] To look for the impossible 
is that form of madness in which we seem to have enclosed ourselves up to now [in 
simply speaking of the gift]·64 Sincerity in giving means authorial immolation, giving 
away everything entirely, as in tKHSRWODWFKFHUHPRQ\GLVFXVVHGDWOHQJWKLQ0DXVV·V
ZRUNZKLFK'HUULGDEUDQGVWKHJLIWWKDW¶gets carried away with itself·DQGZKLFK0DXVV
WHUPV¶WKHPRVWPDGO\H[WUDYDJDQW·RIJLIWV¶QRWHYHQDTXHVWLRQRIJLYLQJDQGUHWXUQLQJ
but of destroying, so as not to give the slightest hint of desiring your gift to be 
reciprocated·65 
 It is sensible to apply a limit to this theoretical possibility. The sincere gift 
requires the entire abandonment of limits and bounds, entering a trajectory of 
inexhaustible, impossible profusion. Indeed, it requires a giving up of subjectivity itself, 
DVXEPLVVLRQWRXQLYHUVDOLW\ZKLFKLVQRWVRPXFKDEVROXWHNQRZOHGJHDV¶DEVROXWH
                                                                                                                                          
eagerly convert more than we now possess into means and powers, when we shall be willing to sow the 
VXQDQGWKHPRRQIRUVHHGV·CW I, 160). 
64 Derrida, p. 34. 
65 Derrida, p. 46. Emphasis in original. Mauss, p. 47. 
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forgetting·66 In claiming to pursue this, Emerson seems to renounce an alternative 
model of possible sincerity³the confessional, so significant in the thesis of repetition 
and its acknowledgement of secular limits. As such, giving sincerely means being 
insincerely, and therefore the limiting utterance must be made under false convictions of 
possible success. If, on the other hand, the author is conscious of the partiality of their 
being subject, of the conditions which circumscribed the confessional, then aspiring to 
WKHJLIWDQGWKHFRQWLQJHQW¶KDSSLQHVV·WKDWDFFRPSDQLHVLWPHDQVWKDWWKH\DUHRQFH
again, aspiring to acquittal, to being absolved. Paradise won through absolution (a 
paradise which is attained in the orthodox fashion, by the loss of the personal, which is 
to say death) is, indeed, something to aspire to, and all the better if it can be done 
without the troublesome business of actually having to undergo the act of dying, as 
Emerson comes to demonstrate. 
 
3OD\LQJ'HDG¶0DQQHUV· 
How, therefore, to explain the process by which Emerson gives effectively but 
insincerely? In addressing this, we FDQSLFNXSWKHHDUOLHUTXRWDWLRQIURP¶1DWXUH·ZKLFK
ILUVWDOOXGHGWRWKH¶IDOVHKRRG·DSSURSULDWHWRRXUFRQGLWLRQ 
 
Every act hath some falsehood of exaggeration in it. And when now and then 
comes along some sad, sharp-eyed man, who sees how paltry a game is played, 
and refuses to play, but blabs the secret;³how then? Is the bird flown? O no, 
the wary Nature sends a new troop of fairer forms, of lordlier youths, with a 
little more excess of direction to hold them fast to their several aim; makes them 
a little wrongheaded in that direction in which they are rightest, and on goes the 
game again with new whirl, for a generation or two more. (CW III, 107-8) 
                                                 
66 7KHWHUPLV'HUULGD·V 
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7KDWWKLVSDVVDJHDSSHDUVLQWKHHVVD\¶1DWXUH·LVVLJQLILFDQWRQFHDJDLQ(PHUVRQ
renounces the youthful claims of his earlier piece by that title in implying that he is no 
ORQJHUWKH¶FXUO\GLPSOHGOXQDWLF·GHVFULEHGIXUWKHUGRZQWKHSDJHEXWWKH¶VDGVKDUS-
H\HGPDQ·RIWKLVSDVVDJH,QGHHGKHPLJKWHYHQEHPRUH¶VKDUS-H\HG·ZHUHKHDOLWWOH
more sincere, given the additional confessions of impotence and of the mechanical 
character of his poetics present in the journal draft of this extract.67 He permits himself 
occasional exasperated doubts on the same theme later: WKDW¶WKHUHLVWKURXJKRXWQDWXUH
something mocking, something that leads us on and on, but arrives nowhere, keeps no 
IDLWKZLWKXV·KHZRQGHUV¶>Z@HUHWKHHQGVRIQDWXUHVRJUHDWDQGFRJHQWDVWRH[DFWWKLV
LPPHQVHVDFULILFHRIPHQ"·CW III, 110-1). But the whole principle of the gift turns on 
renouncing this exhausting, world-ending side of his maturity; on effecting new 
excesses, as the lunatics are given to do by nature and without thought. So, in 
¶([SHULHQFH· DORQJVLGHWKHKLQWVRIGHIHDWLVPSUHVHQWLQ(PHUVRQ·VGLVTXLVLWLRQVRQ
fate, the universe, and the place of his work in it, new measures designed to restore 
exuberance in effect begin to appear. His confession in that essay³¶,NQRZEHWWHUWKDQ
WRFODLPFRPSOHWHQHVVIRUP\SLFWXUH,DPDIUDJPHQWDQGWKLVLVDIUDJPHQWRIPH·³is 
opposed to the demand of form to commit, and so runs against the ethical obligation 
that form constitutes (CW III, 47). But he is conscious of this: a few pages earlier, the 
problem of the non-correlation of sincerity and morality ends in fatalism, if one must 
remain sincere:  
 
                                                 
67 ¶$LPDERYHWKHPDUNWRKLWWKHPDUN(YHU\DFWKDWKVRPHIDOVHKRRGRIH[DJJHUDWLRQLQLWHYHU\
sentence. For the infinite diffuseness refuses to be epigrammatised, the world to be shut up in a word. 
The thought beLQJVSRNHQLQDVHQWHQFHEHFRPHVE\PHUHGHWDFKPHQWIDOVHO\HPSKDWLF·JMN VIII, 87). 
7KHIDFWWKDW(PHUVRQVWUXFNRXWWKHYHU\FOHDUGHVFULSWLRQRI¶IDOVHKRRGRIH[DJJHUDWLRQ·O\LQJLQ
language acts, in sentences, indicates that he was at least concerned with trying to veil his poetic principles 
RIH[DJJHUDWLRQH[FHVVDQGGHWDFKPHQWHQDEOLQJWKHLPSUHVVLRQLIQRWWKHIDFWRIWKH¶HPSKDWLF·7KLV
corroborates the impression of the gift, but also reveals the contrivance used to exert that impression, of 
which I will have a lot more to say here. 
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I would gladly be moral, and keep to metes and bounds, which I dearly love, and 
allow the most to the will of man, but I have set my heart on honesty in this 
chapter, and I can see nothing at last, in success or failure, than more or less of 
vital force supplied from the Eternal. The results of life are uncalculated and 
uncalculable. (CW III, 40) 
 
It is this attitude which underlies the form of the bulk of this essay, with its short, 
aphoristic and, to my mind, consequently fatalistic sentences, expressing an exasperation 
ZKLFKOLIWVWRZDUGVWKHFRQFOXVLRQDV(PHUVRQ·VHIIRUWRIZLOOUHWXUQVKLPWRKRSHDQG
faith. But beyond the local confines of the essay, beyond its internal logic, this poetic 
turn grates against his own earlier honHVW\DQGFRQVWLWXWHVWKHDXWKRU·VGHFHLWRIXVDV
UHDGHUVDQGRI¶(PHUVRQ·KLPVHOIDVZHOORIZKDWKRQHVW\DVNVXVDQGKLPWRDFFHSW³
that a settled conclusion cannot be simply abandoned, that a conviction sincerely felt 
cannot be idly tossed away. 
 In other words, this is what the principle of insincerity starts to look like in 
practice, and twice more in Second Series Emerson references this aspect of his poetics in 
H[WUHPHO\FDQGLGWHUPV)LUVWLQ¶1DWXUH· in the midst of the fatalistic confessions 
already quoted: 
 
A man can only speak, so long as he does not feel his speech to be partial and 
inadequate. It is partial, but he does not see it to be so, whilst he utters it. As 
soon as he is released from the instinctive and particular, and sees its partiality, 
he shuts his mouth in disgust. For, no man can write anything, who does not 
think that what he writes is for the time the history of the world; or do anything 
well, who does not esteem his work to be of importance. My work may be of 
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none, but I must not think it of none, or I shall not do it with impunity. (CW 
III, 110) 
 
The fact that Emerson tells us about the principle of deception in the same volume as 
he practises it upon us wholly corroborates the paradox in this passage, which describes 
the flitting inconstancy in the encounter with form, its native power as much as the 
DXWKRU·VH[FOXVLRQIURPWKDWSRZHU6RKHUHLWHUDWHVZKHQKLVDWWHQWLRQUHWXUQVWRWKH
WRSLFLQ¶1RPLQDOLVWDQG5HDOLVW· 
  
No sentence will hold the whole truth, and the only way in which we can be just, 
is by giving ourselves the lie; Speech is better than silence; silence is better than 
speech;³All things are in contact; every atom has a sphere of repulsion;³
Things are, and are not, at the same time;³and the like. (CW III, 143-4. 
Emphasis added) 
 
To make the gift of writing, we must also make a gift to ourselves³WKH¶JLIW·RI¶WKHOLH·. 
It is as given that we are to be insincere. Knowing that there is nothing more to say, 
Emerson posits that we must at that very moment begin to speak, begin to write. In 
other entries in the journals withheld from full elaboration in the published works, we 
see this exact principle addressed in processes where Emerson seems to try to write 
himself out of fatalism and the dulled mind of maturity. In a passage written in the early 
DXWXPQRIVKRUWO\EHIRUH:DOGR·VGHDWK¶ZK\GR,ZULWHDQRWKHUOLQHVLQFHP\
best friends assure me that in every line I repeat myself? Yet the God must be obeyed 
HYHQWRULGLFXOH·JMN VIII, 96). Here, the obligation to write seems to lead inevitably to 
fallacy and ridicule, not truth and realisation, and in a slightly later entry of the same 
SHULRGWKHSRLQWLVUHLWHUDWHGZLWKPRUHSUHFLVLRQ¶<HWLVLWQRWULGLFXORXVWKLVWKDWZH
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do in this languid, idle trick that we have gradually fallen into of writing & writing 
without end. After a day of humiliation & stripes if I can write it down I am 
VWUDLJKWDZD\UHOLHYHG	FDQVOHHSZHOO·JMN VIII, 126). 
,QFRPSDULVRQZLWKWKH¶VHUHQH·KDSSLQHVVRIWKHWKHRU\RIZHOO-cast writing, the 
cathartic sloughing-off of text here is quotidian and rather banal. But the suggestion that 
WKLVSURFHVVLVD¶ODQJXLGLGOHWULFN·LVLQWHUHVWLQJ2IFRXUVHWKLVZDVZULWWen before 
:DOGR·VGHDWKDQGWKXVEHIRUH(PHUVRQ·VFRQFHUQVLQWHQVLIied. On those terms, we 
SHUKDSVVKRXOGQ·WEHVXUSULVHGWKDWWKHVHNLQGVRIVWDWHPHQWVQHYHUIRXQGWKHLUZD\LQWR
later published work in exactly this format. But this is surely not the only reason that the 
SDVVDJHVDUHZLWKKHOG:HUH(PHUVRQ·VFRQVFLRXVSHrformances so obviously ridiculous 
and contrived, then the impression of sincerity would be very plainly compromised. 
And the obligation of the gift which requires the perpetuation of this ridiculous 
SHUIRUPDQFHHYHQDIWHU:DOGR·VGHDWKRQO\XQGHUOLQHVWKH paradox at the heart of 
(PHUVRQ·VSRHWLFSULQFLSOH1RPDWWHUWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK(PHUVRQZDVDIIHFWHGE\
this loss and the philosophical doubts it engendered, what he came to write as a 
consequence of it was written for the exact reason of breaking with the maturity he now 
IHOW+HZDVOHGWRDZULWLQJZKLFKVLPSO\¶KRQRXUHGKLVSODFH·DQGnot his personal 
knowledge and experience of that place. 
The instance in Second Series ZKHQWKLVFRPHVWRDKHDGLVWKHHVVD\¶0DQQHUV· a 
piece which has received no serious scholarly attention.68 ¶0DQQHUV·LVQRPLQDOO\DIDLUO\
                                                 
68 $UVLýLVWRP\NQRZOHGJHWKHRQO\FULWLFRI(PHUVRQWRJLYHPRUHWKDQSDVVLQJQRWHWRWKLVHVVD\DQG,
DJUHHZLWKPRVWRIWKHWHUPVVKHGHSOR\VWRFKDUDFWHULVHLW$UVLýQRWHVWKDWDGLVFRXUVHRQPDQQHUVLVRI 
considerable significance if we are thinking of how an author is to be personally present or invested in a 
text³after all, the essence of manners is repeatability, and as such a mannered gesture does not need the 
presence of a unique person to be completeG¶PDQQHUVDUHDSXUHO\H[WHUQDOUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWZR
´HQHUJLHVµRUWZRQRQSHUVRQDOLVHGOLYHVWKH\DUHOLNHJHVWXUHVZLWKRXWSHUVRQV·2IFRXUVHRXUXSWDNHRI
ritual also constitutes our capacity to become a social being, and a non-social being, which would be a 
being without language in any sense, is unlikely to be at all, so our investment in the mannered is, like our 
LQYHVWPHQWLQODQJXDJHQHFHVVDU\DVPXFKDVLWLVFRQFHVVLRQDU\$UVLýJRHVRQWRILJXUH(PHUVRQ·V
treatment of manners within her thesis of leaving the habitual, and her conclusion is interesting: that the 
WHUP¶PDQQHUV·XQGHUJRHV(PHUVRQ·VSURFHVVRIVHPDQWLFGHVWDELOLVDWLRQDQGLVJLYHQLQWKHHVVD\RQWKH
VXEMHFWXQGHUGLVFXVVLRQWRFRPHWRPHDQLWVH[DFWRSSRVLWHPDQQHUVDUH¶DODw-EUHDNLQJHQHUJ\>«D
XVDJHZKLFK@SXW>V@WKHPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUGLQGLVFRUGZLWKLWVHOIWKXVLWVHOIEHFRPLQJD´PDQQHUµRI
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innocuous reflection on convention, mores, the value of etiquette and gentlemanliness 
LQUHYHDOLQJRXUEHWWHULQQDWHQDWXUHDQGVRRQ0XFKOLNH¶*LIWV· which Robert 
5LFKDUGVRQFDOOVD¶OLJKWVKRUWSLHFH·LQWKHPRVWUHFHQWPDMRUELRJUDSK\RI(PHUVRQ
¶0DQQHUV·VHHPVRQHRIWKHZHDNHUFKDSWHUVLQ¶DQXQHYHQYROXPH·QRUPDOO\SDVVHG
over in favour of the more compelling essays around it.69 Yet this essay is turned inside 
out by a closer (and better informed) reading, to reveal a window on the machinations 
involved in the literary mode of the gift. Its opening sentence, lifted from Rabelais, 
seems innocently based in the concerns of the title, figuring cultural insularity and 
xenophobic misunderstanGLQJV¶+DOIWKHZRUOGLWLVVDLGNQRZVQRWKRZWKHRWKHUKDOI
OLYH·CW III, 71). The Rabelaisian allusion, however, hints that things are perhaps not 
so straightforward. A world deemed divisible into two precisely equal parts is difficult to 
conceive, XQOHVVZHFRQVLGHULWDVWKH¶ZRUOG·WKDWH[LVWVIRUWKHDXWKRUDQGSUHVXPHG
UHDGHURUUHDGHUDQGSUHVXPHGDXWKRU,IWKLVLVDWH[WXDOZRUOGRIWZRWKHQ¶LWLVVDLG·
that sympathy does not exist, at least. Author and reader never meet, for each is absent 
while the other engages with the projected text. The overtones here again bring 
(PHUVRQSDUDOOHOZLWKKLVFRQWHPSRUDU\3RHDQGWKHODWWHU·V¶3KLORVRSK\RI
&RPSRVLWLRQ·LQIDFW(PHUVRQLVDJUHDWGHDOFORVHUWR3RH·VFRPSRVLWLRQDOWKHRU\WKDQ
has ever been acknowledged.70 
7RXQGHUVWDQGZK\ZHFDQVWDUWDWWKHHVVD\·VHSLJUDSKDIRXUWHHQOLQHSRHP
FRQWDLQHGZLWKLQDVLQJOHVHWRILQYHUWHGFRPPDV,W·VQRVRQQHW³the opening four lines 
form a quatrain separated from the following ten by a single line break. But the whole 
                                                                                                                                          
VSHDNLQJ·:KDW,KDYHWRVD\KHUHVLJQLILFDQWO\GHYHORSVWKLVGRXEOHVHQVHRIWKHWHUPE\UHYHDOLQJKRZ
Emerson figures two very GLIIHUHQWVWDWHVRIDXWKRULDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\DGKHULQJWRDVLQJOHWH[W6HH$UVLý
pp. 303-6. 
69 Richardson, Mind on Fire, p. 400. 
70 $V3RHSXWLWLQWKHOLQHVTXRWHGRQWKHILUVWSDJHRIWKLVWKHVLV¶0RVWZULWHUV>«@SUHIHUKDYLQJLW
understood that they compose by a species of fine frenzy³an ecstatic intuition³and would positively 
shudder at letting the public take a peep behind the scenes, at the elaborate and vacillating crudities of 
WKRXJKW>«@WKHZKHHOVDQGSLQLRQV³the tackle for scene-shifting³the step-ladders and demon-WUDSV·
HWF+LVWDUJHWLQWKLVSLHFHZDVRIFRXUVH¶WKHVRFDOOHGSRHWU\RIWKHVRFDOOHG7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVWV·Poe, 
¶3KLORVRSK\RI&RPSRVLWLRQ·, p. 979, 986. 
198 
 
nevertheless seems consistent within its inverted commas, and is credited to Ben 
Jonson. The accreditation is correct³Jonson did write all fourteen of these lines. But 
the line break which separates the two pieces of text acts as a disguised ellipsis and a 
suEVWDQWLDOHUDVXUH7KHTXDWUDLQFRPHVIURP-RQVRQ·VPDVTXHLove Freed From Ignorance 
and Folly (1611), the following ten lines from an entirely separate work, another masque, 
Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue (1618). Yet Emerson provides no indication that such 
substantial editorial work was involved: the lines appear as though, by happy 
coincidence, they began as a unity which when transcribed entirely fitted the new 
setting. Emerson has a history of misrepresenting his sources or adapting quotations: 
IRUDIDPRXVH[DPSOHZHPLJKWUHFDOOWKHRSHQLQJVHQWHQFHRI¶6HOI-5HOLDQFH·DQGWKH
¶YHUVHVZULWWHQE\DQHPLQHQWSDLQWHU·ZKRP(PHUVRQHOHFWVQRWWRQDPHOHWDORQH
quote the mentioned verses. But this is not so unusual in a broader literary context³
allegations of plagiarism in literature, often well-founded, occur in every era, and 
Chaucer, Montaigne, Shakespeare and Milton are among the accused. 71 Aside from its 
direct relevance to allusions to the secrecy of composition in the opening sentence of 
¶0DQQHUV· therefore, this abuse of Jonson is a pretty minor infraction endemic to all 
manner of writers. However, this instance is not isolated³LQIDFWLW·VDPHUHSUHOXGHWR
what takes place on the next page. 
What IROORZVRQFH¶0DQQHUV·JHWVXQGHUZD\WDNHVWKHLQWHUWH[WXDOKLQWVRIWKH
epigraph in combination with the Rabelaisian opening and quietly runs riot. The 
RVWHQVLEOHVXEMHFWLVWKHFXOWXUDOGLIIHUHQFHREVHUYHGE\¶RXU([SORULQJ([SHGLWLRQ·
ZKHQWKH\¶VDZWKe Feejee islanders getting their dinner off human bones· RU¶WKHURFN-
7LEERRV·ZKR¶VWLOOGZHOOLQFDYHV· RU¶WKH%RUQRRV·ZKR¶KDYHQRSURSHUQDPHV· This 
PLVFHOODQ\RIH[RWLFRGGLWLHVPXVWFRPHIURPVRPHZKHUHRWKHUWKDQ(PHUVRQ·V
                                                 
71 Thomas McFarland nods toward the idea that plagiarism, or at least accusations of plagiarism, 
constitutes the dominant constant of literature as he details this pantheon of plagiarists in his Originality 
and Imagination. See McFarland, pp. 22-30. 
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personal experience, of course. But the point of curiosity is not simply that Emerson 
cribbed from his library for the information: rather, he copied the prose he found 
DOPRVWWRWKHOHWWHU$V-RVHSK6ODWHU·VQRWHVWRWKH+DUYDUG%HONQDSCollected Works 
edition of Second Series VXJJHVW¶(PHUVRQ·VGHEWWR>*LRYDQQL%DWWLVWD@%HO]RQL·V
Narrative of the Operations within the Pyramids, Temples, Tombs and Excavations, in Egypt and 
Nubia (London, 1822) was greater than the quotation marks [apparent, briefly, in the 
opening paragraph RI¶0DQQHUV·@LQGLFDWHG·72 This is evident when the passages from 
Emerson and Belzoni are held up against one another: 
 
The husbandry of the modern inhabitants 
of Gournou (west of old Thebes) is 
philosophical to a fault. To set up their 
housekeeping, nothing is requisite but two 
or three earthen pots, a stone to grind 
meal, and a mat which is the bed. The 
house, namely, a tomb, is ready without 
rent or taxes. No rain can pass through the 
roof, and there is no door, for there is no 
want of one, as there is nothing to lose. If 
the house does not please them, they walk 
out and enter another, as there are several 
hundreds at their command 
(Emerson, CW III, 71). 
When a young man wants to marry, he 
goes to the father of the intended bride, 
and agrees with him what he is to pay for 
her. This being settled, so much money is 
to be spent on the wedding-day feast. To 
set up their housekeeping, nothing is 
requisite but two or three earthen pots, a 
stone to grind meal, and a mat, which is 
the bed [«] The house is ready, without 
rent or taxes. No rain can pass through the 
roof; and there is no door, for there is no 
want of one, as there is nothing to lose 
[«] If the house do not please them, they 
walk out and enter another, as there are 
several hundreds at their command 
                                                 
72 See CW III, p. 200, n. 71.5. 
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(Belzoni).73 
 
$WWKLVSRLQWLQ¶0DQQHUV· Emerson introduces quotation marks and directly references 
Belzoni by name. So what is the significance of his not doing so before? We must ask 
this question by a circuitous route, examining first the context of EmerVRQ·V
unattributed quotation. The differences in the above quoted text are minimal³a semi-
FRORQLVUHSODFHGZLWKDFRPPD¶GRHV·UHSODFHV¶GR·SODLQO\WKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQW
DGGLWLRQLVWKHUHPLQGHUWKDWWKLVLVQRRUGLQDU\KRXVHEXW¶QDPHO\DWRPE· a pRLQW,·OO
come back to shortly.74 The elisions, therefore, are perhaps more notable. In the Belzoni 
original, the context is a discussion of marital ritual, as is indicated in the excerpt above, 
and the elided sentences all tie the discussion to that contexW(PHUVRQ·VHOLVLRQVWKXV
decontextualise the passage, but, more importantly, they also singularly emphasise the 
subject of household management³DQ¶HFRQRP\· LQRWKHUZRUGV)LQDOO\(PHUVRQ·V
decision to preface the whole with the statement that this ecRQRP\LV¶SKLORVRSKLFDOWRD
IDXOW·LVFXULRXVLVWKHVLPSOLFLW\DQGVHOI-sufficiency of this economy excessively 
philosophical? What might a less faulty economy consist of, and does this alternative 
have anything to do with the formal practice in evidence here? 
 $V¶0DQQHUV·FRQWLQXHVVRGRHV(PHUVRQ·VSODJLDULVP7KHQH[WVHQWHQFHDIWHU
WKHUHIHUHQFHWR%HO]RQLZKLFKEHJLQV¶,QWKHGHVHUWVRI%RUJRR· is a compression of 
GLVFXVVLRQVOLIWHGIURP$+/+HHUHQDQGXVHVWKHH[DFWSKUDVLQJRI+HHUHQ·V
translator, D. A. Talboys.75 %XWKHUH(PHUVRQ·VRZQZRUGVFURSXSDPRQJVWWKH
purloined sentences to provide insight into the compositional process at hand. As he 
writes, the barbarians described in these excerpts of imported text are not so far away 
                                                 
73 Giovanni Battista Belzoni, Narrative of the Operations within the Pyramids, Temples, Tombs and Excavations, in 
Egypt and Nubia, 3rd edn (London: John Murray, 1822), I, pp. 284-5. 
74 These changes are also present in the journal original of the passage, where Emerson does name Belzoni 
and uses quotation marks more appropriately (JMN VII, 103). 
75 See A. H. L. Heeren, Historical Researches into the Politics, Intercourse, and Trade of the Carthaginians, Ethiopians, 
and Egyptians, trans. by D. A. Talboys, 2nd edn (Oxford: D. A. Talboys, 1838), I, pp. 221-2 and 230-1. 
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from the civilised West when the products of such barbaric cultures are themselves 
LPSRUWHG¶%XWWKHVDOWWKHGDWHVWKHLYRU\DQGWKHJROGIRUZKLFKWKHVHKRUULEOH
regions are visited, find their way into countries, where the purchaser and consumer can 
hardly be ranked in one race with these cannibals and man-stealers·CW III, 71. Emphasis 
added). 
 7KHSDUDOOHOKHUHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIHYHU\WKLQJ,·YHVDLGVRIDULQWKLVFKDSWHU
should be perceived to lie in the dynamic between the overt, surface characteristics of 
WKHWH[WDQGLWVDUJXDEO\OHVV¶FLYLOLVHG·VXEVWUXFWXUHZKLFKLVGHOLEHUDWHO\FRQFHDOHG
There is no immediate reason why the reader should be conscious that such a text acts 
DVDJLIW2YHUWO\WKHPDQQHURIWKHSURVHRI¶0DQQHUV·UDWKHUSODLQOy echoes the 
concerns of its title: it begins in a conventional mode of asserting consensus with the 
ZRUGV¶,WLVVDLG·LWGLSVLQWRHVWDEOLVKHGOLWHUDU\DQGVFLHQWLILFWUDGLWLRQIRULWVLQWHUWH[WV
LWJRHVRQWRRVWHQVLEO\ODXGHWLTXHWWH¶WKHJHQWOHPDQ·, and other tasteful nineteenth-
century received wisdoms. But this mannered prose in fact only thinly disguises the 
¶FDQQLEDOLVP· WKH¶PDQ-VWHDOLQJ·RI(PHUVRQ·VFRPSRVLWLRQ7KHFRQVHTXHQFHLVWKDWIRU
the unsympathetic reader who does not follow up the hints provided³the hints of 
Jonson, of Rabelais, and of the manipulation of Belzoni³the recycled text is renewed, 
given new setting, given to appear as new. At the same time, the person of the giver is 
concealed³although Emerson seems to give the text to us, it is not, strictly speaking, 
his to give, and in his passing on of the plagiarised text the authentic original donor 
disappears. By doing this, he neatly side-steps his impossible obligation³he gives, but 
the gift is insincere. But this realisation is not the end of the matter. This essay both 
ruminates on and serves as an example of the practice of how to accommodate the fact 
that just as the writer of the gift inherits language in general, so he inherits its extant 
forms. The question is therefore how one is to live amongst such dead forms, how one 
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is to make new the world built upon them and formulate an economy which expends, 
but which does not acquire or consume. 
 :HFDQUHDG¶0DQQHUV·DJDLQVWLWVVRXUFHVLQWKLVUHVSHFW)RU%HO]RQL·V
LQKDELWDQWVRI*RXUQRXDUHLQDVLPLODUSRVLWLRQWKHVHDUHDSHRSOH¶ZKROLYHLQ
sepulchres, among the corpses and rags of an ancient nation, which they know nothing 
of·76 As Emerson emphasised in his adaptation of the source text, the fact that the 
KRXVHVDUH¶QDPHO\WRPEV·PHDQVWKHSHRSOHRI*RXUQRXOHDGDQHFURSROLWDQH[LVWHQFH
7KLVLVZK\WKHLUHFRQRP\LV¶SKLORVRSKLFDOWRDIDXOW·QRWRnly because it is harshly 
IUXJDOEXWEHFDXVHLW·VDKRXVHNHHSLQJZKLFKDFFRPPRGDWHVWKHGHDGDOLWWOHWRRYLVLEO\
and with too great a philosophical contentedness. To live contentedly among the dead is 
bad manners and indecorous, albeit with respect to the living and the future rather than 
with respect to the dead. The inhabitants of Gournou are not like Emerson the 
SODJLDULVWDQGJLYHUEXW(PHUVRQWKH¶VDGVKDUS-eyed man· Being philosophical to a 
fault is akin to being honest to a fault: it involves staring a little too dispassionately, a 
little too sincerely, at the reality of the situation at hand. And the situation at hand is the 
contested status of personality³of the person of the bequeathing writer and the 
mutually exclusive person of the reader for whom the text must always be new. When 
(PHUVRQLV¶KRQHVW· he proposes his doubt and places bounds on the range of 
possibility available to future persons. As we have seen, pessimism dominates these 
discussions³Emerson is sure in maturity only that, intellectually speaking, the security 
RISHUVRQKRRGKDVQRWFRPHWRKLPZKLOHWKHSHUVRQKRRGRIRWKHUVLVRQO\¶SHUKDSV·
the case. We can have only an elective, and never chemical or necessary, affinity with 
them. 
 Yet the opposition between this sincerely pessimistic experience of the author 
and the jocund, disseminating performance of the donor is neither resolved nor held in 
                                                 
76 Belzoni, p. 283. This sentence is the only one Emerson places within inverted commas (CW III, 71). 
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binary opposition, but exists simultaneously with another more personal voice which is 
more or less apparent throughout Second Series. Not only the honest, confessional 
moments throughout the volume, but also the continuously dropped hints which lead to 
suspicions about the purpose of this particular essay, suggest that Emerson never seems 
FRPIRUWDEOHZLWKWKHWKHRUHWLFDOELQGKH·VGULven himself into, and as a consequence the 
formal hypotheses of the volume end in problematic irresolution. Again, close readings 
LQ¶0DQQHUV·H[DPLQLQJWKHVSDFHVEHWZHHQ(PHUVRQ·VLQWHUWH[WVLOOXPLQDWHWKHFRQFHUQV
attendant on this point. First, the fact that both pieces of text borrowed from Jonson 
are taken from the Renaissance form of the masque is worth highlighting, because it 
nods to the masking/unmasking through which he toys with his reader in these pages 
while also implying the special relevance of the piece to the conditions of personhood. 
)RULIZHRYHUORRNWKHZRUG·VQRUPDWLYHVHQVH³that a person is a being possessing 
both biological and mental consistency³we note that it is a word which has the 
interesting quality of having two meanings that are precisely opposed to one another. Its 
QRUPDWLYHXVHLVZKDWZHILQGLQWKHSKUDVH¶WKHSHUVRQRIWKHNLQJ·WKDWLVWKHNLQJ·V
body, mind, and soul alone, without reference to the socio-political function of his 
being the king. Yet, etymologically, the classical Latin persona was a mask worn by an 
actor, and, by virtue of a disappeared synecdoche, this comes to stand in general for a 
part or role performed, the king as mere function.77 ,Q¶0DQQHUV· Emerson extends the 
play on this distinction. 
 In general, of course, a text is defined by its exclusion of the authorial person if 
the word is used in the normative sense and demands literal and immediate presence, 
SK\VLFDODVZHOODVLQWHOOHFWXDORIWKHUHIHUHQWWKDWWKHDXWKRU·VQDPHLVSUHVXPHGWR
indicaWH6KDURQ&DPHURQ·VSURSRVLWLRQWKDW(PHUVRQ·VSHUVRQDOLW\LVXQQHUYLQJO\RQO\
¶UKHWRULFDO· DQG¶LVQRWYLVLEOHH[FHSWWKURXJKVW\OH· is by no means unique, even if his 
                                                 
77 The OED traces this classical meaning to its hypothesised origin in an Etruscan word, phersu, meaning 
mask. 
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work makes the problem both more visible and more troublesome than other writers.78 
But we must remember the extent to which the proxy of the text has been essential to 
(PHUVRQ·VSKLORVRSK\RIVHOI-realisation throughout the late-1830s. The turn from text 
GLVFORVLQJSHUVRQWRWH[WGLVJXLVLQJSHUVRQDLQ¶0DQQHUV·LVWKHUHIRUHVLJQLILFDQWDnd we 
VKRXOGDQWLFLSDWHWKDWFHUWDLQFRQVHTXHQFHVDUHLQHYLWDEOH(PHUVRQ·VFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRI
the gentleman in the piece is telling in this respect.  
For Emerson, the gentleman is not simply a man of fashion or of good manners 
EXWKDVD¶SHUVRQDOIRUFH>that] never goes out of fashion· As he goes on to say, that 
IRUFHGRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\FRQVLVWRIPRUDOUHFWLWXGH,QVWHDG¶EUXLVHUVDQGSLUDWHVDUHRI
better promise than talkers and clerks [«The gentleman] is good company for pirates, 
and good with acDGHPLFLDQV·CW III, 73,74). Emerson does not mean that he is merely 
adaptable, however. In yet another appropriated and adapted quotation, which this time 
has both inverted commas and accreditation even as it is used discontinuously with its 
source contexW(PHUVRQZULWHV¶,DPIDUIURPEHOLHYLQJWKHWLPLGPD[LPRI/RUG
)DONODQG´WKDWIRUFHUHPRQ\WKHUHPXVWJRWZRWRLWVLQFHDEROGIHOORZZLOOJR
WKURXJKWKHFXQQLQJHVWIRUPVµDQGDPRIRSLQLRQWKDWWKHJHQWOHPDQLVWKHEROG
fellow whose forms are nRWWREHEURNHQWKURXJK·CW III, 74). As Slater notes, 
Emerson lifts this quote from a contemporary novel, which itself lifted it from an older 
history.79 7KHSKUDVH¶FXQQLQJHVWIRUPV·GRHVQRWDSSHDULQHLWKHURIWKHVHVRXUFHV
however, and the adaptation is significant. Two persons may attend the ceremony or 
¶PDVTXH·RI(PHUVRQ·VWH[WWZRDUHSUHVXPHGEXWWKHWZRFDQQRWJRWRJHWKHU6RWKLV
¶EROGIHOORZ·LVIUHHWRWDNHZKLFKHYHUFXQQLQJIRUPVDUHDYDLODEOHDQGWKLVLVSUHFLVHO\
what Emerson does. We mD\WKLQNKLPWKHEHQHYROHQWJHQWOHPDQLIZHGRQRW¶EUHDN
                                                 
78 &DPHURQLPSOLFLWO\DFNQRZOHGJHVWKLVE\ZD\RIDOOXVLRQWR¶)RXFDXOW·VDXWKRU-IXQFWLRQ·LQWKHVDPH
FRPPHQWV6HH&DPHURQ¶:D\RI/LIH·S 
79 6ODWHUVXJJHVWVWKDW(PHUVRQIRXQGWKLVTXRWDWLRQLQDIRRWQRWHLQ5REHUW3OXPHU:DUG·VTremaine; or 
the Man of Refinement, (London: Henry Colburn, 1825), II, p. 70. The footnote itself refers to Edward Earl 
RI&ODUHQGRQ·VHistory of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England (Oxford: Sheldonian Theatre, 1707), I, p. 81. 
See Slater, in CW
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WKURXJK·WKHPDQGQRWEUHDNLQJWKURXJKLVDFFHSWLQJDWIDFHYDOXHOLWHUDOO\LWLV
accepting the mask or persona and not interrogating the pathos of the person behind it.80 
 But if we are unsympathetic in this way, we are undoubtedly subject to the 
personal force of someone Emerson chooses to associate with pirates, an author who is 
cunning, manipulative, and opaque. It is worth recalling here the odd analogy 
)LFKWHOEHUJPDNHVWKDW(PHUVRQ¶DVSLUHGto be a transparent medium, an affectionate 
general equivalent like money itself·81 ,QWKH¶VDLQWO\HFRQRP\·KHVHHV(PHUVRQDQG
others aspiring to, the concept of money may not be tainted with the inevitable 
problems it consistently meets in use. But Emerson seldom mentions a paper currency 
ZLWKRXWWKLVDFNQRZOHGJHPHQW6RLQ¶&RPSHQVDWLRQ·LQFirst Series, he writes of how 
¶VLJQVOLNHSDSHUPRQH\PD\EHFRXQWHUIHLWHGRUVWROHQ·CW II, 67). Within a symbolic 
economy, monetary or otherwise, the counterfeit operates exactly as effectively as the 
DXWKHQWLFWRNHQVRORQJDVLWVLQDXWKHQWLFLW\UHPDLQVFRQFHDOHG7KH¶QHZ·WH[WRI
¶0DQQHUV·PD\QRWEHDXWKHQWLFDOO\QHZEXWLWDFWVLQWKHPRGHRIWKHJLIWIRUDOOWKRVH
unaware of this fact. Indeed, just as Derrida emphasises in his reading of the gift in 
%DXGHODLUH·V¶/D)DXVVH0RQQDLH· the counterfeit is no less a gift for the recipient whose 
XVHRILWJHQHUDWHVSRVVLELOLW\$VWKHQDUUDWRURI%DXGHODLUH·VVKRUWSURVHSLHFHUHPDUNV
¶>W@KHFRXQWHUIHLWFRLQFRXOGMXVWDVZHOOSHUKDSVEHWKHJHUPRIVHYHUDOGD\V·ZHDOWKIRU
a poor little speculator·82 $OWHUQDWLYHO\LWPLJKW¶DOVROHDGKLPWRSULVRQ· The point is 
                                                 
80 6KRXOGZHWKHUHIRUH¶EUHDNWKURXJKWKHPDVN"·7KH0HOYLOOLDQRYHUWRQHVLQWKLV(PHUVRQLDQ
FRQVLGHUDWLRQIURP¶7KH4XDUWHU-'HFN·FKDSWHURIMoby Dick, indicate that the desire to do so is 
monomaniacal; its end, as sought by Ahab, is only exhaustion of what remains unknown, not epiphanic 
UHDOLVDWLRQEXWLPSXGHQFHULVLQJWRFRQWHPSW$VKHGHFODUHV¶7KDWLQVFUXWDEOHWKLQJLVFKLHIO\ZKDW,KDWH
and be thH:KLWH:KDOHDJHQWRUEHWKH:KLWH:KDOHSULQFLSDO,ZLOOZUHDNWKDWKDWHXSRQKLP·6RWKH
VLQJXODULW\RI$KDE·VSXUSRVHDQG$KDELVVRVLQJXODULQWKLVFKDSWHUWKDWKLVWKRXJKWDQGDFWH[DFWO\
coincide³¶\RXFRXOGDOPRVWVHHWKDWWKRXJKWWXUQLQKLPDVKHWXUQHGDQGSDFHLQKLPDVKHSDFHG·LV
PRVWDNLQWR(PHUVRQ·V¶VDGVKDUS-H\HGPDQ·ZKRZRXOGUDWKHUGHFODUHWKHZRUOGFORVHGWKDQEHTXHDWK
it still full of possibility. Seeing through the mask, therefore, does not automatically engender a desire to 
destroy it to prevent future audiences from undergoing the same realisations, but invokes an ethical 
decision for the reader to make. Herman Melville, Moby Dick (1851), ed. by Hershel Parker and Harrison 
Hayford (New York: Norton, 2002), p. 140, 137. 
81 Fichtelberg, p. 118. 
82 &KDUOHV%DXGHODLUH¶/D)DXVVH0RQQDLH·¶&RXQWHUIHLW0RQH\·WUDQVE\3HJJ\.DPXI
reprinted in postscript in Derrida. 
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that, in this instance, the donor has no interest in the consequences of the gift. This 
coheres with the terms of the gift theory, but it also has relevance to the broader set of 
SUREOHPVZHILQGLQ¶0DQQHUV·DQGWKURXJKRXWWKHYROXPH)RUWKHJLYHURIWKH
FRXQWHUIHLWFRLQGRHVQRWH[SHQGDQ\WKLQJLWLVDVWKRXJKLQ%DXGHODLUH·VZRUGVWKHDFW
of kQRZLQJO\JLYLQJDFRXQWHUIHLWFRLQLVDQDWWHPSW¶WRZLQSDUDGLVHHFRQRPLFDOO\LQ
short, to pick up gratis the certificate of a charitable man·83 
 And so, in Second Series, a comment that DSSHDUVWRZDUGWKHHQGRI¶([SHULHQFH·
becomes especially relevant. 7KHUH(PHUVRQZULWHV¶,VD\WRWKH*HQLXVLIKHZLOO
pardon the proverb, In for a mill, in for a million·CW III, 48. Emphasis in original). 
Invoking the obligation to give that the mill stood for, Emerson declares his investment 
but does not invest.84 In disseminating counterfeits, he gives nothing away. He gives 
nothing away from his own person³that is, he does not wilfully sacrifice himself in his 
utterance for the good of the future reader. But equally, he gives nothing away of who 
he is or would claim to be: he does not sincerely reveal anything of his deception, but 
conceals himself behind the textual persona:KDWIROORZVLQ¶0DQQHUV· therefore, does 
not endear the sympathetic reader, the one who goes through the mask, to Emerson or 
his enterprise(YHQDVKHODPHQWVLQWKHPLGGOHRIWKHHVVD\WKDWLW¶VHHP>V@DVLIPDQ
was of a very sly, elusive nature, and dreaded nothing so much as a full rencontre front 
to front with his fellow· he slips back into the masque (CW ,,,/LNH¶&DUGLQDO
Caprara· ZKR¶GHIHQGHGKLPVHOIIURPWKHJODQFHVRI1DSROHRQE\DQLPPHQVHSDLURI
green spectacles· OLNH'XSLQLQ3RH·V¶3XUORLQHG/HWWHU· who adopts the same disguise, 
Emerson again fences himself away (CW III, 80). Towards thHHQGRI¶0DQQHUV· he 
                                                 
83 %DXGHODLUHLQ'HUULGD7KHHVVD\¶4XRWDWLRQDQG2ULJLQDOLW\·IURPLetters and Social Aims, is outside the 
remit of this thesis, not only because it was not published until 1876 but also because it is doubtful just 
how much authorial input the elderly Emerson had (see p. 94, n. 58 above). However, the fact that 
TXRWDWLRQWKHUHLVVDLGWRRSHUDWHRQDQ¶H[WUHPHHFRQRP\·FRUURERUDWHVWKHFRQFHUQVKHZDVGHDOLQJZLWK
in the early-1840s (CW VIII, 94).  
84 Or, perhaps, invests as little as possible that he may be acquitted, since a mill is also one tenth of a cent. 
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goes so far as to dedicate his essay to a defence of the type of benevolence found in the 
manipulation he has sought to practise on his reader: 
 
Let there be grotesque sculpture about the gates and offices of temples. Let the 
creed and commandments even have the saucy homage of parody. The forms of 
politeness universally express benevolence in superlative degrees. What if they 
are in the mouths of selfish men, and only used as a means of selfishness? What 
if the false gentleman continues so to address his companion, as civilly to 
exclude all others from his discourse, and also to make them feel excluded? (CW 
III, 85) 
 
Excluding all others, especially the authors of these plagiarised texts, so long as the 
reader feels taken into confidence, the actions of the counterfeiter succeed0HOYLOOH·V
famous criticism is correct³Emerson is a confidence trickster.85 
But Emerson always insinuates that the trick is played for the benefit of his 
unsympathetic readers, for whom the world is infinitised, and not so much for himself. 
After all, in the context of the high seriousness that plays across other parts of the 
volume, where the fact which instigated this whole notion of the gift³:DOGR·VGHDWK³
LVWRXFKHGXSRQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHVRI¶0DQQHUV·DQGRWher essays are foolish in the 
extreme. Indeed, it might be said that Emerson makes a clown of himself. There are 
compelling parallels with such behaviour which say something of his significance to a 
Continental tradition that more usually goes unacknowledged. In many ways, Emerson 
resembles the romantic author theorised by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc 
Nancy in their Literary Absolute. For the romantic author who comes at the end of a 
                                                 
85 Indeed, it is known for a fact that Melville rHDG¶0DQQHUV·³his copy contains marginal marks, although 
it is not believed that he read the volume until 1861, four years after the publication of The Confidence-Man. 
6HH:LOOLDP%UDVZHOO¶0HOYLOOHDVD&ULWLFRI(PHUVRQ·American Literature, 9 (1937), 317-34 (p. 319, n. 14). 
Braswell also treats of the commonly accepted view that The Confidence Man satirises Emerson on p. 329. 
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historical tradition, the obligation is to be sociable and generative rather than withdrawn 
and pessimistic. What Lacoue-/DEDUWKHDQG1DQF\WHUPERWK¶JHQLDOLW\·DQG¶:LW]·
HVVHQWLDOO\¶ZLW·LQWKHDXWKRULDOpersona exists because of the kind of abandonment to 
DVRFLHWDOZKLPLWHQWDLOV¶WKHPDMRUH[LJHQF\ZLWKUHJDrd to Witz, [is that] one must 
abandon oneself to its fundamentally involuntary character· and the exemplary feature 
RIZULWLQJZKLFKWLHVLWWRJHQLDOLW\LVWKDWLWFDQHPERG\WKLVDEDQGRQPHQW¶DVWKH
passage into form, into the formal legality of the work·86 But releasing oneself merely to 
a societal whim³being its Witz³involves putting on affectation, dishonesty, and 
clowning. Lacoue-/DEDUWKHDQG1DQF\XVH)ULHGULFK6FKOHJHO·VFRQFHSWRI
¶WUDQVFHQGHQWDOEXIIRRQHU\·WRGHVLJQDWHWKLV/DWHURIFRXUVHwe can see the laughter of 
Nietzsche as a continuation of the same, but there it is apparently less well modulated, 
less measured, than we find in the reasonably balanced words of Emerson. 
 This is why Emerson, finally, is so curious. For although he cannot give himself 
over to the infinite profusion of the gift, this does not exactly lead him into a collapse 
into fatalism or pessimism. Throughout Second Series, the problem is held in balance less 
by skilful moderation than in the tension of fascination. There is neither apparent order 
QRUUHVROXWLRQLQWKHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHHVVD\VLQWKDWYROXPH¶0DQQHUV·SUHFHGHV¶*LIWV· 
so the trick is promulgated before the theory that might go some way to revealing it is 
SHUFHLYHG¶*LIWV·LVIROORZHGE\¶1DWXUH· where, more than anywhere else, Emerson 
FRQIHVVHVKLVGRXEWVDQGUHYHDOV¶WKHOLH·KHVHHNVWRJLYHKLPVHOI6RWKHKRQHVW\IRXQG
LQ¶([SHULHQFH·DQGWKHGHFODUDWLRQRILQYHVWPHQWPDGHWKHUHLVIXOILOOHGYLDWKH
PHFKDQLVPVRI¶0DQQHUV·RQO\WREHSXQFWXUHGDJDin by a restoration of the honest, and 
LQWKLVVHQVHPRUH¶SHUVRQDOO\·IHOWYRLFHLQ¶1DWXUH· The consequence is that the series 
seems just as arbitrary as that discontinuity of our moods that Emerson laments in 
¶([SHULHQFH· DQGDVVXFKZHQHLWKHU¶ILQGRXUVHOYHV·QRUWKHSHUVRQRIWKHDXWKRUEXW
                                                 
86 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, pp. 54-5. 
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GLVFRYHUDYDFLOODWLRQEHWZHHQUKHWRULFDOPRGHVEHWZHHQWKH¶SHUVRQD·SHUIRUPHGDQG
the guarded, doubting voice of a more mature sincerity. The point is that Emerson 
never commits to the theory espoused here. He harbours a residual claim to sovereignty: 
he cannot undergo the demand of immolation which comes with giving his text away. 
But neither can he renounce what the theory stands for and return to a recursive and 
progressive mode of writing. In this way, textual relation remains an unresolved 
dilemma as we leave this volume, and it will stay in the balance into the later 1840s. The 
QRWLRQRISRVVHVVLRQLVDWVWDNHRIRQH·VSRVVHVVLRQRIDWH[WRUEHLQJSRVVHVVHGE\D
text, and interpersonal relation remains a corollary of this problem that Emerson 
struggles to accommodate. 
$WWKHYHU\HQGRI¶1RPLQDOLVWDQG5HDOLVW· which essentially concludes the 
essays of Second Series ¶1HZ(QJODQG5HIRUPHUV·EHLQJVWULFWO\VSHDNLQJDQDGGUHVV
Emerson reiterates the paradox of the entire volume in a rich passage of self-mockery. 
%HJLQQLQJE\VHWWLQJWKHFRQWH[WDUHFHQWFRQYHUVDWLRQEHWZHHQKLPVHOIDQG¶DSDLURI
SKLORVRSKHUV·LGHQWLILHGLQWKHMRXUQDOVRXUFHIRUWKHSDVVDJHDV&KDUOHV/DQHDQG
Bronson Alcott), he presents the contradictions of the genial and honest aspects of his 
QDWXUH¶,HQGHDYRXUHGWRVKRZ[«] that I loved man, if men seemed to me mice and 
rats; that I revered saints, but woke up glad that the old pagan world stood its ground· 
and so on. The closing lines have evident comic effect: 
 
Could they but once understand, that I loved to know that they existed, and 
heartily wished them Godspeed, yet, out of my poverty of life and thought, had 
no word or welcome for them when they came to see me, and could well 
consent to their living in Oregon, for any claim I felt on them, it would be a 
great satisfaction. (CW III, 145)87 
                                                 
87 See JMN VIII, 386 for the original of this passage and the direct reference to Lane and Alcott.  
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Painting himself simultaneously as an over-effusive enthusiast and a humorous grouch, 
Emerson entirely dispels the seriousness that IROORZHG:DOGR·VGHDWKLQZKLFKWKH
VWUDWHJ\RIWKHJLIWZDVIRXQGHG7KHGHVLUHRI¶VDWLVIDFWLRQ·LVLURQLFDVLWZDVLQWKH
DEVXUGO\UXGLPHQWDU\¶VDWLVIDFWLRQ·RIILQGLQJUHDOLW\LQVKDNLQJVRPHRQH·VKDQG*LYLQJ
will not lead to satedness: it is always something we bear forth and away from ourselves, 
and hence literature conceived of as gift tends away from any notion of reciprocality: 
¶2XUPXVLFRXUSRHWU\RXUODQJXDJHLWVHOIDUHQRWVDWLVIDFWLRQVEXWVXJJHVWLRQV· (CW 
III, 110). He may write in the VDPHHVVD\RIKRZ¶ZHFRQWLQXHRXUPXPPHU\WRWKH
wretched shaving· a reference to the necessary clowning of the writer in his 
abandonment to form made without fondness (CW III, 135). Yet without it, he would 
have neither justification nor obligation to write at all. Only in 1847, with the 
publication of his collected Poems, does Emerson finally find a writing practice which 
corroborates the theory arrived at in Second Series, to which I now turn. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Lions in Eden: Poems (1847) 
 
 Is there no change of death in paradise? 
 Does ripe fruit never fall? Or do the boughs 
 Hang always heavy in that perfect sky? 
    WallacH6WHYHQV¶6XQGD\0RUQLQJ· 
 
All writing is by the grace of God. People do not deserve to have good writing, 
they are so pleased with the bad. In these sentences which you show me I can 
find no beauty, for I see death in every clause & every word. There is a fossil or 
a mummy character which pervades this book [«] I like nurseries and gardens. 
Give me initiative, spermatic, prophesying man-making words. (JMN VIII, 148) 
 
 
7KHGHYHORSPHQWRI(PHUVRQ·VWHUPLQRORJ\DFURVVKLVHDUO\FDUHHUVuggests that the 
ascent of the poet constitutes the apotheosis of his conceptual scheme. By the mid-
1840s, the poet had fully usurped the scholar to become the icon of the representative 
man in his thought.1 Over the same period, the question of how his own verse mirrored 
this ideal was beginning to be answered as it gradually found publication³first, in 1839, 
LQ-DPHV)UHHPDQ&ODUNH·VWestern Literary Messenger, and then from 1840 to 1844, under 
0DUJDUHW)XOOHU·VHGLWRUVKLSDQGODWHUKLVRZQ(PHUVRQSXEOished a substantial number 
of verses in The Dial. More appeared in gift books edited by William Henry Furness in 
WKHZLQWHUVRIDQG)LQDOO\LQODWH'HFHPEHU(PHUVRQ·VILUVW
collected Poems was published in two editions: one in Boston, the other in London. 
 7KLVVLPXOWDQHRXVWUDQVDWODQWLFSXEOLFDWLRQGHPRQVWUDWHV(PHUVRQ·VIDPHLQ
both Britain and the United States; it is the kind of event which signals the apogee of a 
ZULWHU·VFDUHHU7KHODFNRIDSSUHFLDWLRQDFFRUGHGWKLVYROXPHKRZHYHUEHJVDQXPEHU
of questions as to what kind of an apotheosis Poems might figure. On the one hand, no 
major American writer has produced two bodies of work which are regarded with such 
                                                 
1 For an extensive discussion of the background to this shift in terminology, see Leonard Neufeldt, The 
House of Emerson (Lincoln NE and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), pp. 47-71. 
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variance in respect as Emerson. While his essays continue to form the spine of 
American letters in the nineteenth-century, it has always been acceptable to dismiss the 
poems. As Leslie Fiedler once wrote, acquitting the prejudices of generations of 
VFKRODUV¶>H@DVLHVWRIWKHOLQHVRI$PHULFDQYHUVHWRIRUJHWRUUHPHPEHULQJWRGHVSLVH
is the verse of Ralph Waldo Emerson·2 This curious distinction, which also structures 
YLUWXDOO\HYHU\FULWLFDODSSUDLVDORI(PHUVRQ·VSRHWLFRXWSXWis interrogated at length in 
this chapter. But more than this, based on the path this thesis has described³in which 
Emerson has increasingly demonstrated vacillations over his obligations and freedoms 
in relation to text which show no sign of imminent resolution³we might reasonably 
ask what kind of apotheosis he could possibly hope to achieve by turning his attention 
WRWKHPRVWFRQFHQWUDWHGIRUPDO¶VKDYLQJ·OLWHUDWXUHKDVWRRIIHUWKDWRIWKHPHWULFDO
stricture of the lyric. I argue that Emerson achieves a kind of poetic apotheosis with this 
volume, but it has little to do with the repute attendant on his transatlantic publication, 
or his being feted as a representative poet in his time. Rather, it has to do with 
possibilities which depend on the fact that the verse seems egregious or unsatisfactory, 
XQEHFRPLQJRIDQDXWKRURIUHSXWHDQGWDOHQWDNLQGRI¶EDGZULWLQJ·ZKLFKKDV
VRPHWKLQJWRGRZLWK(PHUVRQ·VFRQVLGHUDWLRQLQWKHVHFRQGHSLJUDSKDERYH,ILQ
¶0DQQHUV· KHKDGGHPRQVWUDWHGKRZWRZULWHZKLOHFRQFHDOLQJWKH¶GHDWKLQHYHU\FODXVH
DQGHYHU\ZRUG·ZKLFKOD\EHKLQGWKDWSLHFHPoems picks up similar concerns but finds 
new ways of turning formal conditions to the effect of acquitting the author of his 
obligations with respect to the text. Here, as I will demonstrate, the principle of the gift 
UHPDLQVSHUWLQHQWEXW(PHUVRQ·VPDLQFRQFHUQLVKRZDQHSLVWHPROogy of poetic acts 
and poetic form renders that gift more effective. 
,QWHUPVRIWKHSRHWU\·VYDOXHWKHQRUPDWLYHFULWLFDOSRVLWLRQKDVFKDQJHGlittle 
since the mid nineteenth-FHQWXU\$YHU\VPDOOQXPEHURIYHUVHVVXFKDV¶'D\V·DQG
                                                 
2 Leslie Fiedler, Waiting for the End (London: Jonathan Cape, 1964), p. 209. 
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¶7KH6QRZ-Storm· are consistently anthologised. Perhaps one or two, certainly 
¶&RQFRUG+\PQ·DQGDUJXDEO\¶'D\V· DUHHYHQHIIHFWLYHO\ORGJHGLQ$PHULFD·V
FROOHFWLYHFXOWXUDOPHPRU\%XWWKHVFKRODUO\KLVWRU\RI(PHUVRQ·VSRHWLFHQGHDYRXUVLV
miniscule by way of comparison with that treating of his prose writing, with only two 
scholarly monographs directed predominantly to the poems in the last fifty years, and 
the consensus on why this is the case is long settled.3 Even in 1845, Frederick Henry 
Hedge had seen enough to preILJXUHLWZKHQKHZURWHWKDWDOWKRXJK¶0U(PHUVRQ
possesses all the intellectual qualifications of a great poet· KHKDG¶QRWIXOILOOHGWKH
GHVWLQDWLRQLPSOLHGLQWKHVHHQGRZPHQWV>EHFDXVHRI«] a defect of temperament³an 
excess of purely intellectual life·4 $¶OLWWOHPRUHIHHOLQJ·LVZKDWLVJLYHQWREHODFNLQJLQ
(PHUVRQ·VSRHWU\DQGLQWKLVFULWLFLVPOLHVERWKRIWKHVWDQGDUGREMHFWLRQVRIWKH
following one hundred and sixty years. On the one hand, as Matthew Arnold put it, 
(PHUVRQ·VSRHWU\RIWHQVHHPHGPHFKDQLFDOFRQWULYHGXQQDWXUDOKHZDV¶QRWRQHRI
the born poets·5 And on the other, the excess of intellectualism is understood to have 
OHG(PHUVRQWRDQLPSRVVLEO\LGHDOLVWLFWKHRULVDWLRQRIWKHSRHW·VFDSDFLW\ZKLFKOHGWR
an anxiety that hamstrung all attempts to realise it in his own work.6 Indeed, for others 
ZKRKDYHZULWWHQPRUHH[WHQVLYHO\RQ(PHUVRQ·VSRHWU\WKLVGLVWLQFWLRQEHFRPHVWKH
FHQWUDOWKHVLV$V'DYLG3RUWHUZULWHV¶>L@QVKRUWWKHSRHWU\IDLOXUHDQGWKHSURVH
triumph were inseparable· PDLQO\EHFDXVH(PHUVRQ·VYHUVHGHPRQVWUDWHGWKHYHU\OLPLWV
of the poetic conventionality with which his theoretical prose took issue, and the latter 
would give impetus to those American poets, such as Whitman and Dickinson, who 
                                                 
3 7KHWZRYROXPHVDUH+\DWW+:DJJRQHU·VEmerson as Poet (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1974), and David Porter, Emerson and Literary Change (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1978). 
4 )UHGHULFN+HQU\+HGJH¶:ULWLQJVRI5:(PHUVRQ·The Christian Examiner and Religious Miscellany, 38 
(1845), 87-106 (pp. 100-1). 
5 0DWWKHZ$UQROG¶(PHUVRQ·0DFPLOODQ·V0DJD]LQH, 50.295 (May 1884), 1-13 (p. 3). 
6 A conventional example of measured criticism in this line is given by Harold Bloom in A Map of 
Misreading, p. 167. 
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could take up the newly created theory and put it to practise in a successful rejection of 
stymied form.7 
 It should not be taken for granted, however, that improprieties in the verse are 
simply marks of poetic incompetence; that these kinds of lapses are unintentional in the 
VDPHZD\WKDW(PHUVRQ·VEL]DUUHRULQDSSURSULDWHWURSHVZHUHIRUDORQJWLPH
considered to be.8 One might again consider the example of Melville, who in recent 
\HDUVKDVEHHQH[RQHUDWHGRISUHVXPHGOLWHUDU\PLVGHPHDQRXUVKLV¶EDG·ZULWLQJLQVWHDG
read as attempts at richer performances in text than earlier readers were able to 
appreciate, as Alex Calder has noted.9 This extends to his own under-read poetry, 
according to Cody Marrs, who argues WKDW0HOYLOOH·VSRHWLFRXWSXWLQKLVODWHUFDUHHU
does not merely signal the solipsistic escape from the vicissitudes of the literary 
marketplace that critics have traditionally seen it to be, but constitutes the exploration of 
a wholly new lyric form which figured the representational challenges of the Civil War. 
As Marrs writes, Melville incorporated the war ¶E\LQVFULELQJFRQIOLFWinto the very 
structure of [his «] poems· DFRQIOLFWWKDWHPHUJHVLQWKH¶HVFKHZ>DORI] perfect rhymes 
and disrupt[ed «] metric patterns· VWDJLQJ¶RQWKHOHYHORISRHWLFVWUXFWXUHDVXEtle 
undoing of instrumental rationality·10 I do not propose to demonstrate that Emerson 
seeks to represent anything on such figurative terms: he is, unquestionably, more 
metaphysical in his aims. But could the range of infelicities critics have identified in 
Poems be reconsidered according to a more coherent poetic ambition, similar to that 
found by Marrs in Melville?  
Those infelicities, it should be emphasised, are numerous but connected. His 
metre and phrasing is often conditioned by logic: line ends match phrase ends, while 
                                                 
7 Porter, p. 3. For a more extensive survey of critical opinion from the 1840s up to the 1970s, see 
Waggoner, pp. 3-52. 
8 See the discussion of Packer on this point in chapter four above, pp. 171-2. 
9 Calder, pp. 11-31. See also the discussion on p. 170 above. 
10 &RG\0DUUV¶$:D\ZDUG$UWBattle-Pieces DQG0HOYLOOH·V3RHWLF7XUQ·American Literature, 82 (2010), 91-
119 (p. 109, 110, 112). 
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negative propositions invariably necessitate positive counterpropositions to give the 
YHUVHVDFRQVLVWHQWSDWWHUQZKLFKWHQGVWROHDGWRUHDGHUO\HQQXL7KH¶DUJXPHQW·RIWKH
piece dominates in other ways³Emerson was fond of the use of a synthesising, 
¶EHDPHGLQ·YRLFHWRUHFRQFLOHSRHWLFGLOHPPDDQGGLVSDULW\DQGWKHYRLFHLVJHQHUDOO\
given to a force or figure in the realm of nature: in Poems, he voices, among other things, 
a squirrel, a pine-tree, a mountain, the earth, God, and Allah by this method. Twentieth-
century critics have identified this type of impersonal address as a contrivance which 
seeks to enact the grand resolution of natural processes, language, and the human mind 
that Emerson so often ascribes to the poetic act, but it is given to be a failure. Instead, 
the preacherly tone and bloodless abstraction invoked by this mode corroborates the 
long history of a perceived impersonality and coldness in the poetry.11 Finally, and 
entirely in keeping with the mechanical character of these predominantly intellectual 
SRHPV(PHUVRQ·VUK\PHVFKHPHVDQGPHWULFDOIUDPHVFDQEHDVWRQLVKLQJO\EDQDO$Q\
reader acquainted ZLWKWKHYROXPHZLOOUHFRJQLVHZKDW3RUWHUODEHOVWKH¶familiar 
WKXPSLQJFDGHQFH·RIPHWULFDOO\LGHQWLFDOUK\PLQJFRXSOHWVRUDOWHUQDWHOLQHVLQGHHG
7KRUHDXFULWLFLVHG(PHUVRQIRUSUHFLVHO\WKLVWHQGHQF\WR¶VORSHWRWKHUK\PH·WRR
UHDGLO\WRWKHH[WHQWWKDWLWPDGHFHUWDLQSLHFHVVRXQG¶OLNHDSDURG\·12 
 My continued concern with literary form thus needs qualifying in the context of 
the current discussion³RQHFDQQRWHVFDSHWKHSRHPV·IDLUO\LQGXELWDEOH
conventionalism and the disappointment this engenders following the experimental 
approaches advocated in the works of the preceding years. But perhaps those readings 
which slide into critique when faced with the very obvious incongruities of his verse are 
PLVVLQJDFUXFLDOSRLQW$UJXPHQWVWKDWIRFXVRQWKHGLVSDULW\RI(PHUVRQ·VSRHWLF
                                                 
11 For discussions of the dissociated voice, intellectual abstraction, and numerous other shortcomings 
ZKLFK¶GRJ·WKHSRHWU\VHH3RUWHUSSDQGpassim. 
12 7KHSRHPWKDW7KRUHDXKDGLQPLQGZKHQPDNLQJWKHVHFRPPHQWVZDV¶2GHWR%HDXW\·6HHThe 
Correspondence of Henry David Thoreau, ed. by Walter Harding and Carl Bode (New York: New York 
University Press, 1958) p. 146. 
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practice and theory are well represented in existing scholarship, and they tend to 
SURFHHGLQHYLWDEO\WRVRPHOHYHORIUHFRJQLWLRQRI(PHUVRQ·VIDLOXUHDQGFRQVHTXHQW
irrelevance as a practitioner of literary form. Indeed, the disjuncture between theory and 
praxis becomes simply the crucial fact for just about everyone to have written on 
(PHUVRQ·VYHUVH0RVWLQFOXGLQJ3RUWHUDQG(OLVD1HZWZRFULWLFVZKRZLOOEHFHQWUDO
to my concerns here for reasons that will become clearer later in the chapter, hold the 
aforementioned conviFWLRQDQGK\SRWKHVLVH(PHUVRQ·VSRHWLFUHGXQGDQF\WRYDU\LQJ
extents.13 For others, it is something that must be acknowledged in order that it might 
subsequently be overcome or overlooked as the critic proves (PHUVRQ·VSRHWLF worth in 
some unorthodox sense. The logic of this is that he wrote with such power and poetic 
liberty in the essays that the poems surely cannot be just an aberration. This course is 
advocated by H. Hyatt Waggoner and R. A. Yoder.14 If the disjuncture cannot but be 
acknowledged, however, this does not necessarily mean that it should dominate the 
discussion. As I will demonstrate, conditions which only really find full expression in 
(PHUVRQ·VSULYDWHPHGLWDWLRQVRQKLVSRHWU\KDYHMXVWDVH[WHQVLYHDQHIIHFWRQKLV
poetic practice as any publicly theorised ideal, and these conditions, along with other 
shifts in his thinking and reading habits in the mid-1840s, have a significant part to play 
in defining specific formal obligations and strictures that the poet must accept and obey. 
 
The Properties of Poetry 
To reset the problems emergent in the theory/praxis dichotomy described above, it is 
SHUWLQHQWWRWKLQNRIKRZ(PHUVRQ·VYHUVHIRUHJURXQGVLQLWVHJUHJLRXVIODZVDQRYHU-
H[WHQGHGLQWHOOHFWXDOJUDVSWKH¶EHDPHG-in voice· the dominance of logic, a preacherly 
                                                 
13 1HZHFKRHVDQGHQGRUVHV3RUWHU·VSRLQWWKDW(PHUVRQ·VSRHWU\LVDIDLOXUHH[FHSWinsofar as it permits 
the extravagance and impossibility of his poetic theoryEXWVKHJRHVIXUWKHULQDUJXLQJIRU(PHUVRQ·V
redundancy in the history of American poetry as a direct consequence of this proto-post-structuralist 
DWWHPSWWRFUHDWHD¶SRHWLFVIUHHRIWKHSRHP·6HH(OLVD1HZThe Regenerate Lyric: Theology and Innovation in 
American Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 41 and 27-55 passim. 
14 See Waggoner, pp. 6-5$<RGHU¶7RZDUGWKH´7LWPRXVH'LPHQVLRQµ7KH'HYHORSPHQWRI
(PHUVRQ·V3RHWLF6W\OH·PMLA, 87 (1972), 255-270. 
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sententiousness³all echo the grandiose pomposity of the sphinx in WKHYROXPH·V first 
piece, who questions across the first and second stanzas: 
 
¶:KR·OOWHOOPHP\VHFUHW 
The ages have kept?³ 
I awaited the seer, 
While they slumbered and slept:³ 
 
¶The fate of the man-child; 
The meaning of man; 
Known fruit of the unknown; 
'DHGDOLDQSODQ· (CW IX, 5) 
 
The point here is that, from the first lines of the volume, the principle of some esoteric 
poetic knowledge³the prerogative of the ¶VHHU·³is paramount. As such, we might ask 
KRZ(PHUVRQ·VYHUVHJRes on to function as a statement on, or an act within, the 
parameters of this principle? The epistemic remit of poetry is given in these lines to 
constitute profound insight into the structures of mind and world, but we can also 
consider that some less nebulous aspects belong under the same designation. This does 
QRWRQO\PHDQWKHUROHRIWKHSRHWZLWKUHVSHFWWRKLVDXGLHQFHEXWDOVRWKHSRHW·V
epistemic relation to that which his text contains. This is an extension of those 
questions of investment in text as an ethical issue already considered, but brought now 
LQWRPRUHFDWHJRULFDOWHUPVE\FRQFHLYLQJRILWVHSLVWHPRORJLFDOERXQGDULHVWKHSRHW·V
possession or property rights with respect to the text, its themes and elements. 
Although Emerson found publication as a poet only once he had established an 
authorial career, he had been writing verse which would eventually appear in print since 
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the 1820s. Many verses were circulated amongst friends, but otherwise most of these 
early pieces were written privately and for personal reading, much as his journals and 
notebooks were composed. Such verse was, as Yoder noWHV¶QRWFRQVFLRXVO\SUHSDU>HG 
«] for a poetic career. The role of his journal poetry is unquestionably self-expression, 
dialogue with oneself [«] DPHDQVRIIRUPXODWLQJRQH·VSULYDWHFRQYLFWLRQV·15 In this 
earlier period, therefore, they constitute a private concern, something palpably restricted 
WR(PHUVRQ·VSRVVHVVLRQ2QO\LQ-6, the period immediately preceding the 
publication of Poems, does Emerson become anything like a public poet, and this period 
was, of course, as much about compositing as it was about writing the final verses to 
flesh out the volume. This period therefore constitutes another spell of double writing, 
of preparing private and personal texts for public consumption, but there are points of 
interest here that make Poems unique, and its engagement with the finer points of textual 
property more pronounced. 
 2IFRXUVHWKHQRWLRQRIWKHSURSHUW\RIRQH·VWH[WH[WHQGHGIDUEH\RQGWKH
concerns of this volume. Emerson had always published by way of an arrangement in 
ZKLFKKHUHWDLQHGRZQHUVKLSRIWKHSULQWHU·VSODWHVDQGZLWKLWFRPSOHWHHGLWRULDO
authority. In return his publisher, James Munroe for all volumes up to and including 
Poems, and Phillips, Sampson, and Company, followed by Ticknor and Fields, thereafter, 
took on less monetary responsibility and hence less risk in the venture. Poems was 
therefore simply a continuation of existing habits, except that in the run-up to 
publication Emerson explored numerous options with other publishers before deciding, 
for reasons that I consider to be more than merely remunerative, to stick with tradition 
DQG¶WKHSURSHUW\RIP\RZQERRN· as he described it to his brother William (L III, 
350).16 The editorial control in perpetuity this model facilitated was, however, used more 
                                                 
15 Yoder, p. 256. 
16 For an extensive discussion of these explorations and the publication history of Poems which does 
HPSKDVLVHWKHUHPXQHUDWLYHUHVWLWXWLRQWKLVPLJKWHQVXUHVHH-RVHSK37KRPDV¶´7KH3URSHUW\RI0\
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extensively with Poems than with any other volume. Emerson significantly altered pieces 
long after publication, as his heavily marked personal correction copy of this first 
edition, now in the Houghton library, testifies.17  
2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKLVUHWHQWLRQRIRZQHUVKLSLVSUREOHPDWLVHGDV(PHUVRQ·V
habits in Poems do not correlate with his attitude to what might be deemed personal 
property or private knowledge in his prose works, and the indicators of possession 
usually altered in journal passages which found their way into printed prose are 
consistently dealt with in the opposite way here. As Glen M. Johnson has noted, 
Emerson habitually depersonalised excerpts from his journals and generalised personal 
pronouns when preparing prose works for publication.18 In Poems, however, pieces are 
FRQVSLFXRXVSUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHRIWKHLUSHUVRQDODGGUHVV7KLVFKDUDFWHULVHV¶2GH
Inscribed to W. H. Channing· DQG¶7R-:· in particular, and, while both poems 
caused controversy in New England circles, the latter, inscribed to a young divinity 
student, John Weiss, who was a minor voice amongst critics of Goethe in the mid-1840s 
and whom Emerson apparently barely knew until late 1846 at least, seems oddly and 
unnecessarily personalised.19 In addition to this, as well as the evidently personal nature 
RISRHPVVXFKDV¶7R(OOHQDWWKH6RXWK· ¶7R(YD· DQG¶7KUHQRG\· Emerson wrote of 
¶'LUJH·WKDWLWVVXEMHFWZDVWKHGHDWKVRIKLVEURWKHUV(GZDUGDQG&KDUOHVDQGWKDWKH
might have printed WKHOLQHV¶LQWKH'LDOEXWIRUWKHLUSHUVRQDOLW\· a fact which did not 
stop him submitting them first to The Gift, and later reproducing them in Poems (L VII, 
                                                                                                                                          
2ZQ%RRNµ(PHUVRQ·VPoems (1847) and WKH/LWHUDU\0DUNHWSODFH·The New England Quarterly, 69 (1996), 
406-25. It should not be considered implausible that Emerson might hold strongly contradictory views 
with respect to monetary and literary economies; indeed, the paradox of simultaneously exercising and 
forfeiting property rights figures his whole poetic endeavour, as I will argue here. 
17 As well as heavy marking in both pencil and pen, many poems are marked for deletion in this volume 
by having their pages torn away completely. The changes are, however, impossible to date, since they 
appeared and/or disappeared variously in further editions of Poems published over the following twenty-
five years. Emerson, Poems (Boston, James Munroe: 1847),*AC85.Em345.846pba(D), Houghton Library, 
Harvard UnivHUVLW\7KHFKDQJHVLQWKLVFRS\DUHDOVRGLVFXVVHGLQ$OEHUWYRQ)UDQN·V¶7H[WXDO
,QWURGXFWLRQ·LQWKHUHFHQWO\SXEOLVKHG+DUYDUG%HONQDSCollected Works edition. See CW IX, pp. cviii-
cxlvii (p. cxiv). 
18 Johnson, p. 52. 
19 6HHYRQ)UDQN·VFRPPHQWVRQWKLV episode in CW IX, 52-3. 
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592). Most significant of all, Emerson was directly challenged on this issue in the weeks 
after Poems was published when his close friend Caroline Sturgis complained of being 
DEOHWRUHFRJQLVHKHUVHOIDQGRWKHUVDVSRHWLFVXEMHFWV(PHUVRQ·VUHVSRQVHZKLFKKDV
gained a moderate level of notoriety, is suggestive but oblique, and utterly unapologetic. 
His poems, he states, are 
 
consciously fabulous to any actual life & purposes of mine, when I write them, 
& so manifestly, that, after a short time, they take rank in my memory with other 
SHRSOH·VSRHWU\DVLQWHOOHFWXDOH[HUFLVHV	DIWHUDOLWWOHZKile, are as readily 
exposed to other eyes as odes on Napoleon or Apollo. But the seeing you 
[sic]³suggested that these poems which the day before were poems,³were 
personalities, & they instantly became unspeakably odious to me. (L VIII, 106-7) 
 
His advice, therefore, comes in the imperative³¶7R\RXWKHYHUVHVDUH	ZLOOEH
nothing· And as a consequence, articulating clear positions on poetic property or 
knowledge becomes difficult. They may be plucked from life, and they may be returned 
to and dealt with aWOHLVXUH<HWWKH\DUHDWRQFHDNLQWR¶RWKHUSHRSOH·VSRHWU\· 
detached, expelled, and radically impersonal to all parties³Emerson, to whom their 
IDPLOLDULW\ZRXOGEH¶RGLRXV· DQGKLVUHDGHUWRZKRPWKH\¶ZLOOEHQRWKLQJ· 
 Since the status and conditions of personality in the works of the early-1840s 
had been repeatedly questioned and refigured, what to make of this further turn, in 
which writing personally effectively depersonalises, becoming instead a mode which 
Emerson comfortably declares archly GLVSRVVHVVLYHGHDGHQLQJDQGSURQHWR¶ZDUS
DZD\·IURPOLIHDVGRHVDQ\YHUVHZKLFKIDLOVWROLYHXSWRWKHH[SHFWDWLRQRI¶%DUGLF
VHQWHQFHV·JMN IX, 367)? Critically, we can assert that he differs enormously in both 
principle and practice from many poets who wrote in his wake, and the disinclination to 
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accept this leads to comparisons which tell us plainly what these verses are not, but 
perhaps not so much about what is original in the Emersonian approach. The examples 
of Porter and New are instructive in this respect, each treating their subject by way of 
substantial comparisons with another American poet³Porter uses Whitman, New opts 
for Frost. In each case, the problem revealed by the comparative approach is the extent 
RI(PHUVRQ·VFKLOO\LQWHOOHFWXDOLVP6RZKHUHDV:KLWPDQFHOHEUDWHGWKH¶FRQFUHWH· the 
individual, and the particular in poems which give an image of vitality and disparity, 
PorteUOHYHOVDW(PHUVRQWKHFKDUJHWKDWLQKLVSRHPV¶PHDQLQJGLVSODFHGSDUWLFXODULW\
morality displaced reality, and clarity displaced body. The world was glass·20 In much 
WKHVDPHZD\1HZDSSURDFKHV(PHUVRQ·VZRUNZLWKWKHFRQYLFWLRQWKDWLWV
intellectualism prevents it from being part of the key American mode³that of the 
lyric³EHFDXVHWKHO\ULF¶LVSUHFLVHO\DJHQUHRIGHWHUPLQDWLRQ· DSRHPERUQHRXWRI¶GLUH
necessity [«] the rock pile of singularity [«] a limit where the determinations of the 
poem and the undeterminable square off·21 The fact that both Porter and New 
FRQFHQWUDWHRQWKHSOHDVXUHRIWKH¶FRQFUHWH·LQWKHSRHWLFXWWHUDQFHZRXOGKDYHSOHDVHG
Matthew Arnold, who criticised Emerson for lacking precisely this quality. 22 
Furthermore, this discloses both 3RUWHU·VDQG1HZ·V preconception of the terms by 
which poetry is to be enjoyed, a notion of poetic knowledge³RIRXUDOUHDG\¶NQRZLQJ·
what we expect a poem to be, and the standard against which we judge it³which is of 
questionable provenance and to which I will return later. More pressingly, both Porter 
                                                 
20 Porter, p. 17, 19, 15. 
21 New, pp. 41-2. 
22 $UQROGZULWHVWKDWKHVRXJKWWRDWWDLQD¶UHDOHVWLPDWH·RI(PHUVRQ·VSRHWLFDELOLW\WKDWKHPLJKW
GHWHUPLQHKLV¶OHJLWLPDF\·+HYHU\TXLFNO\ILQGVDJDLQVW(PHUVRQVLQFHE\QRWPHHWLQJ his expectation of 
EHLQJ¶SODLQDQGFRQFUHWHHQRXJK·KHLV¶LQRWKHUZRUGVQRWSRHWHQRXJK·$UQROGSS-4. Waggoner 
GLVFXVVHV(PHUVRQ·VSHUSHWXDOH[FHSWLRQDOLW\LQWKH$PHULFDQWUDGLWLRQDQGKRZWKLVKDVDOZD\VEHHQ
conceived in negative terms, from Arnold, to Eliot, to the New Critics, and beyond. See Waggoner, pp. 6-
7. Since 1974, little has been written that challenges or modifies these critical orthodoxies. 
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and New are addressing aspects of the commitment to form.23 And the very fact that 
both use these grounds to critique Emerson evidences the fact that in his poetry, the 
questions I have been putting to his work earlier in the thesis do not apply in quite the 
same way. The suggestion made by both of these critics is that the Emersonian poem 
seeks synthesis, a completed knowingness declared by the poet, for the poet, rather than 
the lyrical possibility of disparity and multiplicity. Hence it is implied not only that the 
poet has the last word, but that there is a wilfulness evident in this finalising act and its 
fatalistic form that disempowers anyone who might have a future encounter with this 
text. In WKHILUVWLQVWDQFHWKHUHIRUHWKLVLVWKHPRGHRI¶SRVVHVVLYHQHVV·,LQWHQGWR
interrogate. 
 
Aggrandising Poetic Knowledge 
$IDWDODQGILQDOIRUPLVRIFRXUVHLPSOLHGLQWKHOLQHVDOUHDG\FLWHGIURP¶7KH6SKLQ[· 
WKDW¶´.QRwn fruit of the unknown; | Daedalian planµ·. Secular formation suggests the 
FRQVXPPDWLRQRINQRZOHGJHDUHDOLVDWLRQZKLFKUHWDLQVHOHPHQWVRI(PHUVRQ·VHDUO\
theses of the manifestation of mind in an inevitable style,  a point to which he was still 
directing occasional attention in the mid-V¶)RUP· KHZULWHVLQDQHQWU\RI¶LV
the mixture of matter & spirit; it is the visibility of spirit· a definition derived from a 
maxim attributed to Zoroaster repeated three further times in various journal entries 
between 1844 and 1847 (JMN IX, 117).24 Yet the benefit and, indeed, the nature of the 
knowledge derived from this act hangs in the balance, as it had done since the shift in 
(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWDWWHQGLQJ:DOGR·VGHDWKLQ$FFRUGLQJWRWKHWKHRULVDWLRQ
developed around that time, and postulated in Essays: Second Series, literature entails 
                                                 
23 ,QGHHGRQHRI1HZ·VUHPDUNVHQFDSVXODWHVWKHFRQGLWLRQRIIRUPDVFKRLFHZKLFKVWUXFWXUes this thesis: 
¶2QO\E\WKHH[TXLVLWHKRQLQJPRYHPHQWRIYHUEDOFKRLFHGRHVWKHO\ULFSRHPHPHUJHPDGHRIWKHVH
ZRUGVDQGQRWRWKHUV·1HZS 
24 )RUWKHRWKHUWKUHHH[DPSOHVLQFOXGLQJWKHRULJLQDOFRSLHGIURP7KRPDV7D\ORU·VWUDQVODWLRQRIWKH
Chaldean Oracles, see JMN IX, 81, 352, 356. 
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giving away, granting not the reflexive acquisition of self-knowledge and literary 
empowerment but instead entering its author into a movement of infinite regress and 
investment without restitution. In Second Series, this led to confessions of doubt and the 
consequent adoption of a mannered and masked voice, and in Poems, similar tendencies 
are evident. 
In a primary and fundamental sense, one might consider the extraordinary 
extent to which Emerson belittles or disputes the value of his poems, such that it is as if 
he seeks to disown them. In the years leading up to 1847, his letters constantly reiterate 
his dissatisfaction with and lack of interest in his poetic endeavours. The volume was 
solicited, Emerson repeatedly states, by friends and later by publishers. Reflecting on 
these requests in a letter to his brother William, he confesses doubt in his ability to fulfil 
WKHP¶XQFHUWDLQDOZD\VZKHWKHU,KDYHRQHWUXHVSDUNRIWKDWILUHZKLFKEXUns in 
verse·25 We may be tempted to credit such comments to a veneer of assumed modesty, 
EXW(PHUVRQJRHVVRIDUDJDLQVWKLVVWDWHGLGHDORIWKHSRHW·V¶FDOPDIILUPDWLRQ·DWWLPHV
that our doubts should not simply be dismissed. Consider a letter sent to William Henry 
Furness, editor of The Gift DQG(PHUVRQ·VOLIHORQJIULHQGWUHDWLQJRIKLVVXEPLVVLRQVIRU
WKDWYROXPHZLWKPDXGOLQDSRORJLHV(PHUVRQGHVFULELQJKLVVXEPLVVLRQVDV¶UXGH
dirges· GUDZQ¶RXWRIWKHLUVDGUHFHVVHVIRU\RX·DV ¶VRPEUH·DQG¶OLWWOH·L VII, 591-2). 
3DUDGR[LFDOO\RQHRIWKRVHVXEPLVVLRQVZDVWKHDOUHDG\GLVFXVVHG¶7KH3RHW·V$SRORJ\·
ODWHUUHSULQWHGDV¶7KH$SRORJ\·LQPoemsLQZKLFKWKHSRHW·VH[HPSWLRQIURPDSRORJLD
and liberty from the secular works of man constitute the central points.26 In the journals, 
meanwhile, the reflections are much the same. In 1840, he may have been content to 
ZULWHWKDW¶DSRHPDQRWKHU·VRUP\RZQ,UHDGZLWKMR\· but later in the decade, 
perhaps with a promise already made to set his verses into the finality of print, Emerson 
                                                 
25 L III. 227. See also L III, 234, 288, as well as L VII, 591-2. The last of these letters mentions Elizabeth 
Hoar as the friend who first prompted Emerson to publish his poems. 
26 See the discussion of this poem on pp. 183-4. 
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ZULWHV¶,KRSHHYHU\PDQLVQRWWREHFRQILQHGWRKLVRZQSRHWU\)RUWKR·,OLNHWR
make mine well enough, I know few unhappier employments than to read it & I wish to 
UHDG0U7HQQ\VRQ·V·JMN VII, 68; VIII, 471). 
 At times, meanwhile, the poems themselves advance and develop the same 
notion. The fatal singularity of form was the primary concern of the years surrounding 
Essays: Second Series, and the poetic necessity of such a grand and austere conception is 
perpetuated into Poems,Q¶0RQDGQRF· the mountain of that name is elevated to an 
H[HPSODURIVLQJXODULW\DQGSHUPDQHQFHWKHRSSRVLWHRIRXU¶LQVHFWPLVHULHV· and the 
ideal which poetic form is imagined to resemble: 
 
 O barren mound, thy plenties fill! 
 We fool and prate; 
 Thou art silent and sedate. 
 To myriad kinds and times one sense 
 The constant mountain doth dispense. (CW IX, 131-2) 
 
%XWWKHIDFWWKDW¶0RQDGQRF·DQGLWVDSRVWURSKLVHG¶0XWHRUDWRU·LVLPPHGLDWHO\
followed by the popular children·VYHUVH¶)DEOH· in which a squirrel chastises a now 
UDWKHUOHVVHORTXHQWPRXQWDLQIRUDQLQVXOW¶OLWWOHSULJ·ZLWKWKHUHMRLQGHU¶´,I,FDnnot 
carry forests on my back, | Neither can you crack a nutµ·, is very obviously bathetic 
(CW IX, 115-6). Indeed, Poems is composited in such a way that similar pairings and 
sequences emerge which go to great lengths to undermine the high seriousness of the 
SRHWLFWKHVHVRFFDVLRQDOO\DGYDQFHGDQG,·OOKDYHFDXVHWRORRNDWRWKHULQVWDQFHVRIWKLV
in time. In yet more concentrated ways, individual poems do this as well, as ostensible 
attempts to manifest poetic ideals in practice deconstruct themselves of necessity. 
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 $PRQJVXFKSLHFHV¶:RRGQRWHV,,·FDUULHVVSHFLDOVLJQLILFDQFH,WZDVRULJLQDOO\
published in The Dial in 1841, written that year and evidently the product of the 
hypotheses of rhyme, repetition, and poetic metre which characterised the journals in 
the period surrounding Essays: First Series. Its opening lines, however, have a new 
pertinence in the context of concerns only raised fully in 1844·s Second Series: 
 
 ¶Whether is better the gift or the donor? 
 &RPHWRPH· 
 Quoth the pine-tree, 
 ¶,DPWKHJLYHURIKRQRXU· (CW IX, 103) 
 
The pine-WUHH·VRSLQLRQKHUHLVDWRGGVZLWKWKHWKHRU\RIWKHJLIWGHYHOoped over the 
following years, the effect being that the tree, by 1846-7, seems hubristic in implying the 
superiority of the alms-giver in the proposed distinction. And this indication of hubris, 
once noted, consumes the rest of the piece as it progresses. Thematically, the poem 
belongs amongst a cluster of pieces at the heart of Poems for its content³the organic 
transformative power of nature, and the appositeness of this to writing, which, Emerson 
VD\VLQWKHMRXUQDOV¶VKRXOGEHWKHVHWWOHPHQWRIGHZRQthe leaf, of stalactites on the 
wall of the grotto, the deposit of flesh from the blood, of woody fibre in the tree from 
WKHVDS·LQRWKHUZRUGVZULWLQJRXJKWWRSURFHHGLQHYLWDEO\IURPWKRXJKWZHVKRXOG
¶DVNWKHIDFWIRUWKHIRUP·JMN IX, 207; VIII, 101).27 %XWLQ¶:RRGQRWHV,,· the 
sententious tree undermines the theoretic dream and figures an increasingly conspicuous 
acceptance of failure. Once again, its placement in the volume is significant. It precedes 
                                                 
27 <RGHUQRWHVWKDWWKLVRUJDQLFWUDQVIRUPDWLRQZKLFKKDVEHHQWDNHQE\PDQ\WREH(PHUVRQ·Vmodus 
operandi, was actually valid only for a short period around 1840-DQGWKDW¶GRXEWDQGGHWDFKPHQW·EHWWHU
characterise his long term programme. See Yoder, pp. 259, 264-6. Neufeldt offers a reading which, in 
VHHNLQJWRYDOLGDWHWKHQRWLRQRIRUJDQLFWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLQVWHDGLPSRVHVLWRQ(PHUVRQ·VSRHPVDQG
claims that such a process is enacted through a naturalistic use of punctuation, a proposal which seems to 
me to be a contradiction in terms. See Neufeldt, pp. 143-68. 
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WKHFRPSRVLWLRQ¶0RQDGQRF· and prefigures the ventriloquism found there. But 
ZKHUHDVWKHPRXQWDLQYRLFHGLQ¶0RQDGQRF·LVGHVFULEHGLQDSDUDGR[ZKLFKQRGVWR
WKHFRQWULYDQFHE\ZKLFKWKLVLQDQLPDWHIRUPVSHDNVDV¶0XWHRUDWRU· granting itself as 
¶SXUHXVH·RUFRPPRGLW\WRPDQZKRDV(PHUVRQ SXWLWLQPLJKW¶UHGXFHLWXQGHU
GRPLQLRQ·WRWKHHQGRIVHOI-assertion, the pine-tree is positively boastful: 
 
 ¶What prizes the town and the tower? 
 Only what the pine-tree yields; 
[«] 
I give my rafters to his boat, 
 0\ELOOHWVWRKLVERLOHU·VWKUoat; 
 And I will swim the ancient sea, 
 To float my child to victory· (CW IX, 105) 
 
Indeed, the poem as a whole constitutes three hundred and eighty lines of euphuism on 
nature voiced by the increasingly boorish tree, perhaps accepting an inevitable readerly 
lethargy (without making any concession to it) in its repetition of imperatives to 
¶´+HDUNHQ+HDUNHQµ·LQOLQHVDQG7KHRGRUH3DUNHUPLJKWEHIRUJLYHQ
IRUUHPDUNLQJWKDW¶DSLQH-WUHHZKLFKVKRXOGWDONDV0U(PHUVRQ·VWUHHWDONVZRXOG
deserve to be plucked up and cast into the sea· 28 
 If this prolixity is intended to represent an organic and necessary form, filled as 
it is with examples of what LawUHQFH%XHOOFDOOHG¶FDWDORJXHUKHWRULF·³the fulsomeness 
of nature and its identity in difference given in descriptive lists of natural phenomena, or 
lists of analogous characteristics in a sequence of lines beginning with an identical 
preposition³then our interest is piqued when around the midpoint its effect seems to 
                                                 
28 The possibly apocryphal remark is recorded in Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Contemporaries (Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1899), p. 19. 
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go awry.29 Initially, the ventriloquism of the tree becomes self-conscious, although still 
in the mode of a divine and non-human origin: 
 
 ¶And, far within those cadent pauses, 
 The chorus of the ancient Causes! 
 Delights the dreadful Destiny 
 TRIOLQJKLVYRLFHLQWRWKHWUHH· (CW IX, 107-8) 
 
Taking up the subject of this ideal poetic voicing, the pine-WUHH·VQDUUDWLRQWXUQVDWRQFH
to the divinity of poetic rhyme and metre as a means of invoking unity in disparate 
particulars. Yet there are suggestions around this point that this project is destined to be 
LQHIIHFWLYH)LUVWWKHWUHH·VH[SRVWXODWLRQRIWKHWKHPHLVW\SLFDOO\SRPSRXVDQG
exclusive: 
  
 ¶In music he repeats the pang 
 Whence the fair flock of Nature sprang. 
 O mortal! Thy ears are stones; 
 These echoes are laden with tones 
 Which onl\WKHSXUHFDQKHDU· (CW IX, 108) 
 
,IRXU¶HDUVDUHVWRQHV· WKHQZHDUHSHUKDSVH[RQHUDWHGIURPEODPHIRUKHDULQJ¶ODGHQ·
VOLSWRZDUG¶OHDGHQ·LQWKe monotonous rhythm of the SRHP·V tetrameter. But there are 
other indications around the same point that the tree is not so compelling a poetic 
persona as it seems to believe. Just after the above, the tree extends an invitation to the 
human poet: 
                                                 
29 Buell, Literary Transcendentalism, pp. 166-87. 
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 ¶Talk no more with feeble tongue; 
 No more the fool of space and time, 
 Come weave with mine a QREOHUUK\PH· (CW IX, 108) 
 
:KLFKLQWKHFRQWH[WRI¶:RRGQRWHV,,· is an entirely empty offer. This verse is in no 
way dialogic, the poet being permitted only to voLFHRFFDVLRQDOOLQHV¶4XRWKWKHSLQH-
tree·LQFXLQJXSDQRWKHURUDWRULFDOGHOXJHIURPWKHYHQWULORTXLVHGWUHH:KDW·VPRUH
QRULVWKHSURPLVHRI¶QREOHUUK\PH·FRQYLQFLQJ2YHUWKHIROORZLQJWKLUW\OLQHVWKHWUHH
extols its musical nature a further fouUWLPHVRQWKHVDPHWDFN)LUVW¶´&RPe learn with 
me the fatal song | :KLFKNQLWVWKHZRUOGLQPXVLFVWURQJµ·WKHQLQWKHHOHPHQWDO
poetic rhythms of nature: 
  
¶Come lift thine eyes to lofty rhymes, 
 Of things with things, and times with times, 
 [«] 
 For Nature beats in perfect tune, 
 And rRXQGVZLWKUK\PHKHUHYHU\UXQH· 
 
From here, the tree continues in familiar manner, extolling its own poetic wisdom: 
 
 ¶And the ripples in rhymes the oar forsake. 
 The wood is wiser far than thou; 
 The wood and wave eaFKRWKHUNQRZ· 
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$IWHUZKLFKLWLVOHIWRQO\WRODPHQWRQFHDJDLQWKHSRHW·VH[FOXVLRQ´%XWWKRXpoor 
child! unbound, unrhymed, | :KHQFHFDPHVWWKRXPLVSODFHGPLVWLPHG"µCW IX, 
109). Yet the tree is hardly as poetically profound as it makes out. The poem, which, for 
the most part, consists of rhyming couplets of iambic tetrameter, is neither rhythmically 
QRUSKRQLFDOO\SXUH7KHUHDUHSULQWHUV·UK\PHVHYHU\ZKHUHGHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWWKHWUHH
presumably does not need the mediacy of writing to make its rhyme stick. Likewise, the 
moulding of lines to scansional or rhyming necessity leads to syntactical chaos on a 
QXPEHURIRFFDVLRQVIRULQVWDQFH¶´6SHDNQRWWK\VSHHFKP\ERXJKVDPRQJµ·DQG
¶´7KHOHDVWEUHDWKP\ERXJKVZKLFKWRVVHGµ·ZKLOHDVXJJHVtion is made of the 
inappropriateness of linguistic legality to the ideals the tree espouses in the halting and 
overlong second line of the coupleW´¶0\EUDQFKHVVSHDN,WDOLDQ_ English, German, 
%DVTXH&DVWLOLDQµ·CW ,;(YHQWXDOO\WKH¶JUDQG-strRNHV·RIUK\PHVR
emphatically advocated in this and other works of the period are subtly brought under 
inquiry as the poetic figure of repetition, that which is hoped will manifest recognition 
RIWKHIXOVRPHULFKQHVVRIQDWXUHIRUPDQ·VHQGVLVLQVWHDGErought to bear in lines 
GLVFORVLQJWKLVQRWLRQ·VDQWLWKHVLV¶´7RWKHHWKHKRUL]RQVKDOOH[SUHVs | Only emptiness 
DQGHPSWLQHVVµ·CW ,;,QRWKHUZRUGVWKH¶YRLFH-IOLQJLQJ·HQJDJHGLQE\
Emerson here is nothing like as natural as the tree would have its listener believe, and, 
by way of this increasingly reflexive undermining of his own poetic edifice, the poet 
hints to the reader his own loosening grip and ineffective will, veering away from 
intellectual settlement and synthesis rather than supplementing it.30 When the tree 
LQVWUXFWVLQSDUHQWKHVHV¶´$Qd thou,³go burn thy wormy pagesµ·, before ending the 
                                                 
30 On this point, the essay by Mutlu Konuk Blasing discussed briefly in my introduction supplements my 
WKHVLVE\SURSRVLQJWKDW¶SRHW·V´PHDQµE\EHFRPLQJLQVWUXPHQWVRIIDWH·³WKDWLVE\DOORZLQJODQJXDJH·V
own necessity to condition, inflect, and develop their argument rather than simply emphasising and 
IUDPLQJLW(PHUVRQ·VSRHPVKDYHDKLJKO\LGLRV\QFUDWLFZD\RIILJXULQJWKLVDQGLWVIXOOSURFHVVZLOOEH
elaborated throughout this chapter. Suffice it to say, however, that I am in full agreement with Blasing on 
WKHSRLQWWKDW(PHUVRQ·VFRQFHUQZLWKSRHWLFIRUPGLGQRWHQWDLOWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDQHZSRHWU\OHDVW
RIDOODQ¶$PHULFDQ·SRHWLFWUDGLWLRQ5DWKHUKLVLQWHUHVWLVPRUHHOHPHQWDO¶+HRQO\GLVFRYHUV to his 
VXUSULVHWKDWKLVIRUPLV)RUPDQGKLVIDWH)DWH·%ODVLQJSS-23. 
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piece in extolling the fluidity and impermanence of thought through all substances and 
forms, the imperative seems to apply to this poet as much as any other, since all fail to 
HIIHFWLYHO\YRLFHDQGSODFHIRUPDOERXQGVRQPXWHQDWXUHDVEURDGO\DVWKHWUHH·V
verbosity might imply (CW IX, 111). 
 
Alternative Poetic Epistemologies 
$OWKRXJK¶:RRGQRWHV,,·SURSHUO\EHORQJVWRWKHSHULRGDIWHUWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI·V
Essays and the emergence of doubt in the efficacy of metrical language at that time, the 
final statements of the pine-tree remain important because they preface a turn (or, more 
SURSHUO\DUHWXUQLQ(PHUVRQ·VLGHDVHYLGHQWLQWKHMRXUQDOVRIWKHPLG-decade. For the 
fugacity of thought and transience of forms, which had always been a factor in his 
thinking, received new impetus in these years from his intense and original interest in a 
pantheon of Eastern texts, from the Persian poetry of Hafiz, to Buddhist and Hindu 
mysticism, to Chinese philosophy. In the main, the effect of this reading on Emerson 
was not revelatory, but rather evoked, and then complemented and confirmed, 
convictions he had earlier held. Be this as it may, the consequences nevertheless had an 
important part to play in conditioning the epistemic principles of poetic acts in the lead-
up to the publication of Poems.31  
 The effect of this reading returns ideas which had subsided since 1841-2 to the 
FHQWUHRI(PHUVRQ·VWKLQNLQJ,QSHUKDSVWKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWLQVWDQFHRIWKLV
&ROHULGJHDQ¶5HDVRQ·VXGGHQO\UHHQWHUV(PHUVRQ·V lexicon after he had maligned the 
term for a number of years, and its manifestation comes in direct opposition to the 
condition of form as finality, fatalism, and Logos that equally characterised other work of 
                                                 
31 A substantial body of work exists on the proposed influence of Oriental thought on the 
Transcendentalists. To my mind, however, any assertion of direct influence on Emerson is overstated³it 
seems more likely to be the case, as Sarina Isenberg has recently written, that Emerson read Eastern texts 
for confirmation in analogues of ideas he had long held to be true, which came from Coleridge, German 
Idealism, and liberal UnitarianLVPUDWKHUWKDQLQWDFWIURP%XGGKLVPRU6XILVP6HH,VHQEHUJ¶7UDQVODWLQJ
:RUOG5HOLJLRQV5DOSK:DOGR(PHUVRQ·VDQG+HQU\'DYLG7KRUHDX·V¶(WKQLFDO6FULSWXUHV·&ROXPQLQ
The Dial·Comparative American Studies, 11 (2013), 18-36. 
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the period. Here Swedenborg, who by now is receiving not unmeasured praise but the 
critique we find in Representative Men, comes under attack for his prolixity and excess of 
system: 
 
The intricacy & ingenuity of your insanity makes you only the harder to be 
undeceived. This is the excess of form. The fallacy seems to be in the equivocal 
use of the term The Word. In the high & sacred sense of that term used by a 
strong Oriental rhetoric for the energy of the Supreme Cause [in act,] all that is 
predicated of it, is true: it is equivalent to Reason. (JMN IX, 302. Emphasis and 
square brackets in original) 
 
Although the passage is nominally addressed to Swedenborg, the second-person 
pronoun implies self-address and critique too, since Emerson had been subjecting 
himself to a kind of formal askesis since 1842. As ever, therefore, the mutually exclusive 
concepts of formal singularity and the formless infinity of spirit constitute the polarities 
RQZKLFK(PHUVRQ·VLGHDVDUHEXLOWEXWDWWKLVSRLQWLQWLPHWKHGLFKRWRP\LV
expressed in a particularly schizophrenic manner, flitting between valorisation and 
damnation of the formal endeavour from one page to the next. Throughout, (PHUVRQ·V
interest slides, as was his tendency, toward absolutes. In this context, his Oriental 
reading offers notions of infinite flux, endless metamorphosis, and, emphatically, a 
trajectory which warps away from every exigency of form otherwise at the heart of his 
contemporaneous work. And this relates directly to questions of poetic possession, 
SURSHUW\DQGZLOO,QSDVVDJHVFRSLHGRXWRI++:LOVRQ·VWUDQVODWLRQRIWKH
9LVKľX3XUiľD(PHUVRQ·VLQWHUHVWV are clear:  
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7KHQRWLRQVWKDW¶,DP³WKLVLVPLQH· which influence mankind, are but 
delusions of the mother of the world, originating in thy active agency [«] The 
words ¶I· & ¶mine· constitute ignorance [«] Dispel, o lord of all creatures, the 
conceit, of knowledge which proceeds from ignorance. (JMN IX, 320-1)32 
 
If Reason is permitted back into consideration, therefore, it should be clear that the 
attendant attempt to deductively recover a prereflective ME and the scope of what is 
¶PLQH·GRHVQRWFRPHZLth it.  
In fact, in both poems written in 1845-6 and the journals of the time, the poetic 
act always entails a renunciation of knowledge as possession or personal property. As 
such, in a move which anticipates and explains the ventriloquistic tendency of Poems, 
(PHUVRQZULWHVLQDMRXUQDOHQWU\RI-XQH¶,IWKHSRHWcould only forget himself in 
his theme, be the tongue of the mountain, his egotism would subside and that firm line 
which he had drawn would remain like the names of discoverers of planets, written in 
WKHVN\LQOHWWHUVZKLFKFRXOGQHYHUEHREOLWHUDWHG·JMN IX, 433. Emphasis added). 
Besides the repeated expression of doubt in the possibility of effective poetic 
ventriloquism, Emerson emphasises the fact that the namer of a planet takes no 
ownership of it, per se, but bequeaths it to the future. He grants it linguistic and 
intellectual currency by giving name, just as the poet seeks to bequeath by giving voice 
WRWKHPRXQWDLQRUWUHH6RLGHDOO\LWLVWKH¶SRHWLFJLIWZHZDQWEXWQRWWKHpoetic 
profession [«] QRWERRNPDNLQJDQGERRNVHOOLQJQRWFROGVS\LQJ	DXWKRUVKLS·JMN 
IX, 268-9). In the poems themselves, therefore, we find once again notions of a poetics 
RIJLIWJLYLQJDSRHWLFDFWZKLFKLVEXLOWDURXQGWKHSRHW·VVHOI-renunciation, but a 
renunciation that cannot become overtly conspicuous lest some expectation of 
                                                 
32 For the source of these quotations in the original text, see 7KH9LVKľX3XUiľD$6\VWHPRI+LQGX0\WKRORJ\
and Tradition, trans. by H. H. Wilson (London: The Oriental Translation Fund, 1840), pp. 584-5, 659, 585. 
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restitution be mistakenly invoked. In Poems, the term that comes to be used to 
FRQFHSWXDOLVHDQGGHYHORSWKLVSULQFLSOHLVWKH¶DPXOHW· 
,Q¶*X\· a poem composed in the productive period of 1845-6, the amulet finds 
its first expression in the volume amongst meditations on the poetic ideal. Guy, whom 
Emerson sometimes used in the journals as an alter-ego fully given over to the demands 
of Idealism and his poetic hypotheses, is fated to whatever consequences are implicit in 
VXFKGHPDQGV6RLQDJHQHUDOO\SRVLWLYHVHQVHKHLV¶$Wtempered to the night and day, 
| Interchangeable with things· DQGDVVXFK¶1HHGVQRDPXOHWVQRUULQJV·WRUHIOHFWLYHO\
assure himself of the security of being (CW IX, 61).33 The poem itself is not explicit on 
what is meant by these items, but the following lines offer a cluH¶*X\SRVVHVVHGWKH
talisman | That all things from him began· A superior mode of self-possession is thus 
JUDQWHGEXWWKHZRUG¶WDOLVPDQ·LVVLJQLILFDQW$VAlbert von Frank notes in his 
introductory remarks to the piece in the recent Harvard Belknap Poems, talisman derives 
from the Greek telos, and hence the term implies definite fulfilment. Guy is thus 
possessed only of a certain fate, a notion which gains additional credence when, in the 
next line, he is compared to Polycrates, whose immense good fortune prefigured his 
inevitable destiny of loss and tragedy, something implied to be native to the productions 
of the genuine, giving poet.34 
The significance of this only becomes apparent later in the volume, where, 
DSSDUHQWO\FRQWUDU\WR*X\·VFRQGLWLRQWKHDXWKRUSURGXFHVKLVRZQ¶$PXOHW·LQDVhort 
poem of that title. It sits amongst some of the most personally significant pieces in the 
FROOHFWLRQSUHFHGHGE\¶7R(OOHQDWWKH6RXWK·DQG¶7R(YD· both poems written for 
and about his first wife before she died in 1831. Such poems ought, we would suppose, 
to have been of great significance to Emerson as mementoes of their short marriage and 
                                                 
33 See JMN VII, 99 and 333 for the use of the character of Guy as an alter-ego. 
34 )RUEDFNJURXQGWR(PHUVRQ·VLQFOXVLRQRIWKLVILJXUHVHHJMN V, 93-6HHDOVR(GZDUG(PHUVRQ·V
notes to the poem in Centenary Edition. The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson (Boston and New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1903-4), IX, p. 416 n.1. 
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KLVORVWORYH6RLWLVFXULRXVWKDW¶7KH$PXOHW· written in the early-1840s, should clearly 
reject this principle. The piece begins in a brief rumination on the unchanging nature of 
DSRUWUDLWZKLFK¶VPLOHVDVILUVWLWVPLOHG· OLNHZLVH¶7KHULQJ\RXJDYHLVVWLOOWKHVDPH· 
EXWGHVSLWHWKHSRHW·VGHVLUHVRWKHUZLVHQHLWKHU¶DPXOHWVQRUULQJV·QRUDQ\RWKHU
formed production, however singular it is, can absolutely represent the absent referent 
so far as the poet himself is concerned: 
 
Alas! That neither bonds nor vows 
Can certify possession; 
Torments me still the fear that love 
Died in its last expression. (CW IX, 187-8) 
 
,QWKHYHUVHWKDWIROORZV¶7KLQH(\HV6WLOO6KLQHG·³another early piece for Ellen³the 
GRXEWVRI¶7KH$PXOHW·VHHPWRKDYHEHHQVXGGHQO\DQGLQH[SOLFDEO\RYHUFRPHLWLVRQ
the surface, an amulet-poem of memorial and recollection. Yet the surviving draft of the 
piece tells a different story. There, an extra stanza makes explicit reference to a 
miniature Emerson owned of Ellen: 
  
 I need not hide beneath my vest 
 Thy picture, the pride of art, 
 Thy picture burns within my breast, 
 And the chain is round my heart.35 
 
                                                 
35 $OVRH[FOXGHGDUH DQXPEHURI OLQHVRIGLUHFW DGGUHVVZKLFKFDQGLGO\ H[SUHVV(PHUVRQ·V ORYH LQ WKH
first-person, an elision which adds further credence to this reading. See The Poetry Notebooks of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, ed. by Ralph F. Orth and others (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1986), p. 27. See too L 
I, 269 for an early reference to this miniature. 
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In other words, by excluding the stanza this short poem renders its representation of 
memory impersonal and non-specific³the poet now only finds his amulets in nature³
and by doing so he more emphatically (and in fact) enacts the sentiment otherwise 
described in the elided stanza aQGPRUHUHDGLO\DFFHSWVWKHFRQGLWLRQVJLYHQLQ¶7KH
Amulet· That he does not explicitly tell us so is to be expected, for his poetic obligation 
is to give up the kinds of possession implied in these verses, but to do so without 
announcing the giving up. 
 The amulet, both in the poem by that title and across the volume, thus stands at 
once for the necessity of poetic production and the inevitability of poetic failure, at least 
so far as that production is intended to constitute an icon or avatar of the poeW·V
experience and knowledge.36 The consequence is that Emerson, by the mid-1840s, is 
exploring alternative systems of poetic epistemology, and within these explorations an 
assortment of influences conspires to drive his thought toward some subtle 
refiguratLRQVRIWKHSRHWLFHQWHUSULVH,Q¶7KH6SKLQ[· Emerson had described form as 
WKH¶NQRZQIUXLWRIWKHXQNQRZQ· a phrasing which rather obviously nods to the Tree 
of Knowledge and the kind of knowingness implied in the expulsion from Eden. 
Indeed, the knowledge which constitutes Original Sin, the knowledge we inherit both 
within Christian theology and as the Cartesian philosophical and cultural tradition of the 
West, is our impression of self-awareness and self-possession, as Emerson plainly put it 
LQ¶([SHULHQFH·¶,WLVYHU\XQKDSS\EXWWRRODWHWREHKHOSHGWKHGLVFRYHU\ZHKDYH
                                                 
36 A curious letter, sent to Daniel Jefferson³DQ(QJOLVKDGPLUHURI(PHUVRQ·VZRUN³in June 1846, is 
worthy of remark in this context. Jefferson had written requesting a calotype³essentially, an amulet in 
photographic form³RI(PHUVRQ+HUHVSRQGHGLQWKHQHJDWLYHH[SODLQLQJWKDW¶P\IULHQGVGHFODUHGWKDW
I was a very bad subject for that style, and that every impression was a painful misrepresentation, which 
WKH\FRXOGQRWFRQVHQWWRJRDEURDG·&RQVLGHUHGLQLVRODWLRQWKLVDQHFGRWHVLPSO\VXJJHVWV(PHUVRQ·V
dissatisfaction with poetic iconography, but its significance is amplified by the other major subject of the 
letter³immortality, and particularly poetic immortality³in which he discusses how lives and acts are a 
VHTXHQFHRISHUSHWXDOG\LQJ¶ZHDUHFRQWLQXDOO\FDVWLQJRIIVKUHGVRISHUVRQDOLW\·ZKLFKDUHLUUHFRYHUDEOH
DQGKHQFH¶RQHZKRKDVWKHKDELWRIUHTXLULQJVHOI-evidence in every article of his creed will, I apprehend, 
be sensible of a slight coldness or deadness in almost every remark that is made in houses concerning 
IXWXUHOLIH·,QVWHDGRIDWWHPSWVWRZDUGVHOI-JUDWLI\LQJ¶NQRZOHGJH·RIWKHZRUOGWRFRPHEH\RQG death, 
(PHUVRQYDORULVHV¶DGLUHFWSRHWLFHPDQFLSDWLQJHPDQDWLRQRIWKHWKLQJVSRNHQRI·ZKLFKSRLQW
corroborates his poetic thinking entirely, as I will argue below (L VIII, 82-3). 
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PDGHWKDWZHH[LVW7KDWGLVFRYHU\LVFDOOHGWKH)DOORI0DQ·CW III, 43).37 Too late it 
PD\EHEXW(PHUVRQODPHQWVQRQHWKHOHVVWKDWKH¶ZRXOGJLYHDOOIRUDQHZNQRZOHGJH· 
and so he seeks alternative paradigms for different epistemic possibilities (JMN IX, 
436). Initially, this comes in his Oriental reading. From the 9LVKľX3XUiľD, Emerson 
FRSLHVRXWGHWDLOVRIWKH¶6WRU\RIWKH3iULMiWDWUHH· a tree of knowledge in a distinctly 
GLIIHUHQWWUDGLWLRQZKLFK¶HQDEOHGHYHU\RQHWRUHFROOHFWWKHHYHQWVRIDSULRUH[LVWHQFH
so that, on beholding their faces in that tree, all the Yádavas contemplated themselves in 
WKHLURULJLQDOFHOHVWLDOIRUPV·JMN IX, 320).38 The Párijáta tree, which is further 
GHVFULEHGDV¶WKHFRPPRQSURSHUW\RIDOOZRUOGV· thus stands for a restitution of the 
ZRUOGO\DQGGLYLQHTXLWHRSSRVHGWRWKHVWULFWXUHVLPSRVHGE\(GHQ·VIRUELGGHQ7UHHRI
.QRZOHGJHDQGWKLVH[DPSOHLQIOHFWV(PHUVRQ·VIUHTXHQWDOOXVLRQVto the latter 
throughout his writing of the mid-to-late-1840s. 
We can observe the meeting of these two models in further examples of the text 
he copies into his journal from the 9LVKľX3XUiľD In one, he records that 
¶>H@PDQFLSDWLRQIURPexistence is the fruit of self-control [«] Foolishness has been the 
FKDUDFWHURIHYHU\NLQJZKRKDVERDVWHG´$OOWKLVHDUWKLVPLQH³every thing is mine³
LWZLOOEHLQP\KRXVHIRUHYHUµ³IRUKHLVGHDG·JMN IX, 321).39 And, in another 
transcription, the declaration of emancipation is equated with wisdom and, once again, 
WKHIUXLWLQJERG\¶(PDQFLSDWLRQLVWKDWZKLFKWKHVDJHVHHNV+HORRNVXSRQKHDYHQO\
fruition as an impediment to felicity. He seeks final emancipation [«] ´2IZKDWDYDLOLV
DVFHQWWRWKHVXPPLWRIKHDYHQLILWLVQHFHVVDU\WRUHWXUQIURPWKHQFHWRHDUWKµ·JMN 
IX, 308).40 In all of these quotations, the source of interest is the structure of a 
knowledge averse to possession, acquisition, or empowerment. When Emerson reflects, 
                                                 
37 6HHDOVR¶8ULHO·LQPoemsZKHUHWKLVFRQQHFWLRQLVUHLWHUDWHGLQWKHOLQHV¶$VDGVHOI-knowledge; 
ZLWKHULQJIHOO_2QWKHEHDXW\RI8ULHO·CW IX, 34). 
38 See The 9LVKľX3XUiľD, p. 589. 
39 7KLVSDVVDJHLVWKHVRXUFHRI(PHUVRQ·VSRHP¶+DPDWUH\D·DQG,ZLOOKDYHFDXVHWRUHWXUQWR it, and to 
WKHSRHW·V¶WDNLQJSRVVHVVLRQ·RILWDVDIUDPHIRUKLVYHUVHVKRUWO\6HH7KH9LVKľX3XUiľD, p. 488. 
40 See 7KH9LVKľX3XUiľD, pp. 210-11. 
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DIHZSDJHVODWHUWKDW¶IRUPLVLPSULVRQPHQWDQGKHDYHQLWVHOIDGHFR\· the reason is 
that both are equally false promises rooted in the aspiration of perpetual self-possession 
and a self-consciousness that has a determinable secXODURULJLQ2QH·VRZQIRUPDWLRQV
do not lead to liberation via expression or the guarantee of self-knowledge, while heaven 
cannot be emancipating if its promise depends on committed and binding assurances of 
redemption issued while still alive in the world. Instead, the fruition of being is in an 
HPDQFLSDWLRQWKDWLVFRPSOHWHZLWKRXWDUHVWRUDWLYHPRGH¶7KDWZKLFKWKHVRXOVHHNVLV
resolution into Being above form, out of Tartarus & out of Heaven; liberation from 
H[LVWHQFHLVLWVQDPH·JMN IX, 322). 
Yet all of this does not equate to a swing so radical that the obligation to form is 
thereby negated. The schizophrenic flitting between polarities leads to the confession of 
UHDOLVDWLRQVWKDW¶>Z@HDUHPDGHRIFRQWUDGLFWLRQV³our freedom is necessary·JMN IX, 335. 
Emphasis in original).41 If the inheritance of sin determines the possibility of our 
freedom, then the inheritance of form ought to function in the same way. Indeed, much 
as a readiness to accept formal obligation was seen as a simple fact of maturity in the 
RSHQLQJSDJHVRI¶([SHULHQFH· VRLQ(PHUVRQZRXOGZULWH¶,JURZROG,DFFHSW
conditions; [«] that the sins of our predecessors are on us like a mountain of 
REVWUXFWLRQ·JMN IX, 363). The question we have before us is thus how the visible fruit 
RI(PHUVRQ·VPLQGWKHSRHPVWKHPVHOYHVQHJRWLDWHEHWZHHQWZRVHWVRILQIOXHQFHRQ
WKHRQHKDQGWKH¶IUXLWLRQ·ZKLFK signifies emancipation in his Eastern reading, and on 
the other, the trope of the Forbidden Fruit in the Judaeo-Christian tradition³the fruit 
of self-awareness, of personal expression, and the self-recognition that, in the Fallen 
world, is the knowledge of limit and of death. 
Emerson had, in fact, been conceptualising poetry in these kinds of terms for 
several years. He had written iQWKDW¶DSRHPVKRXOGQRWQHHGLWVUHODWLRQWROLIHWR
                                                 
41 $OLQHZKLFKRIFRXUVHODWHUFRQVWLWXWHVWKHHVVHQFHRIWKHHVVD\¶)DWH·CW VI, 12). Indeed, the 
substance of that essay is formed of journal entries made in the later years of the 1840s. 
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explain it; it should be a new life, not still half engaged in the soil like the new created 
OLRQVLQ(GHQ·JMN VIII, 372).42 If the poem is not native with the lions of Genesis 1: 
29-30, immanent with the earth from which they were formed, still herbivorous and 
deathless, then they are characterised by a freedom conditioned by the Fall, carnivorous, 
both symbol and cause of death. Indeed, the point is made yet more explicit in two 
journal passages RIWKHIROORZLQJ\HDUVWKHSRHW·VKLVWRU\LV¶WHVWLILHGE\WKHP\VWLFDQG
GHYRXWWKHKLVWRU\RIWKH)DOORIDGHVFHQWIURPDVXSHULRU	SXUHUDFH·LQIDFW
(PHUVRQ¶VXSSRVHV·WKDWWKH¶RIILFHRISRHWU\·ZDV¶LPSDUDGLVLQJ·JMN IX, 241-2, 376). 
To better understand what this means in context, and what relation it has to the 
HSLVWHPLFGLPHQVLRQRISRHWU\ZHVKRXOGORRNWR¶7KUHQRG\· the penultimate piece in 
WKHYROXPH7KLVHOHJ\RQ(PHUVRQ·VGHDGVRQ:DOGRFRQFOXGHVDVHTXHQFHRISLHFHV
concerned in YDULRXVZD\VZLWKOLPLWV)URPWKHSRHW·V¶GHDWKRILQDQLWLRQ·DPRQJVW
ZRUOGO\VXUIDFHVLQ¶%OLJKW· WRWKHERXQG¶DFUH·RI&RQFRUG(PHUVRQHXORJLVHVLQ
¶0XVNHWDTXLG· WRWKHPHPRULDOLVDWLRQRIKLVEURWKHUV&KDUOHVDQG(GZDUGLQ¶'LUJH· 
the closing poems EULQJWKHUHDGHU·VDWWHQWLRQWRDWLJKWIRFXVRQWKHIXQFWLRQRIGHDWK
LQ¶7KUHQRG\· And, indeed, this poem is worthy of closer attention, for it is 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIHYHU\DVSHFWRI(PHUVRQ·VYHUVHERWKLQDVSLUDWLRQDQGDFWXDOLW\/LNH
so much of his poetic project, the piece is distinctly double-voiced, being clearly 
bisected by a double line break after line 175. In its first section, which seems to have 
EHHQZULWWHQVRRQDIWHU:DOGR·VGHDWKLQ-DQXDU\EDVHGRQWKHSUHVHQFHRIGUDIWV
in the jourQDOVRIWKDWWLPHWKHQDUUDWLRQLVLQWKHSRHW·VRZQYRLFHZLWKLWVDWWHQGDQW
HPRWLRQWKHORVVRIWKH¶GDUOLQJ· ¶K\DFLQWKLQH· ¶JUDFLRXVER\·OHDYHVWKHSRHWGHVSDLULQJ
¶,DPWRRPXFKEHUHIW·CW IX, 290-4). Such lines typically displeased early twentieth-
FHQWXU\FULWLFVZLWKDFOHDULGHDRIZKDWFRQVWLWXWHGFDQRQLFLW\WKLV¶WRRLQWHQVHSHUVRQDO
VRUURZ·FRXOGQRW¶FRPSHWHZLWKVPRRWKHUDQGPRUHDFDGHPLFHOHJLHV· but the bisected 
                                                 
42 Emerson surely has Milton in mind in this analogy. See Paradise Lost (1667), ed. by Stephen Orgel and 
Jonathan Goldberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Bk. VII, l. 463-6, p. 181. 
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voices of the poem are reflected in a divided critical tradition.43 The second part, 
completed sometime during the productive period of 1845-6, is narrated³and the death 
thus transformed and intellectualised³E\RQHRI(PHUVRQ·V¶EHDPHG-in voices· and 
consequently later twentieth-century critics, influenced now by the Whitmanian legacy, 
have critiqued its supposed loss of focus and power by virtue of its very impersonality.44 
In other words, this conjunction of personal experience and synthesising intellect, of the 
emotional property of its author subjected to a study of disinterested impartiality, is a 
poem absolutely concerned with polarities of possession. 
Yet the bisection into possessive categories is not quite as simple as this. In the 
ILUVWVHFWLRQWKHSRHW·VLQWHQVHSHUVRQDOODPHQWDWLRQFDQEHGLVWUDFWLQJEXWLWUHPDLQV
the case that his claim over the departed child is, and, in the context of the piece, has 
always already been renounced. It is, in fact, as though the synthesis enacted in the 
VHFRQGKDOILVDOUHDG\LPSOLFLWO\REVHUYHG$OWKRXJKKHPD\GHFODUHWKDW¶I had the right, 
few days ago, | Thy steps to watch, thy place to know· this observation and knowledge 
is relational rather than possessive, as the second person pronouns stating ownership 
suggest. Indeed, the very next line³¶+RZKDYH,IRUIHLWHGWKHULJKW"·³simultaneously 
GLVFORVHVWKHIUHHZLOORIWKHSRHW¶IRUIHLW·UDWKHUWKDQGHSULYDWLRQRUORVVDQGKLVODFN
of knowledge of how he came to will it so (CW IX, 291). This is to say that the poet is, 
by some method, responsible for his own inability to possess and incapacity to know. 
As a matter of fact, the only noun used with the first person possessive in the poem 
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHFKLOGDSSHDUVDV¶P\WUXDQW· reiterating that it is the very nature of 
WKHSRHWLFVXEMHFWDQGWKHSRHW·VKDQGOLQJRILWLQODQJXDJHWRZDUSDZD\IURPLWV
author. Under these conditions, we can examine the closing lines of the first section, 
                                                 
43 W. R. Cairns, A History of American Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1912), p. 236. 
44 See John McAleer, Days of Encounter (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1984), p. 313, and Gay Wilson 
Allen, Waldo Emerson (New York: Viking, 1981), pp. 396-7. 
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and observe the emergence of almost the opposite meaning to that which might be 
apparent in a first reading: 
 
O child of paradise, 
%R\ZKRPDGHGHDUKLVIDWKHU·VKRPH 
In whose deep eyes 
Men read the welfare of the times to come, 
I am too much bereft 
The world dishonoured thou hast left. 
2WUXWK·VDQGQDWXUH·VFRVWO\OLH 
O trusted broken prophecy! 
O richest fortune sourly crossed! 
Born for the future, to the future lost! (CW IX, 294-5) 
 
7KLVFDQEHUHDGDVODPHQWDWLRQDPHPRULDOLVLQJRIWKHER\·VSRWHQWLDOQHYHUWREH
fulfilled, its eye to the past rather than the future. But there are reasons to see it 
RWKHUZLVH¶&KLOGRISDUDGLVH·:DOGRPD\KDYHVHHPHGEXWWKHUHLVVRPHWKLQJ
problematic in granting this totemic status. He was at once iconic of a prelapsarian past, 
tangibly present, and prophetic of a redeemed future. In other words, to know this boy 
is to know all possible worlds, a continuity of promise which cannot correspond with 
death or expulsion from divine immanence. In consequence, the two ambiguous lines of 
the passage demonstrably re-enact the Fall as they figure its exigencies. A world already 
¶GLVKRQRXUHG·FDQQRWVXVWDLQD¶FKLOGRISDUDGLVH· but at once, the death of the 
paradisiacal child dishonours an otherwise honourable world. And, more importantly, 
the readiest possibility of the last line is that the child is lost to any possible future 
EHFDXVHKHLVERXQGE\WKHDXWKRU·VPHPRU\DQGERXQGE\WKLVPHPRULDOLVLQJDQG
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testamentary poem. But at the same time, this child is lost to the future, to a future 
inaccessible and unknowable, a life in legacy in which the engendering author accepts he 
ZLOOKDYHQRKDQGDQGFDQH[HUWQRZLOO,WLVLQRWKHUZRUGVDSRHWLF¶ZLOODQG
WHVWDPHQW·LQDTXLWHGLIIHUHQWVHQVHWKHJLIWRIWKHSRHW·V death insofar as he announces 
his own exclusion from its futural possibilities. 
 ,QWKLVZD\WKHDWWLWXGHRIWKH¶'HHS+HDUW·V·DQVZHUZKLFKIROORZV
LPPHGLDWHO\RQWKHDERYHLVPRUHUHDGLO\DSSUHKHQVLEOH7KHOLQHV¶´:RUWKLHUFDXVHIRr 
passion wild | ,I,KDGQRWWDNHQWKHFKLOGµ·UHIOHct, admittedly rather insensitively, on 
the fallacies of a possessive knowledge alluded to in the preceding stanza.45 The 
H[WHQVLYHPHGLWDWLRQRQDUHFHSWLYHLQWHOOHFWXDOLVHGDWWLWXGHDYHUVHWRWKH¶EODVSKHP\RI
JULHI·ZKLFKIROORZVWKXVHIIXVLYHO\DIILUPV and celebrates the trajectory evident in the 
first part, rather than merely chastising and correcting its errors. In its closing section, 
this celebration tends toward a discussion of the poetic act which in some ways invokes 
(PHUVRQ·VLGHDOVRISRHWLFRUganicity and natural synthesis, but also endorses the other 
concerns already raised here and helps us to see more clearly the broader scope of his 
poetics. Thematically, the poet remains a perpetuator of creation³¶´5HYere the maker; 
fetch thine eye | Up to KLVVW\OHµ·³but in the following words³¶´DQGWKHmanners of 
WKHVN\µ·³the implication that reverence and the perpetuation of the cycle of creation 
requires mannerism and performance, akin to the ethical dynamic of the 1844 essay 
¶0DQQHUV· is suggested (CW IX, 297. Emphasis added). An engendered future rather 
than a memorialised past structures the poetic epistemology: 
 
 ¶Not of adamant and gold 
                                                 
45 A letter from Thoreau to Lucy Brown³(PHUVRQ·VVLVWHU-in-law³UHIOHFWVWKHVHQVHWKDW:DOGR·VGHDWK
ZDVVHHQWREHDSHUYHUVHQHFHVVLW\DPRQJVWWKH&RQFRUGJURXS¶,ZDVQRWVWDUWOHGWRKHDUWKDWKHZDV
dead;³it seemed the most natural event that could happen. His fine organisation demanded it, and nature 
JHQWO\\LHOGHGLWVUHTXHVW,WZRXOGKDYHEHHQVWUDQJHLIKHKDGOLYHG·6HHCorrespondence of Henry David 
Thoreau, p. 63. 
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 Built he heaven stark and cold 
 [«] 
 Built of furtherance and pursuing, 
 NRWRIVSHQWGHHGVEXWRIGRLQJ· (CW IX, 297-8) 
 
%XWLISHUVLVWHQWKLQWVRIRUJDQLFLW\VWLOORFFXUDPRQJVWWKHVHOLQHV¶´1R, but a nest of 
bending reeds, | )ORZHULQJJUDVVDQGVFHQWHGZHHGVµ·VRPHWKLQJHOVHLVHYLGHQWO\LQ
WKHDVFHQGDQWLQWKHSRHP·VFRQFOXVLRQ 
 
 ¶Waters with tears of ancient sorrow 
 Apples of Eden ripe to-morrow. 
 House and tenant go to ground, 
 /RVWLQ*RGLQ*RGKHDGIRXQG· (CW IX, 298) 
 
 This very explicit allusion to the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge is critical to 
fathoming Poems as a single and sustained poetic aFW7KHIUXLWRI(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKWLV
XQULSHXQWLOWKLVSHUSHWXDO¶WRPRUURZ·RIWKHUHDGHUDQGDVVXFKWKHSRHWDQGKLV
audience are never contemporaneous. The rejection or misunderstanding of his 
endeavour in almost all of the scholarly literature turns on this point. In terms of the 
Whitmanian legacy, this Emersonian notion is anathema. To look again at David Porter, 
who incessantly uses Whitman as his point of comparison, or Elisa New, who depends 
upon Frost, the implausibility of such comparisons emerges clearly in some very 
different expectations of the fruiting trope. Porter, for instance, holds up these lines of 
:KLWPDQ·V¶&RPHXSIURPWKH)LHOGV)DWKHU·LQDUHIOHFWLRQRQ¶7KUHQRG\· 
 
 Where apples ripe in the orchard hang and grapes on the trellis·GYLQHV 
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 (Smell you the smell of the grapes on the vines? 
 Smell you the buckwheat where the bees were lately buzzing?)46 
 
1HZPHDQZKLOHTXRWHVIURP)URVW·V¶$IWHU$SSOH-Picking· especially focusing on what 
VKHGHVFULEHVDVWKH¶KHIWRI%HLQJ·GRPLQDQW LQLWVOLQHVVXFKDVZKHQWKHSRHW·V
QDUUDWRU¶IHHOVWKHSUHVVXUHRIDODGGHUURXQG·against the arch of his foot, a pressure 
1HZFRQQHFWVWRPHWULFDOIHHWDVPXFKDVWRWKHSRHW·VERG\47 Neither critic, however, 
DOOXGHVWR(PHUVRQ·VRZQ¶$SSOHVRI(GHQ· in treating of these other, more vaunted 
DSSOHVRIWKH$PHULFDQWUDGLWLRQ,QVWHDGWKHWDQJLEOHVHQVXDORUJDQLF¶FRQFUHWH·ZRUOG
into which a symbolically loaded Edenic apple quite plainly does not belong becomes a 
fixation. So Porter valorises Whitman IRU¶UHVWRULQJWKHZRUOGWKDW(PHUVRQKDG
annihilated· FUHDWLQJD¶JHVWLF·UDWKHUWKDQD¶VWDWLF·ODQJXDJH48 New, meanwhile, engages 
with the tropological subtexts of )URVW·VDSSOHV. A poetry that evinces the qualities of 
organicity and locatedness in time and place is ¶DIDOOHQJHQUH·, a designation from which 
Emerson is excluded, for he ¶ZLWKKROG>V«@ the self from the implications of poetic 
speech [«] the lived sense of time, the pang of seized particular, the long arch of an 
ascent[. These] are a feZRIWKHSRHWLFYLUWXHV(PHUVRQ·VSRHPVV\VWHPDWLFDOO\UHVLVW·49 
 6XUHO\KRZHYHUWKHGHFODUDWLRQWKDWWKH¶$SSOHVRI(GHQ·ZLOOULSHQ¶WRPRUURZ·
LVQRWVLPSO\WR¶XQZULWH·WKH)DOODV1HZKDVLWEXWLQVRPHZD\WRSURYLGHIRULWV
being re-experienced and rewritten, even if it be unquestionably true that this experience 
LVQRWVRPHWKLQJREYLRXVO\XQGHUJRQHLQ(PHUVRQ·VSRHPVWKHPVHOYHVWRWKHH[WHQW
WKDWLWLVVRHYLGHQWDVWRDSSHDU¶V\VWHPDWLF· Indeed, there is very much more of 
significance in EmersRQ·VFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIWKHYDOXHRIIUXLWWKHRUHWLFDQGDFWXDOSUH- 
                                                 
46 :DOW:KLWPDQ¶&RPHXSIURPWKH)LHOGV)DWKHU·LQThe Complete Poems, ed. by Francis Murphy 
(London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 327-8. Porter, p. 34. 
47 1HZS5REHUW)URVW¶$IWHU$SSOH-3LFNLQJ·LQSelected Poems, ed. by Ian Hamilton (London: 
Penguin, 1973), pp. 68-9. 
48 Porter, p. 34, 39. 
49 New, p. 43, 46. 
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and postlapsarian, to consider against this line. As Emerson well knew, it is a matter of 
QHFHVVLW\WKDW¶ZKHQDIUXLWLVULSHLWIDOOV· but if this fruit signifies immanence and 
singularity with its source before ripening, if it then fell away from the mind which 
brought it to fruition, it cannot be restored by any means to that which bore it (CW II, 
7KHNLQGRIPRGHOLPSOLHGKHUHLVQRWRULRXVO\UDLVHGLQ¶([SHULHQFH· where 
EmersRQZURWHRIWKHGHDWKRI:DOGRWKDW¶LWGRHVQRWWRXFKPHVRPHWKLQJZKLFK,
fancied was a part of me, which could not be torn away without tearing me, nor 
enlarged without enriching me, falls off from me, and leaves no scar. It was caducous. I 
grieve that JULHIFDQWHDFKPHQRWKLQJQRUFDUU\PHRQHVWHSLQWRUHDOQDWXUH·CW III, 
29). The epistemic revelation Emerson finds in the death of Waldo is that his every 
connection was caducous³it was fated to fall away, leaving no enrichment or 
development. EqualO\LQWKHRWKHUPHDQLQJRI¶FDGXFRXV·³that of a lapsed estate or 
testamentary gift, an inheritance not claimed³(PHUVRQ·V¶KRXVHDQGWHQDQW·DUHQRW
restored as might be intended by the will of the author, but are given back to the earth. 
He bequeaths freely and generally, not specifically and privately.50 And, increasingly 
throughout the journals of the mid-VWKLVFRQVWUXFWLVGHYHORSHG:DOGR·VGHDWK
ZDVDNLQWRDIDOOLQJIUXLWZKLFKLVDNLQWRWKHIUXLWRIRQH·VPLQG³all seem, by an 
organic necessity, to fall away offering no return, as Emerson implies in a passage 
treating of self-GRXEW¶%XWKRZLI\RXKDYHQRVHFXULW\RI[«] a [promising] result; how 
if the fruit of your brain is abortive, if cramp & mildew, if dreams & the sons of dreams, 
if prose & crotchets & cold trifles, matter unreadable by other men & odious to your 
RZQH\HVEHWKHLVVXH"·JMN IX, 203). It is the nature of writing, however, to accept 
                                                 
50 0DU\&KDSPDQGUDZVDWWHQWLRQWRWKLVPHDQLQJDQGLWVFRQQHFWLRQWRWKH¶KRXVHDQGWHQDQW·RIWKH
SHQXOWLPDWHOLQHRI¶7KUHQRG\·EXWQHJOHFWVWRDFFRPPRGDWHWKHFOHDULQYRFDWLRQRIDODSVHRUORVVLQWKH
inheritance. Instead, she aligns with conventional wisdom in seeing Emerson as inheriting some kind of 
¶FRQVRODWLRQ·IURPWKHSRHWLFPHPRULDOWR:DOGRWKDWWKHIDWKHU·VSRHPEHFRPHVE\DUHFXUVLYH
PRYHPHQWWKH¶FKLOG·VSRHWLFEHTXHVWWRKLVIDWKHU·,WVKRXOGEHFOHDUWKDW,VHHDOOVXFKUHVWLWXWLYHPRdes 
DVDQDWKHPDWRWKHHSLVWHPRORJLFDOVWUXFWXUHRI(PHUVRQ·VSRHWLFSURJUDPPH6HH&KDSPDQ¶7KH
(FRQRPLFVRI/RVV(PHUVRQ·V´7KUHQRG\µ·American Transcendental Quarterly (June, 2002), 1-15. For 
DQRWKHUUHFHQWH[DPSOHRIDUHDGLQJRI¶7KUHQRG\·ZKLFKVHes the poem facilitating consolation for its 
grieving author, see Keane, pp. 489-511. 
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and even to invoke caducity. Not only is a persistence of epistemic involvement plainly 
denLHG¶´)UXLWXUIDPDµQRQHYHU7KHSRHWLVOHDVWDSRHWZKHQKHVLWVFURZQHG7KH
transcendental & divine has the dominion of the world on the sole condition of not 
KDYLQJLW·JMN IX, 420).51 More than this, there is always a methodical ploy involved, as 
disclosed in a remark which begins in consideration of the relative monetary value of 
SHDFKHVLQWKHRUFKDUGDQGDWDFLW\PDUNHW¶7KDWLVWKHPDLQFRQVLGHUDWLRQLQIUXLWWR
put the tree out of sight [«] Jugglery, or the order of wonder, always consists in putting 
WKHWUHHRXWRIVLJKW·JMN IX, 310). 
 Reenacting or reinvoking fallenness, even if to celebrate it, is not necessarily 
conducted through sanguine correspondence with a poet wise enough to make language 
effectively prelapsarian³WR¶IDVWHQZRUGVagain to visible things· as Emerson had put it 
back in 1836 (CW I, 20). Indeed, this is the central paradox of a conviction that poetry, 
to be properly representative of the ontological condition of postlapsarian mankind, 
must be forceful and concrete, seQVXDOO\HYRFDWLYHRIWKDWRIZKLFKLWVSHDNV¶6PHOO\RX
WKHDSSOH"·LQVSLWHRIWKHVWDUNIDFWRILWVDEVHQFH$JUHDWWDOHQWWKLVPD\EHDQGLWLVD
talent much valorised in the American tradition, manifested in what Lionel Trilling 
FDOOHGWKH¶H[TXLVLte particulars· but it need not exclude the validity of other poetic 
SRVVLELOLWLHV,QGHHGLQ(PHUVRQ·VODWHHVVD\¶3RHWU\DQG,PDJLQDWLRQ·ZKLFKKDGLWV
origins in a lecture given in 1854, but was not published until 1876), familiar 
considerations from earlier poetic treatises are revisited, but in a phrasing which plays 
LQWRWKHVHFRQVLGHUDWLRQV+HUHLWLVWKH¶FRPPRQ-sense which [«] takes things at their 
word· an attitude New would have us believe the lyric enables, but which is surely 
recidivist. It is no wonder that New postulates this as a rather blunt counter to a post-
VWUXFWXUDOLVWSRHWLFV¶IUHHRIWKHSRHP· because the nature of such arguments is to refute 
once and for all the notion that we might ever again hold poems in such regard. Instead, 
                                                 
51 See too JMN VIII, 528, where this Latin phrase³¶KHGHOLJKWVLQIDPH·³is also inscribed in a similar 
context. 
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Emerson leads us away from the preconceptions of Arnold and all who accept his 
GLVWLQFWLRQVLQVXSSRVLQJWKDWRXU¶LQWHUHVWLVJUDGXDOO\WUDQVIHUUHGIURPWKHIRUPVWRWKH
OXUNLQJPHWKRG·CW VIII, 1-2. Emphasis added). 
 This method is in no way singular. It is the exigencies of language as much as 
WKHZLOORIWKHDXWKRUWKDWIDFLOLWDWHVLWVSOD\DVZDVLPSOLHGLQ¶:RRGQRWHV,,· The 
attitude of the reader is obviously of critical significance too. In all ways, in fact, it can 
feel to author or to reader DVWKRXJK¶VRPHRQHLV´GRLQJµKLP· as Emerson wryly puts it 
in the same late essay; that the poem is never an organic, sound, vitalising edifice of 
enrichment but a device of deceit, a mechanism that operates not only to undo the 
SUDFWLFDOLW\RI(PHUVRQ·V own ideals, but any knowledge we may feel entitled to bring to 
the poem (CW VIII, 2). 
 
Pomology and Poetics 
To put it another way, Emerson understood the exigencies of fruit and of horticulture 
more deeply than to assume its natural and organic virtues, something of which the 
LQJpQXHVRI%URQVRQ$OFRWW·Vcommunitarian experiment at Fruitlands, for example, 
were certainly guilty. Throughout the mid-1840s, up to his departure for England in 
late-1847, contemporaneous with the process of compositing and completing Poems, 
Emerson was occupied at length with planting an orchard on land he had recently 
acquired adjoining his estate.52 Not only was he in the business of acquiring large 
numbers of pear and apple trees, therefore³a process he recorded in the journal 
QRWHERRN¶7UHHV· LQZKLFKLWLVZRUWKQRWLQJGUDIWVRIWKHVHFRQGSDUWRI¶7KUHQRG\·
are to be found (JMN VIII, 518-49). He was also immersed in the science of pomology, 
EHLQJSDUWLFXODUO\LQIOXHQFHGE\$QGUHZ-DFNVRQ'RZQLQJ·VThe Fruit and Fruit Trees of 
                                                 
52 Richardson dedicates a short chapter to this in his Mind on Fire, a fact which ought to recommend its 
significance to Emerson scholars, even if this has not, as yet, fully come to pass. See Richardson, Mind on 
Fire pp. 433-5. 
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America, just published in 1845.53 And here, as Edward Emerson later recounted, the 
human part in the process of cultivation and the amelioration of the fruit tree was the 
SRLQWRI(PHUVRQ·VJUHDWHVWLQWHUHVW7KHFUDE-apple or wild pear, Downing explains, is 
GHVWLQHGLQQRUWKHUQFOLPHVWR¶DSHUSHWXDOVWUXJJOHZLWKQDWXUH· DQG¶>L@WLVWKXVRQO\LQ
the face of obstacles, in a climate where nature is not prodigal of perfections, and in the 
midst of thorns and sloes, that MAN THE GARDENER arises and forces nature to 
yield to his art·54 Most important in the cultivation of excellent fruit, therefore, is the 
suspension of organic processes, such as rearing from seed, which are likely to return 
WKHYDULHW\WRLWVZLOGVWDWH,QVWHDG¶>L@WZLOOEHUHPHPEHUHd that our garden varieties of 
fruit are not natural forms. They are the artificial productions of our culture·55 And the 
means of facilitating this³which if Emerson did not already know, he would have 
learned in detail from Downing³is grafting, the combination of new growth from one 
tree with the old root-stock of another, to produce a reliable and consistent example of 
a cultivated variety.56 
 As such, if Emerson speaks often of fruit, and of gardens, in the journals of 
these years, he is not merely troping on some organic idealEXWWKH¶OXUNLQJPHWKRG·
which underlies its possibility. He knew that the apparent organicity of poetic 
spontaneity was a fraud³DVKHZURWHRQPRUHWKDQRQHRFFDVLRQKH¶KDWHGHDUO\
poems· precisely because they visibly belied this fact (JMN VII, 249, 316). For the same 
reason, he saw that his own poetry would always be unripe to his own eyes.57 In most 
cases, his poems were developed from prose passages in the journals, and if not there, 
from the works of other poets or other traditions³*UD\·V¶(OHJ\·VSHDNVRIWHQIURP
                                                 
53 )RUPRUHGHWDLORQ(PHUVRQ·VLQWHUHVWLQWKLVYROXPHVHH(GZDUG(PHUVRQ·VQRWHVLQWhe Centenary 
Edition: Complete Works, V, pp. 336-7, and Richardson, Mind on Fire, p. 433. 
54 Andrew Jackson Downing, The Fruit and Fruit Trees of America, (1845), (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 
1847), p. 1. 
55 Downing, p. 4. 
56 )RU'RZQLQJ·VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHPethod, its history, and the processes involved, see Downing, pp. 12-
9. 
57 ¶$JODQFHDWP\RZQ066PLJKWWHDFKPHWKDWDOOP\SRHPVDUHXQILQLVKHGKHDSVRIVNHWFKHVEXWQR
PDVWHUSLHFH·JMN VIII, 132). 
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between the lines of pieces in Poems¶+DPDWUH\D·FRPHVGLUHFWO\IURPDSDVVDJHFRSLHG
out of the 9LVKľX3XUiľD; there are translations of German translations of Persian 
SRHWU\UHZULWLQJVRI+DIL]LQ¶%DFFKXV· and so on. But if these adaptations, adoptions, 
DQGYHUVLILHGPXWDWLRQVDUHSODLQO\QRWSXUHO\RUJDQLFDQGHVVHQWLDOH[DPSOHVRI¶IDFW·
OHDGLQJ¶IRUP· nor are they usurpations of the tradition by an anxious Oedipal author in 
pursuit of assurances of self-possession, or vague, unconsciously bad reflections of 
natural processes forcibly pressed into linguistic legality. They are, instead, the grafted 
products of husbanded old root-stock, a perpetuation of traditional fruit devoid of any 
attempt to establish new variety. The significance of his poetic project rests in this 
principle.  
,Q·V¶0DQQHUV· he had demonstrated an earlier version of the same idea, 
there positing that the comfortable cohabitation of dead tradition and living present 
FRQVWLWXWHGDPRGH¶SKLORVRSKLFDOWRDIDXOW·³that is to say, a mode that makes too 
many concessions to the synthesising powers of intellect, and too few to the processes 
necessary to sustain life and provide for future possibility. Essays: Second Series manifestly 
struggled to enact this same cohabitation³Emerson failed there to disengage from his 
text, to accept tKHSULQFLSOHKHREVHUYHGLQ¶0DQQHUV·WKDWZLWKDXWKRUVDQGWKHLUZRUN
DVZLWKRUFKDUGNHHSHUV¶WKHIORZHUDQGWKHIUXLWQRWWKHJUDLQRIWKHWUHH>LV@
FRQWHPSODWHG·CW III, 73). The achievement of the graft comes not in the immediate 
success of the artificial procedure itself but in the satisfaction produced by its fruit, a 
fruit which is far removed from its organic origins. In the dissolution of his claim over 
his productions, his acceptance of their project as merely a slight furtherance and 
perpetuation of their cultural tradition, Emerson distinguishes himself from the 
alternative poetical ideal which seeks to draw the reader near to discuss his method in a 
state of sanguine understanding. He is not Whitman because the imperative to 
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emancipate himself from his own text precludes him from the possibilities the later poet 
saw as permitted, even necessary.58 
,QWKLVZD\(PHUVRQ·VSHFXOLDUSRHWLFDSRWKHRVLVFDQEHFRQWHPSODWHG,ILWEH
WKHSRHP·VWDVNWRILJXUHDQGHQDFWIDOOHQQHVVWRPDNHWKLVUHDOLVation³of fatedness, 
the acknowledgement of false wisdom, a possibility of moral redemption³part of the 
literary phenomenon, then it is highly questionable whether the poet himself should be 
granted the right to tell us these facts, to let us into his own knowledge as his familiar. 
5DWKHUSHUKDSVWKHSRHW·VWDVNLVWRILJXUHWKHXQNQRZLQJLQWRZKLFKDVKHHYHQWXDOO\
FRPHVWRNQRZKHPXVWSURMHFWKLPVHOI7RJRIURPWKH¶.QRZQIUXLWRIWKHXQNQRZQ·
at the beginning of Poems WRWKH¶$SSOHVRI(GHQ·DWLWVHnd is to enact a kind of Socratic 
wisdom, a conscious XQNQRZLQJQHVVDVWKHWUDMHFWRU\RIWKHYROXPH(PHUVRQ·V
paradoxical humility comes as a product of his inability to think but in absolutes and 
polarities. For instance, the nature of fruit is always also its opposite³organic, and yet 
artificial, fulsome as nature, but imprisoning when troped as knowledge. Such poles 
dominate his thought, of course: freedom is necessary; committing to form is liberating; 
¶HPDQFLSDWLRQIURPH[LVWHQFHLVWKHIUXLWRIVHOI-FRQWURO·ZLOIXOQHVVHQDEOHV
abandonment. We should not be surprised, therefore, that when Bronson Alcott read 
Poems in 1847, he found the volume utterly representative of this structure, as Emerson 
recalls: 
                                                 
58 7KHVLJQLILFDQFHRI(PHUVRQ·VDWWHPSWVWRUHVWRFNDQd perpetuate his cultural inheritance extends 
beyond his 1847 volume. A recent article by Nikhil Bilwakesh discusses his 1874 poetic anthology 
Parnassus³a diffuse compilation of poetic fragments from almost two hundred poets³proposing that the 
volume repreVHQWVDXQLTXH¶ODWHFRPSRVLWLRQDOVW\OH>«@ZKLFKUHOLHVRQTXRWDWLRQDVWKHSULPDU\XQLWRI
FRPSRVLWLRQ·DVW\OH%LOZDNHVKWHUPV¶(PHUVRQ·VGHFRPSRVLWLRQ·,QGHHGZKDW%LOZDNHVKILQGVWREHWKH
case in Parnassus is equally evident in the epistemic concerns of Poems: that in Parnassus ¶(PHUVRQ
FRQVLVWHQWO\VWURYHWRDXWKRURUDXWKRULVHZRUNVWKDWZRXOG´RXWJRWKHSHUVRQDOLW\µ·E\ZD\RI
¶WUDQVODWLRQUHGDFWLRQV>DQG@FRPSLODWLRQV·WKDW¶>D@ORQJZLWKKLVPHPRU\·LQKLVROGDJH¶(PHUVRQ·V
authorial pHUVRQDOLW\GLVVROYHV·Poems is important therefore because it anticipates the completed Parnassus 
SURMHFWE\DOPRVWWKLUW\\HDUVDQGUHYHDOVWKDW(PHUVRQ·VSRHWLFHQGHDYRXUZDVVLQJXODUO\FRQFHLYHGDQG
intellectually coherent. I would go further than Bilwakesh, however, in positing that the regenerative 
process has broader significance than simply refreshing a staid poetic tradition: in particular, it has 
significant philosophical and social implications, on which I will elaborate here and in the postscript. 
%LOZDNHVK¶(PHUVRQ·V'HFRPSRVLWLRQParnassus·Nineteenth-Century Literature, 67 (2013), 520-45 (p. 527, 
528, 537). 
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Alcott, among many fine things he said of my volume of Poems, said, the 
sentiment was moral and the expression seemed the reverse. 
I suppose if verses of mine should be compared with those of one of my 
friends, the moral tendency would be found impressed on all mine as an original 
polarity, that all my light is polarised. (JMN IX, 464) 
 
,QGHHGLQ¶6XUVXP&RUGD· Emerson had hinted that something like this was to be 
deemed a poetic necessity. This poem, ambiguous in its apparently simultaneous 
advocacy of humility and self-regard, demands that the following address be made by 
the poetic soul: 
 
 ¶Here I am, here will I abide 
 Forever to myself soothfast; 
 Go thou, sweet HHDYHQRUDWWK\SOHDVXUHVWD\· 
 Already Heaven with thee its lot has cast, 
 For only it can absolutely deal. (CW IX, 171) 
 
From absolute commitment (or absolute renunciation) comes absolution, which is to 
say the apotheosis of the literary endeavour, the effective merging or inseparability of 
author and work.59 We can easily cast the most common complaints against Poems in this 
light: its absolute omniscience, sententious intellectualism, and deadening logicality all 
become necessary features. How can Emerson sincerely present an ongoing world, a 
SRHWLFQRWLRQWKDWPDNHV¶WKHSRHPDVYRLFHGDQGH[SHULHQFHGQRWDVREMHFWEXWDV
                                                 
59 2QFHDJDLQFRPSDUH%LOZDNHVKRQWKLVSRLQW¶7KLVDXWKRULQGHFRPSRVLWLRQ>«LV@OLWHUDOO\absolved 
from the individuality of traditLRQDODXWKRUVKLS·%LOZDNHVKS(PSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO 
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movement across the page and mind· as New says of the lyric?60 He is not there: he 
does not, cannot, know these works. So the absolute declaration of knowledge, 
possession, command; these reports of nature told and not shown and shared, all invoke 
their polar opposite³a world from which the poet is acquitted, disappeared, oddly and 
uncannily absent except in the texts they bequeath to us. It is, in other words, quite as 
though he performs his death by way of his authorship.61 
 Back in 1835, in a letter to Lidian which predates their marriage, Emerson had 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\UHIOHFWHGWKDW¶>W@KHGDQJHURIVXFKDWWHPSWVDVWKLVVWULYLQJWRZULWH
Universal Poetry is,³WKDWQRWKLQJLVVRVKDEE\DVWRIDLO·L I, 445).62 But, along with 
the general current of his poetic theory, we should expect that this idea will have been 
subject to modification. Hence by 1846, now less enamoured of the heroic ideal for the 
poet, and more specifically of his capacity to fulfil it, he articulates a very different 
manifesto befitting the poet he perhaps could be: 
 
Do they stand immoveable there,³the sots, & laugh at you socalled poetry? 
They may well laugh; it does not touch them yet. Try a deeper strain. There is no 
makebelieve about these fellows; they are good tests for your skill; therefore, a 
louder yet, & yet a louder strain. There is not one of them, but will spin fast 
enough when the music reaches him, but he is very deaf, try a sharper string. 
Angels in satinette & calico,³angels in hunting knives, & rifles,³swearing 
angels, roarers with liquor;³O poet, you have much to learn. (JMN IX, 441) 
 
                                                 
60 New, p. 11. 
61 1HZOLNHPRVWFULWLFVRI(PHUVRQUHJLVWHUVWKLVH[SHULHQFHYHU\FOHDUO\¶7KHYRLFHRI(PHUVRQ·V
SRHPVIUHTXHQWO\LVVXHVIURPDSODFHGHVLJQHGO\XQSODFHGDSODFHZLWKRXWGLPHQVLRQRUH[WHQW·
Something like a performance from beyond the grave. The problem is that, like most critics of the poetry, 
she is too ready to see this as merely symptomatic of poetic failure. See New, p. 51. 
62 The letter is also transcribed into a contemporary journal (JMN V, 138-9). 
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This is a poetry of preparation rather than redemption, anticipatory rather than 
revelatory. Indeed, it constitutes Emerson's assertion of his commitment to the artifice 
of his project, to a poetic possibility not the preserve of benign nature, a spurious 
¶EHDXW\·QRWWREHSRVVHVVHGEXWDFWXDOLVHGLQVWHDGWKURXJKVFUHHFKLQJGLVVRQDQWQRQ-
musicality; through aggression, violence, a manifestly contrived and excessive manner. It 
is an emphasis that VHHPHGWREHPRUHREYLRXVDPRQJ(PHUVRQ·VHDUOLHU readers, many 
of whom, including Franklin B. Sanborn and Charles Ives, remarked on it.63 Perhaps 
because subversion and antagonism became common aesthetic practices throughout the 
twentieth-FHQWXU\(PHUVRQ·s attempts according to 1847 standards have seemed less 
striking to readers than those of other more idiosyncratic and dissonant poets. 
 My final remarks, however, are addressed to any doubts we might still entertain 
as to the coherence and singularity of what Emerson sought to achieve through metrical 
language. ·V¶'D\V·³one of his more universally appreciated poems³offers an 
articulation of precisely these themes in a form which is closer to the expectations of an 
audience anticipating poetic consanguinity. For here Emerson is unusually candid, 
providing his readers with a lens onto the whereabouts of their poet at the apogee of his 
project, if only for the briefest of moments: 
 
 I, in my pleached garden, watched the pomp, 
 Forgot my morning wishes, hastily 
 Took a few herbs and apples, and the Day 
Turned and departed silent. I, too late, 
                                                 
63 (PHUVRQ·VRQHWLPHDFRO\WH6DQERUQVWDUWHGWKLVWUHQGE\GHFODULQJWKDW¶KHSXUSRVHO\URXJKHQHGKLV
YHUVH·$IWHUWKLV&KDUOHV)5LFKDUGVRQZURWHLQWKDW(PHUVRQZDVDEVROXWHO\¶GHOLEHUDWHLQKLV
TXDLQWHVWPRVWLUUHJXODUDQGFDFRSKRQRXVYHUVH·.DWKHULQH/HH%DWHVLQGHVFULEHG(PHUVRQ DV¶LI
QRWDQDFNQRZOHGJHGPDVWHU\HWDSRHWZKRVHO\ULFLVPLVVRVWUDQJHDQGUDUHDVWRGHI\WKHFULWLFV·2UDV
Ives recorded in Essays Before a Sonata¶,I(PHUVRQ·VPDQQHULVQRWDOZD\VEHDXWLIXOLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK
accepted standards, why not accepWDIHZRWKHUVWDQGDUGV"·6HH:DJJRQHUSS-9, for these and other 
LQVWDQFHVRIWKHVXSSRVLWLRQRIGHOLEHUDWHO\GLIILFXOWZULWLQJ,YHV¶(PHUVRQ·LQEssays Before a Sonata (New 
York: Knickerbocker Press, 1920), pp. 11-45 (p. 29). 
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 Under her solemn fillet saw the scorn. (CW IX, 427) 
 
)OHHWLQJO\ZHVHH(PHUVRQHQVFRQFHGLQWKLVERXQGHG¶SOHDFKHGJDUGHQ· renouncing 
the impossible aspirations of his youth and instead committing himself to a perpetual re-
HQDFWPHQWRIWKH)DOOOLNHWKHOLRQVLQ(GHQZKRZHUH¶JLYHQHYHU\JUHHQKHUEIRU
meat· the poet takes his appointed herbs, but he is sustained also by the apple that 
concludes the paradisiacal state.64 :LWKWKDWKHTXLWVWKHUHDGHU·VDWWHQWLRQDORQJZLWK
their progressing world, retiring into the shadow of the text whence he is bound and 
embedded in perpetuity.  
                                                 
64 Genesis, 1: 30. 
254 
 
Afterword 
 
 They see in my garden that I must have some other garden. (JMN VII, 379) 
 
 
:KDWWKHUHIRUHRIWKHVRFLDOHIIHFWVRI(PHUVRQ·VFRQWULYHGDFTXLWWDO"7KLVFDQEH
considered by way of an analysis of the concepts and ideas that preoccupied him in the 
mid-to-late-1840s. By the evidence of the journals, it seems fairly clear that the project 
of Poems concerned him only intermittently. Instead, the work of the era which 
dominates these pages is Representative Men, the lecture series first given in draft form in 
the winter of 1845-6, and revised continuously until its publication in 1850, which takes 
DVLWVSULPDU\VXEMHFWWKHVRFLHWDODQGFLYLOLVLQJIXQFWLRQVRIWKH¶JUHDWPHQ·DPRQJ
whom are to be included the philosopher, the writer, and, most central of all, the poet. 
)URPWKHYHU\HDUOLHVWVWDJHVRIWKHSURMHFWLWLVSHUWLQHQWWR(PHUVRQ·VSRHWLFFRQFHUQV
6KRUWO\DIWHUWKHILUVWMRXUQDOUHIHUHQFHWRD¶3DQWKHRQFRXUVHRIOHFWXUHV·ZKLFKDOUHDG\
contains the six names of the series in sketch, he writes that his UHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶0DQRI
WKH:RUOG·1DSROHRQ¶ZDV)UDQFH·DQGFRQWLQXHVDVIROORZV 
 
$PDQRI1DSROHRQ·VVWDPSDOPRVWFHDVHVWRKDYHDSULYDWHVSHHFK	RSLQLRQ
He is so largely receptive & is so posited that he comes to be an office for all the 
light, intelligence, wit, & power of the age & country. He makes the code,³the 
V\VWHPRIZHLJKWVDQGPHDVXUHV>«@(YHU\OLQHRI1DSROHRQ·VWKHUHIRUH
deserves reading as it is the writing of France, & not of one individual. 
Napoleon was truly France. (JMN IX, 139, 140-1) 
 
Such are the general terms by which the romantic hero is identified, which in real terms 
led to a personality cult that Emerson critiques in the finished lecture. But there are 
aspects in the above excerpt which offer a more compelling point of comparison with 
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the themes of acquittal so far considered³ZHRXJKWWRQRWHWKDW1DSROHRQWRR¶DOPRVW
FHDVHGWRKDYHDSULYDWHVSHHFKDQGRSLQLRQ·,QGHHGWKHHIIHFWLYHGLVDSSHDUDQFHRIWKH
person of such significant figures into their work and legend had always fascinated 
Emerson in excess of any adherence to the type of the romantic hero. In 1835, he 
UHPDUNHGRQWKHIDFWZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHVWDWXVRI-HVXV·VKLVWRULFLW\UHIOHFWLQJWKH
8QLWDULDQK\SRWKHVHVRIWKHWLPH¶:KHQWKHJRGVFRPHDPRQJPHQWKH\DUHQot 
known. Jesus was not. Socrates & Shakspeare ZHUHQRW·JMN V, 12). By 1845, now at 
work on Representative MenWKHSULQFLSOHKDVWDNHQRQIXQGDPHQWDOVLJQLILFDQFH¶,VLWQRW
strange that the transcendent men, Homer, Plato, Shakspeare, confessedly unrivalled, 
VKRXOGKDYHTXHVWLRQVRILGHQWLW\	RIJHQXLQHQHVVUDLVHGUHVSHFWLQJWKHLUZULWLQJV"·
(JMN IX, 184).  
Of the names given in these two extracts, the constant is Shakespeare, 
(PHUVRQ·VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHSRHWDQGLQWKHFRQWH[WRI(PHUVRQ·VRZQSRHWLFHnterprise, 
the lecture on this subject is the most significant in Representative Men. In some respects, 
the mode of thought in evidence in these excerpts echoes Victorian Bardolatry and 
prefigures his later endorsement of the work of Delia Bacon, but with Emerson the 
LQWHUHVWQHYHUOLHVLQGHGXFLQJZKRPLJKWUHDOO\KDYHEHHQEHKLQG6KDNHVSHDUH·V
improbable genius. Rather, the fascination is with the wild divergence in our knowledge 
of our inheritance³this sense that biographical vagueness somehow becomes a 
necessary corollary of the work of genius; that, as we have seen in the last chapter, great 
poetry demands a renunciation of life. And, in Representative Men itself, when Emerson 
comes to discuss his representative poet, it is this principle which dominates. 
 ¶6KDNVSHDUHRUWKH3RHW·RSHQVLQDPDQQHUWKDWLPPHGLDWHO\EHOLHV(PHUVRQ·V
SUHRFFXSDWLRQV¶*UHDWPHQ·KHZULWHV¶DUHPRUHGLVWLQJXLVKHGE\UDQJHDQGH[WHQW
WKDQE\RULJLQDOLW\·,QGHHGRULJLQDOLW\LVLQIDFWDKLQGUDQFH³¶7KHJUHDWHVWJHQLXVLVthe 
PRVWLQGHEWHGPDQ·DQG¶>J@UHDWJHQLDOSRZHURQHZRXOGDOPRVWVD\FRQVLVWVLQQRW
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being original at all; in being altogether receptive; in letting the world do all, and 
VXIIHULQJWKHVSLULWRIWKHKRXUWRSDVVXQREVWUXFWHGWKURXJKWKHPLQG·CW IV, 109-
10). The practical meaning of these considerations is stated explicitly in what follows. 
6KDNHVSHDUH·VJUHDWQHVV(PHUVRQSURSRVHVOLHVQRWLQRULJLQDOLW\DQGLQYHQWLRQEXWLQ
WKHDUFKHW\SDOPRGHRIOLWHUDU\UHFHSWLYLW\¶LQFRPPRQZLWKKLVFRPUDGHV[he] 
esteemed the mass of old plays waste stock, in which any experiment could be freely 
WULHG·CW IV, 111). And so the lecture continues, in a register which alternates between 
exposition of this theoretical position and the elucidation of evidence to substantiate his 
FRQYLFWLRQWKDW6KDNHVSHDUH·VJUHDWQHVVLVWREHH[SODLQHGE\YLUWXHRIWKHIDFWWKDWKH
was a cultured plagiarist.  
The parallel that is emerging here between the Shakespearean and Emersonian 
compositional models is illustrative of how Emerson had come to conceptualise literary 
significance by 1850. In some respects, his ideas remain consistent with his earlier 
convictions. Literary receptivity³or plagiarism³mirrors the kind of genius he had 
extolled in his earlier career in a number of ways. We might recall the facts that the 
poet-priest should be rooted in the heart of his culture, according him the status of 
locus of his time, the voice of the Over-Soul at that historical moment³all principles 
that he reiterates with respect to the Bard. But Shakespeare is curious because he 
presents the method by which one could fulfil that representative function of merging 
ZLWKRQH·VZRUNRIGLVDSSHDULQJLQELRJUDSKLFDOWHUPVPRUHSUDJPDWLFDOO\7KHHVVHQFH
RI(PHUVRQ·VOHFWXUHWXUQVRQ6KDNHVSHDUH·VSeculiar distinction in this light. He mocks 
the inquiries of the Shakespeare Society, active in London throughout the 1840s, with 
WKHLUIL[DWLRQRQ¶ZKHWKHUWKHER\6KDNVSHDUHSRDFKHGRUQRWZKHWKHUKHKHOGKRUVHVDW
WKHWKHDWUHGRRU·DQGVRRQCW IV, 116). The point is precisely that almost nothing 
FRXOGEHVDLGRI6KDNHVSHDUH·VSHUVRQDOOLIHWKDWLQGLFDWHGKLVJHQLXV$V(PHUVRQ
UHFRUGV¶>K@HZDVDJRRGQDWXUHGVRUWRIPDQDQDFWRUDQGVKDUHKROGHULQWKHWKHDWUH
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not in any striking manner distinguishHGIURPRWKHUDFWRUVDQGPDQDJHUV·:KLFKOHDGV
KLPWRDQLURQLFDOFRQIHVVLRQ¶,DGPLWWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKLVLQIRUPDWLRQ,WZDVZHOO
ZRUWKWKHSDLQVWKDWKDYHEHHQWDNHQWRSURFXUHLW·CW IV, 118). The reason is that it 
leaves us in just the same positLRQDV6KDNHVSHDUH·VHVWHHPHGFRQWHPSRUDULHV³Bacon, 
Spenser, Donne, and Jonson³who were oblivious to the genius going about his 
SHUVRQDODIIDLUVDPRQJVWWKHP¶>7@KHLUJHQLXVIDLOHGWKHPWRILQGRXWWKHEHVWKHDGLQ
WKHXQLYHUVH2XUSRHW·VPDVNZDVLPSHQHWUDEOH·CW IV, 117). As mere man, it is as 
though the poet never existed. 
 Emerson, of course, is not so credulous as to entertain the reality of this idea. 
But the functional efficacy of this disappearance does persuade him that Shakespeare 
intended and enacted it as part of his poetic programme, that plagiarism permits 
acquittal of responsibility in two senses, and both of these are important in 
understanding where Emerson stands at the threshold of the decade, still exploring the 
polarities at the heart of his thought but now according to new possibilities, that a 
private writing enables the fulfilment of public duties, public writing private freedoms, a 
double writing in a sense heretofore not fully considered. First, with respect to the 
reception of a cultural tradition in his plagiarism: 
 
The poet needs a ground in popular tradition on which he may work, and which, 
again, may restrain his art within the due temperance. It holds him to the people, 
supplies a foundation for his edifice, and in furnishing so much work done to 
his hand, leaves him at leisure, and in full strength for the audacities of his 
imagination. (CW IV, 111. Emphasis added) 
 
¶$WOHLVXUH·WKHSRHWLVH[RQHUDWHGIURPWKHH[KDXVWLRQDQGVHOI-immolation that might 
otherwise attend his labours in the name of society and culture. And yet, in what 
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immediately follows, the same leisure is held to be the most civil and appropriate of 
VRFLDODFWLRQV¶,QVKRUW·(PHUVRQZULWHV¶WKHSRHWRZHVWRKLVOHJHQGZKDW6FXOSWXUH
RZHGWRWKHWHPSOH·%HFDXVHVFXOSWXUHLQDQWLTXLW\JUHZDVDVXERUGLQDWHIXQFWLRQRI
DUFKLWHFWXUHLWVSODFHZDVDOZD\VVXEVLGLDU\DQGGHILQHGLQWKHIRUPRI¶RUQDPHQW·RU
¶UHOLHI·(YHQDWWKHKHLJKWRIFODVVLFDOFXOWXUH¶WKHSUHYDLOLQJJHQLXVRIDUFKLWHFWXUHVWLOO
HQIRUFHGDFHUWDLQFDOPQHVVDQGFRQWLQHQFHLQWKHVWDWXH·:LWKRXWVXFKDGKHUHQFHWR
the perpetuation of cultural standards, Emerson claims, the sculpture made for its own 
sake was inferior, gaudy, and extravagant. So, he goes on to declare: 
 
This balance-wheel which the sculptor found in architecture, the perilous 
irritability of poetic talent found in the accumulated dramatic materials to which 
people were already wonted, and which had a certain excellence, which no single 
genius, however extraordinary, could hope to create. (CW IV, 112) 
 
In other words, a complicit submission to the bounds attending the rearticulation of 
extant tradition re-enacts the kind of commitment Emerson had consistently recognised 
in literary formalism³one contributes in the accepted currency of exchange, in the 
phrasings, styles, and vocabularies which present themselves most readily and 
conveniently. Indeed, he noted more than once that language itself was a tissue of 
quotation.1 
 In this instance, however, the possibility of exoneration possesses a doubled 
sense: the writer is permitted an ongoing existence both within and without the text in 
different modes, and the without in this instance³being dispossessed, detached, and 
                                                 
1 IQKHPDGHWKHIROORZLQJHQWU\LQWKHMRXUQDO¶+HWKDWFRPHVVHFRQGPXVWQHHGVTXRWHIURPKLP
that came first. You say that Square never quotes: You say something absurd. Let him speak a word, only 
WRVD\´FKDLUµ´WDEOHµ´ILUHµ´EUHDGµ³What are these but quotations from some ancient sage? (JMN 
9,,,3DUWVRIWKLVMRXUQDOHQWU\DUHUHSURGXFHGLQ·V¶4XRWDWLRQDQG2ULJLQDOLW\·6HHCW VIII, 
106. 
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concealed³is not analogised with death, but is instead given to be a state of ease and 
OHLVXUH5HFDOOLQJ%DXGHODLUH·VGLFWXPRIWKHFRXQWHUIHLWHULQ¶/D)DXVVH0RQQDLH·ZKR
VHHNVWR¶ZLQSDUDGLVHHFRQRPLFDOO\·KHUHZHILQG(PHUVRQH[FODLPLQJWKHYLUWXHRIWKH
6KDNHVSHDUHDQPHWKRG¶:KDWDQHFRQRP\RISRZHUDQGZKDWDFRPSHQVDWLRQIRUWKH
VKRUWQHVVRIOLIH·CW IV, 110). 
 %LRJUDSKLFDOVWXGLHVUHLQIRUFHWKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDW(PHUVRQ·VGHVLUHIRUDQ
escape of some kind was wide-ranging in the late-1840s. As Richardson notes, at the 
same time that Emerson truly threw himself into public life as a lecturer³going from 
fifty-four lectures given in 1846 to as many as eighty per year in the early-1850s³he 
began to experience a sense of ennui and lethargy, eventually leading to his decision to 
spend ten months in England and France in 1847-8.2 This sense of dissatisfaction and a 
ORVVRIIRFXVVXUIDFHGWRRLQWKHMRXUQDOVLQKHUHIOHFWVRQKDYLQJ¶ZLVKHGIRUD
proIHVVRUVKLS>«IRU@WKHSXOSLWWKDW,PLJKWKDYHWKHVWLPXOXVRIDVWDWHGWDVN·JMN X, 
28). A candid reconsideration of his aspirations is evident in the same period. The 
function of the writerly gift depends upon the capacities of the writer to fulfil it, and 
(PHUVRQ·VLPSHUVRQDOLW\LQWKHIROORZLQJVWDWHPHQWGRHVQRWGLPLQLVKWKHVHQVH that it 
LVDXWRELRJUDSKLFDO¶7KH\GRDVWKH\FDQRUWKH\PXVWLQVWUXFW\RXHTXDOO\E\WKHLU
failure as by their talent. That is they must teach you that the world is farmed out to 
many contractors, and each arranges all things on his petty task, sacrifiFHVDOOIRUWKDW·
(JMN X, 149). Failure here³especially, perhaps, a cultured failure³is justified a place 
alongside works of genius in the necessary matrix of ongoing culture, and in this, it 
seems, lay the possibility to which Emerson applied himself. 
 Besides Representative Men and Poems(PHUVRQ·V¶SHWW\WDVNV·DQGLQVLJQLILFDQW
¶FRQWUDFWV·RIWKHVH\HDUVKDYHXVXDOO\EHHQVHHQDVFRUROODULHVRUFDXVHVRIKLVOHWKDUJ\
for he spent many months on the most focused self-reading of his career. 
                                                 
2 Richardson, Mind on Fire, pp. 418, 436-8. 
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Professionally, he was tasked to compile his earliest works into a new volume, Nature, 
Addresses, and Lectures, published in 1849, while also preparing revised editions of the first 
and second series of Essays. In 1847, he also read over his entire corpus of journal and 
notebook writings in order to compile two 400-page indexes to themes and topics, 
useful in the compositing of future publishable work, but a tedious labour to complete. 
For my concerns, both of these enterprises ought to be of particular interest³they 
represent the most extensive and wide-UDQJLQJRI(PHUVRQ·VLQWHUURJDWLRQs of his own 
text, in which the contemporary concerns of investment and property should really be 
most evident. Yet this is not the case. On the contrary, what is more striking is how little 
these processes preoccupy his thought according to the evidence of the journals. Bits of 
KLVLQGH[FURSXSRQRFFDVLRQZKLOHLQ-XO\KHZU\O\UHPDUNVWKDW¶>D@PRQJWKH
VHYHQDJHVRIKXPDQOLIHWKHSHULRGRILQGH[HVVKRXOGQRWEHIRUJRWWHQ·JMN X, 132-5, 
105). The revised editions, meanwhile, are barely mentioned in the journals, while the 
revisions themselves are consistently minor. Indeed, as Paul Lauter has noted, the only 
really significant consistent set of changes in Essays: First Series reflects a change in 
(PHUVRQ·VDWWLWXGHWRSHUVRQDOVRYHUHLJQW\SHUVRQDO¶UHVROXWLRQV·EHFRPH¶FKRLFHV·
clear statements of action are replaced by commitments to observance, and the attitude 
to the world without becomes one of cultured acceptance and complicity rather than 
wilful independence and obstinacy. 3  
 Despite the absence of extensive rumination on the themes of revision and 
correction with respect to the indexes and republished works, however, the 
contemporary journals are nevertheless filled with entries that touch metaphorically on 
                                                 
3 The most extensive analysis of the kinds of reviVLRQXQGHUWDNHQDSSHDUVLQ/DXWHU·VHVVD\
¶(PHUVRQ·V5HYLVLRQVRIEssays: First Series·/DXWHU·VVXUYH\LGHQWLILHVYHUEDOFKDQJHVEXWDVLGHIURP
the changes in emphasis on the lines of wilfulness detailed above and the addition of poetic epigraphs to 
each essay in the manner of Second Series, these changes concern punctuation, verbal clarity, and an 
increased tendency to trace effects from particular cases to general, something Emerson had already 
developed a habit of doing in his revisions from JMN to published work. See Paul Lauter, ¶(PHUVRQ·V
Revisions of Essays: First Series·American Literature, 33 (1961), 143-58 (pp. 149-50). Richardson too asserts 
the insignificance of the revisions in his Mind on Fire, p. 436. 
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WKHVHFRQFHUQVDQGWKHPHWDSKRULQHYHU\LQVWDQFHGUDZVRQ(PHUVRQ·VSUHRFFXSDWLRQ
with the garden and the orchard. Where, in prior years, the rewriting process seemed to 
OD\EHKLQGWKHRIWUHSHDWHGVHQWLPHQWWKDW¶>D]ll spiritual activity is abridgement, 
VHOHFWLRQ·LQWKHSHULRGLQTXHVWLRQWKLVEHFRPHVDIDFWRIKRUWLFXOWXUH¶6KDOOKHVHHWKDW
all his gardening is a selection, and then a new, and then a newer selection, and not 
DSSO\WKDWOHVVRQWRKLVOLIH"·JMN VII, 62; X, 112). Not only this, but the garden also 
becomes the lens through which Emerson studies the concepts of investment and 
possession, and in this respect the attitude I have been describing, of withholding the 
liberty to be at ease by not giving of oneself as emphatically as might once have been 
advocated, is consistently evident.  
,QWKHHDUO\VXPPHURIKHUHFRUGVWKDW¶>L@QWKHJDUGHQDPRVWLPSRUWDQW
treatment is a good neglect. It must be a capital care that will make tomato or apple or 
pear thrive like a lucky neglect. Put a good fence round it & then let it alone a good deal. 
)HQFHLWZHOO	OHWLWDORQHZHOO·JMN X, 91-2). Put another way, this is learning to 
publish and be damned. The alternative course was one that he well understood, having 
once followed it himself: 
 
,QDQHYLOKRXU,SXOOHGGRZQP\IHQFH	DGGHG:DUUHQ·VSLHFHWRPLQH1R
land is bad, but land is worse. If a man own land, the land owns him. Now let 
him leave home, if he dare. Every tree and graft, every hill of melRQV>«@DOOKH
has done and all he means to do, stand in his way like duns when he so much as 
turns his back on his house. Then the devotion to these vines & trees & 
cornhills I find narrowing and poisonous. I delight in long free walks. These free 
my braiQ	VHUYHP\ERG\>«@,WKLQN,FRPSRVHHDVLO\VR%XWWKHVHVWRRSLQJV
& scrapings & fingerings in a few square yards of garden are dispiriting, 
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drivelling, and I seem to be robbed of all energy, & I have a sort of catalepsy, or 
unwillingness to move, & have grown peevish & poorspirited. (JMN X, 93) 
 
Is this a reflection on gardening, or on the compositional labours involved in revisiting a 
large textual investment that leaves Emerson spent and directionless, craving, as he 
WZLFHVWDWHV¶IUHHGRP"·%HWWHUtherefore, to try to attain that finer, dispossessive 
knowledge indicated throughout PoemsSDUDSKUDVHGLQDMRXUQDOHQWU\RI¶KHRQO\
has apple trees who knows them, & treats them as apple trees. Else the apple trees have 
KLP·JMN X, 350). Or, applying to literature the essentials of orchard-keeping, entertain 
¶WKDWGUHDPRIZULWLQJLQFRPPLWWHH·ZKLFKIRU(PHUVRQLVFRQFHLYHGDVIROORZV¶7KH
Seckle pear is the best in America. But it is small, & the tree is small. So we bud an apple 
tree just aboYHWKHURRWDQGWKHEXGEHFRPHVURRW·7KHJUDIWSURGXFHVVWURQJHUDQG
PRUHH[FHOOHQWIUXLWDQGKHQFHKHDVNV¶>F@DQZHQRWKHOSRXUVHOYHVDVGLVFUHHWO\E\WKH
IRUFHRIWZRLQOLWHUDWXUH"·7KHQRWLRQRI¶GLVFUHHWO\KHOSLQJRXUVHOYHV·QRGVWRWKH
contrivance by which Emerson will go about this, and so he continues in summing up: 
¶%XWLWUHTXLUHVJUHDWJHQHURVLW\	UDUHGHYRWLRQWRWKHDLPLQWKHSDUWLHV	QRWWKDW
PHDQWKLHYLVKZD\RIORRNLQJDWHYHU\WKRXJKWDVSURSHUW\·JMN X, 154-5). Generosity, 
an attLWXGHRI¶UDUHGHYRWLRQ·³these are the terms of gift-giving, but, within these 
private passages, there is no longer any disguising how the gift must be conceived. 
,QGHHGOLQHVZLWKLQWKHDERYHH[FHUSWIRXQGWKHLUZD\LQWR(PHUVRQ·VOHFWXUHRQWKH
greatest benefactor in English literature³Shakespeare³SHUKDSVWKH¶VHFNOHSHDU·SXW
him in mind of the poet whose name is a near homograph of that fruit. 
 If we are to finalise an answer as to how Emerson conceived of his role as 
author with respect to the society and culture to which he belonged, these metaphors of 
cultured neglect, a kind of laissez-faire DSSURDFKWRKLVZRUN·VHIIHFWVPXVWEHWKH
IRXQGDWLRQ,QGHHG¶)DWH·³that much admired essay published in 1860 which is 
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traditionally recognised to represent (PHUVRQ·VODWHWKRXJKWLQLWVIXOOHVWLWHUDWLRQ³
originates in journal passages inscribed amongst the language of horticulture detailed 
DERYHDQGEHWZHHQLWVOLQHVWKHUROHRIWKHSRHWZKRGRHVQRWPHHW(PHUVRQ·VLGHDO
the preparatory rather than revelatory author, is typified according to the preceding 
SULQFLSOHV,Q¶)DWH·(PHUVRQGHPRQVWUDWHVKLVLQWHUHVWLQWKHQDVFHQWVWDWLVWLFDOVFLHQFHV
DQGWKHZRUNRI$GROSKH4XHWHOHWLQDQHZPHDQVRIDQWLFLSDWLQJJHQLXV¶'RXEWOHVVLQ
every million there will EHDQDVWURQRPHUDPDWKHPDWLFLDQDFRPLFSRHWDP\VWLF·CW 
VI, 10). We might therefore ask³what if Emerson himself acknowledges he is not this 
genius, not the representative of his time in this authentic sense? The answer is given in 
the tone and attitude of the essay: whatever is, is³it is not the prerogative of man to 
FKDOOHQJHEXWWRKRQRXUKLVSODFH)DWHLVGHILQHGDV¶>Z@KDWHYHUOLPLWVXV·EXWZHUHPDLQ
free to turn towards and accept that limitation (CW 9,+HQFH¶OHDUQWRVZLPWULP
your EDUN>«@OHDUQWRVNDWH·WKHVHDUH(PHUVRQ·VLPSHUDWLYHVWRDFFHSW
LPSUHVVLRQDELOLW\RU¶GRFLOLW\·DVKHSXWVLWPRUHWKDQRQFHLQWKLVHVVD\WROHDUQWR
ZDWFKDQGWROHUDWH¶WKLVFURSSLQJ-RXWLQRXUSODQWHGJDUGHQVRIWKHFRUHRIWKHZRUOG·
(CW VI, 17, 11). 
 And yet, lest we see this highly methodical acknowledgement that literary 
production can be reduced to mere bit-playing and groundwork as too creditable, too 
humble, we should not forget that Emerson also theorised a state of ease and leisure for 
WKHDXWKRUDVDVXEVLGLDU\FRPSHQVDWRU\IXQFWLRQ,QWKHFORVLQJSDJHVRI¶6KDNVSHDUH
RUWKH3RHW·(PHUVRQ·VSUDLVHRIWKH6KDNHVSHDUHDQPHWKRGDQGLWVVXFFHVVJLYHVZD\WR
DEULHIFRXQWHUVWDWHPHQWLQZKLFKKHH[SODLQVWKDW¶WKLVEDUGDQGEHQHIDFWRU·who 
might have transcended his time and place and came closest to becoming the truly 
representative poet, still held enough back that he failed to become universal. As 
(PHUVRQQRWHVKHHQMR\HGWKHOHLVXUHKLVOLWHUDU\SUDFWLFHDIIRUGHGKLP¶LWPXVWHYHQgo 
LQWRWKHZRUOG·VKLVWRU\WKDWWKHEHVWSRHWOHGDQREVFXUHDQGSURIDQHOLIHXVLQJKLV
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JHQLXVIRUWKHSXEOLFDPXVHPHQW·CW IV, 123-5). In a similar way, Emerson sought 
absolution³LIQRWWKDWKHPLJKWSXUVXH¶SURIDQH·HQGVDWOHDVWWKDWDPHDVXUHRI
freedom remained to him. 
 We might consider this against the attitude of his committed friend, Thoreau. In 
(PHUVRQUHFRUGHGWKDW¶+>HQU\@FRPSODLQHGWKDWZKHQKHFDPHRXWRIWKHJDUGHQ
KHUHPHPEHUHGKLVZRUN·JMN IX, 206). The implication is that Thoreau failed to treat 
the garden as Emerson did; he failed, perhaps, to acknowledge that principle of cultured 
neglect, to constructively forget his works. A few years earlier, a similar principle was 
noted, but this time more exactingly tied to literature¶$WDOOHYHQWV,EHJJHGKLP
[Thoreau], having this maggot of Freedom & Humanity in his brain, to write it out into 
JRRGSRHWU\	VRFOHDUKLPVHOIRILW·JMN VII, 144). The kind of catharsis implied here, 
ZKHQFRQVLGHUHGZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRI(PHUVRQ·s broader project, uses 
abandonment as a subsidiary part of a larger mechanism, which might be described as a 
moderation between the demands of his poetic theory and his capacity to realise it, 
EHWZHHQWKHSROHVRI¶FRQWLQHQFHDQGDEDQGRQPHQW·DVKHZRXOG put it in in 1850 (JMN 
XI, 230). It has often been observed that Emerson was oddly, even discomfortingly, 
worldly and comfortable when compared to some of his more enthusiastic 
contemporaries. This condition might be drawn on to demonstrate his innate 
conservatism, a trait which kept him from involvement with anti-slavery agitation until 
his hand was forced by the fervour surrounding the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850.4 But 
there may be another way to conceive of how and why he ceded his reservations to take 
on a major public role in abolitionism in the 1850s, which is when, I would contend, his 
poetic theorising more or less comes to an end. So long as he registered the demand of 
                                                 
4 Sharon Cameron offers one of the most insightful and compelling of such arguments in relation to 
(PHUVRQ·VLPSHUVRQDOLW\¶WKHKHURLFLPSOLHVDSHUVRQ·V contact with the real. This source and this source 
alone gives it authority, as Dickinson, Whitman, Melville, and, of course, Thoreau knew. Emerson, 
strangely, GRHVQ·W NQRZWKLV·2USHUKDSVKHNQRZVDQGSUHIHUVDQDOWHUQDWLYHPHDQVRIH[RQHUDWLQJ
himself, which the sharp-H\HGUHDGHUVHHVWKURXJKDV&DPHURQGRHVKHUH6HH&DPHURQ¶:D\RI/LIH·
pp. 25-6. Emphasis in original. 
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IXOOFRPPLWPHQWRIWKHQHHGWR¶FDVWP\VHOIXSRQWKH$JH·DVKHZURWHLQor to 
¶WKURZ>KLV@ERG\DWWKHPDUN·DVLWZDVSXWLQWKHQDIXOVRPHVRFLDOHQGHDYRXUZDV
beyond the capacities of his writing as it stood in those years (JMN VII, 300; VIII, 400). 
Resolution was, perhaps, never very far off: in 1841, he knew enough to instruct 
¶+>HQU\@7>KRUHDX@WKDWKLVIUHHGRPLVLQWKHIRUP·JMN VIII, 96). At the time, this 
ZDVVRPHWKLQJWKDW(PHUVRQKLPVHOIKDG\HWWRIXOILO%XWE\WKHGHFDGH·VHQGYLDWKH
machinations and means described in this thesis, a freedom arrived at through literary 
innovation from the demands of full social or political commitment was his, and his 
relation to the world through his texts was at last established on stable principles. His 
acceptance of his own acculturation, his elevation to representative in his own time, to 
EHVSRNHVSHUVRQRU¶VDJH·RIKLVDJHGLUHFWO\DWWHQGVWKLVH[RQHUDWLRQ 
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